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1 Introduction and an Overview 
1.1 Background and motivations for this study 
Being employed as a research-assistant in the joint research project between the Université 
Nationale du Bénin (UNB) and the Wageningen Agricultural University (WAU) in the 
Netherlands (see Daane et al, 1997), the opportunity was offered for gaining some practical 
experience in anthropological research with the Adja ethnic group in the South-West of Benin. 
The network of the researchers' I belonged to, and the ideas and findings shared during this 
period had contributed to my motivation for pursuing research activities. Two important 
learning points were gained, according to me, during my participation in the research about 
'indigenous knowledge systems' of the Adja people. First, the 'sophisticated' and dynamic 
knowledge networks among the Adja fanners were identified but we realized that they were 
poorly inter-linked (cf. Dangbégnon, 1990; Breusers, 1990; Dangbégnon & Brouwers, 1990; 
Hiddink, 1991; Dangbégnon & Brouwers, 1991bc; Brouwers, 1991,1993; Maas, 1991; 
Gnanglè, 1992; Brouwers et al, 1997). Second, there were no political and institutional 
frameworks for legitmiizing, mobilizing and supporting these 'indigenous knowledge systems'. 
The efforts of the researchers were limited to the discussion with individual Adja farmers for 
the identification of their knowledge. These anthropological studies on the 'indigenous 
knowledge systems' of the Adja ethnic group were inspired by the existing literatures on this 
subject (e.g., Brokensha et al, 1980; Chambers, 1983; Richards, 1985; Darré, 1985; Beal et 
al, 1986; Rôling, 1988, Rôling & Engel, 1988; Chambers et al 1985; Warren et al, 1990, new 
edition 1995), which had served as the basis for the conceptual and theoretical orientations. 
The fact that the Adja farmers' knowledge was not exchanged struck us, and the idea 
of doing a study to explore the role of information network (in the research area) emerged as 
a solution (cf. Dangbégnon & Brouwers, 1991a). Later, this initiative was encapsulated in a 
networking activity with a few farmers' organization, Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and professionals in the research and development organizations in Benin for the 
promotion of 'sustainable agriculture'. This process led to the creation of the Réseau de 
Développement d'Agriculture Durable (REDAD) at the beginning of 1992. The support of 
ILEIA (Information Centre for Low-External-Input and Sustainable Agriculture), which was 
already engaged in a networking for Low-External-Input and Sustainable Agriculture (LEISA), 
had strengthened the process. As a main activist in the RED AD movement at that moment, I 
faced some crucial problems. The first was the lack of a clear perspective for the facilitation 
of this movement. Everybody was talking about Agriculture durable ('sustainable agriculture') 
but nobody had a clear answer about the problem, defined as how to go about by mobilizing 
'indigenous knowledge systems' (cf. Dangbégnon, 1994). In the ambience of the 
democratization process in Benin3, there were new social dynamics and a rapid increase of the 
REDAD movement. The second problem was the difficult coordination of the activities in the 
REDAD, which involved different interest groups4. This period coincided with a fascinating 
2 Platforms for resource management 
context in West Francophone Africa, the political shift to 'democratization' and the idea of 
'decentralization' of certain powers to the local communities. All these problems were also 
stimulating and motivating for undertaking a research at regional/national levels to incorporate 
the emergence of new 'policies' and 'institutions' for socioeconomic change and rural 
development. Before my enrolment in research which eventually led to the present book, I was 
motivated and convinced that, doing a research and focusing on local groups or coalitions 
around specific interests would be very useful. The issue was not to focus only on individual 
farmers' knowledge and their fanning strategies, but to create networks, and exchange 
information with various actors to improve the local people's natural resource base for 
agriculture: the importance of natural resource management. 
These previous studies and activities are a source of experience before my enrolment 
to the research project5 which led to the present book. My training at the WAU6 has influenced 
greatly this study about the richness and the diversity of the concepts and perspectives studied: 
'soft- system thinking', 'Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems', 'actor-oriented 
perspective', agricultural education, gender studies, etc. Discussions within the Netherland-
Israel Development Research Programme (NTRP) project and my access to literature on 
comparative studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJ) in Israel (Blum, 1991ab, 
1994; Blum & Isaak, 1990) stimulated reflection and ideas in the process of the research design 
for the present study. A comparative analysis of case studies was adopted (see chapter 3). 
My youth in 
a Beninese 
rural area 
I 
Experiences 
from REDAD 
Previous study 
at the U N B 
Training at 
the W A U 
Support from 
the HUJ 
Empirical 
material from 
theNIRP 
Project 
BACKGROUND 
Figure 1.1: The different background for this study 
Introduction and overview 3 
1.2 The problematic context for this study 
At an early stage of the present study, the African context, especially West Francophone 
Africa, was targeted7. Many studies (e.g., Harrison, 1991) show that environmental 
degradation has increased seriously during the last three decades in Francophone West Africa. 
Problems are aggravated by natural calamities (e.g., droughts, inundation, war, etc.), 
capricious climatic conditions, unappropriated policies (Horowitz and Painter, 1986); poverty, 
and uncertainty about the world economic environment (Oasa et al, 1986). The awareness of 
such 'pathologies', has increased after the droughts of the 1970s and the 1980s, which made 
visible the relation between resource depletion and human hardships and suffering. The 
magnitude of the problem is so great that conventional public means and services are not 
sufficient to prevent further degradations (Breemer et al, 1995). 
Environmental degradation is largely man-made because people have no other choice 
than to use methods that degrade the environment. Factors that govern changing conditions are 
identified as the following: mounting demographic pressure, regression of annual rains 
possibly as a result of deforestation, uncontrolled transhumance with anarchical exploitation 
of space, unadapted systèmes d'exploitation et de gestion des ressources naturelles* and 
endemic drought of Sahelian countries (PNGT, 1995; PAE, 1993). Successful responses to 
such problems can be expected under experiential, flexible and adaptive processes. In Mali for 
example, the degradation of common pastures, severe erosion and soil mining, are ongoing 
features which have led to a shift of the official mandate from Farming System Research to 
natural resource management (Defoer & Hilhorst, 1995:3). 
Beyond the specific experience with RED AD, the problematic context in West 
Francophone Africa was realized through a prise de conscience with respect to the emerging 
severe ecological crises. This issue had emerged and had become an important problem which 
mobilized donors, governments, policy makers, researchers and development professionals. 
The use of the Gestion des Terroirs (a French approach to natural resource management) in 
the wider context of Francophone West Africa, i.e., Mali (see Souleymane et al, 1994); 
Burkina Faso (see Van der Hœk et al, 1993; Bœr & Kessler, 1994); in Niger (see Briel et al, 
1994), and in Benin the Projet de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles (PGRN) was perceived 
as a challenge for natural resource management to resolving problems related to environmental 
degradation. However, much work has to be done in this domain (Toulmin, 1993). 
The MRP project provided the room to focus on 'natural resource management' (for 
the moment, but later 'resource management' and 'adaptive resource management' will be 
used). The assumption was that by improved collective management of natural resources and 
by using indigenous knowledge in a participatory decision making, an improvement in rural 
development intervention can be achieved (pers. com. Prof. A. Blum). 
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1.3 The focus and main purpose of this study 
'Natural resource management' studies attracts many disciplines in the natural sciences (e.g., 
biology, ecology) and the social sciences (e.g., anthropology, sociology, social psychology, 
economics, etc.). From that point of view, a distinction is made between the biophysical, 
economics, and social actor perspectives (Roling, 1994). 
The biophysical perspective uses simulation and other techniques to develop the models 
that can be used for controlling natural resource dynamics or for predicting the consequences 
of the actions of the people who live with the natural resources. 
The economics' perspective differs from the first and focuses on the people's behavior. 
However, they are assumed to have a goal which is based on the maximization of the 'utility 
function' of their action. Therefore, models are developed for this purpose. Still, the complex 
nature of human is being ignored. There are studies which focus on the political theory and 
policy analysis to explore the conditions for the exploitation of natural resources (e.g., 
Ostrom, 1990). A particular aspect of the environment (e.g., property rights and public policy) 
for economic growth (e.g., Bromley, 1991) can also be a subject of studies. 
The social actor perspective considers people as intentional beings. Unlike the 
economists' perspective, different goals depend on specific values and aspirations. These goals 
are sometimes conflicting and require accommodating strategies. In this perspective, many 
studies try to understand the use and the perception of natural resources by people and 
conflicts that emerge from interdependent resource use (e.g., Benda-Beckmann, 1992, 1995; 
Fairhead 1992; Croll and Parkin, 1992; Breemer et al 1995). 
There are also several studies of natural resource management which combine different 
perspectives. This strategy is emerging in response, according to me, to the complex situations 
involved on the issue of natural resource management. The examples are many but one can 
mention Hanna et al (1996) who analyze the issue of 'property rights institutions' for natural 
systems from ecological, economic, cultural and political dimensions; and Perring et al (1995) 
who try to understand the issue of 'biodiversity loss' by integrating ecological and economic 
approach. Gundersun et al, (1995) integrate ecological and social science perspectives to learn 
about ways and strategies for surmounting barriers in other to renew ecosystems and 
institutions through 'adaptive management'. A growing number of studies in the field of 
'natural resource management' has yielded important empirical material for the understanding 
of phenomena and problems involved in this issue. Yet very few studies (e.g., Roling, 1994, 
1997, 1998; Maarleveld et al, 1997) provide 'theories', empirical materials or conditions for 
the facilitation of a systematic process whereby the natural resources can be regenerated as 
well as the amelioration of the conditions of the people who use them. The present study will 
focus on such a similar process. 
Its main purpose is to explore the conditions for negotiated agreement or concerted action in 
critical natural resource use situations or through interactions between various stakeholders. 
In other words, the present study focuses on the 'soft-side' (cf Roling, 1997) of natural 
resource management. 
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To avoid confusion around the key concept 'natural resources' in the statement above, it seems 
essential to distinguish between the 'natural resource system' (example: a lake fishery, a 
forest) and the 'natural resource units' (example: fish for of a lake fishery, a tree for a forest). 
This conceptual problem, which is also raised by Ostrom (1990: 30), needs to be clarified in 
order to make visible what will be considered in the need to be 'managed'. The present study 
focuses primarily on the 'natural resources units' but it gives a particular attention to the 
nature and characteristics (e.g., complexity, organizing principles) of the natural resource 
systems (called later 'ecosystems') for the management of the 'natural resource units'. 
1.4 A constructivist perspective in this book 
Ways and the nature of knowing about reality are discussed to explain the underlying 
epistemology for the present study. The content of this book does not apply to the realist-
positivist way of flunking, which assumes that 'there is a reality 'out there' which exists 
independently of anyone observing it, so that objective knowledge about that reality can be 
acquired as scientific and value-neutral truth. Studying natural resource management issues 
under these assumptions would involve for instance, on the one hand, the discovery of the 
causes and effects in the ecosystems and the design of strategies for an effective control. On 
the other, the behavior of the stakeholders and the impacts of their actions on the ecosystems 
they depend on, can be predicted. Therefore adequate policy measures can be taken, or 
research activities can identify the adequate innovations or technologies which can be 
transferred as the solutions to the problems. 
The constructivist perspective is adopted in this book. A major assumption is that there 
exist multiple realities depending on sense making processes, i.e., the meaning given to it by 
different people like the stakeholders, the researchers, the policy makers, the development 
professionals, the donors, etc. For instance, knowledge about natural resource management 
is socially constructed (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1967) and reconstructed (e.g., 
Kloppenburg, 1991). Research activities, especially in laboratories, needs to be questioned 
with regard to their contextual and/or situational nature (e.g., Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour, 
1987, 1994). 
"The investigator and the object of investigation are assumed to be interactively linked 
so that the "findings" are literally created as the investigation proceeds' (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994: 111). A problem is how the investigator (a researcher) and the object of investigation 
(e.g., resource users, intervention) know what they know? This question is critical for 
positioning the constructivist paradigm used for the present study which aims to generate a 
fresh perspective for natural resource management. Roling (1996: 41) warns about the danger 
of relativism-constructivism9 by arguing that 'it is too easy to think that every construction can 
be deconstructed ... '. The most important underlying epistemology for a relativist is the 
construction of reality from the viewpoint of vested interests and power politics (Roling, 
1996). But, as will be clear in this book, many natural resource management situations are 
problematic in the sense that the resource users, development professionals, policy making are 
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seeking for alternative solutions without knowing what to do. For that reason, I distance 
myself from the relativist stance. Accordingly with Scott & Shore (1979), if a research aims 
to provide a fresh perspective for empowering actions in resolving for instance NRM 
'problems', it is important to comprehend another position: one which begins and ends with 
alternative perspectives. But how does one begin a perspective and what is the justification of 
ways of formulating it? 
Mental mechanisms of the knower (a researcher) are determinant for thinking about 
perspectives. Existing background such as training, normative referential, practical 
experiences, ambitions, etc., are cognitive experience involve in the knower in a personal way. 
Writing chapter 2 of this book is an example. Knowing is effective action, that is operating 
effectively in the domain of existence (Maturala & Varela, 1992). 
Roling & Wagemakers (1998) explain this way of knowing. They refer to the work of 
Maturala & Varela (1992) to argue that the external (social and biophysical) environment does 
not project itself objectively on the nervous system. The brain is an informationally closed 
system that reconstructs an external environment only from environmental 'triggers', memories 
and interaction with itself. 
1.5 The structure of this book and an overview of its content 
The structure of the book consists of three different parts. Each part forms a building block 
which contains one or more chapters. An introductory chapter gives the orientation of this 
book based on a discussion about its nature, the main purpose, and an overview of its different 
parts. 
Part 1 consists of 2 chapters (chapter 2 and 3). Chapter 2 focuses on the problems and 
perspectives use for the study. It presents some ideas and concepts which are used for the 
analysis of the case studies (in part 2) and represents a core of this book. Key concepts in 
normative frameworks for the facilitation of intervention processes, be they Transfer of 
Technology, Farm Management, or Ecologically-Sound Agriculture (see Roling & Jiggins, 
1998), have influenced the development of the perspectives used (in chapter 2). These concepts 
are: practices, learning, facilitation of learning, support institutions, and conducive policies. 
Chapter 3 discusses methodologies for this study. The two chapters in part 1 constitute a 
whole, and the second chapter complements the first one. 
Part 2 consists of six case studies and six chapters. Each case study forms one chapter, has a 
different feature, and leads to a specific conclusion. Four case studies were selected in Benin 
and the two others in Burkina Faso (see §3.4)(see their location in map 1.1). 
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The first case study (chapter 4) focuses on the analysis of the evolution of the Lake Aheme 
fishery problem from the pre-colonial time (before 1894), where a successful indigenous 
organization was operational, to the recent democratization processes in Benin, a period during 
which an impasse emerged with respect to the governance of the lake. The fifth case study 
(chapter 8) of the Forêt Classée de Maro in Burkina Faso follows the same analytical path. 
The analysis is based on the evolution of the forestry problems from indigenous regulations 
to the recent intervention of the Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs based on a 
participatory regeneration of the forest with the villagers. 
The second case study (chapter 5) concerns the management of 'resources' in 
rangeland ecosystems in the particular community of the Chabe ethnic group in the central part 
of Benin. The analysis focuses on the problems (e.g., crops eaten by cows, conflicts, and war) 
which emerge from the relationships between Chabe people and the herders who are sharing 
the same space for cultivation and herding. The sixth case study (chapter 9) on the 
aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale discusses the same problems in Burkina Faso. The 
need to initiate a process of the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale (ZSP) by the 
Programme Nationale de Gestion des Terroirs results from the severe problems of 
transhumance, crop damage, clashing interests and conflicts between herders (cattle keepers) 
and crop-farmers (the native Bobo and the migrant Mossi). The Benin case focuses on two 
different attempts to resolve the problems: the first concerns what the stakeholders {Chabe 
people and herders) themselves do, and the second concerns an innovative intervention by a 
project which uses an approach called 'Appui-Conseil'. In Burkina, the aménagement of a 
(ZSP) is a programme with the objective of realizing a (ZSP) (tree planting and herding zone). 
The analysis of this case focuses on two phenomena: (i) progress in the process towards the 
realization of a ZSP, and (ii) anticipation on some problems which can emerge, for instance, 
the maintenance of watering place, the protection of the trees (which will be planted), etc. 
The third case study (chapter 6) concerns watershed development in two different eco-
zones of Benin: high rainfall (South-West) and savannah (central part). The problems in this 
case concerns the degradation of land (e.g., soil erosion) in the two different eco-zones. The 
problems had specific features depending on the existing farming practices of the stakeholders 
who are riving in the watersheds (Adja people in the high rainfall area and Mahi people in the 
savannah area). Chapter 6 focuses on the analysis of the facilitation of the resolution of 
problems in the two different eco-zones by the intervention of the Projet de Gestion des 
Ressources Naturelles. 
The fourth case study (chapter 7) concerns 'resource-flow management' by a women 
group in Djeffa, South-East of Benin. The problems discussed are about the ways the fertility 
of the soils is improved for horticulture. Chapter 7 focuses on two different contexts for the 
analysis of the problems: before, and during the democratization process in Benin. In taking 
into account the shift in the global political systems (from 'Marxist' to 'Liberal' regime after 
1990 it was possible to analyze two different situations. The first is characterized by the 
control of development organizations by the government. The second coincided with the 
opening of the intervention web which created several opportunities for the women's group. 
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Chapter 7 focuses on the analysis of the dynamic of the women's group and the role of the 
facilitation of collective action for 'resource-flow management by the NGOs, especially the 
RED AD. 
Part 3 consists of two chapters. The first (chapter 10) presents a synthesis and a comparative 
analysis of the case studies in Part 2. Insights are gained about the concepts developed in the 
perspectives that are used to analyze the case studies. The second (chapter 11) discusses the 
conclusions and the recommendations for the present study. 
Table 1.1 presents the overall structure of this book. 
Table 1.1: Structure of the book 
BUILDING BLOCKS CONTENT 
Chapter 01: Introduction and an overview 
PART 1: 
Problems & Perspectives Chapter 02: Problems and Perspectives 
Paradigms & Methodologies Chapter 03: Paradigms and methodologies 
Chapter 04: Breaking impasse: the evolution of platform 
for Lake Aheme's resource management 
PART2: Chapter 05: Overcoming barriers: developing platforms 
Case Studies for rangeland resource management with 
Chabe people in Benin 
Chapter 06: Scaling up watershed development with 
indigenous people in two eco-zones of 
Benin 
Chapter 07: Collective action and Resource-Flow 
Management for improving soil fertility by 
a Women's Group in Djeffa, Benin 
Chapter 08: Regenerating the Maro Forest in Burkina 
Faso: the evolution of platforms for 
resource management 
Chapter 09: Developing platforms for the Gestion of a 
Zone Sylvo-Pastorale in Burkina-Faso 
PART 3: Chapter 10: Synthesis and Comparative Analysis 
Synthesis and Conclusions Chapter 11: Conclusions and recommendations 
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Notes 
1. The network of researchers concerns the dutch and the beninese students who did their research on the Adja 
people's knowledge under the supervision of Jan Brouwers (see Brouwers 1993: 47), lecturer at the Faculté des 
Sciences Agronomiques of the UNB. This network was exchanging experiences with another network (project 
UNIHO-DRA: research project between the University of Hohenheim in Germany and the actual Institut National 
de la Recherche Agricole du Bénin called INRAB) of researchers (see Floquet, 1994) who were doing research 
in the central part of Benin on the Ayizo and the Fon people's knowledge. Many doctorate studies were also done 
in Benin before the present study: Agbo, 1991; Tossou, 1995; Mongbo, 1995; and Vodouhê, 1996. 
2. The main aim of the RED AD was to promote the 'agriculture durable' (sustainable agriculture). The objectives 
of the REDAD were: (a) to create a linkage between farmers' organizations and NGOs, professionals in research 
and development activities, in order to strengthen local capacities in sustainable agriculture practices; (b) to 
exchange information on indigenous knowledge, and experiences related to sustainable agriculture (through joint 
field visits, newsletters, on-farm trial visits etc.); (c) to create a link between farmers' organizations and 
international development organizations/donors, so that they can be further active in the negotiation of their own 
"development" (see chapter 7). 
3. During the democratization process, a political decision was made about the freedom to create any political, 
cultural or socioeconomic 'organizations' or 'associations' (before the government only could do that). This 
situation has favoured the emergence of many initiatives in Benin. Therefore, there was a tremendous increase 
of the number of NGOs and fanners' organizations in the REDAD. 
4. AU the farmers' organizations were motivated to get money for their activities even if there were no constraints 
which needed funding. Individual members of the REDAD (called resource-persons) were motivated to give 
punctual assistance in order to have money. The NGOs were motivated to provide technical assistance and get 
money even if they lacked a clear perspective to organize a collective learning with the farmers' organization (see 
chapter 7, §7.5). 
5. The research project concerns the NIRP (Netherlands-Israel Development Research Programme) in Benin. It is 
entitled: "The knowledge systems to facilitate sustainable agriculture. The West African Case". It is a joint research 
project which involved Prof. Dr. A. Blum (coordinator) of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel; Prof. Dr. 
Ir. N. Rating (principal investigator) and Ir. S. Nederlof (research-fellow) of the Wageningen Agricultural 
University in the Netherlands; Dr. Ir. R.C. Tossou (principal investigator) and Ir. C. Dangbégnon (research-fellow) 
of the Université Nationale du Bénin. 
6.1 did my M.Sc. degree in Management of Agricultural Knowledge Systems (MAKS) at WAU within the NIRP 
project. 
7. The NIRP research project was designed for the West Africa case. 
8. These concepts have a broader meaning than the concepts 'farming system' and natural resource management 
in English. Systèmes d'exploitation et de gestion des ressources naturelles refer to social organizations, technologies 
used, land tenure and economic issues, cropping systems, farming system. 
9. According to Cole (1994: 4-5), 'the approach to the sociology of science dominant today was first called 
"relativism-constructivism" and is now commonly referred to as "social constructivism". 
Part 1: Problems, Perspectives 
& Methodologies 

2 Problems and Perspectives for Adaptive Resource Management 
There are solutions to the major problems of our time; some of them even simple. But they require a 
radical shift in our perceptions, our thinking, our values. And, indeed, we are now at the beginning of 
such a fundamental change of worldview in science and society, a change of paradigms as radical as the 
Copernican Revolution (Capra 1996: 4). 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter1 deals with the problems and perspectives for 'Adaptive Resource Management' 
(ARM). The problems are defined in a framework to capture the multiple dimensions involved: 
they can be identified either at the level of 'ecosystems' or 'stakeholders', and/or both. From 
that point of view, perspectives are elaborated on 'coupled systems thinking' with the 
recognition of social dynamics in resource use situations. The main purpose of this chapter is 
to assemble concepts, 'models' and concrete ideas for inquiry about ARM. The chapter starts, 
first, with the definition of key concepts. Second, resource management problems will be 
defined. This step enables the identification of a path towards the elaboration of perspectives 
(paragraphs §2.4 to §2.8). Finally, the research problem statement, objectives, research 
questions, and the relevance, will be discussed. 
2.2 Ecosystems, stakeholders, and regenerative practices 
Ecosystems: structure description, biodiversity and ecological services 
Ecosystems structure description 
The main concern in this study is the renewable natural (and man-made) systems such as 
fisheries, rangelands, watersheds, forests, wildlife, groundwater resources, farming areas etc. 
These can be aggregated as 'water and soil in conjunction with the plant and animal 
populations they support, often referred to as biomass' (Uphoff, 1986: 20). 
'An ecosystem consists of plants, animals, and microorganisms which live in biological 
communities and which interact with each other and with the physical and chemical 
environment, with adjacent ecosystems, and with the atmosphere. The structure and 
functioning of an ecosystem is sustained by synergistic feedbacks between organisms and the 
environment' (Costenza & Folke, 1996: 13-4). 
Ecosystems refer to the structural and functional interrelationships among living 
organisms and the physical environment within which they exist. Therefore a distinction can 
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be made between fishery ecosystems, rangelands ecosystems, watersheds ecosystems, forests 
ecosystems, etc. Farming is described as an agroecosystem (Conway, 1986, 1994). 
Ecosystems are open-systems which transform inputs into outputs. The structure of 
ecosystems can be defined as energy flow interdependence, both directly and indirectly of each 
species, components, upon the other, at any prescribed time (Hannon, 1973). It enables 
interaction among components, and some functions such as conversion, cycling, and transfer 
to other systems of materials and critical chemicals that affect the renewability of ecosystems. 
Five elements can be distinguished in all ecosystems: inputs, components, interactions, outputs 
and boundaries. Components can be individual organisms in a population, or various 
populations in a biological communities. Their arrangement defines the organizing principles 
(vertical and/or horizontal). Boundaries are not always clearly known, and can be (as this will 
be explained later) purposefully or opportunistically set. Ecosystems are empirical systems that 
must be described to understand the characteristics and the organizing principles. The 
processes whereby inputs are transformed into outputs are triggered by biodiversity and 
ecological services. 
Biodiversity and Ecological services in Ecosystems 
Biodiversity is referred to as genetic, species, and (recently) ecosystem diversity. Accordingly 
with Costanza and Folke (1996), genetic and species diversity provides the units through which 
energy and materials flow, giving the ecosystem its functional properties. For example, soil 
flora (bacteria, actinomycetes, fungi, algae) and fauna (protozoa, nematodes, collemboles, 
beetles, centipedes, millipedes, ants, termites, rodents, moles etc.) play a major role in many 
soils processes and soil plant interactions: soil formation, soil structure creation, biomass 
decomposition to humus, nitrogen fixation, mineralization to free nutrient for plant growth, 
phosphate solubilization and uptake of nutrients by plant roots, etc. (Reijntjes, et at, 1992: 62). 
A previous study reveals, in a region called Adja plateau (Benin), mat a severe degradation 
of lands leads to the cessation of soil life and to champs comateux, where plants can grow only 
if special management is applied (Brouwers, 1993: 74). 
'Ecological services' are the tasks performed by the biotic and abiotic components of 
ecosystems for obtaining natural resources to human needs such as fish, pasture, fodder, crop-
farm, trees, water (in catchment), oxygen (from photosynthesis). Costanza & Folke (1996: 17) 
argue that ecological services include the maintenance of the composition of the atmosphere; 
amelioration of climate, provision of food; maintenance of species and a vast genetic library; 
and also maintenance of the scenery of the landscape, the recreational sites, and aesthetic and 
amenity values. In that view, ecological services are perceived to support human activities or 
affect human well-being. The malfunctioning of ecological services can endanger the 'health' 
of ecosystems. Box 2.1 provides concrete examples of ecological services generated by 
ecosystems, and which enable the production of 'natural resources'. 
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Box 2.1: Example of ecological services which enable the production of natural resources 
Provision services: capturing C02 for photosynthesis; fixation of solar energy; fixation of nitrogen by growing 
plants; pollination of plants through natural processes; recapturing leached nutrients by deep rooting trees and 
grasses; recharge of water catchments and groundwater for several uses; securing favorable water and soil 
conditions (ecological niche); etc. 
Production services: Assimilation, storage and recycling of waste; formation of topsoil and maintenance of soil 
fertility; biomass production (e.g., food-crops, fish, meat, pasture, woodlot); etc. 
Regulation services: regulation of chemica} compositions in inland fisheries depending on seasons; regulation of 
floods and runoff through hydrological cycle processes; prevention of soil erosion (natural vegetation cover); etc. 
(Adapted from Costanza & Folke, 1996: 18). 
Stakeholders and resource management 
Stakeholders, be they farmers, herders, fishers, agroforesters, horticulturalists, irrigators, etc., 
are those who are directly concerned by the use of 'resources' generated or available through 
ecosystems. They are engaged in various activities by interfering with, and exploiting 
'resources' in ecosystems for their subsistence. Stakeholders include all those who affect 
and/or are affected by the policies, decisions, critical events (collective impact of 'resources' 
depletion) with respect to the ecosystem under siege. Stakeholders can be identified on the 
basis of their interests on the ecosystem under siege, the practices they use and the type of 
'rights', responsibilities and duties they have. 
Stakeholders appropriate 'natural resources' for their livelihood. To avoid confusion, 
it is essential to clarify some concepts: 'natural resources', 'resources' and 'resource use'. 
In this study, the concept 'natural resource' means all kinds of goods which 
stakeholders appropriate from ecosystems for their livelihood. These goods are not joint-use, 
but are subtractable, i.e., their appropriation by a stakeholder creates a diminution for the 
others (cf. Oakerson, 1992; Knudsen, 1995). In concrete term, fish stock harvested by one, 
is not there for someone else, the same thing for pastures consumed by one herder's flock. I 
consider these natural resources as common goods. 
There are other types of 'natural resources' characterized by joint-use, which means 
one's consumption does not create the diminution for the others (e.g., air, oxygen, forest 
beauty). Infrastructures such as irrigation canalization, firebreaks, linked to ecosystems are 
also characterized by joint-use. They help exploit common goods (e.g., irrigation water) or 
maintain ecosystems in a better condition (firebreak). The consumption of joint-use natural 
resources and infrastructures poses the problem of exclusion, as Baden (1977: 138) puts it: 
'people cannot be excluded from its consumption; in other words, property rights cannot 
readily be established ...'. I consider the goods characterized by joint-use as public goods 
(this concept will be later used also for 'institutions' and 'organizations'). The concept 'goods' 
is an economic term (cf. Samuelson, 1954 quoted by Bruin, 1991: 114-6). In this study, it is 
used strategically, which means that the common goods can increase and decrease and the 
quality of both the public goods can change through spatio-temporal scales. 'Resources' 
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concern common goods and public goods. Resource use means the appropriation of goods 
from ecosystems (example of fish stock). 
Regenerative practices on ecosystems 
I Regenerative practices are applied ecological principles and all kinds of measures and actions 
that work to restore the productivity, functioning, resilience and the continuity of ecosystems. 
Measures and actions can be based on socioeconomic, political and cultural principles which 
j will be explained below. 
i 
Ecological principles for regenerative practices 
Inspirations from LEISA (Low-External-Input and Sustainable Agriculture) principles 
(Reijntjes et al, 1992) let me argue that ecological principles for regenerative practices can be 
grouped as follows: 
• Securing and creating favorable conditions for ecological services to happen (e.g., 
habitat protection, soil conservation, mangrove protection, tree planting). 
• Optimizing biodiversity for ecosystems' functioning and continuity (avoiding 
biodiversity loss, protecting keystone species for instance the role of bees in natural 
pollination, mamtaining natural vegetation cover for water recharge, run-off regulation, 
soil erosion prevention, closing cycles, increasing biomass, etc.). 
• Minimizing effects that endanger the effectiveness of ecological services (e.g., overuse 
of natural resources such as common goods, pollution, negative agricultural practices). 
• Designing alternative ecological practices to respond to critical changing patterns of 
ecosystems (e.g., organic matter production, afforestation, water retention, increase 
water level, etc.). 
Socioeconomic, political and cultural principles of regenerative practices 
Inspirations from the works Pretty (1995), Hanna et al (1996), Benda-Beckmann (1995), and 
Wiber & Kearney (1996) stimulate me to argue that these can be grouped as the follows: 
• Mobilizing - in face of imperfect knowledge - information from stakeholders to monitor 
the changing patterns of ecosystems. 
• Rationing the use of natural resources, especially the common goods (e.g., stinting, 
quota). 
• Restoring a taxation system for the maintenance of ecosystem (e.g., group membership 
cost, exploitation taxes). 
• Involving local organizations in decision making processes about ecosystems. 
• Defining institutions and policies that ensure a good governability of ecosystems (e.g., 
law, regulation, property rights institutions, monitoring systems). 
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2.3 Framing the problems of resources management 
Emerging issues such as ecological, economic and social valuation of natural resources, in 
ecosystems, call for, in the one hand, the maintenance of biodiversity and ecological services 
for the functioning of ecosystems; and the other, the allocation (or exploitation), in many 
situations, of scarce natural resources between competing wants. But not all natural resources 
have the same values. The direct value results from the satisfaction of stakeholders 'needs', 
and the indirect one can be perceived from ecological services and the role of biodiversity for 
ecosystems functioning. The loss of biodiversity or the perturbation of ecological services may 
generate environmental feedback (at the level of ecosystems) and collective negative 
consequences for stakeholders. Natural resources' valuation can be biased by anthropocentric 
values, which means the emphasis on stakeholders' needs in particular and economic growth 
in general, while the ecological dimensions, the need to maintain ecosystems in good health, 
are forgotten. From that point of view, the problem of resource management can be framed 
as having three dimensions: (i) the use of scarce natural resources; (ii) degradation of 
ecosystems and critical events; and (hi) the maintenance of ecosystems in good health. 
The problem of natural resources' scarcity and stakeholders' behaviour 
Assuming 'scarcity' of natural resources - only of common goods because of their subtractive 
characteristics - emerges from the evidence that not all situations of their use are problematic. 
Problems occur 'where joint use of ecosystems and subtractive benefits are coupled with 
scarcity, and where in consequence joint users start to interfere with each other's use (cf. 
Wade, 1988: 184). The situations where scarcity is not so, will be discussed later as 
organization and coordination problems. From the use of scarce natural resources, 
stakeholders will face the problem of resource flow allocation in a competitive arena (Ostrom, 
1990). Hardin (1968) predicts the 'Tragedy of the Commons' in such situations, if 
stakeholders have complete freedom, and there is no control over the access to the ecosystems 
which hold scarce common goods. 
Also, game theory is mostly used to study problems of collective action in competitive 
arenas reflecting the situation of the use of scarce natural resources by stakeholders. Game 
iheary is based on the assumption that (i) individual action is instrumentally rational, (ii) there 
is a ^ common knowledge of rationality, and (iii) action is done within a rule (Heap and 
Varoufakis, 1995). The game can be defined as a situation in which the actions of one person 
perceptibly affect the welfare of another and vice versa. There are two main categories of 
games: cooperative and non-cooperative. Communication among stakeholders is forbidden or 
impossible while they are free to make a choice, either non-cooperative (egoistic) or 
cooperative. For each player, the defective choice is optimal compared with the cooperative 
one. Within the metaphor of the 'game', the critical problem of the use of scarce natural 
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resources can be defined as mamtaining the cooperative choice for joint payoffs among 
stakeholders, in face of privately highest payoffs. This situation reflects the logic of social 
dilemmas (Dawes, 1980), specifically common goods dilemmas. The challenge for resource 
management may be the extent to which the problem of common goods dilemmas is overcome, 
which means that stakeholders agree to'take less' through collective choice. 
Classic responses to this problem focus on the privatization and control over natural 
resource use. These perspectives are based on the assumption of narrow economic interests 
as driving behaviour and the incapacity of stakeholders to cooperate and engage in social 
learning (Herring, 1990: 88). But, it is also known through empirical evidence that 
stakeholders can generate rules and regulation and cooperate for successful collective action 
(e.g., McCay & Acheson, 1987; Wade, 1988; Warren, 1991; Mckean, 1992). Yet, a 
systematic process which generates a perspective on solution through communication is only 
now emerging (e.g., Roling, 1994, 1995). Within communicative approach (among others), 
overcoming common goods dilemmas would mean that stakeholders realize the collective 
negative effect of individual actions, agree to cooperate and ration the use of conmongoods 
(take less). 
It is important to argue that common goods dilemmas are not the only problem 
associated with the use of scarce natural resources. There is also the 'assurance problem' 
which means that stakeholders in face of the scarcity of resource flow allocation, can change 
their behaviour and adopt individual actions instead of following the agreement made for 
collective choice because they do not have the complete assurance that the others are 
respecting the rules and regulations (Sen, 1967). Assurance may also be obtained through 
reliance on formal police, formal surveillance and the effectiveness of punishment structure 
(cf. Ostrom, 1992). It is argued that this strategy can also be costly. But, the magnitude of the 
assurance problem can only be established empirically because it is also known that corruption 
is a social phenomenon which weakens formal attempts to establish social order, mutual trust 
and reciprocity among stakeholders. 
The problem of ecosystems degradation and/or critical social events 
Ecosystems degradation and/or critical social events surrounding resource use, the concern of 
this study are environmental problems which have technical, technological and social 
dimensions. Sloep (1994) starts the definition of an environmental problem as any change of 
state at the level of ecosystems. It can be argued that, first, this change of state can result from 
the degradation of the structure of the ecosystems, and this endangers ecological services and 
the functioning of biodiversity. For example, habitat degradation, 'keystone' species loss, 
common goods depletion, disappearance of natural vegetation cover and exposure to soil 
erosion are some examples of factual causes of negative changes of the state of ecosystems 
(Groot, 1992). Second, it can result, in the one hand, from abiotic factors such as agricultural 
practices and water pollution through eutrophication with soluble nitrate and phosphate 
particles (Mannion, 1995), air pollution, negative effects of drastic climatic change on 
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ecosystems (droughts, desertification); and in the other, from biotic factors which can the 
emergence of new ecological order such as water hyacinth and its negative consequences on 
water resources, the modification of trophic chains for living being in ecosystems etc. An 
environmental problem is also any critical event such as an evolving difficult state of affairs, 
debate and paradox with respect to resource use in societies, especially among stakeholders. 
These concerns, also refer to the impacts of current individual practices on ecosystems as well 
as collective negative societal impact. Concrete examples of such problems are: high pressure 
of stakeholders in ecosystems to change existing practices, opportunities and norms; 
transhiimance, animal roaming and crop damage (or crop eaten) by cattle; conflict and war 
over resource use; impasses, with respect to concerted action for resource use, etc. 
Environmental problems described above can be effectively considered as problems to 
be dealt with, only if they are widely shared. Their perception depends on existing frame of 
reference, belief systems and norms of stakeholders (Breemer et al, 1995: 103-4), and of those 
who intervene or have the task to do 'something'. Soil erosion might not be perceived as a 
problem by stakeholders even where technical surveys have made it plausible. The problem 
needs to be socially constructed depending on existing (micro and macro) economic 
opportunities, strategic reasoning and the conception of ecosystems assets by the stakeholders. 
In empirical situation, it seems relevant to adopt an interpretative approach to the problem 
perception by various stakeholders and other actors (researchers, development workers, policy 
makers) in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), development federations and associations 
and Government Organizations (GO). 
The problem of provisions for the maintenance of ecosystems and coordinated action 
In the present study provisions/are contributions in terms of money, labor, know-how, 
innovations, responsibility assignment and credible commitment. Provisions also call for 
solidarity which is the willingness to sacrifice 'resources' (mechanic solidarity) or immediate 
gratifii»tion for the welfare of others (organic solidarity), out of the feeling of unity (Galjart, 
1976) PTOTisionsare directed to improvements, infrastructures and coordinated actions for 
maintaining ecosystems in good health as well as the well-being of stakeholders. Improvements 
are all kinds of efforts that contribute to enhancing, strengthening or 'creating' ecological 
services which regenerate natural resources and or maintain the functions of ecosystems. 
Concrete examples of such type of improvements are: the production of organic matter, 
afforestation, or the reconstitution of mangrove for restoring fish ponds. 
Infrastructures are different kinds of constructions which are parts of ecosystems, and 
help maintain them in a good health or prevent them from being destroyed by environmental 
factors. Examples of such kinds of infrastructures are firebreak for forest protection, gullies 
for erosion control, etc. There are other types of infrastructures which enable the exploitation 
of natural resources (example of canalization infrastructure for irrigation). The creation of 
infrastructures for ecosystems involve different phases: design, finance, construction and 
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maintenance (Ostrom et al, 1993). They can be seen as a response to environmental problem 
(e.g., construction of corridor space to avoid crop damage by cattle) described above. 
A long-term perspective (repair, rehabilitation) and the governability of coordinated 
actions are required for maintenance. Provisions, in this context, are defined in terms of 
responsibility assignment, credible commitment and mutual monitoring for sustaining 
'organizations' and 'institutions' (concepts that will be defined later), be they local, external 
or mix that govern resource use or coordinate and monitor investments and provision needed 
for the improvement and the maintenance of infrastructures. In that view, the situations where 
scarcity does not apply to the use of common goods, governing 'organizations' and 
'institutions' will be needed or maintained (when they exist already) for anticipating on 
scarcity in the future since common goods are subtractive. 
The kind of provisions discussed raise the difficulty of excluding potential stakeholders 
from the benefit of ecosystem health (which results from these provisions). Improvements, 
infrastructures and 'organizations' for coordinated actions define public goods situations which 
offer free-riding incentives, the opportunity to benefit without making any contribution. For 
example, investments in the reconstitution of a mangrove for the improvement of the 
productivity of a lake fishery will benefit all the fishing community including those who did 
not contribute. The motivation to free-ride, or to contribute too little, as could be expected, 
can increase since one can enjoy one's share of the benefits without contributing to them 
(Olson, 1978). Such situations are described in terms of public goods dilemmas: the choice 
between 'give some' or free-ride (Dawes, 1980). 
The challenge for resource management seems to be the extent to which the problems 
of public goods dilemmas are overcome, which means that stakeholders agree to give more for 
the provisions. But, the metaphor 'give more' can work only if voluntary collective action of 
stakeholders is effective. The resource management problem becomes: how to maintain the 
facilitation of voluntary collective action for the provision of public goods. 
The assurance problem identified above appears also at this level. In face of the absence 
of incentives for the provision of public goods, stakeholders can change their behaviour and 
choose to contribute less instead of maintaining voluntary collective action because they do not 
have the complete assurance that the others give more. Assurance may also be obtained 
through reliance on control of contributions, through formal taxation, membership costs. 
Again, effective measures can only be identified empirically depending on situation and the 
nature of the public goods which need to be provided. 
Synthesis: the nature of the problems and the puzzles for resource management 
Framing the problems, discussed above, presents an analytical opportunity. But, in real 
situations, they seem to be intertwined. For example, scarce fishery resource use can reveal 
the problem of common goods dilemmas, while of the same time, mangrove destruction of this 
fishery is a kind of ecosystem degradation problem, although attempts to re-establish this 
Problems and perspectives 21 
mangrove may need investments, the mobilization of stakeholders for maintenance. Then, 
public goods dilemmas situation can be identified. 
The problems of natural resource scarcity and provisions can be solved if common 
good dilemmas and public good dilemmas are overcome, which means that stakeholders agree, 
respectively, on take less and give more games. Ecosystems degradation and/or critical social 
events about resource use can be perceived differently by stakeholders and interventionists, 
and then these problems can be solved if there is a shared understanding for collective 
responses. It seems that solutions to the different problems can be possible only if successful 
collective action is effective, although individual actions must be consistent with collective 
action, otherwise it can only provide partial responses by the organizations which intend to 
intervene. Organizations, - be they local, governmental or non-governmental - are those which 
mobilize resources (money, staff, facilities), perceive objectives and policies (e.g., existing 
government plans), deliver strategies, and use norms of societies to legitimate a process of 
change. Organizations also provide structure to human interaction. But they include political, 
economic, social, educational and cultural bodies (North, 1994: 5). For example, they involve 
political parties, regulatory agency, cooperatives, interests coalitions, training centers, etc.. 
Organizations are groups of individuals with a common purpose to achieve objectives. A 
distinction is also made between local organizations which are created by stakeholders 
themselves, and organization created by government (example: extension organization) or 
^ outside the local setting. 
*~ \ J Hence, a main constraint remains: who/what triggers or maintains collective action 
among stakeholders? The first puzzle of resource management can be defined in terms of the 
extent to which the 'facilitation' of successful collective action can be effective. 
Previous discussions are centered either at the level of stakeholders or ecosystems. The 
problems of resource use have multiple dimensions: technical (ecosystems degradation), 
strategic (common good, - and public good dilemmas) and organizational (critical social 
events). Therefore, multiple perspectives (cf Linstone, 1989: 5) seem relevant to provide 
responses to the resource management problems either spatially or temporally at the level of 
ecosystems, or among stakeholders. But, at which level(s) of the aggregation of stakeholders 
and levels of the ecosystem, are these responses effective? This question seems to raise a 
second puzzle for resource management: collective action needs to satisfy a kind of structural 
arrangement to enable effective resource management (the notion of 'platform' will be used 
later). 
In face of such puzzles that unravel two different assets, the social asset (stakeholders) 
and the natural asset (ecosystem), 'coupled systems minking' may provide ideas and insights 
for better perspectives with respect to resource management. 
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2.4 Conceptualizing coupled systems for resource management 
Systems thinkingis, amongjyarious scientificj^rspectives, anattempt to tackle the complexity 
of real-world through a form of thinking based on wholes and their properties (Checkland, 
1981: 74). Complexity seems to be one of the motives for applying a systems perspective. 
According to Weinberg (1975: 3): 'Science and technology have colonized the planet, and nothing in our 
lives is untouched. In this changing, they have revealed a complexity with which they are not prepared to deal. 
The general system movement has taken up the task of helping scientists to unravel complexity, technologists to 
master it, and others to learn to live with it'. 
Systems thinking is a way to look at the 'reality', to organize knowledge, to orient data 
collection and direct intervention in complex phenomena and social arenas (Checkland, 1981; 
Fresco, 1986; Engel, 1997). This section presents an attempt to apply systems thinking, 
especially 'coupled systems' to the study of resource management problems. Systems thinking 
is widely discussed by Checkland (1981, 1990), Wilson & Morren (1990), Bawden (1995) and 
Engel (1997). A distinction is made between 'hard' systems thinking and 'soft' systems 
thinking. The former is amenable to the discussion of Ecosystems and the latter of Human 
systems (stakeholders and other actors) with respect to resource management. These 
discussions will enable a 'theoretical' conceptualization of coupled systems. 
Applying 'hard' systems thinking to resource management 
Engel (1997: 25) describes the 'hard' system tradition as taking the world to be systemic. 
'Hard' system thinkers take their systemic images to be models, simplified representations of 
real world wholes. 'Hard' system thinkers think of their systems as performing a function that 
can be described as tramforming inputs into outputs. Modelling and simulation are important 
tools in Hard systems thinking (Fresco, 1986). But, according to the description above (see 
§2.2), unlike most mechanical systems [hard engineering systems], ecosystems are complex, 
boundaries cannot be simply delineated and components cannot be easily designated for 
ecosystems (O'Neill et al, 1986: 41). Ecosystems are 'natural' or 'designed' systems. They 
can be viewed across a wide range of spatio-temporal scales. They present difficulties 
concerning the behaviour and the structural organization of their components. Nevertheless, 
one can try to model and even simulate them because 'hard' systems can be assumed to really 
exist. 
A recent study by ecologists (e.g., Grant et al, 1997) reveals that 'problems related to 
systems with relatively many, closely interrelated components [such as ecosystems] ... cannot 
be solved mathematically because an analytical solution to the set of equations describing the 
system, does not exist. On the other hand, dynamics of these systems cannot be represented 
statistically as average tendencies because interrelatedness of the components, or system 
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structure, causes non-random behaviour'. To overcome such difficulties, ecologists use the 
hierarchy concept to try to understand, first, the nature of complexity in ecosystems (cf. Allen 
& Starr, 1982). They distinguish a continuum of three types of complexity. First, organized 
simplicity, when the number of components is few with a high interrelatedness. Second, 
unorganized complexity, when the number of components is many with lower interrelatedness. 
Third, between the previous, organized complexity for which ecologists mostly rely on for 
modelling, simulation and systems analysis (see Grant et al, 1997). 
Other complex system conceptualization exists. For example, Capra (1996: 35) rejects 
the hierarchy concept and argues that: 'living systems at all levels are networks ... There are 
only networks nesting within other networks'. However, what I need for the present study is 
an operational conceptualization of ecosystems to start with the analysis of resource 
management situations. For that reason, inspirations are gained from the way the concept 
'holon' is used to explain hierarchical system organization (cf. O'Neill et al, 1986). 
The concept of the 'holon' which deals with the whole/part dualistic way of thinking 
seems useful to be applied for classifying different types of Ecosystems. According to Koestler 
(1969), all systems [ecosystems] consist of sub-assemblies which have a certain autonomy. 
They are self-assertive, i.e., they manifest wholeness. But at the same time, they are parts of 
larger wholes, and manifest integration. 
Beyond ecologists' conceptualizations, whose assets are the living organisms and their 
relation with their chemical and physical environment (see §2.2), one should consider the 
human dimension, especially, for the problem of ecosystem boundaries. In many 
circumstances, the concept of 'territoriality' is used to set up boundaries defined by 
stakeholders who use natural resources. Territoriality is the attempt by an individual or group 
to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships by delimitating and 
asserting control over a geographic area' (Sack, 1986: 19). 
In the present study, the holon is the level (or the levels), for a given ecosystem, at 
which, regenerative practices, resource management problems-solving such as measures for 
rationing resource use, response to environmental problems, and improvements can be 
effective ^functioning of biodiversity and ecological services). For example, measures 
concerning the use of a fishery resources can only be effective at the level of the whole fishery 
resource system (e.g., lake). But a soil erosion problem can be improved at a part of the 
degraded land in the watershed. Cutting some trees at a part of a forest does not mean that the 
forest as an ecosystem has disappeared. 
Based on the concepts of the holon and human territoriality (territory used later has the 
same meaning), four types of ecosystems can be distinguished (see fig. 2.1) for the purpose 
of resource management. Here the intention is not to verify this classification. However, it can 
be understood as one way to start analysing complex ecological systems. The types are 
characterized as the following: 
• Type I: the whole ecosystem is an holon for resource management. Examples of 
ecosystems are: fisheries, wildlife park, ground water resource, water catchment. 
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• Type II: the whole ecosystem involves many holons which can be set up purposefully 
or opportunistically for resource management. Example of ecosystems are: watersheds, 
forests, common lands. 
• Type HI: the whole ecosystem has no clear boundary. The holon which is considered 
for resource management is a meaningful territoriality. The typical example of 
ecosystem is a rangeland system. 
• Type IV: this type is considered to anticipate on the possibility of complex 
interconnected ecosystems. An example can be: a complex larger ecosystem involving 
watersheds ecosystem, and rangeland areas ecosystems. 
Applying 'soft' system thinking to resource management 
In soft systems thinking, the real-world is assumed to be problematic. Unlike the hard systems 
tradition, assuming 'systemicity' is shifted from: taking the world to be systemic to taking the 
process of inquiry or intervention to be systemic (Checkland, 1994: 80). In the 'soft' system 
tradition, the worlds do not constitute separate domains, like geographical territories with 
clearly marked boundaries, but rather forms under which we organize our attempts to reach 
a common appreciation of problematic situations. 
Soft systems flunking works with ill-structured problems which do not provide a clear 
ground for assuming 'goals'. The goals seem to evolve as an 'emergent property' of the soft 
system since the cognitive abilities of humans enable them to have perceptions, change 
behaviour through interaction, construct understandings and explanations whether of a 
spiritual, mythical, empirical or scientific manner to guide action and to monitor the 
consequences of that action (Rôling, 1988: 183). Soft systems are 'human activity systems' 
which are composed of intentional and sense making humans. Their goals are a bone of 
contention and the outcome of negotiation towards shared agreement and understanding. 
The processes of change fit, to some extent, in Habermas' theory of communicative 
action which posits that humans have instrumental, strategic and communicative rationality 
(Habermas, 1990; Brand, 1990). From that point of view, shared goals emerge from processes 
by which humans move from strategic behaviour, aiming at advantage or winning, to a more 
communicative behaviour. Also, one can be aware that an ill-structured problem which reflects 
soft system thinking can move to hard system thinking in the sense of Havelock (1986) 
"problem solving model" when this problem becomes well-structured, and the "would be 
problem owners' well-defined goals setting and goal seeking behaviour predominate. 
In many circumstances, resource management deals with multiple actors and 
stakeholders with conflicting interests in the sense of the 'actor-oriented perspective' (Long 
& Long, 1992; Long & Ploeg, 1989; Long, 1989). From the 'actor-oriented perspective, 
individual stakeholders have the capacity to process social life, they are knowledgeable and 
capable in resource use situations. Hence, interventions and resource management enter 
existing life-worlds2, power structures and interfaces3. Making a difference, with respect to 
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Figure 2.1: Examples of types of ecosystems 
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resource management, in a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events will lead to arenas 
of struggle and power-play (Long & Villareal, 1994). According to me, in the soft-system 
tradition, the existence of such arenas (see also, Crehan & Von Oppen, 1988; Elwert & 
Bierschenk, 1988) are recognized. Rather, they stimulate reflection, offer the opportunity to 
identify potential interest groups, i.e., coahtions of stakeholders which would be relevant for 
debating resource management problems. Applying a soft system perspective means that the 
problems of resource management become the extent to which stakeholders perceive their 
interdependence, that they form a system towards shared agreement (e.g., to take less or give 
more) or, reach shared understanding on environmental problems (e.g., soil erosion, pollution, 
transhumance phenomena). 
Soft systems thinking is criticized (cf. Jackson, 1985) for its strong reliance on an 
interpretative approach and processes of change based on ideas and communicative 
competence. All these aspects tend to ignore the political and economic factors linked to the 
people's 'worldview'. But, empirical evidence shows that the éleveurs du Ternois in France 
develop a common problem situation through dialogue (Darré, 1985). In the present study, 
emphasis is given to the empirical forces that constitute the grounds for shared agreements or 
understanding with respect to resource management problems. Critical systems perspectives (as 
emphasized by Jackson, 1985) are concerned with these harmonizing processes by giving a 
particular attention to the role of incentives, organizations, institutions, organizations and the 
political context in resource management (see §2.7). 
As discussed in §2.3, resource management problems can be solved only if collective 
action is effective. To emphasis the necessity of collective action, it is also argued that 
individual actions provide partial protection to natural resources (Pretty, 1995: 131-2). Despite 
the importance of having collective action for resource management, ecosystems present 
hierarchical properties (discussed above) which raise the question of the level at which natural 
resources can be managed effectively (the second puzzle of resource management). As a 
response to this problem, soft systems thinking is used to formulate the concept of 'platform' 
for natural resource management (Rôling, 1994, 1995; Rôling & Jiggins, 1998).j?latibrmsjre 
based on soft systems thinking and emphasize the need to create 'collective agency' at a level 
of 'social aggregation' commensurate with the ecosystems level at which present sustainabjlity^ 
^problems are deemed manageable. The idea that a natural resource, at the levels of systems 
perceived as 'hard' (such as ecosystems) requires a platform to manage it sustainably leads to 
'coupled systems thinking' (Rôling, 1997). For the moment, the definition of platform concept 
seems to be abstract ('collective agency'? 'social aggregation'?) because it depends strongly 
on 'coupled systems thinking'. This will be discussed before the concept platform will be 
further elaborated in §2.5. 
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Coupled systems thinking for resource management 
TJieJUse^rifU^upled-^y-Stems, in this study, is seen as an attempt to integrate hard, and soft 
systems thinking to organize a process of inciuiryj^d^analyse me ways mteryentions^anbe 
directed for solving resource management problemsJn thecomplex natural, and socidjvojlds. 
Patterns of 'traditional' West African thought, especially the invocation of Nature, reflect 
coupled systems between the Earth and Communities. Sometimes this takes the form of an 
alliance where 'the idea of Earth-spirit, considered as a principal spiritual guardian of the 
community, links with the assiduous cult of this spirit as the basis of the continued flourishing 
of the Community' (see Horton, 1993: 356). 
Coupled systems are contained in the conceptualization by Maturana & Varela (1992) 
of 'structural coupling' between 'living beings' and their environment. 'Living beings' are 
reproduced by autopoietic s y s t e m s T w h i c h are self-organized systems. There are dynamic 
interactions, structural congruence (or incongruence) and perturbations between the 'living 
beings' and the environment. The environments trigger change, but it is the structure of the 
'living beings' that determines what changes occur in it. The idea of Maturana & Varela 
(1992) reflects coupled systems but it does not give a clear guidance for resource management 
because the 'living beings' concept covers 'organism' in hard systems (defined above) and 
'humans' in soft-systems. This may present analytical problems. To make the discussion on 
coupled systems understandable, different types of ecosystems (hard systems) and platforms 
(soft systems) can be seen, respectively, as natural and social agents (Mougenot & Mormont, 
1997). The emergent structural properties for problem-solving at the level of the natural agents 
(e.g., the holon defined above) imposes (niinimal) structural forms for the social agents 
(perceived platforms), if effectiveness of resource management is to be expected. 
Then, coupled systems look at the purposeful resource management problem-solving 
J^eslbetween the two types of agents that can be taken as systemic. Also, emergent properties 
that can create 'ties' can be noticed through the key concept 'valuation'. For example, the 
french expression patrimoine national (national patrimony) has the meaning of a valuation of 
the natural agent as a patrimony, and a nation relies on it. Economic valuation has the meaning 
that the natural agent can be the basis of subsistence and prosperity for the social agent. 
Ecological valuation can create voices from the social agent to change the statu quo (e.g., 
=) jightejonature.^ conservation policies). 
The voice of the natural agent can be heard from ecological feedbacks, the impossibility 
to satisfy in totality the needs of the social agent. This changing pattern impinges the re-
consideration of the ties through new emergent properties such as new qualification and 
designation of the natural agent, social recognition, scientific valuation, constitutional choices 
and institutional changes, emergence of interests groups, organizations and networks (Lafaye 
& Tbivenot, 1993; Mougenot & Mormont, 1997). These arguments show that the power of 
change at the level of the social agent seems to be rooted at the level of the natural agent. The 
raison-d'etre of platform is the nature, especially, of ecosystems which hold 'resources' that 
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are perceived in the need to be managed sustainably. Platforms can be developed if the coupled 
systems notion is applied. 
2.5 On coupled systems: developing platforms for resource management 
Platforms as levels of 'collective agency' 
Based on the coupled systems notion, effective platforms of stakeholders can be defined as the 
level of collective agency on holons in ecosystems. Collective agency, in this case, means the 
capacity of stakeholders to generate organizations capable of developing regenerative practices. 
Different effective platforms of stakeholders can be conceptualized depending on the type of 
the ecosystems (see fig. 2.2). 
For the ecosystems Type I, problems can be solved only at the level of the whole 
ecosystem which is itself an holon. Only one effective platform of stakeholders is needed (fig. 
2.2A). The second Type is different to the previous: stakeholders must agree (or set up) 
boundaries which is a human territoriality where an effective platform can emerge (fig.2.2B). 
The third Type reflects that many effective platforms of stakeholders can be operational. 
Solving the problem at the level of the whole ecosystem means that those platforms need to 
be integrated in another platform at a higher level (the highest, is the level of the 
ecosystem)(fig. 2.2C). At least, the fourth Type is more complex because it presents the 
possible situation that the previous types of ecosystems may overlap in a larger ecosystem. 
Fig.2.2D presents only one alternative. These discussions of platforms tell us that stakeholders 
must come together (through representations) at certain levels of an ecosystem (the holon) to 
enable the use of regenerative practices. 
But two important points need to be raised. The multiple dimensions of the problems 
(see §2.3) call for other actors, the institutions and organizations beyond the platforms of 
stakeholders. It is also known from perspectives on political economy of rural Africa (e.g., 
Bates, 1983) and especially West Africa (e.g., Hart, 1982), that stakeholders are encapsulated 
in a wider socioeconomic and political administrative context, or the logic of a government 
'ideology' (e.g., Godin, 1986). Zooming in at local, regional, meso, or macro levels of 
resource management reflects different levels of social aggregation. It is evident now that 
platforms cannot be conceived only at the level of stakeholders, it seems that the links with the 
higher levels of social aggregation remains important to focus on. The processes by which 
platforms of stakeholders expand to higher levels seem to be very complex depending on the 
nature of the resource management problems. For instance, redefining and enforcing property-
rights for regulating the access to an overused fishery resources might not be easy with 
stakeholders, and require external intervention based on government political choice. The 
expansion of platforms of stakeholders can occur through scaling up processes, networks and 
probably other processes which can only be identified through empirical research. 
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• 
Eexample of ecosystems 
Figure 2.2 Examples of platforms of stakeholders 
(after Röling, 1994) 
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Developing platforms through scaling up processes 
The concept 'scaling up' is applied to grassroots NGOs to analyse the processes and different 
paths whereby they move beyond their original local constituencies to institutions, policies, 
donors, etc., and have larger impact (Uwin & Miller, 1996). Here, the discussion focuses on 
scaling up processes as alternatives paths whereby platforms can expand to higher levels of 
social aggregation for decision-making, implementation of policies, resource mobilization (e.g. 
credits), training opportunities, access to knowledge, integration of the body politic (e.g., raise 
ecological awareness), etc. 
Scaling up processes by integrating many platforms of stakeholders 
Many resource use situations present various interest coalitions of stakeholders be they ethnic 
groups, strategic groups (conflicting interests), categories of resource users, etc. Difficulties 
for developing a platform can appear especially for ecosystems Type I. Effectiveness can only 
be possible if all the interest coalitions of stakeholders join their effort instead of only one of 
them behaving as a platform. Scaling up processes may take the form of negotiation and 
contending interest coalitions of stakeholders in an effective platform. 
There are also other types (e.g., type U) of ecosystems on which many effective 
platforms can evolve for resource management. Acting at the level of the whole ecosystem 
imposes a scaling up process which integrates 'intermediary' effective platforms to the one at 
the level of the whole. In real-situations, this may take the form of structuration at different 
levels of social aggregation, for instance, at the levels of the farming 'household', stakeholders 
in a village, federation of villages, region, etc. The same process can appear in ecosystems 
with unclear boundaries. Platforms evolve or are created at the level of a meaningful territory 
(e.g., a village territory). Scaling up processes may take the form of integrating different lower 
territories in a larger one. Another example is scaling up across administrative divisions. 
Scaling up processes for collective decision-making 
Within the context of a participatory approach, platforms of stakeholders can be linked up with 
government organizations to enable collective decision-making about ecosystems in terms of 
policies, planning, or identifying future actions to be taken. Scaling up processes can follow 
such paths which give the impression that programmes which are built at higher levels 
(ministries) emerge from fora and concerted action with stakeholders. 
The resolution of certain conflicts over resource use (e.g., war between coalitions) are 
difficult for stakeholders themselves. A mediation at higher level (an authority or organization 
beyond the ecosystem under dispute) is necessary. For example the displacement of a Dogon 
population in Mali after a severe drought and their insertion to Bambara people, involved 
mediation at a higher level (cf. Tembely, 1991). Then scaling up processes can emerge from 
such chaotic contexts where other actors, at higher levels of social aggregation, are required 
for collective decision-making to happen. 
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Scaling up processes by linking up platforms of stakeholders with governmental (non-
governmental) organizations or administrative bodies 
Various organizations, be they governmental or non-governmental, are created in many 
societies for education, information exchange, production, in general for knowledge 
generation, exchange and utilization for the purpose of 'development'. It can be possible that 
platforms of stakeholders and organizations function synergically to support these knowledge 
processes towards innovative practices for resource management. From that point of view, 
scaling up processes can take the form of linking-up platforms of stakeholders with 
governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with resource management issues 
at higher levels of social aggregation. For example, a platform of fishermen in a nation can 
be scaled-up with a national Department of Fisheries at a Ministry level, which is handling 
policy-making that might affect the destiny of stakeholders. 
These examples of scaling up processes give analytical ideas for exploring the real-word 
situations which can vary (greatly) according to the type of ecosystems. But, the push by 
stakeholders, or the pull by other actors, of platforms of stakeholders towards higher levels 
of social aggregation, the forms the expansion these platforms may take, and the strategies for 
making this expansion happen, can only be known better through empirical studies. 
Developing platforms through networks 
Networks can be seen as alternative processes by which the impact of platforms can increase. 
Some literature shows that: (i) networks can be constructed through deliberate action by 
external stakeholders (e.g., Callon & Law, 1989); (ii) networks can emerge from stakeholders' 
interaction ('actor-network perspective, e.g., Verschoor, 1997); and (iii) network can be based 
on emergent issues from the Nature (e.g., Mougenot & Mormont, 1997). I rely on this 
literature to develop some ideas as a starting point for developing platforms through networks. 
Developing platforms through a deliberated construction of networks from 'outside' 
An example of a deliberate processes of the construction of (sociotechnical) networks, by three 
scientists, with the notion of 'translation' is provided by Callon & Law (1989). 'Translation' 
is defined 'as a process in which some sets of relations between projects, interests, goals, and 
naturally occurring entities - objects which might otherwise be quite separate from one another 
- are proposed and brought into being' (Callon & Law, 1989: 58). The distinction is made 
between context, which is like GOs or NGOs at higher levels of social aggregation; and 
content, which can be considered as a domain of activity of stakeholders. From that point of 
view, it seems to be analytically an advantage to look, within the field of resource 
management, at what interventionists or facilitators do in the real-world to bring content and 
context together. In other words, the process of stimulating, mobilizing and linking together 
various stakeholders and other actors. 
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Developing platforms through networks which emerge from new designation and qualification 
of ecosystems 
The third process which can trigger the development of networks, and then the expansion of 
platforms is basically inspired from the statement that: giving a new value for certain objects 
in Nature (or ecosystems), qualifying and designating Nature, for instance making decision 
about the conservation of ecosystems, leads to the development of networks (Mougenont & 
Mormont, 1997). All the ecosystems valued or designated create networks with the 
corresponding stakeholders. These networks define other actors at higher levels of social 
aggregation through four poles: (i) the practices and scientific models, (ii) institutional 
practices, (in) management organizations which describe nature, and (iv) the ecosystems under 
siege. The idea is amenable to the analysis of the expansion of platforms in terms of how new 
designation and valuation of ecosystems lead to joint and coordinated action of all 
interdependent elements composing the networks. 
Sustainable development as the emergent property of platforms 
Sustainable development means a development that meets the 'needs' of the present without 
compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987). 
The concept of sustainable development, with respect to resource management is a paradox 
because it seems to raise issues like the satisfaction of the 'needs' of stakeholders, the 
economic growth, etc.; but in the same time, the yield and the productivity of ecosystems (in 
general earth's natural systems) must be maintained. 
There are definitions which center 'sustainability' on concepts like ecologically sound, 
economically, socially just, humane and adaptable (Reijntjes, etal, 1992: 2). Other argue that 
sustainability means different Ihings depending on worldview, experiences, thoughts, ways to 
go about ihinking (Sriskandarajah et al, 1989: 2), value judgement on multiple criteria 
(Checkland, 1986) and social institutions (Lynam & Herdt, 1992: 212). 
With regard to these few considerations (since several other definitions exist) 
difficulties appear to arrive with respect to a precise and absolute definition of sustainable 
development, a concept which is itself complex and contested (cf Pretty, 1995: 11). 
But, like soft system thinkers, sustainable development is considered, in the present 
study, as the emergent property of platforms. This means that one can focus on how platforms 
learn their way to agree on what they consider as sustainable development and their capacity 
to cope with emerging complex issues (new ecological and social order) and the development 
of regenerative practices. 
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2.6 Dealing with the dynamics of coupled systems: focus on social learning 
Ecosystems dynamics and implications on resource management 
Ecosystems are not inert, but they perform different functions. Holling & Sanderson (1996) 
describes four basic system functions: exploitation, conservation, release, and reorganization. 
The first two functions reflects sucession. Exploitation means a rapid colonization - of recently 
disturbed areas - enabled by processes in ecosystems. Maize seeds sown by a farmer on 
cleared land (disturbed area) is an example of a rapid colonization. The growth of the maize 
plants (and also weeds) is an example of conservation function of the land. Conservation is a 
slow accummulation and storage of energy and material. This function will be completed when 
these plants become mature. If nothing is done (harvesting or any human action), degeneration 
will occur through natural process (e.g., biomass cycling). This function is called release or 
creative destruction which stimulates or creates the opportunity for the fourth stage, 
reorganization, where released materials are mobilized to become available for the next phase 
(Holling & Sanderson, 1996). Release and reorganization functions reveal self-organizing 
ability of an ecosystem, or its resilience determines the capacity to respond to the stress and 
shocks imposed by the predation or pollution from external sources. Release or creative 
destruction (degeneration) goes very fast but, reorganization (regeneration) is very slow. For 
example, if we consider a pasture in a savannah grazing area, fire can clear an hectare (in the 
dry season) in a few minutes, while the regeneration of the pasture in the same area can take 
several weeks or months. 
The dynamics of ecosystems necessitate the observation of their behaviour for the 
purpose of resource management. Not all the changing patterns of ecosystems are visible. The 
specificity of their strategic dimension is that they do not speak for themselves, but are always 
represented by 'spokes persons' (Mougenot & Mormont, 1997). 
Ecosystems dynamics stimulate the importance of temporal and spatial dimension 
resource management. It becomes, relevant therefore, to focus on historical and comparative 
approach to cope with these dynamics. 
Social dynamics and implications on resource management 
Many situations of social dynamics, with respect to resource management, comprise harmony 
and disharmony, congruence and incongruence with ecosystems (Holling & Sanderson, 1996; 
Maarleveld & Dangbegnon, 1998). Interactions between ecosystems and stakeholders are 
going on. 
There are also perspectives which center the social dynamics at the level of a process 
of change from 'within' through an active experimentation, the production of knowledge and 
the development of skills and know-how (e.g., Biggs, 1980, Richards, 1985; Warren et al, 
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1995; Dupre\ 1991). From that point of view, it is argued that intervention process as such as 
resource management, can be more efficient if the 'outputs' from social dynamics are brought 
about through a process of change through participation and interaction (Chambers & Jiggins, 
1987; Roling & Engel, 1988; Engel, 1997). 
In view of the above, one can focus on social learning as a way to cope with these 
dynamics. The concept of social learning can provide a framework which seems to expand our 
awareness of the effects of the strategic dimensions of stakeholders as intentional beings. 
Novel solutions to evolving conditions are to be expected through adaptive responses. Then, 
Adaptive Resource Management (ARM) - instead of resource management - concerns the 
integration of social dynamics into the 'facilitation' of change. The elaboration of the concept 
of ARM is one of the objectives of the present study. 
Applying Social Learning concept in ARM 
What is meant by social learning? 
The term social learning is used in many circumstances with different attributes and different 
meanings (Parson & Clark, 1995). Social learning can take the form of a process of 
experiential (or action) cycle (cf. Kolb, 1984; Bawden & Macadam, 1991) or of integrating 
adaptive management and political changes towards sustainable economy (Lee, 1993). Parson 
and Clark (1995) after discussing the different contours of the social learning concept, provide 
four key operational concepts as guidelines for inquiry processes: who (what) learns? what 
kinds of things are learned? what counts as learning? 
Among these questions, it can be argued in this study that, the kinds of things which 
are learned can be aggregated in three different poles: (i) the ecosystems, (ii) social processes 
involved in ARM, and (hi) platform development. At each of these poles, the learners can be 
defined and what counts for them as learning. But, one question which seems important for 
this study, does not appear in the framework of Parson and Clark (1995: 455-7): how do 
people learn? Therefore, one can focus also on the analysis of social learning processes, a core 
issue for ARM. Social learning can be Jnterpreted as a dynamic process which involves 
continuous sense-making of the worfd through perspectives or frames of reference based on 
concrete experience-modified knowledge, beliefs, values. The outcomes of concrete 
experiences of the world are explanations, hypotheses or interpretations which emerge as 'new 
concepts' or 'theoretical propositions' and help evaluate the 'little bags of tricks' used, which 
in turn leads to adaptation of the perspectives or frames of reference, (see fig. 2.3). 
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Experience 
Little bags of tricks 
for Action 
Figure 2.3: Learning process cycle based on the experiential learning 
theory of Kolb (1984) 
Learning about ecosystems 
Learning about ecosystems can take the form of participatory processes with stakeholders for 
mapping, identifying indicators, agreeing on boundaries and classificatory concepts, and using 
analytical tools to 'make things visible'. The facilitators of such processes can be the 
researcher or others (development professionals, bio-physical scientists etc.). For the former, 
methodologies like Participatory Action Research are used, and for the latter, the study will 
account for what they do and what can be learned from their practices. 
At the level of stakeholders themselves, learning processes can be based on the 
observation of ecosystems through decennia. Their contributions (as spokespersons) are, 
particularly, important for the type of ecosystems (e.g., lake fisheries) whose patterns of 
change or behaviour are not readily observable at a given temporal scale or without 
information from stakeholders. 
Learning about social processes 
Learning about social processes means, in this study, various interactions between individuals, 
groups or organizations, towards agreement or shared understanding on problems, consensus 
formation or accommodating perspectives (which means to demarcate what is permitted/chosen 
and what is forbidden/rejected) to take actions. One can argue, for instance, that the things that 
are learned concern negotiation and mediation with respect to collective decision-making and 
action implementation, and conflict resolution strategies. These processes can occur among 
stakeholders themselves and in the arenas of intervention. 
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Negotiation is defined as a discussion between two or more parties, be they individuals, 
groups, organizations, or political units such as nations, with the apparent aim of resolving a 
divergence of interest and thus escaping social conflict (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993 : 2). 
I Particularly, in ARM, existing social practices, norms, and standards can influence ideas, 
1 arguments, motivations and negotiation processes. Mediation involves strategic choices which 
are the following (see also Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992: 538): (i) concession making, an attempt 
to reduce one's demands, desires, wants and aspirations with respect to resource use to 
accommodate the other party; (ii) contending, which is a strategy aimed at pushing the other 
party in the direction of one's wishes (for instance regenerative practices); and (iii) problem-
solving, efforts to locate and adopt win-win solutions which means solutions that satisfy both 
parties' goals and current states of affairs in ecosystems. Conflict resolution emerges from 
clashing prejudices, desires and interests over resource use. It involves negotiation and 
mediation, and aims at discovering unifying bonds (Moscovici & Doise, 1994). The learners 
engaged in these processes are individuals and groups of stakeholders, or organizations which 
intervene in the course of ARM. 
Learning about platforms development 
The focus is on the understanding of phenomena involved in structuration with respect to 
platform development processes. Platform is defined as a level of collective agency on holon(s) 
in ecosystems where resources can be managed effectively. At the level of the holons, 
interdependence of stakeholders in ecosystems can be perceived. One can focus on the nature 
of this interdependence and on phenomena involved in the success or failure of collective 
agency. 
Previous discussions raises alternative processes whereby platform development can 
occur through scaling up and networks. One can also focus on phenomena that motivate or 
hinder platform development processes. At this level, an anticipation on critical issues like 
'power', 'group dynamics' and 'leadership' can help understand phenomena, while the 
variables can best be identified through empirical studies when there are blockages and barriers 
in the development of platforms for ARM. 
2.7 The Facilitation of change in ARM 
The termjacjlitation can be interpreted as a way to 'manage', especially in this study, a 
process of change in ARM towards a desired ends: regenerative practices on ecosystems and 
sustainable development, the capability of emergent platforms to engage in continuous social 
learning about evolving conditions. Here, facilitation has a broad meaning. It can be 
considered as an enabling condition, such as (local or external) institutions and policy contexts, 
for change. It can be viewed also as an intentional process whereby an organization (be it local 
or external) stimulates and guides change among potential stakeholders. But, it is essential to 
explain that the means or mechanisms by which an intentional process can be based vary from 
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'communication', incentives' to others like 'power and control of people'. For the latter, 
Seabright (1993: 117) argue that 'anthropologists and sociologists focus on the way in which 
individual behaviour is governed by rules and codes of conduct, the genesis of which is often 
explained by how well such rules serve the interest of the group'. Having in mind that some 
forms and content of facilitation which prevail in a given situation of ARM can only be best 
known empirically, five issues are discussed for resource management purposes. These are: 
(i) potential stakeholders and organizations; (ii) Communicative intervention; (in) incentive 
design for stimulating or mamtaining behavioural change; (iv) support institutions; and (v) the 
policy context. 
Potential stakeholders and organizations 
Potential stakeholders are those who are engaged in a process of change. Several concepts are 
used for their designation: target groups, clients, contact groups etc. But I consider 
stakeholders as problem-owners who evolve in a problematic context. Changing their current 
state of affairs with respect to resource management is an improvement. They are also the 
main concern for an intervention process which aims at improving their resource base. 
Stakeholders Analysis (for details see §3.3) can inform about their interest, concern, purpose, 
hope and fear about the processes of change. 
A distinction can be made between the main organization, and others which are directly 
or indirectly concerned. It is also important to focus on the raison-d'être of 'ideologies' (e.g., 
Auto-promotion, Développement local, Grass-root development, Participatory development) 
which guide the strategies or praxeology the use and those who influence the background of 
the professionals. How much negotiation space is available to trigger or make effective a 
process of change? Negotiation space is an area within which the organizations at stake can 
enjoy a degree of autonomy from the existing context (cf. Callon & Law 1989: 62). 
Communicative intervention 
Using communication to intervene is a non-coercive strategy to achieve an ultimate goal. In 
this study, the goal is the extent to which platforms for ARM and successful collective action 
can be effective. Communicative intervention involves non-formal education methods, training, 
joint decision-making, and participatory methods. 
Non-formal education can be considered as an empowering process of stakeholders, 
whereby they gain and utilize capabilities for collaborative problem-solving, influencing 
socioeconomic conditions and relationships through group action-taking (see also Kindervatter, 
1979). NFE can enable the learners to critically analyse their own life situation, or gaining an 
understanding of and control over social, economic, and/or political forces to improve their 
current practices and ways of living in ecosystems. Animation rurale (out of school adult 
education) is a form of non-formal education (Adam, 1982; Moulton, 1977). Several methods 
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can be used in non-formal education mass media, focus groups, audio-visual, folk media (Van 
den Ban & Hawkins, 1996: 120-76). NFE can give stakeholders the principles for active 
experimentation and adaptation and for processing information (Roling, 1988). 
Training concerns the acquisition of specific skills (technical or organizational) by 
stakeholders in order to be able to accomplish specific tasks, for instance, repairing 
agricultural materials. Few stakeholders who start in a training programme can move to the 
position of local trainers of others trainees to accelerate (even at low cost) skill acquisition by 
a large percentage of stakeholders. How training needs evolve, and the processes to realize 
them, is of particular importance. 
Joint decision-making is considered as a negotiation process (Zartman, 1978). Here, 
it refers to concerted action through regular meeting to discuss about blockages in the course 
of actions being implemented, to evaluate the magnitude of progress, and to find solutions for 
future action. 
Participatory methods that can be used are many. Some examples are Rapid Rural 
Appraisal (RRA), Participatory Technology Development (PTD), Rapid Appraisal for 
Agricultural Knowledge Systems (RAAKS), etc. Some general guidelines and principles to 
understand the methods used in real situation are discussed in next section (§3.4). 
Incentives for changing or maintaining behaviour 
Changing or mamtaining stakeholders behaviour is partly determined by the way they perceive 
the external environment for resource management. To conceptualize this issue, I rely on the 
work of Kelman (1969) which makes the distinction between three processes of opinion 
change: 'compliance', 'identification', and 'internalization'. 
Compliance results from the social control of behaviour, establishment of 'fences' for 
the limitations of choices, for instance with respect to resource use. In resource management 
situations, the power for controlling behaviour would be based on an effective means. Then 
incentives result from the realization that everybody is in the same condition. 
Identification is a process of opinion change which is based on mechanisms such as 
attractiveness, satisfying self-defining relationships, and expectations. For instance in resource 
management situations, the stakeholders may change behaviour because they want to be 
accepted by attractive others. 
Internalization is a process of opinion change based on a person's value system. For 
instance the process of change, with respect to resource management, matches with one's 
existing values. Change results from conviction. 
These three processes of opinion change according to Kelman (1969) will guide 
reflection for analysing resource use situations. However, new insights may evolve from 
empirical investigations. 
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Support institutions 
According to Ostrom (1986a quoted by Ostrom 1990: 51 ), 'institation^can be defined as 'the 
_sets-of-vKorking^ulesJhajl^are used to determine who is eligible to rnake-decisions in somearena^ 
what^iojisare allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures 
musthe followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be 
assigned to individualsdependent on their actions'. 
This definition contains some key elements that stimulate reflection: eligibility for 
decision-making, actions assignment, rules, procedures and provision of information. From 
that point of view, support institutions in ARM can be seen as frameworks which define these 
elements to trigger the facilitation processes. In concrete terms, examples of support 
institutions can be identified in the constitutions of nations, governments' decrees, pmpexty, 
lights content, and conventions - of GOs, NGOs or stakeholders - in some arena. 
^ Organizations involved in ARM can face some difficulties (e.g., changing property 
rights regime, financial resource constraints, ineffectiveness of a strategy to solve a problem) 
that existing frameworks of institutions do not allow to overcome. What do they do in such 
situations seems to be relevant, particularly in ARM. Therefore, an analysis of support 
institutions can focus, also, on networking among organizations to achieve their goal. But, 
institution and organization are commonly used interchangeably and this contributes to 
ambiguity and confusion. A differentiation between these concepts is made by North (1994, 
1995) with metaphors and parables. 
North (1994: 3) defines institutions as 'the rules of the game in a society or more 
formally, or the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction'. The rules can be 
informal (unwritten) or formal (written). North (1994: 4-5) argues that: 'Like institutions, 
' organizations provide a structure to human interaction. ... Conceptually what must be clearly differentiated are 
the rules from the players. The purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played. But the objective of 
the team within that set of rules is to win the game - by a combination of skills, strategy, and coordination; by 
fair means and sometimes by foul means. Modeling the strategies and the skills of the team as it develops is a 
separate process from modeling the creation, evolution, and consequences of the rules'. 
In concrete situations, these parables and metaphors can help to avoid confusion. 
Support institutions can be seen as rules within which organizations work. But the interaction 
between the two seems to be relevant for understanding changing patterns of institutions. Skills 
and knowledge that individuals and their organizations acquire can shape evolving perceptions 
- about opportunities, strategies, new ways to go about change; which can incrementally alter 
institutions. In turn, institutions dictate the kinds of skills and knowledge that are needed for 
organizations. 
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Policy context 
The compass metaphor is used for adaptive management and policies are considered as 
important because they can be seen as experiments (Lee, 1993). The policy context can be seen 
as the compass, the legitimation of prerogatives for taking measures or not, perceived enabling 
conditions, in an attempt to affect or guide social change. The compass metaphor is used to 
emphasize the influence and effects of a policy context on individuals, organizations and 
societies. In the specific ARM situations, it can be useful to analyse how political orientations 
of a nation, region or locality affect the capabilities and initiatives of stakeholders and 
organizations, involved in a process of change, to achieve performance. For instance after a 
shift in general policy context (e.g., democratization process), one can look at new dynamics 
at the level of stakeholders and organizations. 
By considering the facilitation process in ARM at the level of an ecosystem with a 
given community of stakeholders, prerogatives for taking measures or not would mean the 
extent to which the allocation of certain powers (e.g., statutory powers) is effective or not. 
Here the so-called issue of decentralization (more responsibiUties and power for stakeholders) 
appears. It is argued that decentralization can offer hope for greater accountability in 
agricultural development (Scoones & Tompson, 1994: 9). Toulmin (1993) explains that 
decentralization has taken place largely at the level of rhetoric. The concept is used to describe 
government and donor policy. It seems important to focus also the analysis of the effectiveness 
of decentralization, as it is related to ARM, at the level of stakeholders and organizations 
working with them. 
Enabling conditions are similar to what Pretty (1995) has called: 'policies that work'. 
Policies that work for ARM can be defined as a set of instruments or procedures to stimulate 
regenerative practices on ecosystems. These instrument can take the form of government 
declarations, priorities, grants, encouragement, better information, law, etc.. 
2.8 Towards perspectives in ARM for greater sustainability 
A) The Ecosystem and Stakeholders 
Understanding the ecosystem under siege 
• Describing the ecosystem: making visible complexities such as organizing principles, 
boundaries, hierarchies and inputs/outputs for agroecosystems. 
• Identifying the resources (which are valuated), the holon(s) and the type(s) of 
ecosystem which is (are) considered for inquiry. 
• Explaining the implications of the type(s) of ecosystem identified for the strategies that 
can be used for identifying stakeholders 
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Identifying Stakeholders in interaction with the ecosystem under siege 
• Appraising and locating the people who have voices and interests in the ecosystem 
under siege. Explaining, if necessary, their cultural diversity (e.g., ethnicity). 
• Appraising and locating different groups of people who affect temporally/spatially the 
state of the ecosystem through their practices, 'rights', duties and responsibilities. 
• Explaining the nature of the 'would be platform of stakeholders' at the level of the 
ecosystem 
B) The Problem and Perceptions 
Analysing and interpreting the problematic situations 
• Observing ecosystems, and collecting information from stakeholders about the 
problematic situation. 
• Analysing and interpreting the assets and the conditions, under which these situations 
evolve at the level of the ecosystems, or of stakeholders. 
Identifying the problem and perceptions 
• Identifying the 'would be problem owners': key stakeholders and (if necessary) other 
actors at higher levels of social aggregation. 
• Identifying constraints, critical events and information about ecosystems and key 
stakeholders and (if necessary) other actors at higher levels of social aggregation. 
• Adopting an interpretative approach to explain how the problem is perceived by key 
stakeholders and others. 
• Synthesizing and defining the nature of resource management problems: metaphors, 
critical events, ecosystems degradation patterns, etc. 
Identifying and analysing alternative solutions and approaches chosen for problem-solving 
• Analysing how stakeholders agree or share understanding and see their interdependence 
at the level of the holon(s) in the ecosystems. 
• Identifying the nature of pIatform(s) that can only help address alternative solutions 
to the problem. From that point of view, one can assess critically the solutions and 
approach chosen by stakeholders themselves or organizations which intend to intervene 
for solving the problem. One could focus also on the processes whereby such 
organizations become a problem-owner. 
42 Platforms for resource management 
C) The Social learning processes in ARM 
Learning about ecosystems 
• Developing, using and accounting for participatory methods such as PAR for mapping, 
identifying classificatory concepts, agreeing on the boundaries of the ecosystem and 
the resources which will be managed. 
• Incorporating indigenous knowledge to the understanding of ecosystem behaviour and 
pattern of change. 
• Developing and identifying analytical tools to make things visible at the level of the 
ecosystem. 
Learning about social processes 
• Identifying and analysing negotiation and mediation processes for concrete issues such 
as collective decision-making, action implementation, etc. 
• Explaining successes or failures, on the one hand, of agreement making or shared 
understanding on problems; and on the other, of consensus formation and 
accommodating perspectives about the solution or approach chosen for solving the 
problem. 
• Making visible clashing interests over resource use and conflicting arenas. Analysing 
the process of conflict resolution and their outcome. Explaining reasons for successes 
or failure. 
• Analysing knowledge networks, interfaces, and how these influence change in social 
practices, for instance through reflexive learning. 
Learning about platform development 
• Identifying the nature of interdependence on holon(s) in the ecosystem under siege. 
Explaining, depending on the circumstance, how stakeholders themselves perceive this 
interdependence. 
• Identifying the phenomena involved in platform development either through scaling up 
processes, networks or other processes. 
D) Facilitating process of change in ARM 
Potential stakeholders and organizations 
• Identifying stakeholders who evolve to be engaged in ARM 
• Using Stakeholders Analysis to identify their concrete needs. 
• Identifying organizations that emerge for the implementation of actions in ARM, their 
concrete objectives, 'ideology', and means available. 
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Communicative intervention 
• Identifying communicative intervention strategies used (non-formal education, training, 
joint-decision making, participatory methods, etc.) 
• Explaining the means used for making effective conmiunicative intervention (media, 
focus group, audio-visual, etc.) 
• Analysing effectiveness, also from the point of view of stakeholders, for the aim of 
triggering change. 
Incentive designs strategies 
• Identifying the nature of informal incentives that are available, and analysing how they 
are perceived and their effectiveness. 
• Identifying incentive design strategies and the conditions for their provision. 
• Analysing the raison-d'elre of the provision of incentives, and its effect for stimulating 
collective action and platform development for ARM. 
Support institutions 
• Identifying (informal and formal) institutional frameworks available and relevant for 
ARM (eligibility for decision making, role development, rules, provision of useful 
information, etc.) 
• Analysing institutional constraints faced by the organizations involved in ARM, and 
how they create networks with other organization to overcome these constraints. 
• Analysing the legitimacy, efficiency of informal institutional framework (compared 
with formal ones) for overcoming problems in ARM. 
Policy context 
• Analysing the influence of the political context on processes (taking measures, room 
of manoeuvre available, space available for incremental development of initiatives) wit 
respect to ARM. 
• Identifying and explaining concrete policies that work for ARM, and analysing the 
effectiveness of their implementation. 
• Identifying and explaining concrete policies that hinder ARM. Analysis why these 
policies are launched. 
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E) The nature of Platforms for ARM 
• Analysing the extent to which collective action (first puzzle) and effective platform 
development (second puzzle) are being achieved through social learning and the 
facilitation of change. 
• Identifying, from the ground, concrete theoretical propositions (conditions) that explain 
platform development processes (successes or failures). 
• Identifying, from the ground, the functions of platform with respect to ARM. 
F) The Assessment of Greater Sustainability 
• Analysing the effectiveness (applicability, constraints involved) of the regenerative 
practices identified, from the ground, in relation to the type of ecosystem under siege. 
• Analysing the extent to which the nature of platform identified can sustain the 
regenerative practices identified on ecosystems. 
• Analysing the extent to which the nature of platforms for ARM is capable of enhancing 
sustainable development. Explaining, if necessary, some risks of failure, and where 
they can be expected to evolve. 
2.9 Research problem statement, objectives, and relevance of the study 
Research problem statement 
Of the many problems of ARM faced by scientists, policy makers and practitioners; the most 
critical is how to intervene in the real-world of resource use, characterized by conflicts, chaos, 
uncertainties and risks, to yield regenerative practices in ecosystems and achieve sustainable 
development. 
In face of such theoretical and practical challenges and dilemmas, the perspectives 
developed above, platforms for ARM, are just one way to approach the problem, particularly 
in the context of Benin and Burkina Faso. 
The overall problem addressed in this book is the extent to which the perspectives elaborated 
above help develop theories, practices and ideas, in the particular contexts of resource use in 
Benin and Burkina Faso, for the facilitation of ARM in various attempts to enhance 
regenerative practices and sustainable development in ecosystems. 
Still, one must be aware of the philosophical paradigm distinction in that this problem 
statement, since the present chapter is theoretical while this problem statement calls for useful 
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contextual theories, practices and insights for regenerative practices and sustainable 
development in ecosystems. The next chapter will explain clearly the paradigmatic framework 
under which this study is done. 
The objectives of the research 
The objectives of this research can be stated as follows: 
• To analyse various resource management situations from Benin and Burkina Faso. 
• To gain insight in the reason why some resource management situations are successful 
and others fail. 
• To generate from the ground, concrete theories, practices and strategies to support 
deliberate interventions for ARM. 
• To make some practical recommendations for development. 
The main research questions 
Accordingly with the problem statement and the objective presented above, the research 
questions are: 
• To what extent can various resource management situations from Benin and Burkina 
Faso, be analysed? 
• What are the factors that affect the success or failure of the various resource 
management situations analysed? 
• Can concrete and fresh theories, concepts and ideas, be identified to support the 
facilitation of deliberate ARM interventions towards greater sustainability? 
The relevance of this study 
The relevance of this study can seen from multiple point of view: theoretical, practical, wider 
development context, and the local setting. 
First, Roling (1994: 392) argues that current approaches, with respect to resource 
management are dominated by technical and economic perspectives, while instrumental 
reasoning prevails. But these approaches lack an effective complementary social perspective 
which can add strategic and communicative reasoning by taking into account several issues like 
conflicting interests, competitive arenas, conflict resolution, negotiation, mediation and 
consensus formation, etc., which are omnipresent in resource use situations. The relevance of 
this study can be perceived through its attempt to incorporate this social perspective. 
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Second, this study is basically action-oriented, a deliberate effort to pursue improving 
social practices in ecosystems through platforms for ARM. Such a way of tMnking is well 
addressed to current worries about increasing ecosystem degradation during the last three 
decades, particularly in Africa (Harrison, 1991). Problems are aggravated with endemic 
droughts which have made visible the relation between resource depletion and human 
hardships and suffering. 
Third, in the wider development context, especially in Africa, economic growth is 
mostly the main concern, and agriculture is the target sector which provides foreign currency. 
But economic growth is always threatened by the uncertainty of the global market (Oasa et al, 
1986) with subsequent increasing poverty at the level of stakeholders and increasing ecosystem 
degradation. The present study raises the importance of socioeconomic sustainability which 
aims at incorporating a social perspective in economic growth: to focus on stakeholders' needs 
and involve them in collective learning which can enable their capacity to respond to evolving 
conditions. 
Fourth, the local setting, in the West African context, involves a high percentage of 
stakeholders (more than 70%) whose activities spread out over agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
livestock production, water management, primary product processing, hunting, etc. One can 
think of local development (e.g., more foods, income based on natural resources, economic 
prosperity), if the resource base is maintained in good health. The present study seeks to 
enhance regenerative practices in ecosystems, which seems indispensable aspect of local 
socioeconomic development. 
Notes 
1. Initial reflection about this chapter is contained in: Dangbegnon, C; RSling, N.; Blum, A., 1995 New 
perspective on complex environmental problem in Benin: platform for resource use negotiation. Paper presented 
at the International Congress on Agrarian Questions, Wageningen May 22-24, the Netherlands. 
The present chapter makes use of many reflections contained in: Maarleveld et al, 1997. FASOLEARN, Social 
learning for collective natural resource management: facilitation, institutions and policies. Wageningen Agric. 
University, Dept. of Communication and Innovation Studies 
2. Life-world according to Ubels (1989:187), 'refers to material-economic dimensions, in terms of production and 
reproduction; to social dimensions, in terms of relations, networks, groups and organizations; as well as to the 
cultural and ideological dimensions of people's lives, in terms of their perceptions, values and ideas'. 
3. Long (1989:1-2) defines social interface 'as a critical point of intersection or linkage between different social 
systems, fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative value 
and social interest, are most likely to be found'. 
3 Methodologies for studying Adaptive Resource Management 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the methodologies of the present study. Two different blocs of 
methodologies are developed. The first can be called Participatory Learning and Action 
Research, which involve curricula for discovery learning by a scientist, RAAKS, and PTD. 
The reason that these participatory methodologies are used will be explained. The second block 
concerns the concrete research methodology. Therefore, the main concern is about the nature 
of the research, the approaches chosen, the methods and techniques to collect information used 
within this approach, and data. The processes involved in the selection of the case studies, the 
methods and techniques used, and the analytical paths for comparative analysis are explained. 
Various methodologies are combined within a constructivist inquiry. This perspective 
is different from the more classical way of doing research ('naive realism'). Emerging complex 
new social problems and demands call for new ways of carrying out scientific and development 
activities, and the previous ones that have become irrelevant are abandoned (Kuhn, 1970). 
First of all, this chapter starts with some initial considerations for a constructivist inquiry. 
Subsequently the problem of 'rationality' will be raised, the three rationalities of Habermas 
(in Brand, 1990) will be discussed, and some basic principles that underpin a constructivist 
inquiry will be explained. 
3.2 Initial considerations for a constructivist inquiry 
The problem of 'rationality' under a constructivist inquiry 
Many situations of ARM involve different stakeholders, development professionals, a network 
of research organizations, universities, policy makers, donors, etc. Each of them is embedded 
in social processes through which reality is constructed (standards, norms, values, diversities, 
etc.) with respect to ARM. They are also active in the interpretation of the world around them 
(creation of 'artefacts'). It is argued that reality is socially constructed (see Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Leeuwis, 1993). Doing research in such situations becomes very complex, 
and this can be defined as how a researcher can integrate different social constructions into his 
or her inquiry process. Kloppenburg (1991: 520) discusses some problems which are related 
to the way a researcher can incorporate alternative sources of knowledge production which are 
qualified but have no voice in the contemporary technoscientific discourse. 
However, the natural and social dimensions of ARM are characterized by uncertainty and 
alternative sources of empirical knowledge should be not neglected. Funtowicz & Ravetz 
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(1990) argue tbat decisions depend on evaluation of future states of the natural environment, 
resources and human society, all of which are unknown and unknowable. Funtowicz & Ravetz 
(1990) argue that science which can be relevant would be based on the assumption of 
unpredictability, an incomplete control, and a plurality of legitimate perspectives, all issues 
which are involved in ARM. 
If one assumes a multiplicity of legitimate perspectives in ARM, then the notion of 
'rationality' needs to be questioned. In many African rural societies, the context of this study, 
there are local perspectives based on the spirituality, for instance, some divinatory practices 
are used to transcend or anticipate critical situations related to perceived problems with respect 
to the use of their natural resources. For example, these types of perspectives which can be 
encountered in resource management raise the problem of 'rationality about how can one deals 
with stakeholders' perspectives which are apparently tinged with myth and superstition (IDS 
Workshop, 1989: 36). Hountondji (1989) argues that: 'beyond the existing superstition, or 
should one say instead of, beyond the mythical discourse - there is a strong core of real facts, 
empirically verified, unavoidable which the scientific rationality is incapable of accounting 
for'. The interest in this section is not to discuss what would be considered as 'rational' or 
'irrational' but, how to go about the crucial notion of 'rationality' in order to legitimate what 
the laymen, the stakeholders, is doing, and to present some relevant evidence in the domain 
of resource management. 
Using the three rationalities of Habennas 
In face of this challenge, the three types of rationality (instrumental, strategic, and 
communicative) distinguished by Habermas (1990) and also in Brand (1990) can be useful. 
They can be applied within the constructivism paradigm (cf. Roling, 1996). 
In studying resource management from a constructivist perspective, instrumental 
rationality would involve participatory and anticipatory experimentation (e.g., by stakeholders 
and scientists), making things visible, classification, etc. Learning about ecosystems with the 
stakeholders is an example. 
Strategic rationality would involve the anticipation on the moves of others. For instance 
in resource use situations, stakeholders would behave selfishly. Maybe, 'adaptive management' 
(Holling, 1995) can stimulate reflection to look at dynamics and think for instance, about ways 
of responsive planning in resource management. 
Previous discussions reveal the importance of collective action and shared 
understanding about resource management problems (see §2.1). Communicative rationality 
from a constructivist perspective has the following implications for studying resource 
management. Collective resource management and sustainabihty are the outcome of negotiated 
agreement and concerted actions. Soft-system thinking (see §2.4) is a perspective for guiding 
reflection during the inquiry for the present study. 
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In additional to the Habermas' types of rationality, one should argue, with a special reference 
to the African context, that beliefs, popular spirituality, certain types of knowledge (the so-
called 'non-scientific' or indigenous), with respect to resource management, get a certain 
immaterial and material value in a certain perspective, and within a particular socio-cultural 
context (Bourdieu, 1990; Geertz, 1983). These situations are strongly concerned with 
interactive and empathetic learning processes with the stakeholders (cf Millar, 1996). 
Interaction and hermeneutic processes: basic principles that underpin a constructivist 
inquiry 
Interaction is, according to me, a very important principle within a constructivist inquiry. It 
enables mutual influence among the people participating in interactions. Interaction among 
various stakeholders, groups, coalitions, networks and organizations is one way to deal with 
different perspectives. According to me, interactions enable the penetration, influence, 
alteration of other people's modes of thought. 
Geertz (1983) argues that the enterprise of 'the understanding of understandings' is 
nowadays usefully called hermeneutics. This definition seems useful in ARM because it allows 
an interpretation of meaning, symbols, conceptions, styles of using natural resources, in other 
words the imaginative cultural make up of a community, according to the interpretation of the 
stakeholders, and not according to one's own cognitive processes. 
In a double hermeneutic (Giddens, 1984), (a continuous interpretation of the others' 
interpretations), an interventionist or a researcher can realize that his/her cognitive repertoire 
is enriched by the cognitive repertoires of others he/she is interacting with. 
3.3 Explaining methodologies for defining resource management problems 
Soft System Methodology (SSM) 
Soft-systems thinking discussed in chapter 2 uses SSM which has been developed almost 
entirely in corporate contexts such as industry, civil service, National Health service, etc. (for 
more details see: Checkland & Scholes, 1990). Stakeholders and other actors involved in ARM 
face a completely different context than a multi-organizational situation, which is 
characterized, for instance, by cultural difference, autonomy for action, different ideas of the 
way to get to the same goal etc. For that reason, Woodhill (1993) calls for the development 
'second generation SSM'. The application of SSM for resource management moves into the 
same direction to identify the problems of resource management in conflicting arenas. It 
involves the following: 
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• An exploratory study for the understanding of the ARM context and the identification 
of groups of stakeholders, interest coalitions, etc., that can be related to the would be 
platforms of stakeholders to manage their natural resources. 
• The appreciation of the problematic situation of resource management according to key 
stakeholders and other actors. This process may enable making visible various 
perceptions and understandings of the problem. 
• The interpretation and the analysis of what the would-be problem owners think about 
the solutions to the problems. One can also focus on the analysis of the existing 
approaches developed as perspectives to solve the problems. 
Stakeholders Analysis (SA) 
SA is developed and applied differently depending on the way the central concept 'stakeholder' 
is conceptualized. 
Burgoyne (in press: 1) defines stakeholders in the domain of occupational and 
organizational psychology as 'those who affect, are affected by, any phenomenon of interest, 
experience or conceptualize it'. Stakeholders are 'actors, agents, interested parties, interests, 
interest groups' (Burgoyne, in press: 6). SA is defined as a research approach which 'proceeds 
by identifying some, many or all of the stakeholders and collects data about their actions, 
perception, behaviors, experiences, thoughts in relation to the phenomenon'. SA is 
conceptualized by Grimble et al (1995) and [by Grimble & Chan (1995)] as an approach for 
NRM. It starts with the identification of the problem and objectives of the stakeholders and 
ends with the definition of options for management. SA is also used for the purpose to identify 
contrasting perceptions through interviews and of conflicts among the landscape users. Then, 
these issues constitute the subject of debate in meetings to explore the possibilities of collective 
action (Ravnborg & Guerrero, 1997). 
SA is based on the increasingly accepted principle that the processes of change related 
to ARM can occur more efficaciously when stakeholders are given the opportunity to define 
and meet their needs rather than passively accept the goals of the economic and development 
imperatives imposed by governments. The application of SA for ARM involves the following 
questions: 
• What are the needs, wants and desires of the stakeholders? 
The needs, wants and desires that are shared by a set of stakeholders can constitute the 
basis for setting priorities or objectives for an intervention, or for making a policy with 
respect to ARM. 
• What are the trade-offs which result from the needs, wants and desires of the 
stakeholders? 
A trade-off is the process of balancing conflicting objectives which result from the 
needs, wants and desires of a set of stakeholders (cf. Grimble & Wellard, 1996: 179). 
The satisfaction of the needs of a group of stakeholders can conflict with the needs of 
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others stakeholders, actors at higher levels of the social aggregation, and also the 
nebulous 'future generations' of stakeholders. The trade-offs can inform us about some 
issues which can stimulate a further negotiation process, a mediation or the provision 
of incentives. 
3.4 Participatory learning and Action Research 
Participatory learning and Action Research (PLAR) explained here, concerns a scientist's 
curricula for discovery learning, Rapid Appraisal for Agricultural Knowledge Systems 
(RAAKS), and Participatory Technology Development (PTD). Below the reason for choosing 
these methodologies are discussed. Using these participatory methodologies, by a researcher, 
requires new professionalism based on new norms and communication skills. One should, 
instead of imposing his or her idea, learn to listen more and share understandings. Therefore, 
avoiding an attitude towards 'knowing' is useful. 'Knowing' is based on the consideration that 
one has the 'truth' and is in a better position than the others for the understanding of how the 
'things' are (see Pretty & Chambers, 1994). 
Cornwall et al (1994: 1994: 43) present a checklist of many participatory 
methodologies of the 1980s-1990s. Most of them emphasize the key word 'participation'. 
Methodologies can be defined as the framework for selecting the means to find out about, gain 
a joint understanding of, organize a joint learning and decision-making about, stimulate 
reflection on, analysis of, ordering of, and self-discovery and behavioral change about a 
particular issue. 
A scientist's curricula for discovery learning 
A scientist curricula for discovery learning allow stakeholders to express themselves through 
an interactive and a multidimensional nature of knowing. It explores the ways in which 
messages can be conveyed and interpreted locally, and offers the opportunity for the 
facilitator(s) to collect data with the stakeholders, and for the stakeholders with respect to 
ARM. Stakeholders participate in the generation, representation, and analysis of the data. 
Stakeholders can perceive themselves engage in a process whereby they seek for clarity, 
understanding and improvement of their way of life. The researcher can understand the 
instrumental rationality of stakeholders and the functional value of natural resources, criteria 
for the assessment of social changes in relation to their natural resource base, and the nature 
of the social and institutional relations. Such curricula include participatory mapping and 
modelling, aerial photograph analyses, transect and group walk, matrix scoring and preference 
ranking, Venn and network diagraming, focus groups, well-being and wealth ranking, social 
maps, etc. (see Cornwall et al, 1994: 46). 
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Curricula for discovery learning can be used for the generation of knowledge with the 
stakeholders based on co-learning tools. The type of tools used depends on the creativity, the 
understanding of the problem context, and the nature of the stakeholders (e.g., illiterate or 
not). 
Curricula for discovery learning are relevant for creating new understandings of a 
phenomenon, related to the use of the natural resources, with the stakeholders through co-
experimentations, and later, a process of change can be triggered in ARM. For example co-
learning tools are used in Australia to increase the ability of stakeholders to understand soil 
management practices (cf. Hamilton, 1995, 1998). 
Rapid Appraisal for Agricultural Knowledge Systems (RAAKS) 
RAAKS is a participatory methodology which involves stakeholders, extension staff, 
researchers, policy makers, traders and others. It focuses on the interaction among the actors, 
and the aim is to share knowledge and information for improving the performance of the social 
organization of innovation (Engel, 1995, with Salomon, 1997). RAAKS is based upon SSM, 
and it consists of three different phases: (i) defining the problem, (ii) analyzing constraints and 
opportunities, and (iii) strategy/action planning. Each phase provides different windows and 
tools (for details see Salomon & Engel, 1997). 
Some windows of the RAAKS methodology, especially, those which help analyze 
constraints and opportunities can be used for enhancing the performance of the social 
organization of innovation in ARM. These windows which seem to be relevant for the present 
context are: knowledge network analysis, integration analysis, coordination analysis, and 
communication analysis. They can be used through interviewing the stakeholders and other 
actors by a researcher, consultant or a team of professionals. The aim is to explore the extent 
to which innovative performance in ARM can be reached. 
Knowledge network analysis focuses on the analysis of the source of knowledge, and 
what type of knowledge is important for a specific perceived innovation-laden problem in 
ARM. Integration analysis looks at 'who has contact with whom? Why and how does it affect 
innovative performance in ARM? Coordination analysis focuses on who involves others in 
their 'projects'? Who has the means to implement important decision with respect to innovative 
practices in ARM? Communication analysis questions whether the actors use the same 
language (understand each other) or not. 
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Participatory Technology Development (PTD) 
PTD is a process of purposeful and creative interaction between stakeholders and outside 
facilitators. It involves various processes such as: 
• gaining understanding of eco-specific and cultural contexts 
• defining priority problems and experimenting locally 
• involving stakeholders in the process 
• generating locally-adapted technologies 
• internalizing the technologies developed 
PTD process follows a different approach to collecting, codifying, interpreting and 
utilizing knowledge and information. It uses a combination of methods and enables the 
mobilization of stakeholders' for the generation of technologies. PTD practitioners can be 
based in any rural development organizations and project, and involve members of a local 
community, and as well as scientists. 
PTD process and methods are explained by Jiggins & de Zeeuw (in Reijntjes et al, 
1992: 135-62). Six steps are distinguished to generate technologies with the stakeholders. The 
same path is followed to explain how PTD can be used in ARM. These steps are: 
• Getting started 
Several methods and methodologies can be used at this level for ARM. For instance, 
SA, PRA and PLAR explained above can help describe and clarify the problem areas 
and the priorities. 
• Looking for things to try 
At this level, a workshop with stakeholders can be organized to agree on a research 
agenda and identify options for an improvement. 
• Designing experiments 
The main output of this step is to agree on protocols which present shared criteria for 
monitoring and evaluation. 
• Trying out things 
Stakeholders are involved in the implementation of ideas, observation of the 
experiments (stakeholders become expert in the process), monitoring and evaluation. 
• Sharing the results 
At this step, key issues concern the critical analysis of the results and their 
internalization or the process is revisited. 
• Keeping up the process 
Enhancing multiplier effects and self-discovery from other stakeholders, and 
stimulating an horizontal diffusion of the technology generated. 
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3.5 Concrete research methodology used for the study 
Exploratory research approach 
The exploratory research approach is one of the many existing research approaches for social 
studies. Rap (1997) summarized some basic characteristics of the exploratory research 
approach. It uses qualitative methods and is less concerned with quantitative relation among 
variables and the testing of hypotheses. It considers the research objects in their daily or 
natural circumstances and not in artificial or experimental settings. 
In exploratory research, sampling is purposive rather than random; the concern is with 
information richness, not representativeness; and the analysis is not linear but iterative process 
(cf. Zyzanski et al, 1992). The data in the exploratory research are qualitative: logs, diaries, 
jottings, memos, notes, field notes, reflexive notes etc. But existing quantitative data can also 
be used to support analysis in an exploratory research (cf. Rap, 1997: 7). A main strong point 
of an exploratory research is that one can concurrently frame and reframe, not only the 
research questions, but the sampling procedure, the analysis, and the theory construction. This 
flexibility can increase the likelihood of gathering data which are very rich in detail. 
For the desire to improve the perspective developed in chapter 2 through the present 
study, according to me, the exploratory study seems the best way to yield novel and fresh 
ideas and concepts from the empirical world. Another reason for choosing the exploratory 
study results from the fact that this approach matches with the consideration of the 
constructivist paradigm for ARM, which calls for more creativity and pragmatism. The 
exploratory research enables the analysis and interpretation towards grounded insights on 
specific contexts, the generation of hypotheses based on observation of phenomena in real 
situations, for instance with respect to notions such as platform development in ARM. The 
hypotheses generated, whether theoretical, can best inform concrete action in the real situation 
instead of increasing an understanding of, or verify old 'truths'. Exploratory research can be 
done within case studies and allows comparative analysis. 
Case study and comparative approaches 
The exploratory character of the research and the intention to grasp different aspects (e.g., 
local arrangements, interventions, etc.) of resource management seem to motivate the choice 
for a case study research approach. Another reason for choosing a case study research 
approach is the flexibility (several cases studies can be conducted simultaneously), and the 
diversity concerning the methods of research applied to them. According to me, it is also the 
only way to display various situations which aim at increasing the 'trastworthiness' and the 
'authenticity' (explained further) of the emergent perspectives from the study. Multiple case 
study design was used (cf. Yin, 1984) in order to cover the different types of ecosystems 
which are considered in chapter 2. 
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The ways in which the case studies were used in this study are likely to form a 
combination of what Mitchell (1983: 193-96) described as an s extended case study' and 
"heuristic case studies': the former traces the events in which the same set of main actors in 
the case study are involved over a relatively long period; and the latter is meant by the 
deliberate choice of some case studies in order to gain theoretical insights. The inspiration I 
gained from the extended case study allowed me to base the analytical path of several cases 
selected according to the possibility to display temporal and spatial variations covered by the 
case studies. This may help to look at the changing patterns that occur with respect to the 
phenomena involved in ARM. The concept of the heuristic case study raises the awareness to 
cover several types of cases in order to grasp as much as possible the different contours of 
ARM. 
One can notice from chapter 2 that there is a diversity in the resources which are in 
need of being managed, depending on the type of the ecosystem under siege. In searching for 
common principles and similarities that can constitute the basis for ARM, a comparative 
approach acquires its relevance in the present study. The adoption of the comparative analysis 
can allow me to isolate and synthesize the common principles and similarities with respect to 
the key variables (the nature of the problem, the social learning processes, the facilitation of 
change, the regenerative practices that can be learned, the variables involved in platforms 
development processes). 
Having the comparative approach in mind, I always felt the need to diversify the 
resource management situations. One can argue that the comparative approach achieves 
information-richness. It offers many possibilities for the replication of a study. However it is 
also argued that the comparative approach presents the weakness of losing the specificities of 
a situation, which the case study investigated. Being aware of this problem, the present study 
analyses and draws a specific conclusion for each case, before a comparative analysis and 
synthesis were attempted. 
Using grounded theory principles to gain theoretical and practical insights 
The grounded theory approach is discussed as a way to build theory based on the empirical 
data in qualitative research (cf. Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Grounded 
theory principles concern the systematic set of analytical induction, interpretation, comparison, 
and coding procedures to develop a theory that is grounded in data collected in the real-world. 
This means that the research does not start with a preconception of the reality through the 
definition of hypotheses derived from existing theories and which are ultimately tested. 
Therefore, one can argue that some concepts and ideas at the beginning of a research can only 
be seen as a guide for the exploratory research, although the finding, the theory, must be 
contextualized. 
The grounded theory principles can offer, during the exploratory study, the opportunity 
to gain novel concepts, ideas, metaphors and methods which can be reiterated into the 
emerging relevant theory for ARM. Instead of using an existing theory or 'truth' to explain 
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(or understand) phenomena involved in ARM, it would be more useful to be creative and 
pragmatic concerning the way to go about this issue. To paraphrase Rap (1997: 7), one can 
argue that the intention is to look at the problems of resource management, as they are related 
to societal problems, from fresh, unprejudiced, sometimes counter-intuitive, yet well-founded 
points of view and to call into question the self-evident. 
Preparing the inquiry: selection of case studies 
The choice of the case studies was influenced by the NIRP programme under which the 
research was done. One of the objectives of this programme was to do the research in Benin 
and another country of the West (Francophone) Africa. For this reason, Burkina Faso was 
chosen. The fact that Burkina is a Sahelian country was a great advantage because of the 
diversity of the ecological zones covered by the present study. Benin and Burkina Faso are two 
neighboring countries. In physical environment patterns, these countries create together a wide 
range of ecological settings. From the South of Benin to the North of Burkina Faso, the 
environment becomes drier (from highly humid zones in the former to desert in the latter). The 
two countries are characterized by a ethnicity diversity. But, the block Fon ethnic group 
represents 47% of the population out of 5,000,000 inhabitants in Benin, while Mossi ethnic 
group represent 44% (3,500,000 out of the 8,000,000 inhabitants) of the population in Burkina 
Faso (Ouedraogo, 1990: 21). Linking ethnicity, politics and socioeconomic development is a 
common practice in the two countries. They gained independence the same year (1960), they 
share a common official language (french), the same currency (franc CFA) and they 
experienced a 'Marxist' regime (cf. Allen, 1989; Baxter & Somerville, 1989). The land area 
of Benin is 112 600 square kilometers and 274 000 for Burkina Faso. About 80% of their 
populations are in the rural areas. 
The selection of the case studies was done gradually through time and spaces (see fig. 
3.1). The number of the case studies definitively selected could not be foreseen at the 
begmning of the study. One of the rules that guides the choice of a case can be defined as the 
following: the progress and the 'discovery' of some phenomena during the inquiry about a case 
which was selected, stimulate the need to select a new case which can be expected to generate 
the counter-part of, or complement the previous 'discovery'. For instance, the investigation 
of a case in an ecozone A can stimulate the choice of the same case study in an ecozone B for 
comparative purpose or for making the conclusions more consistent about the issue under the 
study. In the process of selecting the case studies (described below) particular attention was 
given to a maximum variation of the cases by focusing on strategies which consisted on 
looking for typical cases, deviant or critical cases, politically important or sensitive cases, 
convenience cases (for example: save time, money and effort), etc. (cf. Kuzel, 1992: 38). 
The first case study selected in 1994 was the Lake Aheme in the southern part of 
Benin. The choice of this case was influence by some key concepts used (e.g., 'common 
property resource' use negotiation') at the beginning of the research. The Lake Aheme was 
also known in Benin for the repetitive and the seriousness of conflicts which occurred between 
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FCM case in Burkina 
Figure 3.1: Processes of the case studies selection 
CASE 
STUDIES 
A second case study on watershed was selected in 1995 in Mono (South-West of Benin) under 
the influence of the NTRP project whose one objective was to do a research on three case 
studies in Benin. This case was not too far from the Lake Aheme area (80 kilometers), and for 
this reason it presented a strategic advantage because of the possibility to do the fieldwork 
alternatively in the two locations. Another advantage was the fact that this period coincided 
also with the implementation of the PGRN project, a deliberate intervention which was seeking 
for the improvement, with the Gestion des Terroirs approach, of the watershed chosen as a 
case study. I also assumed that this situation might offer the opportunity to focus on a joint-
learning process between the stakeholders and the intervening agency. This region was known 
before through the previous studies about the 'IKS' of the Adja people. Although, I was 
motivated to see how the PGRN project would learn to live with the Adja people's knowledge. 
The third case study concerns rangelands. It was selected at the teginning of 1996 in 
the sous-prefecture of Save where the Tchabe ethnic groups are living. Save is one of the 
region in Benin where rangeland problems, especially the relationship between the herders and 
the stakeholders. One of the main objectives at that period was to find an interesting case 
which might constitute the basis for building a useful perspective on 'CPR use negotiation'. 
From this point of view, the Lake Aheme was attractive because it involved the stakeholders' 
interaction, the intervention of government organizations and political concerns. I assumed that 
these opportunities would offer diverse empirical data which might be interesting for the 
stimulation of a theoretical, methodological and practical reflection at early stage of this study. 
Progress in the selection processes and the investigations • 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
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the crop-farmers, are conflicting and problematic. The fact that there were conflicts between 
the stakeholders, interactions would occur and the chance to study some processes like 
negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution would be high. The Chabe people are one of the 
ethnic groups in Benin which make use of their local organizations and institutions for the 
preservation of their natural resources (Essouma, 1992). For all these reasons, the rangelands 
case was attractive. During the same period, the case of the Lake Aheme and the watershed 
in Mono were revisited. In Mono, the team of the PGRN project informed me about the 
existence of an intervention on rangelands which was using the appui-conseil approach towards 
concerted action between the farmers (in a village called Kêmon) and the herders. The 
rangelands case in Save was extended to the sous-préfecture of Ouesse (northern part of Save), 
especially Kemon, where the Tchabè people are living. The situation in Kemon complemented 
the one in Save because of the possibility to focus on how the PGRN team was cooperating 
with the local organizations and institutions of the Tchabè people. 
As explained above, the judgement of rigor in the constructivist inquiry is a 
predisposition at a different stage of the research process. At the end of 1996 the previous case 
studies were evaluated. Under the influence of the principles of the constructivist inquiry 
during this evaluation, the need to select other case studies was felt. A concrete example was 
that the watershed case in Mono revealed three important characteristics (Adja ethnic group -
coastal humid ecozone - team of watershed managers controlled by the PGRN headquarter) 
which influenced the data collected. The same variables in another way were identified for a 
watershed improvement activities in Ouèssè: Mahi ethnic group, savannah ecozone, NGO team 
for the execution of the watershed project. This procedure enabled the selection of a second 
watershed case in Ouèssè. 
The same procedure of the evaluation of the case studies which were investigating led, 
in the first hand, to the selection of the Djeffa women case. A motive was to incorporate the 
REDAD experiences (see background in §1.1) into this study. In the other hand, some ideas 
were developed for the selection of case studies in Burkina. For instance, the need to focus on 
the forestry problem was felt because the case studies in Benin did not cover this issue. 
Suzanna Nederlof, a dutch researcher, joined the research project to assist in conducting the 
Burkina case studies. The fact that she had some previous experiences, background, and many 
contacts in Burkina was a great advantage. 
At the beginning of 1997, the fieldwork of the two new case studies in Benin started. 
At the same period, Suzanna Nederlof started a pilot exploratory study in Burkina. Her 
objective was to provide background information for the selection of the case studies in 
Burkina. After this step, the coordinator of the NTRP project went to Burkina for the pre-
selection of some cases which could be interesting for a research (or could enrich or 
complement the Benin cases). In April 1997, the fieldwork started and a final selection of two 
case studies was done: The aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale and the Maro Forest. I 
focused on the zone sylvo-pastorale case while the Maro forest case was done by Suzanna 
Nederlof. The Burkina case studies gave the opportunity to study the intervention processes 
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through the PNGT actions, a similar situation with the PGRN project in Benin, an advantage 
for a comparative study. 
Research methods and techniques applied for the case studies 
The research methods and techniques applied in the case studies comprise unstructured and 
semi-structured interviews, the snow-ball technique and life histories, the participant 
observation, the use of documents as an additional source of information, and imaginative 
methods and techniques. 
Unstructured and semi-structured interviews 
The unstructured interview is known for its flexibility to learn from the respondents (Bernard, 
1988: 205-09) and to preserve an original meaning of information that is called the emic 
approach by Pelto & Pelto (1978: 55-60). According to me, a crucial problem faced by a 
researcher in doing unstructured interviews is how can one improvise, restructure and guide 
the information flow from the interviewed persons. Carruthers (1981:275) provides a mental 
construct (facts, reasons? alternatives? review procedure and forecast) that was used in the 
conditions of the unstructured interviews. These interviews had two basic purposes during the 
study. First, it enable to focus on what the stakeholders and other actors themselves do and 
think in the arenas of resource management. Second it enabled an immersion into the wider 
cultural, social, economic and political existing systems for the particular issue of resource 
management. The unstructured interviews covered several issues such as the identification and 
perception of the resource management problems by the stakeholders themselves and other 
actors, the ways they experienced them, the social processes that occurred and the solutions 
according to them. 
Semi-structured interviews complemented unstructured interviews and were used on 
the basis of an interview guidelines, opportunistically designed according to the data and 
information collected through unstructured interviews and the ideas/concepts from the 
perspectives of the researcher. Semi-structured interviews would mean that the role of the 
researcher is not completely neutral. It was also useful to cross-check the information, analyze 
them according to different windows (notes). Semi-structured interviews were done with some 
key informants carefully selected as is explained later. A key informant is an individual 
stakeholder, a representative of an interest coalition, an actor in development or research 
organization (GO or NGO), a political or administrative representative, a representative of a 
funding organization, etc. 
Snow-ball technique and life histories 
In most of the case studies, the snow-ball technique was used to identify the key informants 
for the interviews. This method is a type of sampling procedure in which, for example, 
choosing one informant may generate information about other persons which leads the 
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observer to contact one of these others as a second informant, who in turn directs him to a 
third informant etc., in an extensive chain of contacts (McCall & Simmons, 1969: 64). Snow-
ball technique leads to non-probability sampling based on reasoning, trial and error, literature 
assessment and creativity to cope with the complexity of a particular situation (Bertaux-Wiame, 
1981). The danger of the snow-ball technique is the fact that the selection of the key 
informants through this method, can lead to a 'false' image of a community because a chain 
of informants can reflect a group of people who share some ideals, opinion or adopt a specific 
about a natural resource use practice. One way to minimize the bias was to diversify the chains 
of informants obtained through the snow-ball techniques. 
In using the snow-ball technique, a particular attention was paid to some stakeholders 
who had some particular duties, responsibilities or leading roles with respect to resource 
management. Those type of stakeholders got a special treatment by what is called here the life-
history approach. Pelto & Pelto (1978: 75) argue that life histories represent the lives of 
exceptional rather than representative or average persons in the community. Selection of 
potential stakeholders in this approach is based on a purposive strategy (cf. Bertaux-Wiame, 
1981). This method, in this study, reflected the richness and personalized nature of some 
particular stakeholders. It enabled a vividness and integration of cultural information that are 
of a great importance and value for understanding particular lifeway in the relation to resource 
management. 
Participant observation 
Participant observation is widely used during the course of this study. Bernard (1988:148) 
explains the "art' of participant observation by saying: 
"It involves establishing rapport in a new community; learning to act so that people go about their business as 
usual when you show up; removing yourself every day from cultural immersion so you can intellectualize what 
you've learned, put it into perspective and write about it convincingly." 
In participant observation, the observer shares in the life activities and sentiments of 
people and his role reflects the social process of living in society (Bruyn, 1966). The delicacy 
of this task requires to be tactful (Berreman, 1972). The hypothesis-generating ability of 
participant observation stems from the observer's ability to apply a theoretical perspective to 
his observations and to respond to both uniformities and regularities in what he sees. 
Theoretical richness is obtained through an analysis based upon the observer's frame of 
reference (Pelto & Pelto, 1978; McCall & Simmons, 1969; Peacock, 1986). 
I was in the field for all the case studies. This gave the opportunity to observe 
stakeholders in their day-to-day activities (farming, fishing, cattle keeping, etc.), social events 
(conflicts, conflict resolution, meetings, collective activity) and the activities of professionals 
and researchers. According to Billaz and Diawara (1981: 112), it is in the field that the 
'rationality', the organizing principle of what stakeholders do and think, can be understood. 
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The use of documents as an additional source of information 
According to May (1993), the type of documents that can be used historical documents, 
official statistic reports, government records (i.e., ministerial records, debates, political 
speeches, adnunistrative and government committee records and reports; and one must add 
also consultancy and evaluation reports. The danger of using secondary sources of information 
is mainly related to the fact that they often emphasize the positive dimension (successes) of 
what had happened. The document might not cover negative dimensions (failures, mistakes, 
negative impacts), for instance, of a resource management project. In order to minimize these 
problems, it was important to do some historical interviews in order to reconstruct, to some 
extent, the past of resource management activities. 
Documents which were relevant for the case studies concerned: (a) government reports 
on general policy for resource management; (b) resource management project documents; (c) 
consultancy reports; (d) basic/applied and socio-economic reports, and historical documents 
which give a view of the past and the present of a resource management process. 
Imaginative methods and techniques 
Imaginative methods and techniques concern all kinds of creations and the bricolage of a 
researcher during the fieldwork. They are difficult to specify clearly because they evolve 
spontaneously according to the imagination of the researcher in searching for a way to 
introduce himself/herself in a community, i.e., using a metaphor to explain the purpose of the 
study, to obtain a type of information, and to learn with the stakeholders about a specific issue. 
Imaginative methods and techniques can be based on visual imagery and iconography (e.g., 
Pryce, 1996; Harrison, 1996) to generate information on a concrete ground with the 
stakeholders. 
3.6 Comparative analytical framework and research questions 
The analytical paths for the inquiry 
The case studies discussed are expected to provide the basis for learning to develop ideas and 
concepts for ARM. At this level, the notion of paradigms (positivism and constructivism) 
explained above appears again. For this reason, it would be useful to make explicit this issue 
in order to show how can distance one paradigm from another in an analytical path. 
The positivist inquiry accordingly to what is explained by Maarleveld et al, 1997 is 
mainly concerned with an attempt to seek a causal relationship among a set of independent 
variables (a, b, c, d, ...) which can hopefully explain or predict the dependent variable (see 
fig. 3.2). For example, the concept effective platform could be considered as a dependent 
variable and the analytical path would focus on ways for seeking a causal relationship between 
independent variables which can predict the conditions for the occurrence of an effective 
platform. 
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Figure 3.2: Realist-positivist analytical path 
In the present study, I distance myself from the positivistic way of inquiry discussed above and 
elaborate analytical paths which seem to be relevant for the analysis and the comparison of the 
data from the case studies in a manner of a constructivist inquiry. The identification of a 
common pattern of variations for the issue under investigations can be, according to me, a 
starting point for building a framework for the analysis in a constructivist inquiry. During the 
discussion about the perspective for ARM (see chapter 2) the importance of temporal and 
spatial variations at the levels of the ecosystems and the social dynamic of the stakeholders 
became apparent. Here, one can suspect that the consideration of the temporal and spatial 
variables in the path would be a predisposition for ensuring rigor in the constructivist inquiry. 
Two analytical paths are considered: the first follows a temporal variation of the case study 
(see fig. 3.3) and the second focuses on sub-cases which present spatially different 
characteristics for a case study (see fig. 3.4). 
How to proceed in the analytical path 1 (temporal variations) ? 
• Define time scales according to some perceived events or assumptions which seem to 
be relevant for the changing patterns of the case study in terms of the problems of 
resource management. 
Dependent 
variable Independent variables 
Four criteria which are used for ensuring rigor in the positivist inquiry are discussed 
by Guba & Lincoln (1989: 234-5): internal validity, external validity, reliability, and 
objectivity. The first criterion (internal validity) is used to test the degree of isomorphism, the 
extent to which the findings of a study correspond to a presumed reality 'out there. The second 
criterion (external validity) is used to test the extent to which the results obtained on a small 
sample are generalizable to a larger sample. The third criterion (reliability) concerns the 
consistency, the predictability and the possibihty to repeat the same study and obtain the same 
phenomena if the same instruments are used. The fourth criterion (objectivity) means that the 
inquiry process is free of bias, values and/or prejudice. The researcher has no influence on the 
research process. Guba & Lincoln (1989: 236) analyze critically these criteria for the positivist 
inquiry and conclude that they cannot be relevant in the constructivist inquiry. 
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• Describe the ecosystem under siege and identify the stakeholders at the period of the 
study. It could be done also through the times scales defined. But the difficulties for 
obtaining, for instance, data about the changing state of the ecosystems in the present 
study did not make it possible. 
• Proceed the analysis through the time scales by using the key variables defined in the 
perspectives for ARM: the problems, the social learning, and the facilitation of 
changes. 
• Draw conclusions, through a retrospective look at the data, about the nature of the 
platform(s) and the assessment of greater sustainability. 
Four case studies, as they were presented further, follow this analytical path: the Lake 
Aheme, the Djeffa women, the zone sylvo-pastorale , and the Maro forest. 
How to proceed in the analytical path 2 (spatial variations) ? 
• Making visible the variables which constitute the ground of the spatial variation of the 
case study in several sub-case studies. The relation of the variation of the sub-cases in 
terms of the problems of resource management is also important to take into 
considerations. 
• Proceed in each sub-case by using the key variables defined in the perspectives for 
ARM: The ecosystem and the stakeholders, the problems, the social learning, the 
facilitation of changes, and the nature of platform. 
• Compare the sub-cases (mainly the differences) and provide a synthesis. A specific 
conclusion will be drawn for the case study. 
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Two case studies follow this analytical path: the Rangeland in Chabe community and 
the watershed development. 
Spatial variation 
Analytical 
Variables 
Analytical 
Variables 
Figure 3.4: Analytical path 2 within a constructivist inquiry 
The criteria for ensuring rigor are explained in details by Guba & Lincoln (1989). Table 3.1 
presents these criteria. The trustworthiness is defined in terms of sub-criteria paralleling the 
ones which are used in the positivist paradigm (see Table 3.1). The first is credibility which 
can be defined in terms of the relevance of the outcome of an inquiry for the stakeholders and 
the other actors involved. The transferability is the extent to which the outcome of an inquiry 
can be used or adapted to a new situation. The dependability and conformability are mainly 
concerned with the methods and the sources used for obtaining the quality of the data. The 
authenticity criteria (ontological, educative, catalytic, and tactical) are mainly concerned with 
the gains from the processes of the inquiry, their usefulness for undertaking and sustaining 
actions. 
Table 3.1: Criteria for ensuring rigor in the constructivist paradigm (after Guba & 
Lincolm, 1989) 
Main criteria Trustworthiness Authenticity 
Sub-criteria 
Credibility (paralleling internal validity) 
Transferability (paralleling external validity) 
Dependability (paralleling reliability) 
Confirmability (paralleling objectivity) 
Fairness 
Ontological authenticity 
Educative authenticity 
Catalytic authenticity 
Tactical authenticity 
Part 2: Case Studies 

4 Breaking The Impasse: The Evolution of the Platform for Lake 
Aheme's Resource Management 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter1 deals with a lake fishery problem. A specific feature concerning fisheries is the 
difficulty of designing any deliberate intervention for the control over fishery resources, and 
of the people who use them. A typical example is given by Anderson (1987) for the Malaysian 
fisheries. Another feature of fisheries is that their resources are used under imperfect 
information and knowledge. One cannot easily know the quantity, the diminishing and 
increasing rate of the fishery resources, and devise a model for their 'rational' use. 
This case study concerns the Lake Aheme fishery in the southern part of Benin. Some 
important literatures about the fisheries in the South of Benin and especially Lake Aheme 
(e.g., Pliya, 1980; Dagba, 1986; Mondjannagni, 1977), and the history, origin, and socio-
cultural organization of the people around the Lake Aheme area (e.g., Manning, 1982; 
Meideros, 1984; Pfeiffer, 1988) were available. Other sources of information which concern 
the reports of the government organizations; the Direction des Pêches (DP), the fishery 
department, and the Centre d'Action Régionale pour le Développement Rural (CARDER), the 
government extension organization which intervenes in fishery issues; were also used. Several 
research methods and techniques were used for this case study. Individual (and group) 
interviews were used to collect the data from the stakeholders and other actors outside the lake 
area. Key informants for the interviews were selected with the snow-ball technique but 
particular attention was paid to the bias, the pretension of the informants to guide the 
researcher towards other informants who should have the same opinion (e.g., agree or against 
a fishing practice) about the problems of the lake. Snow-ball techniques worked as a strategy 
which enabled me to enter the arenas in the lake area. The life history approach was adopted 
for the particular stakeholders who hold (or held) some important responsibilities concerning 
the Lake Aheme. Participant observation was used during many field visits. 
This chapter starts with the description and understanding of the Lake Aheme 
ecosystem, and the identification of the stakeholders at the period of the study (§4.2). But this 
does not mean that the past of the Lake Aheme and the stakeholders is neglected. Rather, a 
historical approach was adopted to analyse the evolution of the problems, the learning 
processes, the facilitation of change, the practices on the lake, and the platforms for resource 
management at four different periods: pre-colonial times before 1894 (§4.3); colonial times, 
period: 1894-1960 (§4.4); post-colonial times, period: 1960-1990 (§4.5.); and during the era 
of democratization after 1990 (§4.6). This case study draws specific conclusions (§4.7) about 
the extent to which greater sustainability is being achieved and the factors involved in 
successes or failures of fishery resource use. 
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4.2 Lake Aheme Ecosystem and Stakeholders 
Lake Aheme Ecosystem 
Lake Aheme is located in the Southern area of Benin and is (partially) a natural frontier 
between the Atlantic and the Mono provinces in Benin (see map 4.1a). From the 
administrative point of view2, the people in the two provinces and the Sous-prefectures of 
Come, Houeyogbe, and Bopa (in Mono province), and of Kpomasse and Ouidah (in Atlantic 
province) use the lake. Several villages are established around the lake. 
The lake is deeply embanked between two plateaus of the Terre de barre (red soil): the 
plateaux of Com6 and Bopa in the West, and of Allada in the East. At the Northern part, the 
lake receives the River Couffo. With 24 km in length, the lake's surface is 78 square/km 
during low levels of water and 100 square/km at the periods of the inundation of the floodplain 
(Dissou, 1986: 68). The Northern part is deep (2.10 m) while Southern part is less deep, 0.30 
m during periods lower water levels. 
The connection of the Lake Aheme to the sea goes through a complex channel called 
Aho, with 10 km in length, which joins the lagoon of Grand-Popo, a crossing point other 
rivers flowing into the Atlantic ocean (see map 4.1b). During the dry season, the water flows 
from the sea through the Aho and causes increasing salinity in the Southern part of the lake. 
This phenomenon happens very often in March according the stakeholders. When the rainy 
season starts, the River Couffo flows abundantly into the lake and causes decreasing salinity. 
The interest here is not to focus on ecological understanding from this dynamic, but this 
description aims at establishing the ground for the understanding of the fishing practices and 
strategies which are used by the stakeholders (to be discussed later). 
The lake's shores were covered by mangroves (e.g., Rhizophora racemosa and 
Avicennia africand) which provided shelter, refuge, shade, food, and fish ponds for the lake's 
species (Pliya, 1980). But this physical state of the lake has changed. According to 
Mondjanangni (1969) and Pliya (1980), the mangroves were completely destroyed, despite 
their importance for providing a suitable ecological niche for the reproduction and the growth 
of the Lake Aheme fishery resources. 
Actually, there are many natural resources in the lake, which have important economic 
value. The further discussions will reveal that the economic valuation of the lake's resources 
had emerged, and the more scarce they are, the more interesting economic value 
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they have, and the more complex is resource management. The stakeholders explained that the 
fish species of the Lake Aheme, called (in Pedah) akpavi, guessou, siko, nongban, blolo, 
ahoue are well-appreciated in the markets (see table 4.1). Other species like degon, assort and 
todan have a very high economic value (see table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Example of the Lake Aheme fishery resources which have important economic value 
according to the stakeholders (source: this study, and Pliya, 1980) 
Local name (Pedah) Scientific name 
Akpavi (fish) Sarotherodon melanotheron 
Guessou (fish) Mugil cephalus 
Siko (fish) Potynemus quadrifilis 
Nongban (fish) Elops lacerta 
Blolo (fish) Chrysichthys migrodigitatus 
Ahoue (fish) Ethmalosa fimbriata 
Degon (shrimp) Penaeus duorarum 
Asson (crab) Callinectes latimanus 
Todan (eel) Myrophus punctutus 
The stakeholders of Lake Aheme 
The first attempt to identify the stakeholders of the Lake Aheme was based on the data about 
their socio-cultural diversity and the social practices which characterize them. This idea came 
from the historical sources (e.g., Karl-August, 1984; Pazzi, 1984; Merlo & Vidaud, 1984) 
which were available. From the social cultural diversity side, two important ethnic groups, the 
Pedah and the Ayizo were identified. 
The Pedah people are the dominant ethnic group of the lake (cf. also Pliya, 1980). 
They are at the Western side of the lake, and live in the consecutive villages Agatogbo, 
Gongue-gbo, Kpetou, Acodeha, Houegb6-Pedah, Sehomi, Tokan, Tossouhon and Ouedeme 
(see map 4.2). At the Eastern side of the lake, Pedah people are dominant in the villages 
Agbanto, Segbohoue and Adjatopka. The Ayizo people live in the Northern part of the lake 
in Bopa (Western side) and in some important villages, D6kanme, Tokpa-Dome, Yeme, 
Houago, Houedjro and Kpago at the Eastern side (see map 4.2). 
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Map 4.2: Villages around Lake Aheme 
T c W o n h o u i « , 
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Scale: 1/100,000 
(Adapted from Pliya, 1980: 147) 
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There are some similar cultural patterns with respect to beliefs and religious practices in the 
two ethnic groups (Aguessi, 1984). Tado (in Togo) is considered to be the place from where 
the Pedah and the Ayizo people originated (Pazzi, 1984; Karl-August, 1984). There is a 
resemblance in the language used by these two ethnic groups. 
From the social practice side (especially the economic dimension), the Pedah people 
are fishers while the Ayizo people are fishers-farmers. The fact that fishing activities are 
common for the two ethnic groups means that they hold a stake in Lake Aheme and may have 
different voices and interests. The methodological dilemma which was related to this situation, 
concerned the identification of different categories of the stakeholders and their social practices 
and interests. 
Gu6zin was identified (on the basis of information outside the lake) as a village which 
is historically remarkable as a centre where some people had played a crucial role for the 
governance of and the control over the lake. Starting intensive interviews from Guezin helped 
me to identify other key informants (snow-ball technique) in the other villages of the lake. The 
practices and the methods used for the fishing activities, especially those which presented 
conflicting grounds, were identified. They constituted the basis for the identification of the 
following main groups of the stakeholders of the Lake Aheme: The De (=King) Zounon, the 
Xha people, the Akaja users and others. 
The De Zounon is the King of Guezin. The dynasty of the Zounon was governing the 
Lake Aheme and the kingdom was supported by the catches from a fishing practice called Xha 
which is a kind of fishing barrier installed at the southern part of the lake (see photograph 
4.1). The Xha enables the owner to catch shrimps and fish species which migrate from the sea. 
The Xha people are the relatives or the family of the De Zounon3. They practice the Xha in 
the lake. The Akaja users are the stakeholders who designed the Akaja system, a kind of 
fishing device based on the principle of setting dense masses of branches in the shallow water 
(see photograph 4.2), which attract a large number of fish because of its resemblance to the 
mangrove. This fishing device is used at the deeper Central and the Northern parts of the lake. 
The owner of the Akaja is the only one who appropriates, after a certain period (6-12 months), 
the catches of a large quantity of fish which is in this fishing device. 
The Xha and the Akaja fishing practices enable few stakeholders to catch more natural 
resources like fish, shrimps, crabs, etc. in Lake Aheme. The majority of the other stakeholders 
have little and became frustrated and they use some fishing methods and tools which are 
perceived as one of the causes of the depletion of the lake. 
According to the discussion above, if the Lake Aheme is to be used in a concerted 
manner, an agreement among the different groups of stakeholders seems to be the only way 
for developing perspectives on solutions at the level of the whole lake. This argument was 
emphasised in another way by the stakeholder Sagbo (see Box 4.1). 
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Box 4.1: The specific nature of the Lake Aheme fishery resources explained by Sagbo 
'Nobody knows how the fishes move in the shallow water of the lake. A fish which escapes your net will be 
caught by someone who is maybe at 10 km ... when you are using a fishing method to catch a large quantity of 
fish, you have to think about the others ..." 
In the further discussions, emphasis is given to the way the different categories of the 
stakeholders, the institutions, and the organization for governing the lake, emerged, the 
interactions among the stakeholders and how they seek solutions for the problems of the lake. 
Photo 4.2: Branches used for Akaja 
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4.3 Lake Aheme during the pre-colonial times: before 1894 
The problems and perceptions of Lake Aheme 
The problematic context of the settlement around Lake Aheme 
The problems of Lake Aheme during the pre-colonial times can be well-understood on the one 
hand, through an analysis of the chaotic circumstances (tribal wars and migrations) whereby 
the settlement of the Pedah people around the lake was affected, and on the other, through the 
representation of the lake in their life-worlds. 
From historical sources, Pedah people were living in a village called Sahe4. They 
created the historical place G16hou6 called Ouidah at the coast of the Atlantic sea in order to 
develop commercial activities with the Europeans. The success of the Pedah Kingdom in Sahe 
attracted the Kingdom of Danxome5, and the King Agadja of Danxome conquered Sahe in 1727 
in order to control the economic activities with the Portuguese (Karl-August, 1984). In these 
difficult circumstances, the Pedah people fled towards Lake Aheme to find a place which 
protected them against the soldiers of the Danxome. They found a refugee place they called 
Mitogbodji6 which is a small island in Lake Aheme. The soldiers of the Kingdom of Danxome 
(a plateau region) who did not know how to swim were not able to cross the lake to reach 
them. Lake Aheme was used as a natural protector against enemies. The context was also 
characterised by the slave trade, insecurity and the many raids to enslave people (see Manning, 
1982). . 
The Pedah people had learned to become fishers. From Mitogbodji, they created the 
village Houegbe-Pedah and many others around the lake. Their adaptation to the fishing 
activities in the lake for subsistence started since their settlement. Following this event, the 
Ayizo people of the Allada plateau who were farmers and hunters, settled in the North-east 
of the lake. They created some villages like Tokpa-Dome and had learned fishing. 
The generation of local organizations and institutions for governing Lake Aheme 
According to local mythology which is known by the stakeholders, and the existing sacred 
places in Gu6zin, the panther had a great significance for the generation of the local 
organization for Lake Aheme in the past. The mythology concerns a hunter called Eklousse 
who left Niaouli (village at the Northeast of the lake) and reached Guezin while hunting on the 
Eastern shore of the lake. In Guezin he killed two panthers which terrified the Pedah people. 
For that reason, Eklousse was welcomed and he started fishing activities with a kind of basket-
trap he made with the veins of the oil-palm tree (Elaeis guinensis). The tool was efficient and 
Eklousse had the idea to design a fishing barrier in zigzag in the lake and fixed the basket-trap 
in the angles along the barrier. Fish, shrimps and crabs were captured in the basket-trap. 
Eklousse was admired by the Pedah people in Gu6zin because of his astute way of fishing with 
the Xha. The Pedah people had benefited from his catches (cf Pliya, 1980: 91). After killing 
the two panthers, and inventing the Xha practice, Eklousse was named the Zounon (which 
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means literally: 'the mother of work'). He was appointed the King of Gu6zin (or Dih Zounon 
in Pedah) by the Pedah people. 
The Dih Zounon extended his authority to all the people (Pedah and Ayizo) around the 
lake. He succeeded to realize the unification of those ethnic groups. He was appointed the king 
of the Lake Aheme by the Pedah people. The agreement was made that the Deh Zounon was 
only one allowed to practice the Xha as a means of support for the Kingdom. The Dih Zounon 
took the control of the voodoos, the spiritual representations of God, such as Dagboe-hounsou 
in Houedjro, Kpohon in Sehomi, Kpassi in Houegnogb6 and Tohonon in Kpindji, which were 
perceived as the protectors of the lake and the stakeholders. He appointed the priests of these 
voodoos and they formed together the local organization for governing the lake. The priests 
were strategically located around the lake (see the villages underlined on map 4.2) in order to 
enable an effective control of the stakeholders. 
The fact that the authority of the Dih Zounon covered the economic, moral, social and 
spiritual dimensions of the people of Lake Aheme provided some prerogatives to the local 
organization of the lake, i.e., setting rules, regulations, the protection of the environment, 
sanctions, treat of different conflicts, protection of villages, etc. The institutions for Lake 
Aheme, generated by the local organization, are synthesized in the Box 4.2. Some taboos 
concerning the King Zounon were defined, for instance, he was not allowed to put his feet in 
the water because, according to the local people, this would provoke the anger of the spiritual 
representations which would create serious floods in the agglomeration of Gu6zin and a lot of 
diseases for those who were living there. 
Box 4.2: The local institutions of the Lake Aheme during the pre-colonial times 
• The Djetowl6 (jumping in the lake) is forbidden in order to protect the spawning ground of the fish. 
• The Dobou-doboui (chasing the fish by hands towards the fishing net) is forbidden. 
• The Amedjrotin (putting leaves in the water to attract the fish) was not allowed. 
• The use of "Mandovi" (a fishing net with a small mesh) and "Djohoun" (a fishing tool which holds a lot 
of hooks) were forbidden. 
• The fishers were not allowed to practise fishing activities two days per week. 
• During the periods of the cult for the voodoos protecting the lake, fishing activities were not allowed. 
The cult ranged over 5 to 7 days. 
The interpretations and identification of the problems of the Lake Aheme 
The motives of using the local institutions were aimed at keeping the Lake Aheme from being 
destroyed. The local institutions of the lake revealed an ecological connotation, for instance, 
the fact that the Djitowle and the Doboui-doboui were banned, can be interpreted as a way to 
avoid habitat degradation of species in the lake. They included the idea of restricting the 
catches by reducing the fishing activities to 5 days in the week and of preventing the use of 
Mandovi, Djohoun, and Amedjrotin. They involved a form of investment which can be defined 
in terms of the contributions required for the spiritual cults (goat, chickens, alcohol, money, 
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etc. for the ceremonies) which stimulated the productivity of the lake, ensured the subsistence 
and the prosperity of all the stakeholders. 
One can interpret that maintaining the local institutions and organization for governing the 
Lake Aheme was the crucial problem. The problems were related to the trust on the local 
institutions because the willingness to cheat by some stakeholders existed already at that 
period. The provision for the effectiveness of the local organization through the mutual control 
of the fishing activities is a dimension of the problem. The notion of spirituality required that 
the stakeholders believed in, and participated (contributions needed for the ceremonies) in the 
cults of the voodoos which mastered the prosperity of both Lake Aheme and the stakeholders. 
The main question which seems relevant is how the stakeholders learned to cope with their 
problems, and what contributed to the process of change for managing resources in the Lake 
Aheme? 
The stakeholders' learning about their way of living with Lake Aheme 
The representations and ways of learning about Lake Aheme Ecosystem 
According to the interpretation of the stakeholders, the Lake Aheme is a part of the natural 
world on which they depend. The natural and the social worlds are under the control of the 
spiritual world (see fig. 4.1) which have several representations of God. 
Figure 4.1: The representation of the Lake Aheme in the frame of reference of the 
stakeholders in the pre-colonial times 
The stakeholder Dossou used the parable: 'a person who is at the top does not know what is 
happening at the bottom, he can only imagine', to explain that the Pedah people knew how to 
handle the Lake Aheme. They knew when one should go to fish and when one should not. 
They knew what should be done or should be avoided to have a specific type of fish species 
in the lake. They respected these rules. According to Dossou, the Pedah people understood not 
only phenomena related to the lake but they made use of their magic and sorcery to transcend 
different kinds of problems at the level of the lake. When something happened, they implored 
their voodoos and the fish would appear again in the lake for all the stakeholders. Spirituality 
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was a repertoire of the local understanding and interpretation to decision-making about the lake 
(cf. Pliya, 1980). 
Decision-making processes about Lake Aheme by the local organization 
In relation to the belief systems of the stakeholders that the lake was under the protection of 
several voodoos, the decision-making about the lake was in the hands of the spiritual 
authorities: the King Zounon and the religious priests of the lake. The communication with the 
spiritual world was done through the consultation of the oracles which would enable 
anticipation on the anger of the voodoos which might create surprises in the lake area 
(inundation, decreasing of fish catches, etc.). According to the existing legends, the King 
Zounon had the possibility to influence the productivity of the lake with the aid of magic and 
supra-knowledge. 
For any problem about the Lake Aheme, the King Zounon convened the religious 
chiefs of the lake for a meeting. They consulted the oracles and entered into communication 
with the spiritual representations of the lake and analysed the situation. Their meeting was 
done at one of the locations where the priests were living (Bopa, Sehomi, or Houedjro), 
especially in a secret woody place. At the end of a meeting the new rules which would be 
applied by the stakeholders were declared by the King Zounon. The communication with the 
spiritual world helped to know the magnitude of the angers of the supra-representations of the 
lake. These issues were the ways the stakeholders identified, anticipated on their destiny in 
relation to the lake. The nature of the offerings to voodoos of the lake was noticed by the King 
Zounon. The Adipkonon, the priest of the voodoo Dagboehonsou of the lake was in charge 
of the organization of the offering ceremonies in Houedjro. The stakeholders around Lake 
Aheme believed in the deliberations of the local organization which was governing the lake 
and they were following its rules. However, one can explore the means by which the local 
organization had to maintain collective behaviour. 
On spirituality, magic and witchcraft: resolving collective problems 
Under the local arrangement, the punishment structure and sanctions for the non-respect of the 
institutions for the Lake Aheme were severe and very efficient according to historical sources 
(e.g., Pliya, 1980) and the information provided by the stakeholders during this study. There 
were different levels of sanctions for those who did not respect the local institutions (cf. also 
Pliya, 1980). Simple sanctions concerned the confiscation of non-authorized fishing tools 
which were publicly burnt in the village of the defector. Dossou explained what he had learned 
from his grandfather about the most severe sanctions of the defectors of the rules in the local 
institutions for the Lake Aheme (see Box 4.3). 
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Box 4.3: Dossou explained the nature of the sanctions in the local perspective 
In the old tunes of our ancestries, the respect of the practices which were banned by the authorities of the lake, 
was a very serious affair. At that period, the religious priests and the old men in the villages were in charge of 
punishing those who were violating the local institutions of the lake. The sanctions were really severe and without 
any compassion to pity. At worse, you will be killed with the witchcraft power or the magic of the spiritual priests 
and the old men. After the tragedy, everybody would say that this was done by the voodoo Dagboehonsou, the 
guard of the lake. The body of the dead person who had violated the local institutions would be passed through 
the whole village to show to the other inhabitants that he had violated the law of the old men (la lot des vieux he 
said in trench). There were many realities in our culture. 
The sanctions were embedded in the spiritual world. The stakeholders believed at that period 
mat those who did not trust the institutions for the lake would raise the anger of the voodoo 
Dagboehonsou, a spiritual guard of the lake, which would create a difficult situation and a 
collective consequence on their livelihoods. This conception was an important motivation for 
a mutual control for the implementation of the local institutions and the detection of the 
defectors. 
Learning about the development of the platform of the stakeholders: why was it successful? 
The platform of the stakeholders under the local arrangement consisted of the King Zounon 
and the local religious priests who adopted a concerted action, at the level of the Lake Aheme 
Ecosystem. The development of the platform of the stakeholders was based on a spiritual 
power which enabled the mobilization of the stakeholders. Spirituality, magic and witchcraft 
were the instruments for exerting a certain coercive power towards an accommodating 
perspective. One can argue that magic and witchcraft created fears and reinforced trust on the 
the local organization which was governing the lake. 
The unification of all the stakeholders by the King Zounon was favoured by the 
common religious practices of the stakeholders. This argument is strengthened by the fact that 
Aguessi (1984) demonstrates the existence of 'religious convergences' among the Adja, Ewe 
and Yoruba, especially the Pedah and the Ayizo (which share same cultural roots with the 
Adja). From that point of view, the existing spiritual values which were shared could be a 
powerful driving force for bringing the stakeholders to accommodate on the platform for 
resource management on the Lake Aheme at that period. 
From the historical point of view, the situation of the Pedah people at the beginning 
of their settlement seemed to create a kind of interdependence. All the stakeholders were 
caught out by tribal wars. The fear to be enslaved was a common problem. One can arguably 
say that they did not have other choices but to develop a platform for the implementation of 
the local institutions which would enable their subsistence with the lake's resources. 
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What can be learned from the local perspective for the facilitation of change about a 
fishery resource management problems? 
From the local arrangement of Lake Aheme, some ideas emerge, could be useful for the 
facilitation of changes in resource management on the lake: the satisfaction of the need of the 
stakeholders, the importance of communicating with others and the role of incentives for the 
local organizations which were generated by the stakeholders. 
As explained above, the platform of stakeholders chaired by King Zounon brought all 
the stakeholders on the lake together for an effective management of the resources of the lake. 
At that period, beyond the problems of peace and security, the subsistence of the stakeholders 
was also important (cf. Pliya, 1980). 
The processes of communicating and influencing the behaviour of the stakeholders were 
embedded in magic. The messages were sacred acts in the frame of reference of the 
stakeholders. Communication can be interpreted as having a function of informing the 
stakeholders about the new norms and rules of the local institutions of the lake which might 
be internalized by the stakeholders. Another function of communication processes in the 
approach of the local organization was to act as a means which enabled contact with the 
spiritual world by a divination system. 
Under the local arrangements, the fact that King Zounon, the chairman of the platform 
of the stakeholders for governing Lake Aheme was the only one who used Xha in the lake 
seemed to be a great incentive. This could be also interpreted as a way to sustain the 
effectiveness of the local organization and stimulate the stakeholders to maintain trust in the 
local institutions for the lake. 
4.4 Lake Aheme during the colonial times: 1894-1960 
Problems and perceptions 
New socio-economic order with colonialism and its implications for the exploitation of Lake 
Aheme 
During the colonization of Dahomey (Benin from 1975), a new law (Decree of 23rd, October 
1904) stipulated in the whole federation of Francophone West Africa that the State had the 
right to control all water resources. 'Public domains' (e.g., fisheries, floodplain, etc.) 
belonged to the State. The Service des Eaux et Forts (SEF), Water and Forests Service was 
created in 1907. The existing local organization and institutions for the lake were not used 
while the new external organization, the SEF did not define the new institutions for the lake 
until 1939 (cf. Pliya, 1980). 
The King Zounon held concurrently his position in the local organization lake and the 
one of the Chefde Canton (formal political authority at the local level) of the Pedah. Despite 
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the fact that the feet of the King should not touch the water of the lake, his new position gave 
other prerogatives to him and he always organized frequent tours in the villages where the 
Pedah people were living in the lake area. Then his activities were beyond the prerogatives of 
the Kingdom. This situation influenced negatively tie credibility of the local organization 
because the king was not allowed to have frequent mobility. 
The fishery resources of the Lake Aheme acquired economic value. Beyond the 
subsistence of the stakeholders, there was an increased demand for fish and market 
opportunities were offered (cf. also Pliya, 1980). The development of transport services and 
the facilities for joining market places encouraged the stakeholders to catch more fish 
in the Lake Aheme. 
Changing conditions about the Lake Aheme and the stakeholders 
Lake Aheme attracted other ethnic groups like the Toffin and the Goun from the South-eastern 
part of Benin and the Ayizo farmers who were living in villages not so far from the lake. The 
lake covered several administrative divisions which were created. Several poles for the 
treatment of conflicts between the stakeholders emerged. The idea of maintaining one authority 
system for the lake was not applied. The sanctions of the stakeholders who were not 
cooperating for the implementation of the local institutions of the lake were no longer 
effective. Any attempts to revive the local arrangement at the end of the 1930s were not 
successful because the laissez-aller reached a certain level which created a loss of trust in the 
local organization, especially King Zounon (Pliya, 1980: 119). 
The emergence of market opportunity, a new valuation of the fisheries resources, and 
the mounting population around the lake, all these issues favoured an increased pressure on 
the lake (see arguments of Comlan in Box 4.4). The problem of scarcity of the fishery 
resources emerged already at that period. 
Box 4.4: Comlan, a sixty year old stakeholder, explained the changing situation around the lake 
My father told me that when he was young, they were not in a large number in the lake area. The fish was in the 
lake and they did not have any serious problems. The shore of the lake was covered by Akpontin (mangroves in 
Ayizo) which constituted the place where the fish increased in weight after three months. Many people came to 
exploit the lake and the Akpontin were destroyed. The fish was not sufficient for everybody and they migrated 
to Ghana, Cote d'lvoire and Gabon. 
What is the nature of the problems and the solutions to the emerging issues? 
During the colonial period, the local organization and institutions serving the use of the lake 
were weakened. In face of the new socioeconomic order and the changing conditions with 
respect to the stakeholders and the lake, defining and enforcing new institutions for the lake 
might be the immediate problem for external organisations. If formal institutions for the lake 
were defined, another dimension of the problem would be related to the cooperation of the 
stakeholders to enable their enforcement. 
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Figure 4.2: The new representation of the Lake Aheme in the frame of reference of the 
stakeholders 
Sagbo explained how professionals of the Service des Peches learned about the idea of Akaja 
which was not known by the stakeholders (see Box 4.5). 
There was also the evidence that the physical state of the lake was changing negatively, the 
mangrove was destroyed (Pliya, 1980: 48). The need to find the solutions for mamlaining the 
productivity of the lake was a crucial problem. The most important idea of the Service des 
Peches for improving the productivity of the lake was the Akaja practice7. How did they learn 
to arrive at this stage? What happened with respect to the introduction and execution of the 
Akaja practice? How was the use of Akaja facilitated? 
The social learning emerges from the use of Lake Aheme 
Learning about Lake Aheme Ecosystem 
According to the previous discussion, the perception of the lake by the stakeholders was based 
on the social, natural, and spiritual worlds. During the colonial period the economic world 
entered the frame of reference of the stakeholders (see figure 4.2). Market opportunities 
altered the local perspective based on spfrituality. This new context did not enable as a 
successful control over the lake as has existed during the pre-colonial times. 
Investigations which were done by scientists at that period revealed that the ecological 
conditions for the reproduction of the species in the Lake Aheme were degraded (cf. Pliya, 
1980: 143). The need to innovate and improve the productivity of the lake was felt. The Akaja 
practice was found as a solution. The officer of fishing development activities at the CARDER 
Atlantic explained that the idea of Akaja was inspired by the fishermen of another lake (Lake 
Nokoue) in Benin. Those fishers observed that the fish were attracted by the mangrove and 
through a process of informal experiments, they put some branches in the shallow water of the 
lake to attract the fishes. 
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Box 4.5: Sagbo explained the learning processes about the lake by scientists 
We were in our village with our lake which was depleted. The yovos (white men) came. They took several 
samples of the mud in the lake. They left and we heard later that the only way to have more fishes in the lake was 
to accept the idea of Akaja that would be installed in the lake. We didn't know anything about it. We refused 
because we did not know that it would solve our problem. When the idea reached a village, everybody refused 
because they thought the yovos wanted to take' our lake. 
Learning about the implementation of the Akaja practice 
The Akaja was installed in Lake Aheme under the control of the Service des Peches. This 
process started in a context which was characterized by the absence of formal institutions for 
Lake Aheme and a of social organization of stakeholders for the use of Akaja. The problem 
was seen only from the technical point of view and one could wonder about the effectiveness 
of the Akaja practice because the organization of the stakeholders was missing (cf. Pliya, 
1980: 151). The stakeholders took advantage of two conditions to learn about the Akaja 
practice: the weakness of the intervening organization and the absence of instruments to 
implement sanctions (see Box 4.6). 
Box 4.6: Abemou explained what happened after the implementation of Akaja 
In 1956, the people of the Service des Peches took the initiative to design Akaja in Lake Aheme. At the beginning 
of their action, they constructed three Akajas in the lake in order to provide the conditions which would enable 
the rapid growth of the fish according to what they said. One Akaja was designed in the lake at the level of 
Segbohoue, the second between Topka-Dome and Possotome and the third between Dekanme and Bopa. The 
Akajas were constructed at the places where the lake was deep. At the beginning the stakeholders did not fish in 
the Akaja because nobody knew its importance. After a year, the branches of the Akaja were untied, by the people 
of the Service des Peches, to spread the fishes in the lake for all the stakeholders. Following this first experience, 
everybody had learned that they could get more fish in the Akaja. The local authorities ordered some people to 
fish the Akaja and the catches were offered to the guests who arrived in the villages. These special privileges were 
becoming a rule for the local adniinistrative authorities to benefit more from the Akaja. The other stakeholders 
were frustrated and they went to fish in the Akaja during the evenings. After this experience, a decision was made 
by the Service des Peches that the Akaja would be exploited collectively and the money which was obtained should 
be used for the realization of infrastructures (road, wells for drinking water, health centre, etc.) in the communes 
around the lake. This idea did not work also because everybody went to fish the Akaja during the evenings, they 
were completely destroyed. The independence of Dahomey came and the experience of the collective Akaja 
amtinued in other way (see Box 4.7 in §4.5). 
From the explanation above, participatory methods were not used for making visible the 
problem of the lake. But after the design of Akaja, the stakeholders were observing, analysing 
and evaluating carefully the performance of this innovation brought by the intervention. Akaja 
which was not perceived as a relevant practice by the stakeholders at first, was experientially 
learned by them. They realized that they should take advantage from the economic 
opportunities which were offered. Instead of mamtaining the original practice of the Akaja 
which allowed everybody to benefit from the productivity of the lake, they were all interested 
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any individual incentive for the stakeholders in using the Akaja practice for a collective 
benefit. 
Parallelling the strategic behaviour of the stakeholders, several scenarios were tried 
(see Box 4.6) by the professionals. They reviewed and evaluated their own intervention 
practices to seek for improvements. The intervention itself was transformed into a learning 
process by trying to find the best way which would enable equitable benefit of improvements 
which resulted from the Akaja in the lake. 
What can be learned about the new development of the platform of the stakeholders? 
The oneness of the authority system, i.e., the local organization for the governance of the Lake 
Aheme, was destroyed. The economic opportunity came to dominate individual interest and 
the stakeholders did not perceive the collective consequences of the impact of their individual 
fishing practices. However, these could be the foundation of their interdependence with respect 
to the use of the lake. The stakeholders did not realize that they should maintain the local 
organization for the governance of the lake. Nevertheless, in face of the individual economic 
interest of the stakeholders, a platform should not be conceived only at their level. Other 
actors at a higher level of the social aggregation than the lake would be required for mediation 
of dispute and decision-making about new ways for using the lake. The Service des Peches 
probably did not perceive this important issue to act to strengthen the existing local platform 
for the lake. 
The nature of the facilitation for introducing Akaja 
Stakeholders analysis and objectives 
The goal of introducing the Akaja system was to improve the productivity of the lake and 
reduce the sufferings of the stakeholders. From that point of view, one can argue that the 
concrete need of the stakeholders was taken into consideration, the desire to have more fish 
for subsistence and the market. The Service des Peches was the main organization which was 
implementing this idea. The rationale behind Akaja was to enable all the stakeholders to 
benefit from the increasing fish stock in the lake. At the beginning of this intervention, the 
local organization chaired by the King Zounon was not functioning in order to compensate the 
non-existence of formal institutions for the lake. The trade-off of the Akaja innovation was the 
danger of cutting the trees (e.g.,the mangrove) for Akaja and the degradation of the vegetation 
and the emergence of a new problem such as the scarcity of fuelwood for the stakeholders. The 
reduction of this trade-off should be negotiated with the stakeholders by implementing a 
specific tree planting project to compensate the changing practices on Lake Aheme. 
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Analysing the effectiveness of the intervention for the implementation of the Akaja 
The introduction of the Akaja revealed that the intervention practices of the Service des Pêches 
was oriented towards technical designs as a basis for solutions concerning the problem of the 
Lake Aheme. This process should have been complemented with training of the stakeholders 
for mutual monitoring and self-evaluation of the situation of their lake. For instance, a non-
formal education programme for the stakeholders should have been implemented in order to 
raise their awareness about the importance for agreeing upon new behaviour to avoid the 
depletion of the lake. In seeing the resolution of the lake's problem at the technical level, the 
Service des Pêches did not perceive the importance of the social organization of the 
stakeholders. Pliya (1980: 1980: 151) puts it: 
' ... the experience of the Akajas in Lake Aheme proves that the solutions of the development problems depend 
first, to some extent, more on the organization of the people and a judicious and strong authority system than the 
only technical structures which were operational. We repeat again, the Akajas collectively used under a regulation 
represent an interesting and valuable solution to the critical situation of Lake Aheme. Unfortunately, this solution 
did not work and the decision-making processes neglected the fundamental human problems' (translation CD). 
Another problem concerning the effectiveness of the introduction of the Akaja in Lake 
Aheme was the absence of incentives for mamtstining behaviour which should enable the 
collective exploitation of the Akaja. The failure of the Service des Pêches to realize mis 
condition did not provide any incentives or assurance for the stakeholders to maintain the 
Akajas in a good condition. 
Support institutions and the policy context for the development of the Akaja 
The institutional framework for the development of the Akaja was not consistent with the 
nature of the lake's problem. A reason was that the Service des Pêches had a technical 
orientation while the socioeconomic and political tasks were more important. The definition 
of laws or new rules and regulations was not done while the local institutions were not used. 
The absence of a research institute or a development centre on fisheries or aquaculture in 
Dahomey was a constraint for the provision of useful information about the Lake Aheme 
which could have improved the performance of the professionals. 
During the colonial period, fishery resources' development was a neglected dimension 
and drew less attention from the colonial authorities who were more interested in cash-crops 
(e.g., cotton, tobacco, oilpalm trees). Some concrete examples (cf Boon et al, 1997: 267) were 
the Société de Commercialisation du Tabac (SOCOTAB), a tobacco company, the Sector de 
Rénovation de la Palmeraie (SRP), oil palm development initiatives, and the Compagnie 
Française pour le Développement des Fibres et Textiles (CFDT), a company which was 
promoting cotton production. One can understand why the idea Akaja emerged in fishing 
communities who were adapting themselves to the changing conditions of the fisheries, and 
reshaped for intervention. 
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4.5 Lake Aheme after the independence of Benin: 1960-1990 
The problems deepened and the perceptions changed 
The beginning of conflicts and wars about scarce fishery resources on Lake Aheme 
As explained in §4.3, the Xha was used by King Zounon, and this derogation was legitimated 
by the stakeholders. But during the colonial period, the Xha became a practice, not only for 
King Zounon, but for the relatives of the Zounon family. Under the influence of the economic 
opportunities the stakeholders had during the colonial period, the local institutions for Lake 
Aheme were modified. From 20 lines of Xha in the lake during the old times, the number was 
increased to 100. A stakeholder argued that, since the death of the last King Zounon in 1975, 
nobody was chosen for the throne. For this reason, if the local rules which were defined 
during the pre-colonial period were to be implemented, the Xha would not be practised from 
1975 onward until the enthronement of a new king. This situation created frustrations for the 
stakeholders who perceived that the local institutions for the lake were changing. 
Parallelling this changing situation in the Southern part of the lake which led to the 
emergence of the Xha people, the failure of the Service des Peches to organize the stakeholders 
at the beginning of the 1960s (explained above) favoured the development of Akaja in other 
way than intended as Abemou in Dekanme explained this (Box 4.7). 
Box 4.7: Abemou explains the new development of Akaja practice 
After 1963, my uncle, a retired civil servant, decided to start fishing activities. He experimented with new ways 
of using in other way the Akaja practice which was done by the Service des PSches. He collected some branches 
near the lake to construct a small Akaja like those which were introduced. This private initiative was successful. 
He got a lot of money and the other fishermen were amazed by this success and took also the same initiative The 
majority of the people who could not do Akaja were obliged to provide labour for the minority who did. They 
could get 200 to 500 FCFA8 and at this time (around 1967) I think it was a good job. Later the Akaja users found 
an alternative to design and harvest their Akaja cheaply. They invited labourers in the village to transport the 
branches to the lake area for the construction of the Akaja. If you were lucky, they would offer you a meal. They 
would not pay you the cost of the labour and would promise to give 1/3 of the harvest. Sometimes those labourers 
were not invited to harvest the Akaja. The Akaja users preferred the Toffin (an ethnic group from the Lake 
NokouS) who are considered as the specialists or "inventors" of Akaja. The Toffin people know the secret to 
harvest the Akaja efficiently and they were called the 'men of the water'. This opportunity had favoured the 
settlement of some Toffin around the Lake Aheme (cf also Dagba, 1985) and they were used by the Akaja users. 
The other fishermen who did not have the financial mean to construct the Akaja were very angry. Most of them 
were opponents of the Akaja risers. 
Merchants, capitalists in the cities, and administrative bureaucrats were attracted by the Akaja 
and they provided financial means to some stakeholders for building them. The catches were 
shared between the outsiders and the stakeholder. Many stakeholders were against this practice 
and they caught fish clandestinely in Akaja which did not belong to them. Conflicts and fights 
were frequent when they were surprised by the owners. Many stakeholders were stabbed or 
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killed and they were found dead in their boat. The proliferation of the Akaja reduced the areas 
where people could fish with their nets. 
In 1969, Welcome (in Pliya, 1980: 145) investigated the situation of Akaja use on Lake 
Aheme on the basis of an aerial photograph. He estimated the number of Akaja in the lake to 
be 2,600 and each has a circular form with 28 metres in diameter. The intensification of 
individual catches was a danger for the Lake Aheme ecosystem. 
The degradation of the Lake Aheme ecosystem 
The Akaja practice increased the pressure on the lake. After the work of Welcome (1971) on 
the inland fisheries in Benin, especially Lake Aheme from 1967 to 1970, he found mat the 
pressure on the lake was very high and the size of the fish caught from the lake too small. 
Then, he recommended that government measures might be taken quickly to save the fisheries 
in Lake Aheme. 
According to the stakeholders, the meshes size of the nets had 5 or 4 'fingers' for 
catching the species which migrated from the sea (e.g., nongban, siko) and 2 fingers for 
catching the akpa (fresh water species). After many people started using Akaja widely in the 
lake, it was difficult to catch more fish and everybody was using fishing with a small mesh 
size (1 finger instead of 2 fingers) to catch the akpa. The situation is changing, according to 
Dossou. Before, a fisherman could spend a month to make a fishing net. Today, one can buy 
hundred of fishing nets a day in the market if one has money. In the market different types of 
fishing nets are available, including the ones with a very small mesh size. Why should the 
customers allow the introduction of such fishing tools in the market (according to Dossou)? 
The professionals use the concept of the 'fishing effort' as an indicator to explain the 
changing patterns of the physical use of the lake. The 'fishing effort' is defined in relation to 
the way the tools used by the stakeholders are changing. The fishing effort of the stakeholders 
increase when they use more powerful tools, i.e., a fishing net with a smaller mesh size. 
According to the director of the Projet Pêche Lagunaire, the 'fishing effort' increases without 
an increase in the catches. This is perceived as a sign of the degradation of the lake. 
Changing perceptions of the problems: the difficulty of concerted action as a solution 
When the idea of Akaja was introduced, the stakeholders did not know that it could provide 
economic opportunities. They discovered that the Akaja is a very good solution to the problem 
of fishery resource scarcity. Through an empirical observation and learning by the 
stakeholders, the Akaja became the only way to catch fish in the lake for some stakeholders. 
The Xha people perceived their practice as a legacy of their ancestors. The Xha became a 
means for subsistence instead of a privilege given to the Dêh Zounon. Everybody knows this 
'reality' (see Box 4.8) which created a blockage for a concerted action with respect to the 
solutions of the lake's problems. 
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Box 4.8: Changing perception of the Xha practice on the Lake Aheme, according to a Xha owner 
You are now in our village to see the real things and to know the truth. So after that, you will work on it. You 
see yourself that we are surrounded by water. There is no land where we can farm. Our main activity is fishing. 
If you go in other villages in the Atlantic part of the lake, you will find the water (Lake Aheme) and lands with 
crops. So they can fish and cultivate their land. Me, and an old man of the Zounon family assisted a meeting at 
the Ministry of Rural development with the Minister, on the problems of the Lake Aheme. We explained to the 
Minister that Xha was in the lake since our ancestors. It is not a problem if the government wanted to remove it, 
but which amount of money (salary) they would provide us to survive. So we should sign a paper and the periods 
we should get the money be known. If not, the old men like us who specialized in Xha activities should suffer. 
The Minister did not say anything. If you have a field and someone takes it without providing anything, what are 
you going to eat? What about your future? 
There were many stakeholders who introduced new fishing tools which provided the 
possibilities to catch more fish. According to the stakeholder Abemou, most of the people who 
used these tools knew that they were doing the wrong thing. With the presence of the Akaja 
and the Xha in the lake, there were no alternative ways to catch fish from the lake. Everybody 
was fishing as much as they could without any worries about the 'carrying capacity' of the 
lake. Several conflicts emerged in complex arenas because one use of the lake's fishery 
resources started interfering with other uses. The problems of Lake Aheme were deepened. 
The social learning processes in complex arenas after the introduction of Akaja 
Learning about the Lake Aheme ecosystem 
In the context of uncertainties, the stakeholders started observing carefully the behaviour of 
the lake instead of believing only in the role of spirituality for the governance of the lake. 
Many stakeholders learned from the observation of the lake that a good fishing period always 
followed the higher water level of the lake after 
inundations, i.e., the periods when the fish found a 
good ecological niche in the vegetation around the 
lake, for both their reproduction and their increase 
in weight. Three months after the inundation 
disappears, fishing activities are very fruitful. This 1 1 
idea is also used by stakeholders to explain the 
importance of Akaja. The stakeholders learned 
empirically that the shrimps are abundant in the lake 
from October to January and after the first rains 
from March to April (Pliya, 1980: 79). „ , , 
Figure 4.3: Evolution of catches from 
Lake Aheme 
The DP started collecting in 1988 statistical data 
about the catches in the lake area in 1988. Fig. 4.3 is based on these data (Statistics of the DP 
from 1988 to 1996). It shows that the catches are decreasing seriously in the recent years. 
Moreover, the stakeholders increased their fishing effort and the size of the fish caught is 
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decreasing (pers. com. of the fishing officer in the CARDER Atlantic). But, from 1988 to 
1992, the evolution of the catches did not show a continuous trend. One can argue that an 
attempt to predict the productivity of the lake should be very difficult. However, data about 
the evolution of the catches can inform the policy makers, professionals and stakeholders to 
think about new ways for using the fishery resources and avoid the degradation of the lake. 
Learning about the government measures in complex arenas and uncertainty 
After the failure of the implementation of the Akaja for collective use, which started since the 
colonial times, from 1964 the government took new measures despite the absence of new ideas 
to help the stakeholders improve their economic situations (Pliya, 1980: 144). The fishing 
police was established for sanctioning the stakeholders who would design Akaja without 
permission. In 1965 for instance, more than 200 people from the lake area were arrested. 
Dossou explained that after a certain period, these measures were not effective compared to 
the ones which were applied during the pre-colonial times. Everybody knew that with a little 
money the stakeholder who who caught could be released the same day. From 1970 onwards, 
the fishing police was not effective and the Akaja was widely used by the stakeholders and 
nothing was done. Frequent conflicts let the government to remove Akaja from the lake 
successively in 1970, 1980 and 1985. However, the stakeholders always found different ways 
to go around the decision of the government. For instance, Akaja was designed by them in a 
way that it would not be recognised because the branches and shrubs used were immersed in 
the shallow water of the lake. The user knew the location of his Akaja and exploited it. Pliya 
(1980: 151) argues that: 
'the experiences of the Akaja in the Lake Aheme revealed that, in many cases, the solutions to this problem 
depended first, on the organization of the people and the existence of an authority system. These issues are more 
important than giving a more technical content to the intervention on Lake Aheme. From a technical point of view 
Akaja was a solution to the problem of the degradation of the lake if it is used under a regulation for a collective 
benefit for the stakeholders as it was implemented at the beginning during the colonial times' (translation, CD). 
Any measure of the government was circumvented in some way by the stakeholders 
of Lake Aheme. The DP realized that these measures would not be effective if the stakeholders 
did not have any alternative solutions. Then Hwedo found as an alternative economic 
opportunity. Hwedo is a kind of local aquaculture developed by the fishermen in the River 
Ouem6 (cf. Nonfon, 1988). The principle is that the floodplain of the River Ou6m6 is flooded 
for at least four months each year and both plain and the river support fisheries based upon 
the natural stocks. During the dry season the plain is left dry and used for agriculture and 
grazing cattle. The fish population is confined to the main river channel and to a series of 
artificial ponds which were dug on the flood plain by the stakeholders. These are known 
locally as Hwedo. 
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The nature of the facilitation of the introduction of Hw6do 
Stakeholders analysis and organization for Lake Aheme 
The rapid development of Akaja by the stakeholders in the lake area was an indicator of then-
desire to get more fish from the lake in order to satisfy their needs. The deliberate intention 
to practise the Akaja by the stakeholders, after the government intervention, was a sign that 
their economic problems were serious. Since the fishery resources are produced under the 
natural processes, the gets of the stakeholders cannot always equal their wants even if the lake 
is depleted, so that everybody will suffer. Hwedo was an alternative solution to respond to the 
needs of the stakeholders at the expense of their efforts instead of depleting the lake. 
Unfortunately, this opportunity which was introduced by the CARDER- Atlantic, was only 
relevant for those who are at the Eastern shore of the lake, the Atlantic province. This 
situation resulted from the fact that the Hwedo project for the Lake Aheme was designed 
according to the existing admimstrative structure. Therefore, the necessity to cover all the 
stakeholders at the level of the lake was not perceived. The CARDER-Mono which was 
supposed to cover the Western side of the lake was not implementing any project for the 
development of aquaculture as it was done by the CARDER-Atlantic supported by the German 
Development Organization (GTZ). 
Analysing the effectiveness of the intervention based on the Hwedo innovation 
Some stakeholders of Lake Aheme were trained to use Hwedo according to the way it was 
shaped by the fishing specialists of the CARDER-Atlantic. A small channel drains the water 
of the lake into the fishing pond, the HwMo, which was dug for the aquaculture. The fry are 
obtained from nurseries and raised in the Hweao. The small channel which communicate with 
the lake is closed to avoid fish moving to the lake. The type of fish used for the Hw6do is 
tilapia which is well appreciated in the market in Benin. 
The formation of the Groupement Revolutionaire a Vocation Cooperative (GRVC), a 
pre-cooperative structure during the revolution period in Benin (for more information see 
Tossou, 1995), by the stakeholders, was the condition for obtaining credit for the Hw6do 
innovation. This idea attracted the stakeholders and they adopted the Hw&io in groups. 
Lacking the economic opportunity which was offered by the introduction of the Hw6do, the 
motivation to continue with Akaja was accordingly higher on the part of stakeholders on the 
Western side of the lake. The effectiveness of the implementation of the Hw&lo idea depended 
also on the institutions which supported the intervention and the policy context. 
Support institutions and the policy context for the development of the Hwedo 
The definition of the institutions for the inland fisheries, especially Lake Aheme, moved to a 
higher level, the President of the Republic, because the problems deepened (conflicts, high 
pressure on the fisheries, etc.). Information provision for the development of the fisheries was 
left to the experts like Welcome who made many suggestions to the government (see Welcome, 
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1971). But, a closer look at the content of the government decree which was proclaimed this 
to ease the problem revealed that the ideas prevalent in the local government institutions were 
mostly used. Thus, the obligation for stakeholders to apply for a fishing permit was 
emphasized. Unfortunately this decree was not applied. The great political instability after the 
independence of Benin was not favourable for long term policies for fishery resource 
development. Also, agricultural development policies continued with the logic of cash-crops 
development as explained above. The prise de conscience for the development of fishery 
resources was visible in the late 1970s when the political engagement for the promotion of the 
aquaculture in Benin emerged. A concrete example was the creation of the Centre Piscicole 
de Godomey9, a centre for aquaculture. 
When the government failed: the initiative of the Xha people for generating new 
institutions and organizations 
A platform development process and collective decision making 
During the execution of the Hwédo project, serious problems occurred. The fish which were 
being raised by the stakeholders in the Hwédo escaped into the lake. According to a fishery 
specialist at the CARDER-Atlantic, the Hwédo failed. The crucial problem of defining and 
maintaining institutions and a new organization for collective use of the fishery resources was 
not perceived by the government organizations. The stakeholders, especially the Xha people 
in Guézin, decided to take the initiative and create a platform for collective decision making. 
In face of the incapacity of the political authorities to ensure the governance of the lake, they 
realized the need to have an organization at the level of the whole lake like the situation was 
during the pre-colonial times. 
In March 1990, different representatives of each village around the lake, the priests of 
voodoos in the fishing communities, met at the place called Mitogbodji which has historical 
importance (see §4.3). They discussed the problems of Lake Aheme and identified new rules, 
regulations and sanctions (see Box 4.9). The participants made the decision to create a 
committee called COGEHEN (Comité de Gestion de Ehen = Committee for managing the 
lake) for the implementation of their decisions. After a month, another meeting was organized 
in the village Guézin by the Xha people. The members of the bureau of the COGEHEN were 
elected10. The local priests of the lake became the advisers of the bureau. This idea was to 
revive the role of spirituality in the enforcement of the new institutions for the lake. A local 
police of the lake was created. It consisted of a group of 15 to 30 stakeholders appointed by 
the COGEHEN according to the size of the villages. Their role was to detect the stakeholders 
who would defect and to enable their sanctioning (see Box 4.9). These activities were effective 
for a certain period but failed in the end as is explained below. 
Box 4.9: Law and regulations set at Mitogbodji 
• The design of Akaja is forbidden; 
• The use of small-mesh fishing nets like Mandovi and Gbagbalulu is forbidden; 
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The fishing method called Tohounga during the day is forbidden. The fishers are allowed to use this 
method from 6 hours p.m to 6 hours a.m. The number of fishing nets will not exceed 5; 
The fishing technique called "Djohoun" during the day and at the place on the lake which is not deep is 
forbidden; 
The fishing method called Gbodoego is forbidden; 
The fishing method with hand called "Lobe" or Gbaha is forbidden 
The space between the Xha for boat circulation must be increased; 
One day per week (from 6 hours p.m of every Saturday to 6 hours p.m of every Sundays) is retained to 
not practise fishing activities (this day is called TOSSE = 'law of Water' or resting day for the lake); 
Every 8th of January is used to commemorate the death of a militant of COGEHEN on the 8 th of 
January, 1990 during the removal of the Akaja from the Lake Aheme. This day will be followed by one 
week resting of Lake Aheme called also TOSSE. 
Sanctions defined at Mitogbodji: the fishers who do not respect these law and regulations will have to 
pay the following amends: 20 litres of Sodabi (local alcohol distilled from palm wine), 2 bottles of Royal 
Gin (imported alcohol), 6 bottles of bier, 6 bottles of youki (minerals), 4 chickens (or 1500 FCFA), 1 
goat (or 3000 FCFA) and 10.000 FCFA. Destruction of boats; burning of fishing nets. 
Learning about platform development: why the Xha people initiative failed 
In view of the discussion above, the initiative of the Xha people can be seen as a process 
which was aimed to develop a platform for concerted action at the level of the lake. The idea 
of involving village representatives by the Xha people was aimed at creating one perspective 
at the level of the whole lake. One can argue that the stakeholders knew that they could not 
solve the problems of the lake without the creation of COGEHEN, a platform for decision-
making and the implementation of the local institutions of the lake. 
But the weakness of the COGEHEN was that the Akaja users were excluded. From that 
point of view, the COGEHEN solved only the half of the problem of having an organization 
at the level of the lake because the Akaja users formed an important coalition. There are also 
many prerogatives which were in the hands of the government, at various levels of social 
aggregation, i.e., the CARDER-Mono and CARDER-Atlantic, the DP, the Ministry of Rural 
Development, etc. The context has changed and the Xha people should not believe that the way 
the lake was governed during the pre-colonial period could be reproduced. 
4.6 Lake Aheme in the democratization era: after 1990 
Various perceptions, interests and impasses: where are Lake Aheme's problems going? 
The problem perception by the stakeholders 
The stakeholders in Lake Aheme are now the Xha people, the organization of the Akaja users 
(as will be explained later) and other stakeholders who were against the Akaja users or the Xha 
people. The local kingdom of Guézin which disappeared after 1975, was re-established in the 
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democratization era11. King Zounon again became a stakeholder. The discussion with the 
stakeholders revealed that there are too few fishery resources (fish, shrimps, crabs, etc.) in 
Lake Aheme. The immediate problem perceived by all the stakeholders concerning the lake 
was defined in this way and the key concept used to explain this fact was: the Ehen is 
impoverished by the Akaja users according to the Xha people or by the Xha people according 
to the Akaja users. The economic value of the fishery resources increased after the devaluation 
of the CFA currency [note]. Before the devaluation, for instance Dagba (1985:82) found that 
the cost for using a big Akaja can range between 100,000 - 200,000 FCFA and the profit 
obtained by the user was estimated to be between 200,000 - 500,000 FCFA. Despite the 
depletion of the lake, all the stakeholders were motivated to use fishing methods and tools 
which enabled them to catch more (see Box 4.10). 
Box 4.10: Synthesis of the ways the stakeholders interpreted their situations 
The stakeholders have different interpretations of the problems of the lake. A closer look of their opinions 
revealed the magnitude of their complex situation and why agreement on a common perspective for the solution 
was difficult. According to King Zounon, the kingdom was related to the existence of the Xha which was a 
privilege and the source of income. He explained that if the Xha practice was banned, the kingdom would not have 
any economic means for its maintenance. The Xha was also the only thing which made the difference between 
King Zounon and the other fishers of Lake Aheme. According to the Xha people, they do not know other ways 
of fishing and when the Xha was removed in 1985 they had suffered and some of them died in Guezin. The Akaja 
users explained that they have peace when the Akaja is in the lake. One of the them gave many arguments to 
emphasise the reason why one cannot stop using Akaja. He said: 'when you practise Akaja you can buy cement 
and build your house, you can do anything you want, for instance, send your child to school or to vocational 
training and cover the costs ... Akaja is what we do to take care of our family, for instance when they are sick, 
we can buy medicines'. The young fisher Codjo in Guezin was using a fishing tool (called Gbabalulu) which was 
banned (see Box 4.9). He said: 'I have 16 Gbagbalulu and I use them to save more than 80 women in this village 
(Gu6zin). They came to me with a deposit to buy the Todan (see table 4.1) which are used to catch crabs. They 
sell it also in Nigeria. I am tired to go and fish everyday but my clients come with money and I am forced to use 
Gbagbalulu'. Nestor is another young fisher in Guezin who was frustrated because his fellows use Gbabalulu to 
get 2000 FCFA to 5000 FCFA/day depending on the importance of the catches, while he could not get anything 
by using 'conventional' fishing nets. Then he was obliged to use Gbagbalulu, waiting until the period where the 
new law and regulations will be established and respected by all the fishers. 
The problem perception by the Direction des Pêches 
The DP is a government organization, at national level, which is under the Ministry of Rural 
Development (MDR = Ministère du Développement Rural). According to the perception of 
the development officer who was in charge of the inland fisheries at the Direction des Pêches, 
the situation of Lake Aheme was critical in terms of the size of the fish caught and the 
increasing fishing effort. The Direction des Pêches recognized the failure of the fishing police 
which was established in the past and the difficulty to control the lake during the days and the 
evenings. The need to organize the stakeholders for enabling the use of the fishery resources 
on the basis of a consensus was explained (see Box: 4.11). As will be shown, the perspectives 
of the DP were based on administrative divisions, which the need to generate a strong 
organization at the level of the whole lake was not emphasized (see Box 4.11). 
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Box 4.11: The perception of new organizations for Lake Aheme according to the DP 
The director of the Projet Pêche Lagmaire, inland fisheries, said: " . . . I can say it is impossible.. That is why 
we are thinking about the way to organise the fishers in the " Comité Communal de Pêche' (Communal Fishing 
Committee)". The legal text ("the statut et règlement") which will explain the organisational functioning of the 
CCP was written at the DP. The main emphasis of the text was the definition of laws and regulations for Lake 
Aheme, the resource use taxation which was non-existent, and the setting of an organisational structure of the 
fishers. The organisational structure is intended to be created at the "commune" level (CCP) and the 
"Department" level ("Comité Départemental de Pêche=CDP: Fishing Committee at the Department Level). Each 
committee will include all the representatives of the adepts of different fishing techniques and methods (Xha, 
Akaja, different types of fishing nets). Those representatives in the CCP and the CDP could come to a consensus 
for the use of the Lake Aheme ("consensus" for the "gestion rationnelle" of the lake) so that the law and the 
regulations provided by the DP might be respected. 
The problem perception by the CARDER organization 
The CARDER is the governmental extension organisation at the level of the province in Benin. 
The CARDER is an organization under the Ministry of Rural Development. The DCVP 
(Direction du Contrôle Vétérinaire et Phytosanitaire = Directorate of Animal and Plant Care) 
a division of the CARDER organisation is involved in the development of fishing activities on 
Lake Aheme. The main issue raised by the fishing development officers of the CARDER was 
the need to support the decision-making about the increasing pressure on the lake by some 
concrete and relevant projects for the stakeholders. The problem was addressed in terms of the 
socio-economic well-being of the stakeholders versus the intentions to safeguard Lake Aheme 
through implementing of laws and regulations. From that point of view, the introduction of 
the aquaculture was 'legimated' as a solution for the problems perceived by the CARDER. 
In practice the CARDER Mono was implementing a programme of aquaculture through the 
Integrated Rural Development Project which started at the beginning of the 1990s at the 
Western shore of the lake. 
The dimensions of the problems and the nature of the perspectives on solutions 
Organizing the stakeholders for concerted action concerning the exploitation of the lake was 
perceived by the stakeholders and the government organizations which intervened. However, 
the motivations of the stakeholders for continuing with their individual strategies were high. 
The importance of controlling the use of new fishing practices in the lake was twofold: first, 
the necessity to avoid that a few stakeholders appropriate all the fishery resources and create 
frustrations and conflicts on the lake; second, to promote an equitable access to the fishery 
resource and ensure social justice vis-à-vis the exploitation of the lake. The definition and the 
implementation of new institutions for Lake Aheme were the crucial problems. Nevertheless, 
governments were not able to do that since the colonial period. According to the stakeholders, 
the idea that the lake needs to be dredged was perceived by the government, but nothing was 
done. The decisions made by the governments were not implemented and one can argue that 
the stakeholders discovered the weaknesses of the formal organizations in face of the problems 
of the lake. 
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Both the stakeholders and the government organizations faced the difficulty to find 
solutions which satisfied the various interests of the stakeholders and the need to avoid the 
danger of the degradation of the lake. Many attempts to solve the problems were not successful 
and always led to impasses. From that point of view, one can ask where are the Lake Aheme 
problems going? 
However, the continuation of the search for a better solution by the stakeholders 
themselves and the government implies that one can explore the ways they learn, and facilitate 
change to establish a new order for Lake Aheme. The main problem can be stated as the extent 
to which strategies can be defined for breaking the impasse. 
The social learning processes for establishing new order for Lake Aheme 
Learning from the situation of the lake: negotiation and mediation by the Akaja users 
The situation of the Lake Aheme is becoming more complex and the stakeholders have no 
choice to collectively find the solution to their problems and reduce the negative consequences 
of their individual actions on the lake. The Akaja users had learned from the actions of the 
COGEHEN that an incomplete coalition of stakeholders would not be able to define and 
enforce new institutions for the lake. The representation and involvement of all the interest 
coalitions around the lake in collective decision-making was a necessary condition for 
successful action at the level of the whole lake (see Box 4.12). 
Box 4.12: The Akaja users are engaged in negotiation and mediation for establishing a new social order 
After the emergence of the COGEHEN, the Akaja users created their organization chaired by a president who 
was elected. The stakeholders at the two sides of the lake were represented. The Akaja users perceived the need 
to take the initiative for the resolution of the problems of the lake. The motive of this process was probably 
grounded on their frustrations which resulted from the fact that the COGEHEN forbade Akaja (see Box 4.9). 
During a discussion in Kpago, the Akaja users decided to organize a meeting in Bopa for collective decision-
making about Lake Aheme. They agreed that if the Xha people accepted to remove their Xha, they would do the 
same for their Akaja. In February 1992, a general assembly was held in Bopa. The Sous-prefet was at this 
assembly with the Commander of the local police of Bopa and some gendarmes. One Deputy of the parliament 
of Benin was interested in the assembly. Concerning the fishing communities, all the priests of voodoo were 
invited. The COGEHEN was at this meeting with their representatives. Most of the village at the West and the 
East side of the fishing communities sent their representatives to attend the meeting (Chef de village, notables 
etc.). The main objective of the meeting was to stimulate reflections on the problems of the lake in terms of how 
it could be safeguarded from being destroyed and how the conflicts between the stakeholders could be reduced. 
During this meeting, a consensus was difficult to achieve because the Xha people did not want to make any 
concession like the Akaja users. But the majority agreed that the only way to realize peace was that each party 
(interest group) accepted to lose something. The decision to remove Akaja and Xha was made. The organizers 
of the meeting helped by the Sous-prefet of Bopa obtained the help of the gendarmerie to implement the decisions. 
They invited their fellows to themselves remove their Akaja. They started, but when the Xha was immediately 
reinstalled, they stopped. The vicious circle was installed and the stakeholders failed again to solve their problems 
themselves. 
Breaking the impasse 95 
Unlike the COGEHEN, the initiative of the organization of the Akaja users moved to the level 
of the whole lake. But the Sous-Préfet of Bopa does not formally represent the highest political 
authority of the Lake Aheme according to the administrative division in which the lake is 
involved. Only few villages of the lake were under his authority. The majority of the 
participants to the meeting adopted the win-win solution (remove Akaja and Xha) for Lake 
Aheme but they did not have really the means to implement this choice. Thinking and learning 
together with the stakeholders to identify other economic opportunities were missing. But this 
alternative strategy required the mobilization of qualified human resources (e.g., 
communication professionals) and the engagement of the government to provide the means. 
The journée de reflexion: the government effort for establishing a new order 
Following the consecutive failures of the stakeholders to solve their problems, the first 
government at the beginning of the era of the democratization in Benin decided to find 
solutions to the problems of the stakeholders in a 'participatory way' (negotiation and 
mediation). The idea of the journée de réflexion emerged. The journée de réflexion involves 
a debate about the problems of the lake for finding a compromise with very high political 
authorities. The DP was responsible for the preparation of this initiative of the government. 
The critical issues of the process concerned the methodology adopted for identification and 
selection of the participants, the collective decision-making procedure, and the solutions 
generated (see Box 4.13). 
Box 4.13: An overview of the journée de réflexion: processes and outcomes 
The preparation of the journée de réflexion stated with the difficult question which was defined in terms of who 
should be the representatives of the stakeholders? This question has also its raison-d'être because the existing local 
organizations were not officially recognized because they were not created according to the official procedure 
defined by the government (official registration at the Ministry of the Interior). However, the president and some 
members of the organization of the Akaja users, the Bureau of the COGEHEN, some representatives of the 
women organization (UFGE: Union de Femmes de Guézin et Environs) were invited. Some representatives, for 
instance the local priests, the local leaders, of the stakeholders were identified by CARDER organizations. A 
particular attention was given to the Association de Développement. All the political representatives of the State 
in the lake area: the Chef de village, the Maires, the Sous-Prefets, the Préfets, the representatives of the CARDER 
(Mono and Atlantic) were invited. The Minister of Rural Development was the chairman of the journée de 
réflexion. Many professionals of the Ministries of the Rural Development, of the Environment, and of the Interior 
were identified as participants. The 28th of My 1992, all the participants were in Ouidah, the town where the 
meeting was held. The cost of transport and sustenance of the participants was covered by the government. At 
the beginning, the Minister of Rural development gave a speech and invited all the participants for comprehensive 
discussion during the meeting. As he said, the main objective of the meeting was the negotiation of another way 
to use the lake. The participants were invited to give a speech concerning their wishes, the problems and ideas 
which were relevant for the resolution of the difficult situation of the lake. Unfortunately the stakeholders, 
depending on the interest group they belonged to, were defending their interests. The Xha people argued that their 
fishing practice is heritage of their ancestors. The Akaja users argued that they can have fish in the lake only if 
they use Akaja. However they can make the concession to remove the Akaja if the Xha people should do the 
same. The participants found that the only to way halt the conflicts between the stakeholders was to remove Akaja 
and Xha from the lake. Meanwhile, the participants did not identify any alternative economic opportunities for 
the stakeholders during the journée de réflexion. The second idea was the creation of the Comité de Suivi (follow-
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up committee) for the implementation of the decisions of the journée de réflexion and the continuation of the 
negotiation with the stakeholders about their difficult situations about Lake Aheme. 
Like the Akaja users initiative, the journée de réflexion chose the win-win solution which 
means in mis context that the different potential interest groups lost something. But, beyond 
the conflicts between the stakeholders, their problems have an economic connotation. 
Therefore one should explore problem-solving directions and trying to locate options that 
satisfy both the parties in the conflict. In concrete terms, the engagement of very high levels 
political authorities like the Minister of the Rural Development and the professionals at the 
Ministry of the Rural Development and Ministry of the Environment was not exploited. 
Priority should be set up and human and financial resources negotiated. For instance, a joint 
committee of scientists, development professionals and stakeholders should be created and 
mandated publicly to continue the reflection and to develop alternative solutions to the 
problems of Lake Aheme. Unfortunately, the Comité de Suivi created by the government after 
the journée de réflexion involved 41 people and the Bureau of the Comité de Suivi consisted 
of 5 people and did not involve any stakeholder of the Lake Aheme (see Box 4.14). In face of 
the complexity of the lake's problems, one can critically analyse the effectiveness of such a 
committee decreed by the government (Arrêté: No714/MDR/MISAT/DCAB/SA, year 1992). 
Box 4.14: An example of a platform generated by the journée de réflexion 
Composition of the Comité de Suivi 
• 16 representatives of the fishers 
• 5 representatives of the Notables 
• 1 representative of the syndicate of the fishers and craftsmen in Benin 
• 5 representatives of the Association de Développement 
• 3 commanders of the "local police" in Mono and Atlantic Provinces 
• 5 Sous-Prefets who were at the journée de réflexion 
• 2 General Directors of the CARDER organisation (Mono and Atlantic) 
• 2 representatives of the Ministry of Rural Development (MDR) 
• 1 representative of the Ministry of Interior (MISAT) 
• 1 representative of the Ministry of the Environment (MEHU) 
Composition of the Bureau of the Comité de Suivi 
• President: Representative of the MDR 
• 1st Vice-President: Representative of the MDR 
• 2nd Vice-President: Representative of the MEHU 
• Members: 2 representatives of the 'Association de Développement' 
Critical analysis of the platform generated by the government at the journée de reflexion 
The representatives of the stakeholders in the Comité de Suivi cover the whole level of the lake 
area. The Comité de Suivi is extended to involve the political authorities and professionals at 
Breaking the impasse 97 
different levels of social aggregation. From that point of view, the Comité de Suivi generated 
by the journée de réflexion is a platform for decision-making about Lake Aheme. 
But the fact that 41 people are in the platform raises doubt about the way the 
coordination of the activities between the members of this platform can be done. The roles of 
different categories of representatives (e.g., political authorities, professionals) in the platform 
were not specified. In practice, the functioning of this platform should not be effective because 
the members did not known a clear statement of the actions they are supposed to do in order 
to solve the problems of the lake. 
The most critical issue for the platform generated concerned the Bureau of the Comité 
de Suivi which can be seen as the operational unit for coordination, monitoring and evaluation 
of the actions implemented at the level of the lake. Unfortunately, the bureau of the Comité 
de Suivi did not involve the stakeholders who are daily experiencing many problems in the lake 
area. How can the professionals at the levels of the ministries respond promptly to the 
problems of the stakeholders? Maybe, the Bureau of the Comité de Suivi had other objectives, 
(as this will be analyzed later) such as the control of the stakeholders instead of living with 
their problems. 
Another critical issue of the platform generated by the journée de réflexion, is that of 
the involvement of the 'Association de Développement' ('Development Association') in the 
bureau of the Comité de Suivi. At the beginning of the creation of the Association de 
Développement (AD) in Benin, the idea was that they should be active in the development 
processes at the grass-roots level. However, the objectives of the ADs changed in the era of 
the democratization because the leaders got involved with political parties. Controlling the 
people to gain a political position became more important than acting for 'development' at the 
grass-roots levels. The presence of the AD in the Bureau of the Comité de Suivi would not 
help to for resolve the problems of the stakeholders. The leaders of the AD would try to 
control the people for their political interests. Yet promoting ecological awareness to resolve 
complex problems like the situation in Lake Aheme did not emerge in Benin. 
Breaking the impasse: seeking alternative solutions for Lake Aheme 
The failure of the implementation of the government decision 
After the the Journée de réflexion in Ouidah, the win-win solution chosen was implemented. 
This action was financed by the government. Unfortunately, according to the director of the 
DCVP (Direction du Contrôle Vétérinaire et Phytosanitaire), the money was not sufficient. 
The Akaja and Xha were partially removed from the lake. The stakeholders were asked to 
continue themselves but they refused. Later a stakeholder in Guézin started the Xha practice. 
The members of the bureau of the Comité de Suivi were not in the lake area to react. The other 
stakeholders took many initiatives and forced the mediation of the political authorities (Box 
4.14). 
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Box 4.15: The failure of the conflict resolution and mediation by the government 
After the break down of the win-win solution by the Xha people, the President of the Akaja users was informed. 
He went to the Direction des Pêches in Cotonou (about 60 km from the lake area) to inform the director. The 
Minister of Rural Development went to the lake area with the director of fisheries. They organised a meeting in 
Kpomassè. After a discussion, the Akaja users said that if the Xha was not removed they would start Akaja. The 
political authorities in Kpomassè asked the gendarmerie to intervene in Guézin to solve the problem. But the local 
police forces did not react because they explained that the Xha in Guézin was not in the Sous-préfecture of 
Kpomassè. The local police force of the Sous-préfecture Corné gave the same argument. The coercive intervention 
became complex because the village Guézin is partially in the Sous-préfectures of Come and Kpomassè. The 
Director of fisheries organized another meeting in Come with some members of the Comité de Suivi in the lake 
area, the Chef de villages and the Sous-Préfet of Come. The Maire of a commune around the lake assisted this 
meeting. The Sous-préfet and the director of fisheries asked him to solve the problem. He refused and found the 
task very dangerous because he could not face eventual revolt of stakeholders in Guézin. 
The Bureau of the Comité de Suivi did not function as it was explained above. All the 
members were outside the lake. Coordination, monitoring and evaluation with the stakeholders 
of any actions were not done and nobody knew how the livelihoods of the stakeholders are 
affected when the Akaja and Xha are removed. The failure of the government intervention in 
1985 was based on the incapacity to maintain the win-win solution they adopted (without 
negotiation). Why should the same solution be repeated again? The representatives of the 
government did not learn from their own practice to make the journée de réflexion more 
effective in terms of the resolution of the problems of the lake. From that point of view, the 
discovery by the stakeholders, of the weaknesses of the government for the maintenance of the 
actions which were implemented did not provide any incentive for changing their practices on 
the lake. The stakeholders did not believe that the professionals and the political authorities 
were able to find solution to their problems which can be defined in terms of economic 
opportunities. 
What should have done by the government for Lake Aheme? 
Following the analysis above, the journée de réflexion should have created a committee for 
starting a learning process with the stakeholders. The implementation of the decisions of the 
journée de réflexion should have been followed with the evaluation of the situation of the 
stakeholders to know how it changes in relation with the fishing practices. This task should 
be done with the learning groups. Since the problems of the lake were collective concerns for 
the stakeholders, they would be motivated to participate in such learning groups. Then together 
with the development professionals and scientists, they should make visible the trade-offs of 
the decisions about the fishing techniques used in the lake and seek for alternative solutions 
and the improvement of their economic situations. 
The trainhig of the stakeholders about the ecological problems of their lake, for 
instance the role of the mangroves which were destroyed, should be a priority for curriculum 
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development. But this means that professionals need to be active in the lake area and that 
intervention processes should be transformed into joint-observation, discussion and reflexive 
learning in order to generate local leaders for ecological movement for the Lake Aheme. This 
objective can be achieved when the recognition of the danger of some practices used by the 
stakeholders are internalized. 
These arguments require communicative professionals and a clear institutional 
framework which reward efforts for solving complex problems at the grassroots level such as 
the situation of the lake. This issue is particularly important because the roles assignment 
among the government organizations for Lake Aheme were not very clear. For instance, the 
Direction des Pêches and of the CARDER both work for the development of the fisheries. 
There was also the pretence that the resolution of the conflicts about Lake Aheme was 
in the hands of political authorities who have the power to mobilize government military forces 
to solve the problems. The consequence was that the government organization which 
intervened, neglected mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution as alternative strategies 
for solving the problems of Lake Aheme. 
The journée de réflexion should have focused on the ways the problems of the 
stakeholders could be approached, and on the generation of collective learning processes, 
supported by the political authorities. The critical evaluation of the intervention practices of 
government organizations should have been a discussion topic at the journée de réflexion. If 
these were not able to provide opportunities for the stakeholders to solve their problems, their 
raison-d'être needed to be questioned. 
The influence of the policy context 
The political context presented many dilemmas for improving the critical situation of Lake 
Aheme. On the one side; any attempt for breaking the impasse on the lake has a political 
connotation, i.e., the decision-making for new rules, regulations, investments and resources 
mobilization. On the other side, the political decisions were difficult in the multiparty system 
adopted by the Beninese in the democratization era because the difficult situations of the 
stakeholders are exploited by the politicians during their campaigns: when the government 
decided to take some actions on the lake (e.g., remove Akaja and Xha), the political opponents 
would promise the re-establishment of these fishing practices to the stakeholders to obtain their 
votes. In face of this dilemma, most of the efforts of governments were abandoned because 
they also missed the support of strong organisations, for instance, ecological movements 
among the stakeholders. 
The stakeholders also learned through decennia the relationship between the changing 
political context and their situation and to behave accordingly. It was not surprising that the 
president of the Akaja users explained, during this study, that any government effort towards 
the situation of the Lake Aheme should only be done after the political elections. The recent 
development on the lake confirmed his analysis. 
100 Platforms for resource management 
Beyond the political barriers many plans of the government involve the idea for 
developing the fisheries by mobilizing the stakeholders at the grass-roots level (cf PAE, 1992, 
1993). Still, these actions were not taken and the control of the votes of the stakeholders may 
be more important than the promotion of grass-root development. 
4.7 Conclusions 
The analysis of fishery resource use in Lake Aheme shows the evolution of the effective 
platform for resource management from the pre-colonial period onwards. The Lake Aheme 
case illustrates the dynamics with respect to the lake's problems, and the institutions and 
organizations for its management. Also, multiple stakeholders' responses to various 
interventions and changing patterns of policy contexts are dynamic from the pre-colonial 
period to the recent democratization period in Benin. The platform for resource management 
was successful before the impasses emerged. This situation presents a strong ground for 
drawing some conclusions about the factors that affect the success or failure for resource 
management in Lake Aheme. 
A main factor related to the success of managing the lake's resources during the pre-
colonial time was that the stakeholders agreed upon a platform for governing the Lake Aheme. 
Other related factors for success were the functioning of the institutions, existing local 
monitoring systems, periodic meeting of the local organization for decision making and 
deliberation, and the effectiveness of sanctioning structures. However, the success was 
achieved in a context for insuring the subsistence of the stakeholders. The local arrangement 
failed beyond this context. The problems of the lake moved to the levels of external supports 
and policy, without success. 
Factors related to the failure were the difficulty for various interventions to set up new 
institutions for the lake, and enforce them. Inconsistent policy frameworks did not allow 
concrete actions like facilitating the development of a new organization among interest 
coalitions that emerged. 
The major lesson from Lake Aheme is that, beyond technical interventions for 
manipulating the ecology of the lake towards higher productivity (e.g., Akaja, Hw6do), and 
beyond biophysical studies to monitor the ecological state of the lake, greater sustainabihty can 
only be achieved if the stakeholders agree upon management rules, institutions and policies. 
The sustainability of Lake Aheme is an emergent property of a soft-system. 
Notes 
1. Initial reflection about this chapter is contained in: Dangbegnon, C. 1996 Breaking the impasse: Platform for 
Common Property Resource use (The Aheme lake case, Benin). Paper presented at the Sith Annual Conference for 
the International Association for the Study of Common Property Resources. June 4-8, 1996 Univ. of Berkeley, 
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Berkeley California (USA). 
The present chapter makes use of: Dangbégnon, C. 1995 Towards Common Property Rights in Fishing 
Communities: a platform for negotiating sustainable resource use (the Aheme lake case, Benin). Unpublished M.Sc. 
Thesis. Wageningen: Wageningen Agricultural University. 
2. Benin is divided in 6 provinces. Each province (called Département) comprises many districts. Each district 
(called Sous-préfectures) comprises many Communes. Each Communes comprises many villages. Some villages 
are divided into hamlets. 
3. Zounon family is an 'extended family' of the dynasty of the Zounon in Guézin. A chronology of all the King 
Zounon in Guézin is shown at a sacred place in Guézin. 
4. Sahè is actually called Savi in the Atlantic Province in Benin 
5. The Kingdom of Danxomè was one of the military and politically units organised at that period. This kingdom 
conquered many other local kingdoms in the past. The centre of this kingdom was Abomey in the present Zou 
province in Benin. 
6. Mitogbodji is a small island in Lake Aheme. Actually, Mitogbodji is considered as a spiritual place by the Pedah 
ethnic group. Nobody is living there. 
7. A practice like Akaja existed already among the fishers, especially in Lake Nokoué in Benin. 
8. FCFA is the currency in the Francophone African Countries. After the devaluation at the beginning of 1994: 100 F 
CFA = 1 FF = 0,20 US dollars 
9. The Centre Piscicole de Godomey was created in 1978. The objective was to supply fry for the aquaculture 
activities in Benin. But this centre collapsed and is not functional nowadays. 
10. The Bureau of the COGEHEN was led by a president and comprises nine members. 
11. There was no King in Guézin from 1975 till 1993 (revolution period 1972-1989). Many local kingdoms were 
recreated (include the one in Guézin) in 1994 after the Conference Nationale in Benin, which was the starting point 
of the democratization process in Benin. 
5 Overcoming Barriers: Platforms for Rangeland Resource 
Management with Chabe People in Benin 
5.1 Introduction 
Among the many existing studies in pastoral development in the African context (e.g., 
Scoones, 1995) the exploration of crucial interactive issues, such as negotiated agreements and 
conflicts resolution among the stakeholders, are neglected. This chapter deals with concrete 
problems and efforts concerning resource management in rangeland ecosystems. The difficulty 
to identify the boundaries of the rangeland ecosystems, the uncertainty about the movement 
of the herders to make best use of the heterogenous landscape, the risk of serious crop-damage 
and conflicts/wars, are some specific issues addressed in this case study. 
At the beginning of the present study, some important reports of studies in the same 
area (Biokou, 1989; P.Onibon, 1990; Essouman, 1992; Oloulotan & P.Onibon, 1994; 
Tchègnon, 1995; P.Onibon & Okou, 1995) and some key literature on the rangeland situation 
in Benin (e.g., Bierschenk, 1988; De Haan, 1997) were available. Project documents were 
used (e.g., Hounkpodoté & Bediyé, 1995). Many reports of the project 'Promotion de 
l'élevage et Préparation d'Actions Intégrées dans le Zou' (Livestock development and 
Diagnosis for Integrated Actions in the Zou province) were available. These studies covered 
several aspects of rangeland resource management: pastures, watering places for the cattle, 
animal health, the movement of the transhumant herders, conflicts, etc., in the Zou province. 
A combination of several research methods and techniques was applied in this case study. 
Individual (and group) interviews were used to collect data from stakeholders and other actors 
in government organizations and NGO. Key informants for the interviews were selected with 
snow-ball techniques. Participant observation was used. Group discussions were done with 
herders. Meetings were organized with a group of herders who discussed their constraints and 
opportunities for improving the situation of the rangeland in their local setting. 
The present case study started with gaining an understanding of the setting of the 
problematic context of rangeland resource use within the Chabe community (§5.2). The 
insights gained from the local context enabled the identification of two different situations 
concerning rangeland management. As will be explained later, each of these situations located 
in the 'territory' of the Chabe people was used as a case study. The first deals with rangeland 
resource management under local arrangement (see §5.3); the second explores an innovative 
external intervention (see §5.4). The following issues discussed concern the problem and 
perception, the social learning, and ways for facilitating change. Some similar patterns or 
specific variations may evolve from the analysis of the two situations studied as cases. For that 
reason a comparative analysis was done to draw conclusions (see §5.6). 
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5.2 Setting the scene: rangeland management in Chabe community 
Geographic location of the Chabe people and their socio-political organization 
The Chabe people live in the Sous-prefectures of Save and Ouesse (Eastern part) along the 
frontier with Nigeria (see map 5.1). This geographic position has some advantages for the 
Chabe such as the development of border commerce activities. Agricultural activities became 
less important for them compared to other ethnic groups such as the Mahi (see next chapter). 
For that reason, the Chabe have access to land near the village near the villages, even if they 
have planted cashew trees because of their economic value. 
The socio-political organizations of the Chabe people is centralized around their local 
kingdom. The Oba is the King of all the Chabe, the highest local authority living in Save, the 
capital of the Sous-prefecture. All the Chabe villages have their local authority called the bale. 
The bale is under the authority of the oba Chabe. At the level of a Chabe village, the balodJe 
is the local authority for the hunters and responsible for the protection of the natural resources 
(forest resources, game, etc.). Land is under the control of the native Chabe called the Agani 
(the land landowner). The bale of the village Kaboua in the Sous-prefecture of Save is called 
Olochoumare and is in charge of the enthronement of the King of the Chabe people. 
The organization of the Chabe gives local authorities the prerogative of the control over 
natural resources (e.g., forest resources, game). The bale ('the father of land') is taking care 
of the village's land (cf. Biaou, 1996). He was responsible for the redistribution of land to the 
villagers for agricultural activities1. The bale 'governs' the village with the assistance of baba 
bale (the father of bale), the Iya Bali (the mother of bale) and other influential people in the 
village (cf. Biaou, 1996). 
The availability of land in Save and Ouesse, and the socio-political organization of the 
Chabe people enabled the settlement of farmers and herders in their territory. Several migrant 
farmers borrowed land from the Agani. The transhumant herders also got the permission to 
settle in the same area. 
This generosity for giving land to migrants enabled the creation of many villages and 
hamlets which consist only of migrant farmers. Especially, in the Southern part of Save2, most 
of the villages were created by migrants through this process of borrowing land from the 
Agani living in Save. Planting trees is a kind of land appropriation in the Chabe community 
and the migrants are not allowed to do this. 
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Migration to, and settlement in, the Chabe community 
The Sous-prefectures of Save and Ouesse attract many herders because of the presence of many 
rivers and the abundance of pastures. For instance, out of 185, 600 hectares of the cultivated 
land available, only 6% were used in 1989. Many ethnic groups (Adja, Fon, Otamari, Berba, 
etc.) migrated from the Southern and the Northern parts of Benin to the territory of the Chabe 
people. 
Rangeland ecosystems are heterogenous in space and variable over time. Pasture 
availability changes drastically with the rainfall pattern. For this reason, herders had to look 
for places where pastures could be available for their cattle. In the driest month, the herders 
left the region of florin in Nigeria to Benin (transhumance) through the Chabe territory in 
Ouesse and Save (P. Onibon, 1990). Many herders arrived also from the Northern part of 
Benin to this region. Grazing areas and farmlands are intertwined. 
Construction of two different situations for empirical investigations 
The first situation concerns the settlement of herders and migrant farmers in an area used for 
grazing and cultivation (see fig. 5.1). These stakeholders are using land which does not belong 
to them for their main activities. The role of the highest level of organization of the Chabe 
people was important for their access to land and pasture. The socio-economic and political 
central functions are performed by villages of the migrant farmers to which one or several 
hamlets of the herders are attached (cf. also Bierschenk, 1988). A hamlet is called gaa by the 
native Chabe although herders use the concept Gure in their dialect. Many hamlets are at the 
periphery of the villages in the Sous-prefecture of Save. They consist of 'household^)' without 
any spatial, socio-economic or political center. 
Highest level of organization 
of the Tchabe people 
Area arbitrarily 
Figure 5.1 : Schematic visualization of the first situation for empirical study: the local 
arrangement (§5.3) 
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Three villages were chosen (Dani, Katakou, and Ayedjoco) in the area arbitrarily 
selected, and the city of Save, the centre of the Chabe people's organization. Many reasons 
motived this choice: (i) many gaa of herders are surrounding these villages; (ii) the facility of 
having contact with the herders existed and there was an experienced interpreter who was used 
by the NGO CEBEDES (Centre Béninois pour le Développement Economique et Social) and 
who knew many herders and could communicate with them. The village Dani is populated by 
Datcha, Fon and Otamari migrants. The case of Ayedjoco is special. The villagers were 
employed in a recent past by a government organisation for forest management called 
SNAFOR (Société National des Forêts). This organisation collapsed and the labourers settled 
there to cultivate the land in the protected forest zone and create the village Ayedjoco. 
The second situation concerned the local organization of the Chabe people at a village 
level. Decision-making about the settlement of the herders was done by the bale and the 
balodè. Both native Chabe and herders were using the village territory for their different 
activities: crop cultivation and herding (see fig. 5.2). The village Kemon was selected for 
studying this situation. The main reason was the presence of an innovative intervention for the 
support of the existing local organization that was operational in finding solutions to the 
barriers in rangeland resource management. 
Figure 5.2: Schematic visualization of the second situation for study: 
external support (§5.4) 
Kemon is one of the nine Communes of the sous-prefecture of Ouesse. Near Kemon live old 
time herders. Kemon has a vast domain that consists partly of sacred forests and woody 
savannah. Three important rivers in Kemon are: Kilibo, Yani and Aouwo. These conditions 
are (probably) one reason for herders to settle in this area. Unlike many villages in Benin, the 
boundary of the territory of Kemon was known by the villagers. There are local religious 
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barriers to tbe exploitation of natural resources which were are strong in Kemon. For instance, 
the land is mastered by a spirit called Ninguedjou, and selling a piece of land is forbidden. 
Having explained the two different situations of rangeland resource use within the 
Chabe community, the following will discuss the problems, and analyse the extent to which 
platforms are developed to overcome barriers to sustainable rangeland resource management. 
Section 5.3 reports on the situation in which local arrangements determine the outcome, nd 
section 5.4 looks at the external intervention. 
5.3 Platforms for rangeland resource management under the local arrangement in 
Save area 
The stakeholders for the rangeland resource management in Save area 
The villagers: migrant farmers 
The migrants in Dani and Katakou originated from the Southern part of Zou Province (Datcha 
and Fon ethnic groups) and from the Atacora province, a Northern part of Benin (Betamaribe 
ethnic group). The Datcha people are dominant in Dani and Ayedjoco. The Fon people are 
dominant in Katacou where they created two hamlets that became one village in 1981. Dani 
became a village in 1974 and the first migrant was appointed bale by the Chabe. The migrant 
farmers have the duty to give a part of their agricultural product (e.g., maize, cassava) to the 
Agani in Save. He became the mediator among all the migrant farmers who asked for land in 
Dani. Each year he collects land rent for the Agani. The Fon people in Katacou also give land 
rent to the Agani in Save. 
The influence of the Chabe people on the migrant farmers is growing because land is 
acquiring an economic value3. The rule that does not allow the migrant farmers to plant trees 
is becoming very strict. However, the government encourage the stakeholders through 
campaigns for planting trees. In this ambiguity, many migrant farmers planted trees and in 
1997, the Chabe people in Save threw them out their territory (more than 500 migrant farmers) 
and damaged their farms (see Le Matin du 9 Mai 1997). 
The political authorities were not able to find solutions to this crisis. The resolution of 
the conflict was brought about by the King of the Chabe people in Save. He became the 
mediator of the stakeholders in conflict with the Agani. This example shows that the Agani in 
Save has a voice in the rangeland issues. In all the villages which were selected, there is a 
local political representative, the Chef de Village, and also members of committees for 
maintaining the infrastructure of pumps for drinking water. 
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The herders in the Save area 
The livelihood of the herders in Save area is very complex. They arrived and settled after 
permission to the Agani. They migrate any time depending on many factors. P. Onibon & 
Adandedjan (1990) identified the following factors: 
• the decreasing quality of the pasture in the area; 
• difficult access to watering places for the cattle (presence of crop farms); 
• the behaviour of the farmers when establishing their crop fields, the herders prefer a 
good atmosphere with the villagers to avoid conflicts; 
• the presence of tse-tse fly in an area; 
• the areas with hydromorphic soils are abandoned because they cause health problems 
for the cattle. 
In view of the above, different gaa had different history. A life history approach was 
adopted to select the herders for the investigations (see Box 5.1). 
Box 5.1: different gaa, different history and profile 
(1) Gaa Amadou: recent migrant with own flock 
Amadou, called El-hadj, is the eldest of the gaa. He had three wives and 15 children. He is living in the gaa with 
three brothers. The first had two wives and seven children, the second had one wife and two children, and the 
third had one wife and one child. The origin of the group was Nikki (a town in a Northeastern part of Benin). 
They migrated from Nikki to Nigeria (Ilorin) where they stayed for 30 years. The large number of herders in the 
region caused pasture and water problems for the cattle. Insecurity (theft of cattle) was also a problem in this 
region. They migrated from Ilorin to Benin (Save). They settled near the village called Dani since 1994 after 
permission from the Agani in Save. The gaa Amadou has a big flock, more than 300 cattle. 
(2) Gaa Sema: recent migrant under a salary contract for keeping the cattle 
Sema is a relatively young herder living with his brother near Save. He had one wife and three children and his 
brother has one wife and two children. He left Bissi (a village in Save) to another village called Gbere' (in the 
Sous-prifecture of Save) and settled near Save. Sema manages a small flock on the farm (settlement place) of 
an El-hadj in Cotonou who was his patron. He receives a salary (15,000 F CFA/month) from his patron. 
(3) Gaa Tikou: recent migrant under the 'old fashioned contract'(see explanation below) 
Tikou is a very young Fulani living with his father, mother, sisters, wives and brother. He is keeping a small 
flock of cattle which belongs to an El-hadji living in Save. Tikou settled in a parcel which was a private property 
of his patron. He did not get a salary from his patron but a percentage of the calves born in the flock (an old 
fashioned contract). 
(4) Gaa Bouba: old time herder under an old fashioned contract 
Bouba has many flocks (total of 600 heads of cattle) because he is keeping the cattle on the behalf of some native 
Chabe. Since five years ago in 1996, he moved with the cattle from Gobe to Katacou because conflicts were 
becoming very frequent. As he stayed in Gobe for a long time, he has a son who went to school and speaks 
French. He has two wives, and several boys already married. They are living in mud houses, an indicator of the 
old time herders. 
(5) Gaa Bawa: old time Fulani under a contract with the villagers of Ayedjoco 
Members of gaa Bawa migrated from Djougou (Northern part of Benin) several years ago to the Sous prefecture 
of Dassa. They arrived in Ayedjoco since 1990. The gaa is composed of several people: four young people with 
one wife each, two old men, one with two wives. The gaa was far from the village Ayedjoco (4 kilometres) in 
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other to avoid conflict with farmers. Most cattle herded by Fulani belong to the villagers of Ayedjoco under a 
contract. 
(6) Gaa Worou: old time herder with a small flock for his own 
Worou left Aeon (a village of Save) because the number of herders is very large in this region. He arrived in Dani 
in 1996, where he lived with the villagers for three months, a period where he expected to find a place to settle. 
Worou was living with his brother, his own wife and the wife of his brother. 
Rangeland problems as perceived by the stakeholders 
The problem according to the perception of the herders 
The main constraint of cattle keeping was introduced by a herder who used the following 
parable: '...a Fulani has to keep the cattle on the Earth and not in the Sky'. Herders 
complained about the difficulty to share the same area with the crop-farmers. Immediately 
perceived problems were defined as follows: the crops eaten by the cattle, corridor space was 
not respected by the farmers, the difficulty of joining the watering places during the rainy 
season, or watering place increasingly dry up during the dry season. The location of the 
different gaa and the nature of the relationship of the villages influences the way the problems 
are perceived by the herders. 
The gaa Amadou and Worou are near the village Dani and the gaa Sema and Tikou 
are located between Save and Dani. Their crucial problem was the difficulty to find water for 
the cattle in the dry season. There is a swampy land area in Dani which holds water in the 
rainy season and the herders use it as a watering place. But in the dry season it dries up and 
herding activities suffered. Another difficulty is the presence everywhere of crops-farms and 
the increasing risk of crop damage. The herders believed that the farmers did not think about 
the herders to reduce their suffering. During the dry season, the gaa Bouba went to the River 
Ouem6 to find water for their cattle. The migrant Datcha were practising shifting cultivation 
toward the gaa Bouba. Everyday, the movement towards this watering place was problematic. 
Very often crop damage occurred. The gaa Bawa in Ayedjoco did not have problem of finding 
water and pastures for their cattle. The immediate perceived problem was the progression of 
crop-farms towards their gaa despite the fact that the gaa is far from the village Ayedjoco. 
The problem according to the perception of the villagers 
The problem perceived by the villagers was the serious crop damage caused by the cattle. The 
most critical problem was the insecurity caused by the transhumant Fulbe4 (the buzu) who are 
well-equipped with guns. According to the farmers in Dani, the buzu are the 'savages' and 
they do not hesitate to shoot the people. After the passage of their cattle, the soils became hard 
and difficult to cultivate (see also De Haan, 1995). Early bush-fire is a common practice for 
the herders in Save. Many insvestigations suggested that this indigenous practice enables the 
nutrients which are released to re-enter the vegetation and stimulate a palatable and nutritious 
flush growth from perennial grasses (see also Fairhead, 1992). Early fires can help drive away 
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Box 5.2: The délégué of the farmers explained the problematic situation in Ayedjoco 
The location of the gaa Bawa was identified on the basis of an agreement we made in the village. We have a 
contract with the herders for keeping our cattle (as this will be explained later). Now the farmers who have no 
cattle and are not expecting anything from the herders are not motivated to respect what we have agreed in the 
village. Those type of farmers are the migrant Fon and Ditamari. Unfortunately, there are some farmers who are 
cultivating toward the gaa Bawa and the cattle caused damages to the cotton farms. Conflicts emerged between 
them and the herders. If they do not want to cooperate, since we, the villagers agreed to settle the herders, we 
will be obliged to keep them out the village. 
Defining the nature of the problem 
The context of Save was characterized by the absence of a useful intervention to solve the 
problems which were identified. For example, the Direction de I'Elevage, the government 
livestock development organization was not helping the herders in the area of study. Only the 
veterinary at the office the CARDER Zou had access to the herders for treating the animal 
diseases. 
The herders have many concrete problems: water, pastures, corridor space, etc. They 
cannot solve them without the other stakeholders, the migrant farmers and the Agani in Save. 
The land degradation, crop damage and conflict which were perceived by the farmers can only 
be reduced if the various stakeholders found a negotiated agreement, adopted collective action, 
and created platforms to overcome the barriers they faced. 
mosquitoes and harmful insects in order to protect the animals. Many farmers found that the 
areas where the herder practised early fires are difficult to cultivate because land clearing 
becomes painful. 
Many farmers in the villages Dani and Katacou asked the Agani in Save to prevent the 
arrival of the buzu in their territory. However, they refused and invited the farmers to a mutual 
understanding with the buzu. Giving permission to the buzu did not involve any risk for the 
Agani in Save. Unlike the migrant farmers, the buzu did not plant trees and should not claim 
any property right in the future. They settlement did not have any risk for losing land by the 
Agani. 
In Ayedjoco the farmers did not perceive the herders as the main constraint to crops 
cultivation. The herders were keeping their cattle. According to a stakeholder in Ayedjoco 
'their bank is in the hands of the herders'. The farmers who owned cattle have one 
representative called the délégué. According to him, the problematic situation was related to 
the shifting cultivation practised by some migrant farmers (see Box 5.2) 
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Can the stakeholders learn their way to overcoming barriers? 
In the absence of a deliberate external support for helping the herders, they learned their way 
to a resolution of the problems they faced. Concrete examples revealed the way in which 
different gaa developed perspectives on solutions and learned about them, according to the 
specific problematic context. 
The negotiation of water for the cattle in Dani and Katacou 
The watering place used by the herders in Dani (gaa Amadou, Tikou, Sema and Worou) dried 
up during the dry season. The alternative solution found by the herders was to go to the River 
Ouem6 at seven kilometres from their locations. Yet the daily movement involved many risks 
of crop (cassava) damage on the route. The herders (gaa Amadou, Sema and Tikou) found the 
idea that they should negotiate to use water from the villagers' pump5 in Dani for their cattle. 
They discussed this with the pump committee and the agreement was that they had to pay for 
water and the cost would depend on the size of the flocks. The gaa Amadou had the large 
number of cattle. He bargained the cost of using the water with the village pump committee 
until the agreement was made that he would pay 2,000 F CFA per flock (approximately 40 
cattle per flock) and per month during the dry season. Sema and Tikou did the same. The 
former would pay 5,000 F CFA for the whole dry season and the latter 4,000 F CFA. This 
arrangement worked only for one year. At the beginning of 1996, the village pump committee 
wanted to double the prices (because of the devaluation of the CFA currency) which they had 
agreed with the herders. The latter realized that the number of their cattle had increased and 
that the villagers might not accept to provide them again with water for their cattle. A young 
herder in the gaa Amadou decided to take the initiative to find an alternative solution to solve 
water problems for the cattle. 
The solution found was to negotiate with the villagers in Dani and to obtain permission 
to dig the swampy watering place which was drying up. The villagers accepted and informed 
the herders that they should invite the public work services (Service des Travaux Publiques) 
to dig the area with a bulldozer. Still, they would pay a certain amount of money (gas oil, 
money for the driver of the worker) to realize this work. The conclusion of the gaa Amadou 
was that the solution to the problem would not be possible at their level. The need to involve 
other gaa around Dani and Save was perceived. Gaa Amadou discussed the initiative with 
them. Some important constraints were identified. The herders who were employed as 
labourers were not able to decide about water problems without the approval of their patrons. 
Furthermore the decision-making process was difficult in the coalition of six gaa (Amadou, 
Bio, Tikou, Sema, and two others) created by the young herder. The herders did not find any 
external support to solve this problem. The fact that they took the initiative and formed a 
coalition reveals the importance of collective action for solving their problem. 
The importance for creating a coalition for collective action became visible as a result 
of the failure of the gaa Bouba to solve the water problem for the cattle. During the dry 
season, the problem of finding water was also crucial for the gaa Bouba. He saw in the Sous-
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préfecture of Ouesse that, a very powerful herder (19 flocks, more than 1,300 cattle) had 
succeeded in obtaining a pump similar to the one used in many villages. Why he should not 
try the same idea? He got the information from the villager that the Health Centre in Save 
should help achieve his goal. He had a contact with the 'Director' of the centre and discussed 
the problem. The cost of pump instalment at that period was 120,000 F CFA. A specialist was 
sent to the gaa Bouba. When he arrived, he counted the number of people living there. The 
conclusion was that they were too few and the pump would not be maintained after its 
realization. The gaa Bouba was disappointed and did not understand the procedure. He wanted 
a pump for the cattle which were not counted. The failure of Bouba revealed that the water 
problem was difficult to solve at the level of his gaa only. He would have succeeded if he had 
networked with the villagers in Katacou or other gaa in the surroundings. Forming coalition 
and networking might be a solution for the various problems the individual gaa in the Save 
area were facing. Negotiated agreements with the villagers were also important. 
Negotiated agreement for herding and cultivation in Ayedjoco 
The inhabitants of the village Ayedjoco were migrant people of the ethnic groups Datcha, Fon 
and Ditamari. The Datcha people were the dominant and they migrated from the Sous-
prefectures of Dassa-Zoumê and Glazoué which are two neighbouring Sous-préfectures. All 
the farmers in Ayedjoco were looking for fertile lands and the shifting cultivation was 
practised. Many Datcha people owned cattle in Ayedjoco and herders were keeping them. 
They created a committee chaired by a farmer called the délégué of the cattle owners. This 
idea emerged from the realization that the herders would be disturbed too much if everybody 
who owned cattle would be visiting them. The herders would have the feeling that the cattle 
owner did not trust them. 
The cattle owners perceived the need to organize cultivation and herding activities in 
the village territory to avoid crop damages by the cattle and the serious conflicts which 
occurred. The committee of the cattle owners helped by the Chef de Village organized a 
meeting to discuss the problem. The decision was made to find a new area for the herders on 
the village territory. According to the Chef de Village, everybody agreed on mat and the area 
was found. 
The herders were displaced to this area which is at four kilometres from the village 
built-up area (the former was at 300 metres). The farmers who were already cultivating in this 
area left. The new situation had some negative implications on the livelihoods of the herders, 
for instance, selling milk and sheabutter to the villagers in Ayedjoco would be painful for the 
women (a long distance to walk every day). But they did not have another choice. They had 
to adapt themselves to the situation. However, they perceived also some advantages. They 
were near the River Ouémé (500 metres) and water for the cattle was not a problem. There 
were no crop farms in this area and conflicts could be avoided. But, this arrangement could 
not be maintained as explained below. Conflicts still emerged. 
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Conflict resolution in the local setting: some concrete examples in Ayedjoco and Katacou 
Conflict resolution was perceived as a frequent occurrence in the local setting. Before the 
presentation of the concrete examples in Ayedjoco and Katacou, an overview of existing 
structures and strategies for resolving conflicts about rangeland problems will be given as a 
basis for understanding the examples described below. 
The government created one ad hoc commission, at the level of the Sous-prefecture, 
which involved the Sous-préfet, the district officer for rural development (RDR = Responsable 
du Développement Rural), the Village Extension Worker (VEW), the police forces 
{gendarmes), a representative of the herders called Chef Peulh, and a representative of the 
farmers (see also P. Onibon & Okou, 1995: 75). The role of this committee was to mediate 
disputes between the crop-farmers and the herders. However, in the local setting, many 
herders preferred a settlement out of court when their cattle damaged a farm. A failure to 
finding a compromise let them move to the level of the Chef de Village or the Maire of the 
Commune where the conflict occurred. Many farmers also preferred the resolution of conflict 
at the level of the gendarmerie where coercive methods are used (e.g., case of Katacou 
explained below) without further actions by the ad hoc commission. As a consequence, many 
herders like El-hadj Oumon (see Box 5.3) did not trust this commission. 
Box 5.3: El-Hadj Oumon, a leader of the herders in Save, gives his perception about the government structure 
for conflict resolution. 
We have a committee at the level of the sous-prefecture and I am a member. The persons involved are the Sous-
préfet, the RDR, the Maire, the Chef de village, representatives of farmers and Fulbe. Unfortunately this 
committee is not functional. When a problem emerges and I go to see the administrative authorities who are in 
this committee, they always say that they did not have time. I would not hesitate to repeat it if all the members 
of the committee were here. Aaministrative authorities at the grass-roots level like the Maire and Chef de village 
are not serious. They will give you a permission to settle in a region and the same authorities will support the 
farmers who will kill your cattle. It is also common for the villagers to say: We give you this area for herding, 
but the same villagers may come and cultivate in this area. Nobody would do anything about this problem. We 
(herders) have to find our way to deal with the farmers. When there is a problem in a region, I will go there with 
local leaders (among the farmers) to negotiate. 
Despite the creation of the ad hoc commission, conflicts between the farmers and the herders 
were increasing (P. Onibon & Okou, 1995). Of the many conflicts which occurred in the local 
setting, the following examples give an idea of the way the problems between herding and 
cultivation were dealt with, and provide some lessons that one can draw.. 
In Katacou, finding water for the cattle was a great problem for the gaa Bouba because they 
did not know where the crop farms were located on the routes towards the River Ouem6. One 
day, the flock of gaa Bouba caused serious damage to cowpea and groundnut farms. The 
owner of the farms in a hamlet of Katacou was alerted by another farmer. He did not say 
anything to the herder and went to the gendarmerie (local police) in Save. He paid 5,000 F 
CFA to the gendarmes to investigate the situation. Thereafter Bouba was arrested. The Village 
Extension Worker was invited to estimate the cost of the damages. This investigation led to 
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an estimate of 200,000 FCFA. The herder bargained and reduced the cost to 160,000 F CFA. 
He was liberated after paying this amount of money to the farmer. This event is an example 
of the way the conflict resolution was done in Save. This strategy did not change anything in 
terms of the problematic situation of the herders. The root of the problem was (among others) 
a lack of organization between herders and farmers for a symbiosis in the exploitation of the 
'common' territory. The existing ad hoc commission for rangeland issues should act to 
generate new organizations of stakeholders to prevent and resolve conflicts in the local setting. 
The example of Ayedjoco revealed another dimension of conflict resolution. Despite 
the existing negotiated agreement between the stakeholders (discussed above), some migrant-
farmers did not trust the local institutions which were generated for fanning and herding 
activities on the village territory. The délégué and the cattle owners warned the migrant-
fanners and tried to convince them that the location of the herders was already far from the 
village and that they could not move again to another place. Despite the existing local effort 
for the realization of a synergy for preventing conflicts, cotton field were installed during the 
rainy season in the area allocated to the cattle. Serious crop damage was caused by the cattle. 
The owner of the farm went to the gendarmerie and the délégué of the cattle owners paid 
45,750 FCFA, as the equivalent of the damage to the farmer. This example of Ayedjoco shows 
that, because of the existing negotiated agreement between the villagers and the herders, local 
organizations emerged for taking responsibility in conflict resolution. A major learning point 
from this example is that, the formal institutions such as the ad hoc commission did not 
support existing local institutions and organizations for preventing conflicts. 
Learning about the development of local platforms for the resolution of rangeland problems 
The integration of local economies, herding and farming enabled the rapprochement of the 
herders and the villagers for finding a negotiated agreement about how they should go about 
their activities based on concerted actions in Ayedjoco. Maintaining this negotiated agreement 
stimulated the development of a platform where the potential stakeholders became the activists 
for its functioning in Ayedjoco. The water problem in Dani raised the need to create a 
platform. But the fact that the decision-making power was not in the hands of the herders 
(e.g., some of whom were labourers who were keeping the cattle of the people living in town) 
they could not overcome the barriers they faced in Dani. 
Living with the herders to learn about change: what are the implications to overcome 
barriers? 
Participatory Learning Action Research 
A herder in the gaa Amadou summarized the learning repertoire in herding activity as the 
following: 'everyday a herder has to think about how to find pastures and water and avoid 
problems with crop-farmers'. This daily reflection of the Fulbe stimulates a participatory 
action research and learning to share the world in which the herders operated and the 
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interpretation and meaning they give to it. The participatory action research and learning was 
aimed at identifying fresh ideas and strategies from the herders for facilitating change with 
respect to the rangeland problems. 
The participatory action research and learning started with a mapping exercise. Some 
principles in the document 'Pour une cartographie paysanne du terroir' (Terroir mapping with 
farmers) of the ESPGRN (Equipe sur les Systèmes de Production et Gestion des Resources 
Naturelles = Team on Farming Systems and Natural Resource Management) in Mali, were 
used. The objective of the present exercise was to create a visual tool which presented a 
concrete ground for discussion, self-discovery and learning through interactive processes. This 
would help identify constraints and potentials on the terroir pastoral according to the way the 
herders experienced it. Another objective was to learn to identify how the herders represented 
the terroir pastoral, the meaning they gave to it, their needs, their perspectives on solution, 
for instance the reorgainzation of the herding and cultivation activities for improving the 
quality of pastures. 
Finding the appropriate period and bringing the herders together was not an easy task, 
especially during the research period (dry season in February) when the idea emerged. 
Incentives were not available to stimulate the herders in participating in a participatory action 
research and learning. The alternative solution was to discuss with the herders how to find the 
appropriate time. As they are Moslems, the gaa Amadou revealed that they had planned a 
gathering for a prayer at their place the 10th of February 1997. They suggested that the same 
day should be planned opportunistically for the participatory action research and learning 
exercises. The proposition the herders worked and the day of their gathering, they agreed on 
the time the exercises were done interactively (see Box 5.4). 
Box 5.4: The exercises for learning about 'pastoral terroir' 
The exercise started with explanation of the materials used. A large sheet of paper was put in the centre of the 
circle where we were seated on a straw mat in a small house. Ten herders were in the house. I explained to the 
herders that this sheet of paper represents the surface where they live with their cattle and all kind of things their 
need for keeping their cattle, sheep, chickens, etc., and the villages which are important according to them. I 
explained also that the objective of what we wanted to do was to draw those things on the surface of the paper 
and after that we discuss. 
The herders had a brief discussion among themselves and El-Hadj Amadou said: this exercise should be 
done by young Fulbe who went to the grazing areas and watering places with the cattle. We, old men are at home. 
Then five young men were chosen to do the participatory mapping exercise. The old men said that they would 
intervene when necessary. The young men said: 'we cannot draw ourselves what you are explaining, but we can 
tell you what we want and you will draw it for us on this large sheet of paper and the exercise started. 
Could you put the four points of the compass on the paper? (first question that should be asked according 
to the ESPGRN document). My interpreter was not able to translate this question in the way that the herders might 
understand. As they are Moslems, I changed the question and asked them to indicate the side where the sun raises 
on the paper. This was the first parameter for the mapping exercise, contrary to the conventional parameter which 
is the North. They showed this position and called it letougal (East). They requested to draw a circle with claws 
around. The opposite side of letougal is called gorougal (West), the North is sobiridel and the South (towards the 
town Cotonou) is Horehoudo. Second request: they asked me to draw small figures which resemble their houses 
in the middle of the paper. My interpreter drew rectangular figures but they refuse. We changed the paper and 
116 Platforms for resource management 
The participatory action research and learning (as discussed above) stimulated joint-learning 
situations, self-discoveries of their problematic conditions and the identification of their needs, 
and the strategies for change towards the improvement of their situation. 
Figure 5.3: Representation and interpretation of a terroir pastoral mapping by Fulbe 
Participatory action research and learning stimulates joint-learning for change 
The participatory action research and learning helped visualize the representation, organisation 
and use of the terroir pastoral by the herders around Dani and Save. Specific concepts were 
used to make sense to the terroir, in relation to cattle keeping. For instance, the concept bella, 
gorou, djesse, lade, letougal etc., shaped the instrumental worldview of the herders (see Box 
5.5). 
Box 5.5: Instrumental and utilitarian organization of the 'pastoral terroir' by the herders 
bella rainy season watering place (swampy watering place in Dani) 
gorou dry season watering place (River OuemS) 
lade grazing areas where conflicts did not exist 
djesse conflict prone grazing areas (many crop-farms) 
shire village 
letougal the side where the sun rises 
drew circular houses as they wanted. Third request: they asked to draw two lines the river Oueme' (gorou) they 
perceived in the opposite side of letougal. Fourth request: they asked to locate the village Dani (shut Dani) and 
the rainy season watering place that they called bella. Fifth request: they asked to draw some trees, shrubs and 
herbs on the paper which represent the pastures for the cattle. The discussion continued and some issues were 
figured out like conflict zones, secure zones, etc. (see fig. 5.3). 
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In observing the map which was jointly drawn, the herders discussed learning about it. 
Reaching watering places were not easy in their area. They have to move carefully around the 
shire Dani as shown on the map (see fig.5.3). The directions of the conflict zones are called 
djesse. The areas continuously cultivated by farmers did not yield pastures of good quality. 
A participating Fulani said that: 
'during the dry seasons, we find pastures of good quality around gorou. We move temporarily with our flocks 
in this area because the watering place bella dries up. However, in the rainy seasons, we return to our gaa and 
use bella. Living near gorou with the cattle during the rainy season is not good because when the hooves of the 
cattle are in the mud they carry diseases'. 
The quality of the pasture is appreciated as they said by the behaviour of the cattle in grazing. 
The cattle move slowly when the quality is good. When they move very fast in grazing, the 
quality of the pasture is not good. 
The discussions generated also an understanding about the institutional network which 
constituted their space for the organization of their activities. The information enabled the 
drawing of a Venn diagram to make visible the network of a gaa in the local setting (see fig. 
5.4). The Beleedi (Agani) was important for the settlement in the territory of Save. The 
authorities of the villages (Laamou, Djohounro) were important because they interacted with 
them for many problems (conflicts, water, corridor space). The mosque was the place where 
they met every Friday in Save and they exchanged information. The cattle market enabled 
many interactions with the brokers (Tiorkoudjo) and the butchers (Paor). The only actor which 
was known at the CARDER representation at Save, was the veterinary (Toufforonnai). 
Figure 5.4: A social network of a gaa in the area of Save 
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The needs of the participating herders 
The discussion among the stakeholders raised two basic ideas about their needs: the desire to 
live in secure conditions and to have a school for their children. 
Secure conditions concerned herding activities. According to them, the government 
should create watering places for herders in the same way as the villagers benefit from the 
construction of pumps for drinking water. The participating herders found some areas in the 
territory of Save which should be very good for their herding activities (lade, see fig. 5.3). 
They would prefer to settle there and avoid conflicts with the farmers. Unfortunately, a 
constraint was the absence of a watering place. A trade-off could also be the difficulty for their 
wives to sell milk to the villagers. 
Despite the fact that a primary school is near the herders in Dani, they identified 
schooling of their children as a need. One should try to understand the reason the herders have 
to perceive a different school for their children. They do not stay for a long time at the same 
place because of the absence of secure conditions. The importance of having a grazing area 
that should be recognised by the authorities and would not interfere with the cultivation areas, 
was crucial. The herders found that the government should protect them against the villagers. 
To emphasize the importance of schooling, a participant to the discussion said: 'if we had been 
to school, you would not have come with an interpreter to discuss with us'. 
Participatory action research and learning generates ideas and strategies for change 
Participatory action research and learning generate indicators and repertoires of herder 
knowledge and strategies that can help the professionals to appreciate the quality of the 
pastures, the anticipation on the health of the cattle and the monitoring of herding activities. 
Participatory action research and learning with the herders helped learn about their assessment 
of the vegetation in the physical environment around them and led to the identification of lade 
which should be a good grazing area. 
The herders revealed an attitude of communicative behaviour, they perceived the 
negotiation with the land owners and the villagers as the best way to go about their activities 
and to overcome barriers in rangeland resource management (water, pastures, security and 
peace). 
Concluding remarks 
This present case study shows that many problems like crop-damage by the cattle, the absence 
of corridor spaces and a difficult access to watering places affect the herders. Serious problems 
occurred like the conflicts between herders and crop-farmers. Many local initiatives emerged 
among the stakeholders for resolving the problem above. However, the fact that they lack a 
desired decision-making capacity (e.g., reorganization of the area used by the villagers and the 
herders) did not generate effective platform(s) at inter-villages level to overcome barriers in 
Overcom ing barriers 119 
the rangeland resource management. Maybe, the absence of an external intervention prevented 
pooling local initiatives. 
The rangeland case in me Save area generated a new idea for an additional rangeland 
case. The study of the situation in Kemon enabled an exploration of the effect of external 
support of sustainable rangeland development within the Chabe community. 
5.4 External support for developing a platform for collective rangeland resource 
management in Kemon 
The stakeholders in rangeland resource management in Kemon 
The villagers and their local organization in Kemon 
Kemon is a Chabe village which still has a strong local organization dealing with the 
socioeconomic and political dimension of social life. The bate is the local authority, the 
spiritual Chief of the land, and the mediator of many disputes. The Imam, the authority of 
Moslems, is also an influential authority. Many farmers in Kemon are hunters and the balode 
is their Chairman. 
Being a hunter in a Chabe community has a cultural meaning. The hunters are 
perceived by the other villagers as courageous, they have occult powers that enable then to talk 
with 'bush spirits' (similar issue in other context is found in Almquist, 1991). The function 
of the balode has a spiritual and mystical dimension. The organization of the hunters (see Box 
5.6) is strategically important within the local institutions of the Chabe people. Traditionally 
the role assigned to the hunters was to protect the village against aggression, or attacks by 
other ethnic groups (tribal wars). A second function was the protection of the environment 
('bush') to avoid or exclude other people from outside the village, practising hunting activities, 
cutting trees, or using the territory for cultivation, etc. Recently the involvement of the herders 
in the control of the transhumance is growing in the Chabe community (e.g., see Onibon & 
Okou, 1995). 
Box 5.6: The composition of the organisation of the hunters is the following: 
Balode: Chairman of the hunters 
Atchikpa: Vice-chairman responsible for the execution of actions 
Achadjou: Responsible for information exchange 
Ahimonde: Second responsible for information exchange 
Monye: Commissioner 
Abeda: Execution of spiritual sacrifices 
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The herders in the territory of Kemon 
The native Chabe considered two groups of herders: the old times herders and the migrant 
herders called buzu. These two groups are using the territory of Kemon. 
The first group consists of sedentary herders living in Kemon since several decades. 
Detailed studies (e.g., Biokou, 1989) provide some indicators for recognizing them. For 
instance, they speak the language of the native and live in mud houses covered by iron sheets. 
Some of them (for example the case of Bouba in Box 5.1) send their children to school. 
The second group of herders is heterogenous. Detailed studies (see Onibon, 1990) 
distinguish four groups: the Bororo (from the Northern part of Nigeria), the Houassadji (from 
the same area), the Abakou (from florin in Nigeria), and the Bargoudje (from the Northern 
part of Benin). Among the buzu in the territory of Kemon recent settlers and trans-migrants 
can be distinguished. The recent settlers have their houses in straw and wood only. This gave 
the impression that they should not stay for a long period. Trans-migrants do not settle in 
Kemon, they stay only for 2 or three days and continue the transhumance. They arrive in 
Kemon only during the dry season. Many buzu arrived in the territory of Kemon and other 
surrounding villages, conflicts emerged with the villagers, and sometimes these develop into 
wars. 
Conflicts and wars between villagers and herders: the problematic situation in Kemon 
area 
The conflicts and wars between the villagers and the herders became a serious problem after 
the droughts of the 1980s. For instance, from 1983 to 1990 many people died (28 herders and 
10 farmers) in the conflicts and wars that confronted the villagers and the buzu in the territory 
of the Chabe people. The following story refers to a conflict in Kemon. 
The conflict started in 1994 in a village called Kilibo, 5 kilometres from Kemon. Four 
hunters in this village were perceived by the villagers in Kemon to be causing the conflict. 
During a hunting day which was not fruitful, they shot a cow that had lost the flock. They 
grilled it, hid their loot in the bush and returned to their village to look for a vehicle to 
transport the carcass. Just then, the Fulbe noticed mat one of their cattle was missing and 
started looking for it. They found meat which was grilled and pursuing the search for the cow, 
they found its horn and hooves. These indicators convinced them that the cow they were 
looking for was killed by someone. They became furious, took their guns, hid themselves in 
the bush and were waiting the people who had caused this problem. When the hunters arrived 
with their vehicle to take their loot, the herders started shooting. They killed two hunters and 
the others run away. They returned to Kilibo and alerted the villagers that the Fulbe killed two 
of them. Rapidly, many hunters in Kilibo were mobilized. They took their guns and went to 
the bush to fight the herders. The problem became common to the Chabe people and all the 
villages surrounding Kilibo (including Kemon) were involved. A war against the herders 
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followed. The villagers killed systematically all the herders they found. In turn, the Fulbe also 
were hidden in the bush with their guns and killed systematically all the villagers, especially 
those who were from Kilibo. Six villagers and fourteen herders died. 
The region became insecure for a certain period. In these difficult circumstances, the 
native Chabe in many villages surrounding Kilibo decided to keep out all the buzu from then-
territory. However, the villagers in Kemon did not behave accordingly as will be analysed 
below. Meanwhile, problem was addressed at the policy level through a military intervention 
of the government. Still, could the problem be solved in this way? 
The problems misunderstood by the government 
The government immediately provided a military intervention to halt the war between the buzu 
and the villagers. The former were perceived as mainly responsible for the problems. From 
the political point of view, they did not have a voice to explain the problems they were facing. 
Any governmental actions could only be influenced by the native Chabe (this also has 
implication for election in the context of the democratization process in Benin). 
As a result, the government adopted the policy of preventing the penetration of the 
transhumant buzu into the territory of Benin, especially into conflict zones such as Zou 
province where crises like the one described occurred very often. The gendarmerie and the 
army were mobilized to send back the transhumant herders to their country (Nigeria, 
Niger).This policy is consistent with the assumption that all buzu arrive from other countries 
such as Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, etc., so that they can be denied use of the territory of 
Benin because they cause serious conflicts. 
In practice, the implementation of the government policy was difficult because the 
herders did not have identification cards and making a difference between Beninese herders 
and those who came from Niger or Nigeria was not evident. The government also did not have 
sufficient means to maintain the military presence as the basis of the policy. Still, conflicts 
between herders and the villagers were increasing in Zou Province (Onibon & Okou, 1995). 
The problems were misunderstood by the government. Initiatives that seek a negotiated 
agreement for the organization of the transhumance should be encouraged. However, a 
constraint is that the herders do not form a socio-political group that with a political influence. 
In the local setting, joint learning between villagers and herders could be difficult because the 
latter are looked at as 'low class' people. 
Parallelling the government action, the villagers in Kemon adopted a different way of dealing 
with the transhumance problem in the Chabe community. 
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Social learning: the villagers' way of dealing with the problems 
The actions of the local organization in Kemon during the conflicts and wars in 1994 
Misunderstandings between the herders and the villagers were perceived as the root of the 
conflicts and wars according to the villagers in Kemon. A hunter in this village asked: why 
did the hunters in the village Kilibo kill the cattle of the herders? Why did the herders shoot 
the hunters? They should have complained and talked about the resolution of the problem 
instead. 
The local organization of the hunters in Kemon knew the relevance of opening a debate 
with the herders. The balode advised the villagers who felt provoked by herders' actions on 
their farms, should not react and return to the village to declare. Then the problem should be 
solved at the level of the organization of the hunters chaired by the balode. Each year some 
sacrifices are organized for the bush with respect to the use of the environment (hunting, bush 
clearing for farming, grazing of the pastures, etc.). The bale and the balode organize the 
ceremony. A goat, chicken, cheese or kolanuts are used. Also, the objective of the sacrifices 
is to call for the assistance of bush spirits to keep away eventual incidents such as conflicts and 
war which lead to injury or death among farmers or herders. The hunters contribute (money, 
in kind) for the annual ceremony. 
The villagers in Kemon did not participate in the war in 1994. Rather, during this 
period they protected a group of 15 herders with their relatives from being caught by the 
gendarmerie sent by the government. The neighbouring villages (e.g., Kilibo) did not 
appreciate this action. Why did Kemon people accept herders who were killing the Chabe 
people? The local organization of Kemon did not change their position vis-a-vis the problem 
and chose to develop its own way of approaching the problem. 
The local way of approaching the problem: If you need peace, you will not touch Yankpekpe 
Yankpepke (Tragia senegalensis) was used by the balode of Kemon as a powerful metaphor 
to explain the conditions for establishing a good relationship between the herders and the 
villagers. Yankpepke or say, a local plant has the following property: when mature fruits of 
this plant touch the human body, it itches for a long period. 
In this context the metaphor Yankpekpe suggested that, if the herders want peace while 
staying in the territory of Kemon they should not create problems (not touch Yankpekpe). The 
buzu who wanted to settle in Kemon should take care of their cattle so as to avoid crop damage 
in the farms. The local organization of the hunters in Kemon decided to show the boundaries 
of the village6 and the areas where their cattle could graze to avoid conflicts with the farmers. 
However, the local organization explained to the herders that they would not be responsible 
for any problems they caused beyond the territory of Kemon. 
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Why were the villagers of Kemon motivated to make peace with the herders? 
The villagers of Kemon had some reasons for developing good relationships with the buzu. 
They needed to buy meat, milk and cheese from the herders. The butchers bought the cattle 
from the herders for the market. In Kemon, many native Chabe were involved in the cattle 
trade and made profit from it. A hunter explained that finding wild animals was difficult 
nowadays and herders were consequently more important. Also, burning the bush to kill a wild 
animal was dangerous because the 'plantation' or someone's farm could be destroyed. 
The buzu contributed to the development of a local market. Their wives bought clothes, 
kitchen utensils and agricultural products. The transhumance had a positive socioeconomic 
impact on the development of the local economy during this period. Therefore the village 
welcomes the transhumants. The presence of the buzu also created the new jobs among 
unemployed young people in Kemon. These jobs were the 'moto-taxi' called Zemidjan. They 
took the buzu from their hamlet to the village and vice-versa. 
The fact that the herders, especially the buzu, contributed to the development of the 
local economy in Kemon can be perceived as an important incentive for the villagers to 
establish a good relationship with them. 
Can the local platform in Kemon be sustained? 
From the analysis above, the stakeholders in Kemon could learn their way to overcoming 
barriers to rangeland resource management. However, their initiatives were not yet recognised 
and supported by the political authorities. This problem may carry the risk that the local 
solution could not be sustained, especially since their perspective deviated and even 
contradicted the government's actions. A case in which external support for a local solution 
was established may clarify this critical issue. 
External supports for the local process: the implementation of Appui-Conseil 
The objectives of the Appui-Conseil intervention 
The basis for the initiatives and the actions foreseen in the framework of Appui-Conseil was 
based on the participatory processes and the support of the stakeholders to help them sustain 
the actions in which they already are engaged. The principal objective of the Appui-Conseil 
was to provide a methodological guide (see Box 5.7) for implementing various actions with 
villagers to improve rangeland resource management in the village Kemon and its territory. 
Concrete objectives of the Appui-Conseil are: 
• to establish a better social relationship between the Fulbe and the farmers; 
• to effectively manage land and associated resources (vegetation and water specifically); 
• to promote the social and economic development of the villagers and the herders. 
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Box 5.7: The different steps in the Appui-Conseil 
The approach of the Appui-Conseil is based on eight steps (cf. Hounkpodoté & Bediyé, 1995): 
(1) Information-communication: Explanation of the approach to the political authorities (the Sous-préfet of 
Ouèssè, the Maires of the Communes and the Chefs de Village), the CARDER organization and the local 
people. 
(2) Organisation of village fora: the first one is a preparatory forum with key stakeholders and the second 
forum involve many decision-making issues 
(3) Joint identification of actions to be supported financially 
(4) Delimitation of corridor space and grazing areas. 
(5) Study the carrying capacity of the grazing areas identified. 
(6) Training and education of the stakeholders: first, training of some stakeholders to be capable to analyse 
maps and aerial photographs; second, training of some stakeholders to appreciate the carrying capacity 
of an area. 
(7) Implementation of actions 
(8) Participatory monitoring and evaluation (Suivi-évaluation participatif). 
Negotiation of the intervention based on the Appui-Conseil 
The Appui-Conseil clashed with the government strategy which was based on a military 
intervention and the decision to send back the migrant herders to their countries. The difficulty 
of the government to continue with this action raised the need to find an alternative solution: 
the political decision in 1992 (the Arrêté interministériel n°010/MISAT/MDR/D-CAB) 
concerning the creation of the transhumance committees (Comités de Transhumance). Their 
role was to prepare the transhumance based on a concerted action between villagers and 
herders. The members of the committee, at the level of the Sous-préfecture of Ouesse, were: 
a representative of the herders, a representative of the crop farmers, the veterinary, the district 
officer for rural development (RDR = Responsable de Développement Rural), the Maire of 
the Communes in Ouesse, and the Sous-préfet. Still, in practice, the effectiveness of these 
committees was problematic and the government was relying on military intervention. 
Despite the failure of existing formal frameworks for resolving conflicts between the 
herders and villagers, the Appui-Conseil was not accepted after the explanation of its content 
to the administrative authorities. The Sous-préfet stated clearly that he has received an official 
instruction from the Préfet of the Zou province and the Minister of interior to send back the 
buzu from the region. The commander of the gendarmerie of Ouesse had also the same 
impression and explained that there is already a committee at the level of the Sous-prefecture. 
The professional in charge of the Appui-Conseil then addressed to a higher administrative level 
to negotiate the plan. He discussed the problem with the director of Livestock Production in 
Benin (Direction de l'Elevage) in other to obtain his support. His main advice was that some 
technical arguments could be used to convince the political authorities. These were the 
following: 
• the optimum carrying of the region was not reached (Oloulotan & Onibon, 1990); 
• it was commonly agreed that the resolution of the transhumance problem should be 
effective with the involvement of the local people in the process; 
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• the people themselves should invest in regenerating the vegetation and the pastures, as 
a way to avoid degradation. 
The continuation of the discussion with political and administrative authorities by using the 
technical arguments enabled to change their opinion about the government policy. Finally the 
commander of the gendarmerie recognized that, in reality, they found it difficult to solve the 
conflicts between the buzu and the farmers on the basis of military action. They were not well 
equipped and their number was not sufficient to control the whole area. 
Also at the level of Kemon, some problems were visible. The local organization of the 
herders did not want the local political representatives (Maire and Chef de Village) to be 
involved in their organization if the Appui-Conseil were to support them. They believed that 
those officials were not able to find the solution to the problem of transhumance (corruption, 
ineffective procedures, etc.). The professionals of the PGRN team had no choice but to start 
with the local organization of the herders which was already strongly engaged in the issue of 
rangeland resource management (see Box 5.8) 
Box 5.8: The professional of the PGRN explained how the Appui-Conseil was known by the stakeholders at the 
beginning 
The hunters in Kemon were already active in the resolution of the problem of transhumance. We began to 
appreciate their activities. We said that we wanted to help them to become more effective. It was a good idea that 
they accepted also the migrant herders to settle in Kemon based on some rules. However, we said the danger was 
the risk of the degradation of the vegetation in the future. We wanted to think with them about the way to enrich 
their bush through the tree planting. What was it that supported the willingness of the villagers to collaborate in 
the implementation of the Appui-ConseiP. The herders said that they wanted peace in the village. 
New roles for the professionals: mediation and negotiation 
Accordingly with the methodology of the Appui-Conseil, the organisation of village fora was 
carried out as planned. The facilitation of the fora revealed two roles for external intervention: 
mediation and negotiation. Fora discussions were used by the PGRN team to explain the 
problem of transhumance and identify some solutions: improving the local organization of the 
hunters, tax for tree planting in other to avoid the degradation of the vegetation. The most 
critical issue for the implementation of the Appui-Conseil was the creation of the new local 
organization for rangeland issues. The organization of the hunters took the initiative with the 
PGRN team and they did not perceive the need to involve the herders. Many ideas were 
generated without the herders: 
the constitution of the BLT (Brigade Locale de Transhumance = Local Brigade for 
Transhumance); 
• the constitution of the CGT (Comité de Gestion de la Transhumance = Committee for 
managing the Transhumance); 
• establishing a residence permit for migrant Fulbe who want to settle; 
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• the proposition of taxes which should be paid by the herders who use the territory of 
Kemon: 75 FCFA/animal for trans-migrant Fulbe who stay in the village terroir for 
few days, 50 FCFA/monûVanimal for recent settlers Fulbe, and 25 F 
CFA/month/animal for (dry) season settlers' Fulbe in the terroir of Kemon. This 
money will be used for the regeneration of the vegetation (planting trees, pastures, and 
shrubs). 
Following the advice of the PGRN team, the participants at the forum agreed that it was 
necessary to negotiate these rates with the Fulbe. A few days later, another meeting was 
organised with the Fulbe. The objective was to inform the latter about the decision made 
during the village assembly. At this meeting, the farmers and the villagers could not agree on 
the taxes proposed by the village assembly. It is not a habit for the Fulbe to pay taxes for using 
pastures around villages. The Fulbe requested that the question of tax should be discussed with 
many of their representatives, the ChefPeulh and especially the leader of the buzu in the Sous-
préfecture of Ouèssè. Two weeks after, the PGRN team successfully enabled the participation 
of all the Fulbe in a discussion forum. Two important decisions were made: (a) the integration 
of recent settlers Fulbe in œmmittees for the control of transhumance, and (b) the 
harmonization of the tax rates to provide the maintenance of grazing areas in Kemon. The rate 
became 150 FCFA/year/animal for all the categories of Fulbe. After this compromise, the 
PGRN team needed to support the stakeholders to maintain the institutions which were 
generated, to exclude outsiders (e.g., new comers who should not follow existing rules) and 
to deal with free-riders in the village territory. 
Learning with the stakeholders about alternative solutions to maintain negotiated agreements 
The idea of 'responsabilisation', the transfer of certain competencies, was used for sustaining 
negotiated agreements among the villagers in Kemon and the different categories of Fulbe. The 
tasks which were perceived to be the responsibility of the organization of the stakeholders 
under the Appui-Conseil framework were: 
• Collaborating with the PGRN people of Ouesse for the registration of parcels in the 
terroir of Kemon; 
• participation in the delimitation of grazing areas; 
• maintain the 'registre foncier' (a land registration document) of the village; 
• taking regulatory measures in relation to the carrying capacity of the grazing areas; 
• organizing regenerative action (planting trees and shrubs) in the grazing areas through 
a rotation system; 
• controlling the exploitation of the grazing areas; 
• collecting taxes from the buzu who are using the grazing areas; 
• managing the funds that result from tax collection; 
• establishing resident permits to the migrant Fulbe who want to stay in the terroir of 
Kemon; 
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• resolving conflicts between Fulbe and farmers. 
These roles were jointly perceived by the stakeholders and the PGRN. They were 
transferred through training and non-formal education of local people. Regularly, programmes 
which featured rangeland issues were broadcast over the Radio Rurale in Ouesse. An example 
of training is the analysis of maps and aerial photograph by the members of the Brigade Locale 
de Transhumance (a transhumance look out post). The objective is to help stakeholders 
themselves to appreciate the extent to which the vegetation is degraded. Training programmes 
for the stakeholders involved helping them to manage funds that result from the collection of 
taxes, and to keep documents of land registration. Another approach to mamtaining negotiated 
agreements was the encouragement of a common project between the villagers in Kemon and 
the Fulbe in order to enable the integration of their economies. A concrete example was the 
idea to build a dam. Villagers of Kemon and the Fulbe started a subscription to realize this 
common project in the hope that it may motivate the PGRN project to provide part of the 
investment. Some villagers in Kemon believe that the dam is only for cattle, but others said: 
I do not think so, we can have a garden on one side and the Fulbe can go to the other side to 
water their cattle. 
Support institutions and the policy context 
The activities of the PGRN team in the framework of the Appui-Conseil were carried out in 
a context characterized by the absence of mechanisms to decentralize power to local people 
(e.g., decision-making capacity, statutory power). Such decentralization could help sustain 
several initiatives at the grass-roots level and create a framework for a dynamic and diversified 
interaction with professionals. For example, the balodè of Kemon complained that they were 
organizing several meetings to resolve their problematic situation with the Fulbe but that they 
were not recognized by the political and administrative authorities. An alternative found by 
the PGRN team to sustain the negotiated agreements was to transform the local organization 
of hunters in Kemon and the Brigades Locales de Transhumance into an NGO by helping the 
stakeholders to obtain official permission from the Ministry of Interior. 
The COGEF (Comité de Gestion du Foncier pastoral = Committee for the management 
of Pastoral Tenure) was created. At the main crossroads of Kemon, everybody can see the sign 
that enables one to reach the headquarters and office of the COGEF. The office is open every 
Wednesdays and a secretary of this day arrives for current affairs. The project people helped 
the COGEF to pay the cost of a secretary until the moment that the organization should be 
stronger financially. On the last Wednesday of every month, the steering committee of the 
COGEF organizes a meeting to treat current affairs at its headquarters. The project invested 
in the material needed for the activities of the COGEF and the functioning of the secretary: 
table, chairs, equipped office for the secretary, didactics tools for presentation, etc. 
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Concluding remarks: what are the effects of the external support? 
Unlike the Save case, the rangeland development in Kemon shows that the facilitation of 
existing initiatives, especially through the Appui-Conseil framework, enabled the generation 
of institutions and an organization capable of enhancing a sustainable future in the local 
setting. The facilitation involved the 'responsabilisation' of the stakeholders for performing 
certain roles, negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution to achieve negotiated agreement. 
However, in the absence of an effective decentralization of power to the stakeholders, 
this did not yet provide an enabling policy framework for generating collective agency in the 
local setting. This problem presents some risks of failure in sustaining the institutions and 
organizations which were jointly generated by the stakeholders in Kemon and the PGRN 
intervention. 
5.5 A comparative analysis and conclusions 
Both situations studied in the Chabe community revealed that rangeland resource management 
problems are not only a question of 'carrying capacity', as it is often claimed. Some barriers 
such as lack of concerted action between the Fulbe and villagers, serious conflicts and wars, 
an absence of organizations and institutions for rangeland resource management, etc., are more 
critical. These issues affected the failure of rangeland resource management. 
In Kemon, the development of collective decision making capacity enabled successful 
collective action to overcome barriers in rangeland resource management. Local stakeholders 
realized their mutual interdependence and developed a negotiated agreement and concerted 
action. Platform development was successful with external support and created the condition 
for decision making, monitoring, sanctions and exclusions. This joint learning generated 
social capital for long-enduring action if the political context provides enabling environment. 
In Save the stakeholders engaged in collective learning lacked decision-making 
capacity. Different interest groups did not realize their mutual interdependence as in Kemon. 
They did not meet and negotiate agreement or take concerted action. Many failures can be 
explained at this level. 
Barriers to sustainably managing rangeland resources can be overcome if the different 
stakeholders adopt collective action, develop platforms for decision-making monitoring, 
sanctions and exclusions, at the level of many gaa, villages and regions. 
Overcoming barriers 129 
Notes 
1. The bale gave the 'usufruct' to the heads of lineages who entrusted the redistribution to other members of 
'families' (different groups and sub-groups of the lineage). The individualisation of land in Chabe community 
started with the plantation of cashew trees. 
2. Save is a city and this name is given also to the Sous-prefecture (district). 
3. Now the trend in Save is to sell land to migrant farmers. The decision was made by the APROSA (Association 
pour la Promotion de Save), a political organization. 
4. Herders are also called Fulbe. The singular is Fulani. 
5. In Dani, the villagers created a committee for managing their pump which provides drinking water. The role of 
this committee was to ensure the maintenance of this pump (collect contributions for its repair). 
6. Kemon is a particular villages in Benin in the sense that the villagers could easily identify the boundary, although 
it is a complex issue even there. 
6 Scaling Up Watershed Development with Indigenous People in 
Two Eco-Zones of Benin 
6.1 Introduction 
A watershed is an area drained by a single watercourse system (White & Runge, 1994). 
Watersheds involve multiple and interconnected natural resources such as soil, water, 
vegetation (forests). Watershed development has become a worldwide agricultural development 
problem especially in developing countries (e.g., Doolette et al, 1990; Ninan, 1998). Many 
watershed development initiatives aim at improving the productivity and production potentials 
of the ecologically fragile and disadvantaged farming areas through the 'adoption' of soil and 
water conservation techniques. However, lessons from Machakos District in Kenya (cf. Tiffen 
& Mortimore, 1992), position the watershed development issue at the level of community 
mobilization. 
This chapter1 explores the conditions and the extent to which a deliberate intervention 
can be successful for watershed development with local people. It focuses on existing an 
intervention, the PGRN (Projet de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles) project in Benin. The 
PGRN is formally part of the DFRN (Direction des Forêts et Ressources Naturelles = 
Directorate of Forests and Natural Resources), the department of forest and natural resources 
of the Ministry of Rural Development, but has a high level of autonomy for the 
implementation of the project. The PGRN obtained financial support from the World Bank, 
the Caisse Française de Développement (French development fund) and the German 
International Development Organization, the GTZ. The project started in 1992. Hence, the 
project offers an opportunity to analyse various efforts toward watershed development in two 
sites (Mono and Zou). The donor of the Mono site was the World Bank. The professionals for 
the watershed development team were recruited by the staff at the headquarters of the PGRN 
in Cotonou. The team functioned under the control of coordinators at the headquarters. The 
Caisse Française de Développement was the donor of the Zou activities and under its 
influence, PGRN signed a contract with a Beninese NGO (GERAM) as a result of which 
GERAM (Group d'Expertise et d'Ingénierie Rurales pour l'Auto-promotion du Monde paysan) 
became the main executor of the watershed development project in Ouèssè (Zou). 
Many sources of information and data were available for this case study. In the Adja 
region, key literatures from a multidisciplinary research programme were available (see 
introduction, §1.1). Many documents of the PGRN project (e.g., Djohossou, 1993; 
Karemangingo & Agbo, 1990), the reports on the follow-up of activities (Adjinacou et al, 
1995, AFVP/GERAM, 1994ab) , and consultancy and advisory reports, were used as an 
additional sources of information. Several research methods and techniques were used for the 
present study. Individual (and group) interviews were used to collect data from the 
stakeholders and other actors, the professionals of the PGRN and the CARDER. Key 
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informants for interviews were selected using snow-ball techniques. Many activities of the 
PGRN project with respect to the watershed development were carried out during the research 
period and participant observation was used. 
As explained above, the watershed concept is complex. The following section starts 
with conceptual issues from the perspective of the PGRN project, the areas of watershed 
development which were selected for the present study, and the regenerative practices which 
the project intended to use (§6.2). The main stakeholders (Adja and Mahi people) in the 
project areas, and their cultivation styles were analysed. This contextual analysis reveals that 
watershed development can be effective if individual efforts are scaled up (§6.4). Scaling up 
(perceived later in terms of collective action and platform development) became the critical 
issue for watershed development. From that point of view, two different situations (Adja and 
Mahi) are analysed (§6.4 and §6.5) and compared in order to draw conclusions (§6.6). 
6.2 The watershed concept and issues from the perspective of the PGRN project 
The watershed concept 
Assuming the figure 6.1 below as a village land use area, the hydrographic units create many 
drainage sites for rainfall water. Such sites are indicated by arrows on figure 6.1, showing 
water movement from uplands to low-lands or the seasonal or the main rivers. There is a 
physical linkage between upland and lowlands. The water flows across the soil surface from 
upper catchment to lower channels. The ability of soil to permit rainfall infiltration and retain 
moisture tends to be associated with its ability to withstand detachment and transport. Hence, 
the watershed is thus a functional unit established by physical relationships where upstream 
areas can incite a chain of environmental impacts affecting downstream areas (White & Runge, 
1994). 
In the PGRN project, the term bassin versant is used for land areas in watersheds. A 
bassin versant involves a land area which drains rainfall water into the same river or low-land. 
As will be described later, the bassin versant is defined by referring to a river. It involves 
upstream, midstream, and downstream, land. A bassin versant can be decomposed in many 
micro bassins versants like a watershed can be decomposed in micro watersheds. The 
relationship soil-water-vegetation or forests involves in the bassin versant insures many 
ecological functions. For instance, the vegetation enables the conservation of soil moisture and 
the regulation of the hydrological cycles. Bassins versants are sensitive to soil erosion when 
the land in watersheds are not covered. In many circumstances, the degradation of land in the 
watersheds constitutes one of the major causes of a loss of agricultural productivity. 
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Figure 6.1: Schematic representation of an example of hydrographie units to explain 
the watershed concept according to the PGRN project 
The watershed area for the PGRN intervention in Mono 
The locations of the PGRN intervention for watershed development in Mono Province are in 
the Sous-pr6fectures of AplahouS and Kloueicanme. The watershed areas are defined in relation 
to the rivers Lomon (Aplahou6) and Lanhoun (Klou6kanme). Several seasonal rivers 
(tributaries of Lomon and Lanhoun) and lowlands define many micro-watersheds. The 
boundaries of the watersheds are set up by the PGRN and the donors (the World Bank) in 
order to estimate costs of the operations for improvement. 
The terre de bane, red soils, dominate in the watersheds on upstream and sloping 
grounds. According to the FAO soil classification (FAOAJNESCO/ISRIC, 1988 in Brouwers, 
1993: 52), terre de barre consists mainly of nitisols (sandy to sandy-loam sols). The 
downstream areas of many micro-watersheds are lowlands with heavy hydromorphic clayed 
soils inundated during the rainy season. These soils are classified as vertisols with especially 
montmorillonite and illite. Farmers regularly cultivate the terre de barre and the vertisols. The 
Adja people in the Mono region distinguish kpedji, the upstream of watersheds and, komi (ko 
= clay), the downstream of watersheds, areas are heavy clay soils. Inundated areas and 
sloping ground are called respectively shihouan and tohouin (a water course). 
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The climate of this region is sub-equatorial with two dry seasons and two rainy seasons. 
Rainfall is spatially and temporary highly varied. There is a long rainy season from March to 
July, followed by a relatively dry period in August, and a short rainy season of about two and 
half months starting in September. The dominant vegetation in Aplahoué and Klouékanmè is 
the oilpalm (Elaeis guineensis) which is planted by Adja farmers. In Klouékanmè, relic forests 
are found on the top of hills in the area. 
The watershed area for the PGRN intervention in Zou 
The location of the intervention Zou Province, is in the Sous-préfectures of Ouèssè. The 
watershed areas are defined in relation with the River Beffa (Bassins versants de la Beffa). 
Several seasonal rivers (liga, toumi, awo, triilii, hinhloua and monnori) and low-lands present 
many micro-watersheds. The boundaries of the watersheds are set up by the PGRN and the 
donors (the World Bank, Caisse Française de Développement) in order to estimate costs of the 
operations for improvements (cf. Karemangingo & Agbo, 1990; A. Onibon, 1993). 
The ferruginous soils, hit by severe erosion, are dominant in the region of Ouèssè. 
These soils are degraded. Hydromorphic soils are found in the low-lands of watersheds or on 
the bank of seasonal or temporary rivers. They present a high level of fertility. Upstream areas 
in watersheds are called kpodji while todo are the downstream areas. Sloping ground between 
upstream and downstream is called todohoiun, the direction of watercourse. Mahi people in 
Ouèssè have their own classification systems. Micro-watersheds areas have specific names: 
saagodji. 
The climate in the region is between the soudanien and subtropical types, but closer 
to the former. Rainfall presents an unimodal regime, a rainy season from April to October, 
and a dry season from November to March. Ouèssè is a savanna region. At certain areas, this 
savanna is woody with the presence of specific tree species such as Adansonia digitata, Khaya 
senegalensis, Parkia biglobasa, Vitellaria paradoxa, etc. Degraded gallery forests (called 
tozoun by Mahi people) border many seasonal rivers. 
Farms, village location, lowlands, permanent and seasonal rivers, and gallery forests 
along rivers, are all found within the boundaries of the bassins versants selected in Ouèssè for 
the watershed development. 
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Watershed development from the perspective of the PGRN project: the Aménagement des 
Bassins Versants 
The intervention objective of the PGRN is to support village communities sustainably manage 
watershed resources and to help them overcome serious erosion problems which cause the 
degradation of agricultural lands. Therefore, the Aménagement des Bassins Versants (ABV) 
is an approach to watershed development. Its rationale is based on 'voluntarism' and 
'partnership' which mean that external support by the project can only start in a village, after 
the local people have expressed, through a letter or other form of contact, a demand for an 
appui (a kind of advice and assistance). Later, the way this strategy works for the PGRN 
teams in Mono and Zou will be discussed. 
Technological packages were available at the beginning of the project. Contour farming 
is an innovation for improving the farmlands in the watersheds. This technique, according to 
the way it was done by the PGRN people, consists of finding the contour lines in the 
watershed and ploughed the furrows along them. Vétiver grasses were planted on these ridges 
in the contour lines. The technique was expected to halt runoff and provide a better infiltration 
of water. Construction of ridges along the contour lines enables the conservation of water for 
the growth of plants. 
Other actions of the PGRN within the ABV involve tree planting and forestation. 
Mulching, manuring the soil and alley-cropping, experimented by a fanning system research 
project, the RAMR2 (Recherches Appliquées en Milieu Réel) in Mono Province, are integrated 
into the technological package. Water control techniques such as check dams and silt traps, 
gully control structures, grassing artificial waterway, and vegetative barriers on contour lines 
are used by the PGRN for the ABV. 
Land surveying activities constitute an important dimension of watershed development. 
According to the PGRN people and experts for this project, surveying and registering the farm 
plots was seen as an important step in solving problems of land tenure insecurity as this will 
be explained below. So a team of surveyors was contracted for mapping all the agricultural 
plots within the watershed area set up for the ABV. 
6.3 The main stakeholders: Adja and Mahi people, their cultivation style in the 
watersheds 
Adja people and their cultivation style in the watershed 
History of the Adja people 
Historically the Adja people are a homogenous socio-cultural group. They migrated from Tado 
in Togo (Pazzi, 1979; Mondjanangni, 1977) and created several villages in the Northern part 
of Mono Province. This region became populated with the Adja before 1800, but several 
villages were created around the 19th century. Some villages took the name of their 'creator': 
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for example Soglonouhoué (Soglonou is a name and houé is home). The creation of villages 
in the Northern part of the Mono province is the outcome of historical processes, involving 
different primary and secondary migrations and displacements due to ethnic and classic 
quarrels, scarcity of lands, insecurity etc. (Mondjannagni, 1977). Three basic sub-ethnic 
groups are distinguished among the Adja people: the houé, the dogbo and the chikpito, but the 
real traits of distinctions are not well known (Den Ouden, 1990). A central authority for all 
the Adja people does not exist nowadays. 
Cultivation style in watersheds 
Adja Farmers, both men and women, have regularly adapted their farming practices to the 
degradation of their lands (Dangbégnon, 1995). They developed solutions according to then-
own local possibilities. Growing oilpahn is a form of improved fallowing in the farmers' own 
farming systems. The oil palm plays a crucial role at the economic, cultural and social level 
of the farming community (Brouwers, 1993). The farmers in this region practice intensive 
cultivation: inter-cropping, relay-cropping and indigenous agro-forestry based on oilpahn 
trees. Rotation of crops with oilpahn, and diversification of varieties, are means of 
intensification used by the farmers. These practices are integrated into the farming systems: 
thus leguminous fertilise the soil and cassava improves its structure. In the Adja region, 
flooding of clay soils (downstream areas in watersheds) is an important problem which 
presents a high risk for cultivation. Meanwhile, previous studies reveal that careful observation 
of biological indicators and climatological phenomena by the farmers, enables them to cultivate 
maize in the heavy clay soils (cf. Dangbégnon, 1990; Dangbégnon & Brouwers, 1990). The 
cultivation styles of the Adja farmers are 'sophisticated' (Brouwers et al, 1997). 
Socio-structural transformations 
The Adja region is one of the most populated in Benin. The population density is 240 
inhabitants/km2. Socio-structural transformations are noticed in the Adja region. The 
differentiation in terms of the access to land and labour mobilization is becoming more 
complex (Daane & Perthel, 1988; Den Ouden, 1986, 1989, 1997; Biaou, 1991, Fanou, 1992). 
For instance, the number of share-croppers is increasing, and possibilities to access 
innovations differentiate the Adja farmers. Studies which were conducted in three 
representative villages (Zouzouvou, Touléhoudji and Gbannavè) in this area revealed that more 
than 60% of the stakeholders were share croppers, land borrowers and tenants (Biaou, 1991). 
The access to land by those stakeholders is regulated under a local arrangement. The 
agreements with the landowners are not formalized, and very are often based on a verbal 
statement, they do not present a secure situation for the land users under such contracts. 
Existing socioeconomic organisations are operational at the village level3. Vodouhê 
(1996) identifies the Kugbè (an indigenous organization for saving), functional groups for 
socioeconomic activities, and the Groupement Villageois (GV) for agricultural tasks (mostly 
cotton production). Many Association de Développement (AD) created at different levels 
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(Commune-Sous-Préfecture and Département) could play this role (cf. Daane & Mongbo, 
1991), but they became political entities as explained in the Lake Aheme case. 
Mahi people and their cultivation style in the watershed 
History of the Mahi people 
The Mahi people discussed in the present case studies live in the Sous-préfecture of Ouèssè 
(Zou Province), which has a total area of 3,200 km2 with a population of 52,000 inhabitants. 
Mahi people are distributed at the Western part of the Sous-prefecture of Ouèssè. 
Historically the Mahi people belong to the socio-cultural era Adja-Tado4. The 
occupation of the region Ouèssè (called also Ouèssè Ouogoudo5) by the Mahi people was a 
very complex process. Many small groups migrated into this region. They created different 
villages which have different histories (see Essouman, 1992; Adjinacou, 1993). Thus the Mahi 
people are heterogenous in terms of the origin and migration itinerary of each Mahi-village 
founder in the Western part of Ouèssè. This phenomenon had some implications that from the 
beginning of their settlement in this region, the Mahi people adopted different individual 
practices6 with regard to the exploitation of the natural resources they found in this area (e.g., 
land clearing and agricultural activities). 
Cultivation styles in watersheds 
Mahi men and women are both involved in agricultural activities. Mahi farmers practice 
shifting cultivation. Space occupation follows a Mahi-rule around two basic concepts: gbého 
and agbovê. Gbého is a recent fallow or a farming area abandoned by Mahi farmers. Agbovê 
is a very old fallow which holds fertile lands. The appropriation of the agbovê is based on the 
respect of houinnou which means the 'front of the furrows'. The land occupation pattern of 
the Mahi farmers follows the direction of houinnou. When a Mahi farmer orients his houinnou 
in one direction, he is the owner of all the space ahead his houinnou until he meets with an 
obstacle like a river, a hill etc. The farm plots in the agbovê are very far from the village 
(sometimes 15 km). Mahi farmers construct small houses (glécohoué) and live there during the 
cultivation period. The glécohoué changes with the abandonment of a farming area (which is 
their property). This cultivation style of the Mahi people has the implication that many 
unoccupied areas can be found in Ouèssè. Ridging before sowing maize, groundnut, cassava, 
yam, etc. is a common practice for the Mahi farmers who are very hard agricultural workers. 
Many of them employ migrants (Fon, Adja, Berba ethnic groups) to solve labour problem in 
their big farms (in average 20 hectares). The migrants arrive from the Northern and the 
Southern part of Benin. Many of them have settled in Ouèssè and are cultivating land they 
borrowed from Mahi farmers (cf. Mensanh, 1995). 
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Socio-structural transformations 
The population density in Ouèssè 21 inhabitants/km2 which is very low compared with the 
Adja region. The Western part of Ouèssè where the Mahi people live is a highly remote area, 
there is no telephone connection. The two roads connecting this area to the main road which 
links Benin and Niger are sometimes not accessible during the rainy season. Ouèssè is among 
the remote Sous-préfectures in which Radio Rurale was set up for experimentation. Mahi 
farmers make a lot of money from agricultural activities. Buying cars for taxi, pickups and 
trucks are the most important investment. 
After the shift in the political system in 1990, local Chiefdoms reemerged in Ouèssè. The King 
of Ouèssè became the local authority of the Mahi people in the Sous-prefecture of Ouèssè. The 
King is always consulted by government professionals and politicians with respect to critical 
decisions or problems. Within the new context of giving more responsibilities to local people, 
a development association called Union pour le Développement Economique, Social et Culturel 
de Ouèssè (UDESCO) was created by the Mahi people for political, cultural and 
socioeconomic functions. The main objective of the association is the development of Western 
part of Ouéssé. 
Critical issues for the watershed development 
In Mono with the Adja farmers 
Adja people have many solutions for their complex cultivation systems. They do not ridge, 
although contour farming, the most efficient way for controlling soil erosion in the PGRN 
technological package, require ridging. Can the Adja farmers change their way of cultivation 
from nnmmal tillage to ridging? This question is critical for watershed development in Mono. 
In view of the discussions above, stakeholder analysis reveals also that the majority of the Adja 
farmers have access to land under indirect rules. They may be not motivated to invest by using 
new techniques for watershed development. 
In Zou with the Mahi farmers 
Mahi farmers have opportunities to clear more land in the agbovê for their sWfting cultivation 
practice while watershed development required a radical change. Can they invest in an 
agricultural parcel for watershed development and abandon their shifting cultivation in the 
agbovil This question is critical because the expected yield after using new techniques for 
watershed development is less compared with the yield in the agbovê. Mahi farmers do not use 
fertilizers in the agbovê. 
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Why is scaling up the core issue for watershed development? 
Within the boundary set up in the intervention areas in Mono and Zou, there are many 
villages, and in each village many households are cultivating the watershed areas. Physical 
properties of watersheds described above have the implication that downstream stakeholders 
need the cooperation of upstream stakeholders if success for watershed development is to be 
achieved. Watershed development necessarily involves coordination among individual 
stakeholders. Scaling up watershed development efforts from individual cultivation parcels to 
the whole watershed area identified for improvement becomes a core issue. Thus this process 
requires, on the one hand, successful collective action among individuals, groups of 
stakeholders or villages in the intervention areas. On the other, it requires a structural process 
for developing platforms of stakeholders to enable collective decision making at the level of 
the whole watershed identified for improvement. A concrete example of the importance of 
such platforms is the need for well-defined rights and duties for land holding patterns, a 
problem which requires collective decision making, negotiation and conflict resolution at the 
level of the platform. 
6.4 Scaling up watershed development with Adja people 
Perceptions of watershed development problems: what does it imply for scaling up 
process? 
The problem according to the PGRN and the donors 
The concrete problem identified by the PGRN project in the Adja region was the stagnation 
of agricultural production, the mounting pressure on land and the decreasing productive 
capacity of the agro-sylvo-pastoral ecosystems within the watersheds. So Adja farmers' 
cultivation practices were seen as the cause for the degradation of land in the watersheds 
(severe soil erosion) and the decreasing productive capacity of agro-sylvo-pastoral ecosystems 
(Djohossou, 1993). 
The promotion of soil and water conservation techniques and tree-planting was the most 
important goal of intervention for the World Bank. This argument is based on the way the 
PGRN team in the Mono site perceived the results expected by the donor. So the success in 
carrying out the activities was evaluated in quantitative terms. For instance, the number of 
linear metres of erosion control techniques (e.g., gullies, contour lines with the vetiver 
grasses), the surface planted with trees, and the number of farmers who used soil erosion 
control techniques, were very important. The efficiency of using financial resources for such 
immediate technical realizations was a criterion for success. 
Nevertheless, the problem perceived in this manner inevitably leads to neglect of some 
important aspects, such as the institutions and the organizations required for sustaining these 
technical realizations. 
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The problem according to the CARDER people 
As the main government centre for extension and rural development, the problems of 
watershed development were also important for the CARDER people. The CARDER already 
introduced mucuna (Mucuna pruriens Var. Utilis) and alley-cropping based on Acacia 
auriculiformis, for improving the fertility of degraded soils in Mono. These technologies were 
developed by the RAMR project as explained above. The CARDER people took the position 
to transfer them to the Adja farmers. Then why could watershed development not be their 
main concern? They wondered whether the PGRN project would act successfully without 
involvement of the CARDER'S professionals stationed the intervention area. 
The problem and perception according to the Adja farmers 
Inundations in downstream areas are perceived to cause crop damage. Several notions are used 
by Adja farmers to explain runoff problems, for instance, eshi lo gbo (the water floods the 
crops in the farm), eshi djanonta non gnigban (in literal translation: the water 'cuts' the head 
of the soil). Then, runoff has two negative effects according to Adja farmers: it destroys the 
crops and transports the arable farming land away. 
Despite such existing notions for characterizing watershed phenomena by the Adja 
farmers, watershed development problems are not so immediately critical for them. As 
explained above (see §6.3), they have silently been experiencing many solutions based on their 
intensive cultivation style. 
So what is the nature of watershed development problems and the implications? 
The watershed development problem perceived by the government was not shared by the 
stakeholders at the beginning of the PGRN intervention. Understanding about the problem was 
different according to the PGRN, the CARDER organization and the stakeholders. The latter 
did not realize any interdependence with respect to the problems. This situation could stand 
in the way of any successful collective action and generation of organizations (platforms) and 
institutions at the level of the watershed area. 
These initial conditions for the watershed development had some implication for the 
intervention strategies of the PGRN team. For instance, scaling up watershed development 
required that the stakeholders in different villages reach a common appreciation of the 
problem. Below, the strategies of the PGRN on this issue and the nature of external supports 
for watershed development are analysed. The extent to which scaling up is being achieved is 
also discussed. 
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Making the problem 'visible': the social learning path used by the PGRN team 
Learning about participatory strategies adopted by the PGRN team 
PGRN people did not focus directly on the intervention objective. Their strategies were based 
on the assumption that, by starting with the stakeholders' immediate priorities, they would 
slowly develop a clear understanding of the watershed development problems. However, a 
policy was formulated to avoid conflicting interests between the intervention objectives and 
stakeholders' priorities. It consisted of reducing project financial supports of activities which 
were not immediately relevant for watershed development. Different levels of financial 
assistance were defined. 
The highest level concerns requests which are fully within the general objectives of the 
project. For example soil and water conservation practices, soil fertility restoration, 
afforestation, improvement of pastures in watershed areas, etc. The second level concerns off-
farm activities which generate additional income. It was assumed that the diversification of the 
sources of income for the stakeholders would decrease the pressure on natural resources. 
Moreover, it was assumed that when stakeholders increase their income, they would be able 
to invest in innovative practices in watershed development. The third level concerns cultural 
activities: promotion of folk media, functional alphabétisation and other local communication 
channels which can be used for sending messages or exchanging information in the context of 
local people with respect to watershed development. The last level concerns social or socio-
economic infrastructures such as wells, maternity hospitals, schools, market places etc. The 
financial contribution of PGRN decreases from the first to the fourth. For instance, an 
afforestation activity can receive 90% financial assistance while road construction can be 
limited to 15%. 
The different levels of financial assistance for types of activities defined political 
framework for negotiation during initial fora which were organized at village level with the 
stakeholders. These fora served also for a diagnostic participatif (a kind of participatory rapid 
appraisal). Many questions were asked to stimulate reflection at the level of the stakeholders. 
These fora provided also first general information to the PGRN about problems, difficulties, 
needs, means and resources available for the stakeholders. They informed villagers about what 
they should expect from the PGRN's intervention and the conditions (their own contributions) 
for obtaining assistance. 
Initial fora can be seen as a way to stimulate at the level of the stakeholders a self-
appreciation about their agricultural practices in watersheds. The opportunity to analyse 
critically their situation was created as for example Kpini in Box 6.1. 
Box 6.1: The appreciation of the situation by Kpini after an initial forum in Tokanmi-Aliho 
Here, our problems concern mostly the rain. When the rainy season is good, we have more food. When there is 
a severe drought, we suffer. The PGRN people arrived and said that our lands were degrading (gnigban sissa). 
However, we did not realize that. They said that the lands would be improved so that we can increase our yield 
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An immediate effect of initial fora was that, they enabled the development of a partnership 
relationship between some stakeholders who request assistance to solve certain problems, and 
the PGRN team. The nature of activities for solving the problems covered many issues (see 
Box 6.2). Tree planting and animal raising, for instance, were individually requested. 
Financial assistance for agricultural products processing was requested by groups of women. 
The activities like protection of villages' mud houses against runoff, the improvement of 
drinking watering places, and road construction, were requested at the village level. 
Box 6.2: The stakeholders requested different activities from the PGRN team 
• protection of the house in the villages against runoff 
• tree planting in individual plots 
• regeneration of sacred forest 
• roads construction or improvement 
• construction of tanks to collect rainfall 
• improving watering places for drinking water 
• reducing the damage caused by runoff in the farms 
• improving the fertility of the soil 
• financial assistance for the agricultural products processing by the women 
• financial assistance for animal raising 
Within the list of the activities requested by the stakeholders, many of them are close to the 
objective of the intervention, for instance, protection of the house in the villages against 
runoff, tree planting in individual plots, reducing the damage caused by runoff in the farms, 
improving the fertility of the soil, etc. So by dealing with the stakeholders' priorities, the 
opportumty was offered to the PGRN team to learn to develop a common appreciation about 
watershed development problems among the stakeholders. 
Focus on the stakeholders' priorities as the starting point of external supports 
A request for a partnership aimed at an external support, can be made by any individual 
stakeholders, group or village. Once a request is made, agreement fora are organized. In the 
first agreement forum, the stakeholders concerned will present their problems and the need for 
their resolution. Then, meetings for discussing specific problems were planned. For instance, 
a forum might address combatting soil erosion, which was raised as a problem by certain 
stakeholders, afforestation, or infrastructure realization. 
These fora concerned specific issues and types of stakeholders. The discussion theme 
on each forum was about the relevance of the problem at stake, solutions already experimented 
without success, the contribution (in terms of labour, money, etc.) of stakeholders to the cost 
and get more money. They explained that a condition to succeed is to create committees and work together to be 
able to solve the problems we are facing. 
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Box 6.3: Examples of concrete activities implemented, with the stakeholders, in the villages Tokanmê-Kpodji and 
Dékandji 
ToVanrpR-Kpndii The village is on a sloping ground. Runoff was perceived by the villagers as a problem which 
caused a serious damage of their mud houses. Runoff also damaged the route to the watering place used by the 
women. They were not able to find a solution themselves. After the initial forum organized by the PGRN team 
in Tokanmê-Kpodji, the villagers (especially the Chef de Village) called for the assistance of the PGRN. Then, 
they established a partnership with the PGRN team in the region. They created a committee, (Comité de Gestion 
de Terroir) and the president of the Groupement Villageois was chosen as the president of the Comité de Gestion 
du Terroir. After negotiation they agreed on activities to be carried out for solving the collective negative effect 
of the runoff in the village. The improvement involved also the protection of the route against erosion caused by 
the runoff. The contribution of the villagers was defined in terms of money and labour. The amount of money 
was 50,000 F CFA for starting the activities. The project provided a financial assistance for buying the tools 
(pickaxe, hammer, wheelbarrow, etc.) needed for the activities and for the support of the technical designers 
(consultants) of the operation. With the Bureau Comité de Gestion au Terroir and stakeholders, together identified 
the locations where the gullies and other infrastructures (e.g., vegetative barriers) should be carried out. The 
village suffered also from the absence of infrastructure like roads, school and health centre. Only one road enabled 
the villagers to reach the market places in their area. The degradation of this road caused many problems, 
especially the difficulty to sell agricultural products. Road improvement was a priority for the stakeholders in 
Tokanmê-Kpodji. They called for the assistance of the PGRN. The contribution of the villagers was estimated to 
be 200,000 F CFA. The GV of the village provided already 50,000 F CFA and the local music group gave 20,000 
F CFA. The villagers were discussing sharing the renuiining of the money needed to start the activities. 
Dekandji. Dekandji is a village in the Sous-prefecture of Klouekanmey. The villagers had serious problem in that 
they lacked clean water during the dry season. A few farmers in the villages built small tanks to collect rainfall 
water from the roof of their house built with iron sheets. The farmers also perceived the degradation of their land 
as a crucial problem. Improving the fertility of their soil was a priority. These problems were raised during the 
initial forum with the PGRN. Later, the stakeholders requested assistance for the resolution of their problems. 
The resolution of the water problem was realized by the PGRN team. The solution found was the construction 
of a big tank in the centre of the village, to collect the water from many roofs with iron sheets. This idea should 
contribute also to the reduction of the runoff problem caused by the water from the roofs of the houses. The 
solution found for the degradation of the soil was the use of the dung of the cattle and droppings of the chickens 
for composting to obtain an organic fertilizer. The cost of a truck was 10,000 F CFA. The contribution of the 
project was 4,000 F CFA and the farmers paid 6,000 F CFA. According to a farmer, one truck of the organic 
fertilizer was enough for one hectare of a maize farm. 
The strategy of the PGRN team, which consisted on starting the intervention with tackling the 
immediate priorities of the stakeholders, generated many socioeconomic opportunities. This 
should be perceived as one way of building trust, which means that the stakeholders became 
convinced that they could solve their major problems with the support of the intervention. 
However, the request for intervention or appui that covered several aspects of 
development activities (infrastructures, activities which generate income, resource 
for resolving the problem. The discussions at the fora aim at decision-making about the 
contour of the process. This includes the organization required (formation of committees of 
the stakeholders), the structuration of the process and training needs. These strategies enabled 
the implementation of some concrete actions by the PGRN team, described in details for some 
villages (see Box 6.3). 
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management) called for many competences. The tasks of the PGRN team became more 
complex because they did not have all the competences required. Network management 
became a crucial activity for the watershed managers in Mono. For instance, the Recherche-
Développement team, the RAMR project at the INRAB (Institut National de la Recherche 
Agricole du Benin = National Institate for Agricultural Research in Benin) was identified for 
farm technology development. Civil engineers are involved in the construction of the 
infrastructures. 
From the stakeholders' priorities to learning processes about -watershed development 
Erosion control in the villages for protecting mud houses was successful. Gullies and ravines' 
treatment were collectively done by the stakeholders. They became convinced that problems 
caused by runoff can be solved also in the farms. The PGRN professionals learned from initial 
activities how they should go about watershed development with the stakeholders. 
The approach of the PGRN team required the mobilization of the stakeholders to share 
responsibility. Committees for the Gestion des Terroirs were created Comité de Gestion des 
Terroirs at the village level. These committees overlap in many cases with existing 
organizations like the Groupement Villageois in the villages. They manage the funds with the 
PGRN people, for instance, the receipts of many expenses are signed by the treasurer of the 
Comité de Gestion du Terroir and a member of the PGRN team. In Tokanmê-Kpodji, two 
members of this committee (treasurer and president) went to Cotonou with the PGRN team to 
buy the tools required for digging the gullies (activities concerning the protection of the village 
against the erosion). The responsabilisation of the stakeholders was an objective of the 
external support. The more they succeeded in the activities which satisfied their priorities, the 
more they could be expected to take further responsibilities for the tasks concerning the 
watershed development. 
Effects of the social learning path 
Hexibility about the intervention in watershed development created room for dealing with the 
priorities of the stakeholders. The learning path yielded situations which presented concrete 
grounds for gradually building a common appreciation of the watershed development problems 
by the stakeholders (e.g., erosion control in the villages). 
External support for the watershed development: can scaling up be effective? 
Living with indigenous knowledge in watershed development: towards interactive processes 
between the PGRN team and Adja farmers 
The Adja farmers in Aplahoué did not practice ridging for cultivation7. The contour farming 
technique in the technological package of the PGRN did not make sense to them. Living with 
the Adja farmers knowledge was the only way for the professionals to start with the watershed 
development in Aplahoué. A forum was organized in the village Dekpo (in Aplahoué) by the 
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PGRN team to identify the appropriate watershed development techniques through interactive 
processes. 
First, contour ridging was explained to the farmers and they found it difficult because 
they practice minimum tillage for cultivation. Second, planting nitrogen-fixing shrubs (Acacia 
auriculifiormis; Gliciridia sepium) as hedgerows in the contour lines, was proposed. The strips 
between the hedgerows would be cultivated by the farmers. The third option which was 
proposed to the farmers concerned the design of ridges with stones (cordon pierreux), 
following the contour lines. The Adja farmers chose the second option, the hedgerows between 
crops because the collection of stones might be too time too consuming. 
Incentives for the support of the watershed development 
Volunteers who were willing to innovate and introduce erosion control received a high amount 
of money as subsidies. About 90% of the additional costs for erosion control technique 
(contour farming) were supported by the project. The labour costs for settling the contour lines 
and ridging were paid by the project. The vetiver grasses were given to the volunteers free of 
charges. The costs of all operations were evaluated to 90,000 F CFA per hectare, an amount 
of money that a farmer in this region should not invest in his land. 
The provision of subsidies to the participants in the watershed development had many 
effects. First it enabled many stakeholders to learn about erosion control techniques (e.g., 
contour farming) in their farms. It helped build a good 'image' about the PGRN team in the 
rural area. Subsidies as so had the effect to increase gradually the number of the participants 
in the watershed development. However, subsidies did not overcome the crucial problem of 
land tenure insecurity among the stakeholders who feared that their parcels might be taken 
back by the land owner after having invested to improve those parcels. 
The animation rurale in support of watershed development 
Beyond the provision of subsidies by the PGRN to obtain immediate results, the importance 
of using communication strategies to stimulate voluntary behavioural change in the short term 
was perceived. Mass-media, especially radio broadcast, was used. The presence of the Radio 
Rurale set up in Lalo, the capital of a neighbourhood Sous-prefecture of the PGRN 
intervention area, creates an effective condition for the implementation of broadcasting 
programmes for the stakeholders. Particular emphasis as given to specific issues such as the 
importance of planting trees, the negative effect of bush fire, etc. The promotion of the PGRN 
message was done by explaining to the stakeholders the reason that they should participate in 
the activities. 
Folk media, especially local singers and folklore groups were used. The forum 
d'animation culturelles, organized competition among different folklore groups with respect 
to watershed development. Local singers were asked to present a song which would raise 
interest for PGRN's activities. The groups were rewarded. Many T-shirts were given to the 
Scaling up watershed development 147 
members of the folklore groups with a print which reflected the main message (e.g., tree-
planting). 
Folk media had the effect of stimulating quick mobilization. They enabled a better 
construction of messages in local language by using proverbs ( e.g., 'it is on the old cord one 
knits the new one') and local metaphors that can be learned by professionals to reiterate in 
their daily interaction with the stakeholders in watershed development. 
Institutional support and policy context for the watershed improvement in Mono 
In Mono Province, potentials existed for building an operational and dynamic institutional 
framework for the PGRN intervention. Many organizations were functional: the CARDER, 
the RAMR project, the SassaKawa Global 2000 project, the PADES-Mono and many NGOs. 
The absence of a clear definition of roles among these actors (cf Djohossou, 1993) did not 
permit a good synergy and complementarity to emerge among them. Each of them had its own 
working style. A tentative collaboration between the CARDER and PGRN enabled the 
involvement of the Village Extension Workers (VEWs) of the CARDER in the activities at the 
beginning of the PGRN intervention. Later, the PGRN recruited animators for tasks similar 
to those of the VEWs. One can arguably say that the collaboration between PGRN and 
CARDER did not work. Coordination of the activities between the organizations was not 
effective. Joint learning based on tools such as RAAKS, which could help develop new roles 
for the institutions for the watershed development project was not done. A workshop could 
have been organized so that these organizations would have arrived at a common mission 
statement and the raison-d'être for their linkages. 
Another critical institutional issue concerned the land surveying activities. According 
to the interpretation of the coordinator of the volet operation foncière (cadastre section in the 
PGRN), land surveying activities were based on the assumption that they would provide a data 
base for decision makers (government) and a tool for achieving security in land tenure. 
However, as noticed above, although subsidies were provided, many stakeholders still feared 
the crucial issue of landholding insecurity. In addition to land survey and registration, the 
generation of powerful local institutions for mediating land tenure security would have 
provided an important incentive to participating stakeholders in watershed development. 
The way the activities were organized by the PGRN required a policy context which 
would decentralize many responsibilities and the capacity for decision making to the local 
level. Many Associations de Développement' in the intervention area at the levels of the 
Province, Sous-prefectures, Communes and villages were created by the stakeholders. These 
political organizations could provide room for scaling up decision making processes with 
respect to the erosion control to the watershed level. Unfortunately, the mobilization of such 
organizations for environmental and resource management issues did not yet emerge. The 
Association de Développement offered only political promotion to the leaders who became a 
minister, a deputy in a parliament, a Préfet, or a Sous-préfet, etc. 
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Analysing the effectiveness of the external support 
Successful collective action was effective in situations where the stakeholders perceived their 
interdependence, for instance, the erosion control in many Adja villages. Runoff caused a 
collective negative effect (destruction of mud houses) for all the villagers. Still, despite the 
incentive policy adopted by the PGRN, the animation rurale processes, and existing 
institutional frameworks; the scaling up of watershed development from the farms of individual 
participating stakeholders to the whole watershed area, has so far not yet been effective. The 
patterns of individual farm arrangements in the watershed under siege did not correspond to 
a specific village land use area. A 'village terroir' does not exist in the Adja region. The 
stakeholders in various micro-watersheds do not live in the same village where some CGTs 
were operational. Yet platforms for pooling a systematic treatment of micro-watersheds 
towards the watershed development based on inter-village structuration processes did not 
emerge in Mono. 
6.5 Scaling up watershed development with Mahi people 
Perceptions of watershed development problems: what does it imply for scaling up 
processes? 
The problem according to the perception of the PGRN and the donor 
The PGRN and the Caisse Française de Développement were the main actors in watershed 
development in Ouèssè. The problem which was particularly identified in Ouèssè concerned 
land degradation as a result of the cultivation methods of the Mahi farmers. The ultimate aim 
was to change this trend in Ouèssè. The Caisse Française de Développement was the donor 
for the implementation of the PGRN in Ouèssè. Since the beginning of the eighties, the Caisse 
Française de Développement has promoted the French approach to natural resource 
management called the Gestion des Terroirs in Sahelian countries (e.g., Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Senegal). A key feature of this approach is participation and the transfer of responsibilities to 
the local collectivities to support collective resource management. From that point of view, 
one can arguably state that decentralization and transfer of competences to Mahi people for 
mastering the evolution of property rights and tenure security was important for the Caisse 
Française de Développement. 
The problem according to the perception of the GERAM team 
The situation of the GERAM as a contractor of the PGRN is strategically important. A failure 
to carry out the project in Ouèssè could have a negative impact on the potential role and 
capacity of Beninese NGOs for promoting grass-root developments. The members of the 
GERAM team gave much weight to the anticipated problems because they would be judged 
by the effectiveness of their actions as front-line development professionals. As described 
above (see §6.3), the opportunity Mahi people have for clearing more lands, in the agbovê, 
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very far from their villages, might well affect an intervention effort to halt severe soil erosion 
problems through watershed development. The GERAM decided that, Mahi farmers would 
participate in either the watershed development activities, and improve degraded lands near 
their villages, or they would continue to move far to clear new lands for cultivation, an option 
which provide higher yields without any external input (e.g., fertilizers). 
The problem according to the perception of the Mahi farmers 
Watershed development problems perceived by the Mahi farmers were based on indicators and 
direct observation. These are the following: 
• the water in the wells and rivers are drying up; 
• scarcity of firewood compared with the past; 
• runoff causes land degradation on the farms; 
• the agricultural plots are very far from the villages (the farmers had to go far to clear 
fertile lands). 
However, according to the same farmers, other problems, which affect seriously their 
daily Uvelihoods, are urgent. These concern labour availabiUty, drinking water, infrastructure 
and a transport problem of the huge amounts of agricultural products after harvest (maize, 
cassava, groundnuts, and cotton). The women would prefer financial assistance for the 
processing of agricultural products which provide an important source of income. At least the 
migrant farmers consider land tenure security as crucial. They are not allowed to plant trees 
(e.g., cashew trees, teak, oil palm, etc..) on the parcels they are farming. Planting trees in 
Mahi society is a kind of land appropriation. According to the King of Ouèssè, the most 
important issue was: ' to safeguard the natural patrimony and bring many wealths in the 
region'. 
What is the nature of watershed development problems and their implications? 
Like in the Mono, the understanding of the problem and the approach to its solution were 
different. Some stakeholders had learned their own way of dealing with runoff problems in the 
farms, as Ayena did (see Box 6.4). 
Because of the opportunity Mahi farmers have in the agbovê, they did not perceive the 
watershed development problems as a priority. In theses circumstances, external supports for 
scaling up watershed development require first that the stakeholders in different villages reach 
a common appreciation of the problems, adopt collective action and develop platforms for 
decision making. So what are the strategies of the GERAM team in Ouèssè? To what extent 
scaling process is being achieved? 
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Making the problem 'visible': the social learning path by the GERAM team 
Learning about participatory strategies adopted by the GERAM team 
The GERAM team transformed the intervention for the watershed development into a learning 
process in Ouèssè8. As in Mono, the principle of 'voluntarism' and 'partnership' was used. 
The necessity to learn to develop a common 
appreciation among the stakeholders was 
assumed. The policy for financial subsidies 
according to the intervention objective and the 
stakeholders' priorities, was the same as in 
Mono. 
A particular issue in Ouèssè was that the 
professionals adopted a 'learning model' (see 
fig. 6.2) for intervening (pers. com. 
Adjinacou). The 'learning model' was based on 
three different element A, B, and C (see fig. 
6.2). The idea about the first element nS^e 6 2 : 'Learning model' used by GERAM 
(A) was to start the intervention with the identification of existing official or strategic 
organisations like the Groupement Villageois, tontine groups (local saving groups), the village 
council, etc. 
The stakeholders in these organizations should be opportunistically engaged in a 
learning process which might stimulate a reflection about their different levels of activity. The 
appui about the transfer of competence concerned the training for concrete action, the 
appropriation of technical skills, and non-formal education through the animation rurale. The 
appui for the development of a negotiation capacity among the stakeholders involved a joint 
analysis of the situation and identification of constraints and opportunities (the MARP method 
was used), a joint construction of plans for action called Dossier de Financement (DDF). The 
plan was based on imagery leaflets so that all the stakeholders should understand. Initial fora 
were organized also with the stakeholders in Ouèssè. The process stimulated many requests 
for assistance as in Mono (see Box 6.5). 
A 
A: appui structuration/organization 
B: appui transfer of technical competencies 
C: appui transfer of capacities for negotiation 
Box 6.4: Ayena explains his solution of runoff problems 
In the past, my grandfathers used to practise tillage which consisted of making ridges parallel to the todohoiun 
(runoff channels). When they did the ridges perpendicular to the todohouin, runoff flowed down the crops and 
the ridges. This phenomenon causes serious damage to the farms. Our grand fathers were rights to do their ridges 
in the parallel to the todohouin. Then the water flows in the furrows and did not easily transport the crops. An 
interesting thing is that the seeds of the weeds in the furrows are transported and the labour for weeding is then 
economised. 
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Box 6.5: The nature of the activities perceived by the stakeholders 
NRM activities 
• protection of the houses in the villages 
• tree planting by individual stakeholders 
• reducing the damage caused by run-off in the farms (contour farming) 
• regeneration of gallery forests 
• bush-fire prevention 
• improving the fertility of the soil 
Activities which generate income 
• nursery plant production 
• bee-keeping in the gallery forest 
• gardening/horticulture by the women's groups 
• ardrnal raising (pig, chicken) 
• storing and reselling agricultural products by women's groups 
• agricultural product processing by the women 
hrfrastructure 
• well construction 
• bridge construction 
• road construction 
• construction of house for storing inputs 
Socio-cultural activities 
• cultural fora 
• radio programmes 
Focus on the stakeholders' needs as the starting point of the intervention 
At the beginning of the intervention by the GERAM team, the actions were localized at the 
village level. The appui ranged from the level of individual stakeholders to a whole village 
which was the higher level of implementation of activities. Probably this choice was based on 
the administrative division in Benin which considers the village as the lowest level. The 
support requested by the stakeholders from GERAM showed the importance of other 
livelihood activities beyond the watershed development (see Box 6.5). From a strategic point 
of view, this approach was aimed at building trust in the effectiveness of the core issue: the 
watershed development. The quantification of the demands (see table 6.1) of the stakeholders 
for the appui of the GERAM shows the importance of activities beyond watershed 
development. 
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Table 6.1: Quantification of the nature of the appui requested by the stakeholders in Ouèssè 
Domain of 
activities 
Nature of the demands made by the stakeholders in % Total 
individual level group level village community level 
NRM activities 23 (40%) 32 (37%) 16 (28%) 71 (36%) 
AGI* 20(34%) 51 (59%) 1 (2%) 72 (36%) 
Infrastructures 10 (17%) 4(4%) 29 (52%) 43 (21%) 
SCA** 5(9%) - 10 (18%) 15 (7%) 
Total 58 (100%) 87 (100%) 56 (100%) 201 (100%) 
Source: Annual report of the GERAM team (see Adjinacou et al, 1995) 
* Activities which generate income 
** Socio-cultural activities 
From the stakeholders' priorities to learning processes about watershed development 
Like the situation in the Mono site, the attempts of the GERAM team to deal with the 
immediate needs of the stakeholders led to situations which enabled stakeholders to learn about 
watershed development. The idea was to work closely with the stakeholders on various issues 
(amelioration of village built-up area, tree-planting, etc.), whereby they would discover the 
importance of using watershed control techniques brought by the GERAM team. 
The erosion control in the village Gbanlin (see Box 6.6) has influenced the perception 
of the stakeholders about the solution of the watershed development problem. Kossi 
experienced erosion control in his courtyard and was satisfied (see photo 1). He argued that 
'the knowledge he acquired from the PGRN will be used by the future generations of his 
family'. Kossi discovered the 'secret for controlling the erosion effect' (in his tenninology). 
In photo 2, he is showing the direction of the runoff and the principle of controlling a water 
course. The lines which were drawn suggested the need to design a barrier to halt the transport 
of land by the runoff. The explanation provided by Kossi displays a radical shift in his 
perspective from ridging parallel to the runoff course to ridging in perpendicular to it. Many 
stakeholders like Kossi in Ouèssè learned solutions for controlling erosion. Afterwards they 
became volunteers to practice the ideas of the GERAM team in their farms. 
Box 6.6: A concrete example of successful collective action in Gbanlin 
As an illustration, a concrete case from the village Gbanlin will be presented. The phenomenon of erosion was 
a major problem in the agglomeration in Gbanlin. An important network of ravines had emerged in the village. 
One of them was called Wamankpa ('we did everything without success'), i.e., the villagers were trying to fill 
in this ravine with wastes without any success (cf. AFVP/GERAM, 1994a). According to the Chefde Village, 
Gbanlin is on a sloping ground of a micro-watershed and the runoff of rains took away the houses. The villagers 
called for the appui of the PGRN and decided to apply its methods for controlling the erosion in the village. 
According to the villagers, if these innovations were successful, they would do the same in their farms. The 
activities were jointly planned with the stakeholders. Many techniques for controUing the erosion (bench terracing, 
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check dams, waterways, vegetative barriers, micro-dams) were explained and designed for the stakeholders: The 
cost of the operation was 3,166,200 F CFA. The contribution of the stakeholders was 100,000 F CFA 
(financially) and 1,514,500 F CFA in terms of labour. 
The activities of the GERAM for solving the erosion problem started by the creation of two 
organizations at the village level (cf Adjinacou et al, 1995: 47). The first one concerned the 
Village Assembly (Assemblée Villageoise de Concertation) with 40 representatives who were 
chosen by the villagers themselves. The members of this organization discussed periodically 
the evolution of the activities which were implemented with the GERAM team. The second 
was the Temporary Committee for the organization and the follow-up of activities (e.g., 
forestation, beekeeping). The members (total 7) were the contact persons of the GERAM team. 
This committee is being trained by the GERAM to transform it into CGT. This strategy is 
different from the one in the Mono which directly created a Comité de Gestion de Terroir for 
the watershed development activities. Existing local organizations such as the Village 
Development Committee (Comité de Développement du Village) and the Village Consultative 
Council (Conseil Consultatif du Village) were used. The former consisted of seven local 
leaders. Their role was to maintain cohesion in the village through resolution of conflicts (e.g., 
landholding disputes). The latter consisted of six members, the Chef de Village and five 
Conseillers (advisers) who were the official political and administrative representatives at the 
village level. The functional committees (see fig. 6.3) can be perceived as different platforms 
for implementing various activities at the village or group level. However, these platforms can 
only be effective for watershed development if they enable a systematic treatment of at least 
a micro watershed. 
LEVEL OF THE 
STRUCTURATION 
VILLAGE LEVEL 
GROUP LEVEL 
FUNCTIONAL COMMITTES 
Village Development Committee 
Village Consultative Council 
Village Assembly for Concertations 
Organization and Follow-up Committee 
Committees for GT activities 
Committees for infrastructures 
Committees for economic activities 
Committee for the socio-cultural activities 
etc. 
Figure 6.3 : Structuration processes according to the GERAM in Ouèssè 
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Photo 6.1: Kossi shows his success to control erosion in his courtyard 
i 
a 
Photo 6.2: Kossi is sharing his learning point 
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Effects of the social learning path 
Like the situation in Mono, flexibility within the GERAM approach to watershed development 
offered many socioeconomic opportunities for the stakeholders. The activities of the 
stakeholders became diversified and dynamic. New socioeconomic groups such as nurserymen, 
beekeepers, horticulturalists emerged. Grass-roots development processes created learning 
groups of stakeholders and learning communities. By doing so, they could exercise certain 
power and negotiation capacity in Ouèssè. For instance, stakeholders have appreciated their 
involvement in the negotiation and approval of a joint design of activities for funding (pers. 
com., Adjinacou). 
The fact that the appui of the stakeholders covers resource management activities (see 
Box 6.5) was an opportunity for making problems visible. The learning enabled a better 
appreciation of the watershed development problems 
External support for watershed development: can scaling up be effective? 
Incentives for the support of watershed development 
After the successful erosion control in the village Gbanlin, the stakeholders were convinced 
that the PGRN team could help them improve their way of cultivation in the watershed. This 
situation provided an incentive for them. Many farmers became volunteers and they were 
willing to experience erosion control techniques in their farms, as it was successful in the 
village Gbanlin. Subsidies were also given to them. The labour cost for setting contour lines 
and ridging were paid by the project. For example in Gbanlin, the amount of money used for 
subsidizing the treatment of 24 hectares of land improvement in a watershed was 276,000 F 
CFA. The cost for improving one hectare was 37,000 F CFA on the average and the 
contribution of the participating stakeholders was 11,500 F CFA. 
The fact that the local land tenure arrangements forbid migrant farmers from planting 
trees did not make the subsidies an effective incentive for them. However, they were mostly 
using degraded lands in the watersheds. They were not allowed to practise shifting cultivation 
in the agbovê like the native Mahi. 
The animation rurale for the support of watershed development 
Radio-Rurale set up in Ouèssè was successful. Mahi people have discovered it as a powerful 
means of communication. For instance, the announcement of burial ceremonies was done 
through the Radio Rurale and everybody in the region was quickly informed. This media was 
used by the GERAM team for the animation rurale which was aimed at watershed 
development (see Box 6.7). 
Box 6.7: Examples of broadcasting messages through the Radio Rurale in Ouèssè 
• Amelioration of soil fertility with the Mucuna 
• The importance of erosion control in the agglomeration 
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The importance of contour farming 
Land clearing and its consequence in the Sous-prefecture of Ouèssè 
Opportunities for tree planting in the Sous-prefecture of Ouèssè 
Farmers themselves analysed problems related to excessive land clearing and realized the opportunity 
for of forestation in the Sous-prefecture of Ouèssè. Local songs were used during the analysis by the 
stakeholders. 
Many cultural fora (forum culturels), songs, and the use of slides to show different methods 
of erosion control techniques were organized in Ouèssè by the GERAM team. Stakeholders' 
consciousness raising through Hie folklore local (events which enabled participants to draw 
some lessons on a specific issue) was periodically organized. Imagery was used to support 
discussion with the stakeholders during negotiations. 
Animation rurale involved training towards skills development and training of local 
trainees. The first practice enabled the emergence of new local 'professionals' (e.g., 
nurserymen, beekeepers in gallery forests). Through the second practice, the GERAM team 
transferred some technical competencies to stakeholders pooling many watershed development 
activities (e.g., setting contour lines, forestation techniques, maintenance techniques). 
Institutions and policy context for the watershed improvement 
Competencies struggle problems, among potential organizations as were observed in Mono, 
were also present in Ouèssè. Here, the GERAM team, the CARDER representation in Ouèssè, 
the R&D team of the INRAB did not function synergically for the support of watershed 
development. The problem could be a weakness of the official institotional framework for the 
PGRN activities in Benin. Maybe, those organizations lack learning tools to realize tbeir 
problems of coordination. It was not surprising that an annual report of the GERAM team 
stated that the contributions of the R&D team to the watershed development in Ouèssè were 
below expectation (Adjinacou et al, 1995). 
Property rights institutions for tenure were very weak (not formalized). Many land 
disputes were observed (cf. AFVP/GERAM, 1994b). They were mediated by the notables 
(local leaders and 'chiefs' of lineage called hennugan). Recently, the UDESCO has started the 
resolution of land conflicts which could not be done at the village level. As in the Mono, land 
surveying activities by the PGRN did not yet solve (or reduce) this problem. 
Unlike the Mono case, existing local organizations (e.g., King of Ouèssè, UDESCO) operated 
already at the level of the whole community of the Mahi people in the Sous-prefecture of 
Ouèssè. This condition might be favourable for scaling up watershed development in Ouèssè. 
Still, how much power did the existing organizations have for making crucial joint-decision 
with the GERAM team? Decentralization of certain power (e.g., statutory power) from the 
government administrative bodies to the local people was not effective. The policy context did 
not yet offer enabling conditions for active learning about watershed development in the 
communities in Ouèssè. 
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Emerging issues and effectiveness of the external support for watershed development 
Ecological crises in the farms of participating stakeholders 
Many farmers adopted contour farming introduced by the GERAM in Ouèssè. Contour lines 
were set, and ridges done following the contour lines. Vétiver grass and cashew trees were 
planted on the main contour lines. The farmers realized the effectiveness of the innovation for 
water conservation and the significant reduction of runoff problems they had faced in their 
farms. 
However new problems emerged. Farmers who practised contour ridging did not have 
time to prune the vétiver which became very dense and constituted a niche for rats and snakes. 
The rats destroyed the maize stored in the farm and the snakes killed their chickens reared 
also on the farm. They removed the vétiver from their farms but still kept the contour ridges. 
They suggested the replacement of vétiver by Cajanus cajan, and others suggested ananas and 
this raised a debate among PGRN people about the efficacy of the farmers' suggestions. They 
wanted a plant which would provide food (example of the Cajanus cajan) or additional source 
of income (ananas). The ecological service of the vétiver in controlling soil erosion was 
misunderstood the farmers. 
Analysing the effectiveness of external support 
Despite the vétiver problem, horizontal diffusion (replication) of contour farming was noticed 
in Ouèssè among non-participating farmers9, who learned contour farming through 
observation. Among the villagers in the region of Ouèssè, a shared understanding emerged that 
runoff could be controlled with ridges perpendicular to it (runoff) as Kossi had explained (see 
photo 6.2). The success of erosion control in Gbanlin showed that effective collective action 
took place when stakeholders shared a common problem and were mutually dependent on each 
other. 
The GERAM team learned from the intervention process that the engagement of the 
Mahi farmers in watershed development was growing. However, the team realized that they 
did not succeed to mobilize collective action for the complete treatment of micro-watersheds. 
Contour farming was practised on many different places in the watershed. When a farmer at 
a downstream location volunteered to adopt contour farming, those who were upstream were 
convinced to do the same and all the cost of the operation was supported by the GERAM. 
Negotiation depending on the situation was done in this way by GERAM. 
During a periodical meeting between the GERAM team and watershed development 
committees from different Mahi-villages in Ouèssè, to monitor and access the progress of the 
activities, participating farmers realized the importance of creating a higher level organization 
(cf. Adjinacou et al, 1995). They perceived that isolated action by small groups in different 
villages would not realize the potential importance of these activities. They used the metaphor 
SEDOKU ('Our common wealth from Nature') to qualify the natural resources. Then, they 
expressed the need to have a structure for concerted action (cadre de concertation) to manage 
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those resources. After this meeting, the GERAM team initiated a scaling up process for 
watershed development. 
Towards a scaling up process for the creation of the UJGREN/SEDOKU for the watershed 
development 
The inter-villages organization that needed to be created was called SEDOKU, the metaphor 
of the Mahi people, and UIGREN (Union Inter-villageoise pour la Gestion des Ressources 
Naturelles = Inter-village Union for Natural Resource Management). An independent 
consultant was commissioned by the GERAM team for organizing the process. Different steps 
were followed (for more details see Tinondé, 1997). Different categories of stakeholders, 
coalitions, professional groups, local authorities10, professional organizations11, representatives 
of migrants12, organisations for watershed development13 generated by the GERAM, political 
organization and bodies14, were consulted to know their appreciation of this initiative. The 
GERAM team was the mediator in this process. The mediation is based on solving problems 
like misunderstanding between strategic groups (e.g., local formal administration versus 
UDESCO) and coalitions (natives versus migrants) which affected the scaling up process. 
A general assembly was organized with representatives of various groups. The roles 
of the UIGREN/SEDOKU were perceived first as a local negotiation body and a higher 
decision making entity for covenants, new norms and regulations for collective natural 
resource management. The organization will take an active part in the identification of concrete 
resource management projects for the region of the Mahi people in Ouèssè. A key role also 
addressed here concerns the participation in the monitoring and control of the implementation 
of resource management projects. 
A structural organisation at three levels (the whole region inhabited by Mahi people, 
the Commune level, and the village level) was created (see figure 6.4). At the Mahi region 
level, the Assemblée Générale (AG) was the decision making structure. A monitoring 
committee and a decision support commission were created to support an executive secretary 
at this level. Look-out posts were created at Communes and villages levels (Vigie Communale, 
Vigie Villageoise). According to the GERAM team, the functioning of this structure should 
not be simple. So they would learn with the leaders to gradually transfer many competencies 
to them. 
The present study observed only the scaling process (not the functioning), which 
coincided with the period of the investigation. However, the functioning of such structure may 
be interesting for further research. Especially, the facilitation of such organization for 
collective decision making , monitoring, joint learning, and so forth., might be revealing. 
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Figure 6.4: Emerging platforms for watershed development activities in Ouesse 
6.6 A comparative analysis and conclusions 
The present case study of watershed development problems were perceived at the policy level. 
However, the two situations studied showed that a joint learning path involving intervening 
party and stakeholders enables a move towards a common appreciation of these problems. 
Existing cultural practices have some implications for the way one should go about the 
solutions and innovations in watershed development. For instance, in Aplahou6, the Adja 
farmers' way of farming imposed an interactive learning for identifying appropriate erosion 
control techniques. 
In both Adja and Mahi regions, institutional frameworks and policy contexts are crucial 
issues for the watershed development. A concrete example was the absence of a consistent 
property right institutions which created a barrier for many stakeholders. 
The most critical question which emerges from the present case study is why the 
scaling up process started successfully in Ouesse and not in Mono (Aplahoue and 
Klou6kanmey). 
In Ouesse, existing organizations (e.g., functional committees for watershed 
development, UDESCO, King of Ouesse) at the level of the Mahi region were already active 
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and they were a driving factor for the scaling up process. Nevertheless, the initiative of the 
GERAM team which enabled operational committees from different villages to meet and 
discuss was determinant for collectively perceived interdependence (SEDOKU metaphor) for 
resource management. This condition also triggered the process of scaling up process the 
creation of a higher platform such as the UIGREN/SEDOKU. Then a condition for sustainable 
resource management at the level of the whole watershed was created. Such a situation was 
not yet realized in Adja region due to the failure to start the generation of organizations at a 
higher level of social aggregation for sustainably managing emerging watershed development 
problems. 
Notes 
1. This chapter makes use of : 
Dangbegnon, C. (forthcoming). Rural Development in the Western part of the Sous-Prefecture of OUESSE, Benin. 
In: Hoefsloot, L. (Ed.) Land use planning and negotiating platforms. (To be published by Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation). 
Dangbégnon, C. 1996. Watershed management with indigenous people in Benin. Paper presented at the 
International Workshop: "Using Communication to Make Environmentally Sustainable Development Happen". 
November 1-2,1996 Burlingame, California (USA). 
1. RAMR is a Recherche-Développement project established in the Mono Province since 1986 (for more 
information see Koudokpon, 1992). Many innovations were developed by RAMR. Mucuna (Mucuna pruriens, 
var.Utilis) and Acacia auriculiformis (alley-cropping) were experimented and used successfully for improving the 
fertility of the soil. These innovations were available for the PGRN project 
3. Different levels of organization almost only existed for cotton production. The Groupement Villageois (GV) 
functions at the village level. At the higher level, we found the union of producers at the commune level is called 
UCP OInion Communale des Producteurs), the union of producers at district level is called USPP (Union Sous-
Préfectorale des Producteurs), and the union of producers at province level is called UDP O^nion Départementale 
des Producteurs). 
4 . Like the Adja people in Mono, die Mahi people have a historical background within the socio-cultural era Adja-
Tado, which is common to many ethnic groups like Adja, Fon, Goun, Sahouè, Ayizo, etc. 
5 . There are many villages called Ouèssè in Benin. Ouèssè Ouogoudo means 'Ouèssè behind the River Ouémé' 
when one refers to the location of the Mahi people in the Sous-préfecture of Savalou. Ouèssè is a city, capital of 
the Sous-préfecture of Ouèssè. Ouèssè is also the name given to the Sous-préfecture of Ouèssè which involve 9 
Communes and many villages. 
6. Here, individual practices reflect the way of using natural resources by different small groups that are, each, 
extended families called 'hennu' living together in the area in which they practice agricultural activities. 
7. However, in the Sous-préfecture of Klouékanmey, the proximity of the Fon people in Zou influenced the 
cultivation style of the Adja farmers in this region. They practise minimal tillage and ridge also like the Fon people 
do. For that reason the PGRN team could introduce contour ridging. So the situation in the Sous-préfecture of 
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Klquékanmey is not the same compared to the one in Aplahoué. 
8. The GERAM team in Ouèssè and the PGRN team in Mono used the same perspective within the PGRN project. 
However, the GERAM team had more autonomy in the implementation of their activities compared with the PGRN 
team in Mono. 
9. The investigations of this issue was done by two Beninese consultants during my field research. I had the 
opportunity to assist in the analysis of the information they collected. 
10. Dah (Chief of lineage called hennugan), Notables (influential people in village communities). 
11. Farmers' organisation called USPP (Union Sous-Préfectorale des Producteurs); forest resources' users 
(Exploitants forestiers). 
12. Migrant farmers from the Northern part of Benin, migrant Fon; migrant Adja, Old time Fulbe; Recent settler 
Fulbe. 
13. Beekeepers, nurserymen, folklore group, and Radio Rurale committee. 
14. Maires of the Communes, the Chefs de Villages, UDESCO, and Youth Association. 
7 Collective Action and Resource-Flow Management for Improving 
Soil Fertility by a Women's Group in Djeffa, Benin 
7.1 Introduction 
In many situations, the appreciation of women's position reveals their marginalization with 
respect to access to external supports. Power relations between men and women tend to be the 
focal point in many analyses. Recently this problem became a political concern and has 
stimulated the emergence of new 'paradigms' which emphasize gender issue in development 
(e.g., Moore, 1988; Rogers, 1980; Schrijvers, 1986). The present study is based on the 
assumption that the division of labour between women and men, and gender sensitive 
.-j knowledge and responsibilities are relevant for respect to resource management (especially 
/ resource-flow management). These issues are some aspects of socioeconomic development of 
women. One should analyse the context and content of existing initiatives of women in order 
to help them enhance their performance. Many efforts for helping the women are limited to 
specific domains, for instance, agricultural product processing, credit, village water supply, 
etc. The support of the women's groups for integrated resource management was a neglected 
dimension of intervention practice in Benin. 
This chapter deals with the initiative of a women's group in Djeffa which developed 
several activities for improving soil stability and fertility within horticultural development. 
Different methods and techniques were used to carry out this study. Individual interviews with 
the members of the group were carried out. Group interviews were organized the day (every 
Thursday) the women worked together. The involvement in the activities of the women 
enabled participant observation and an in-depth analysis of the group's dynamic, the 
motivation of the members and how they overcame various problems that occurred. 
Participatory methods were used to explore new opportunities for the women and the way the 
performance of their activities could be enhanced with respect to group maintenance. The 
additional sources of information used for this case study concerned the documents of the 
group and small-scale project reports about the activities which were written by the NGOs 
working with women. 
This chapter starts with the history of the formation of the woman's group in Djeffa 
(§7.2) with an emphasis on the context and the content. Then resource-flow management is 
analysed from the perspective of the women. At the time when the group was created (in 
1988), the CARDER and very few emerging NGOs were available for helping the group. In 
1990, the democratization era started in Benin and many NGOs entered the development 
scene. The women's group could call on many external supports for their activities from 
various sources. This situation enabled me to study this group from a historical approach at 
two different periods: before and daring the democratization era in Benin (§7.4 and §7.5). 
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This case study draws specific conclusions (§7.6) about the facilitation of successful collective 
action for improving soil stability and fertility by a group. 
7.2 Formation of the women's group in Djeffa: context and content 
The context of the women's group formation in Djeffa 
Djeffa is a coastal village is in the Southern part of the Ou6me Province in Benin. From the 
adniinistrative side, Djeffa is a village of the Commune Rurale of Ekpe in the Sous-Prefecture 
of Seme-Kpodji. The dominant ethnic group in Djeffa is the Xla people. The population of this 
village is 4,264 inhabitants (TNSAE, 1993). Djeffa is an area in Benin where the density of the 
population is high (beyond the 240 inhabitants/km2 noticed in the Adja region in chapter 6). 
The agro-ecological context in which the Djeffa women are living is very complex. As 
in all coastal regions in Benin, the dominant natural vegetation in Djeffa is the coconut tree 
(Cocos nucifera). A research station on coconut trees, the Station de Recherche sur le 
Cocotier (SRC) is set up in the Sous-Prefecture of Seme-kpodji near Djeffa. The soils of Djeffa 
area are described by Schelhaas (1978: 22). As a coastal village, the soil in Djeffa is very 
sandy, very poor in organic matter, and has a very low water holding capacity. The poor 
fertility of the soil was a serious constraint for practising agriculture in Djeffa. Crops do not 
grow well on the sandy soils in Djeffa without a treatment with organic matter to improve their 
stability and fertility. The climate on the Djeffa is sub-equatorial with two dry seasons and two 
rainy seasons like the situation in the Adja region. 
Socioeconomic activities are diversified in the village. Small scale commerce like 
selling sugar, soap, fish, and agricultural products (e.g., maize, gari1, coconut oil, etc.), is 
dynamic. Djeffa has many swampy areas which are inundated during the rainy season. The 
local people use them for sugar cane cultivation. Vegetables are produced during the dry 
seasons. Tomato, maize and cassava are cultivated during the rainy season. 
Socio-structural transformation and continuous differentiation are ongoing processes 
in the region of Djeffa2. A coconut tree has great economic importance in the region as is 
oilpalm for the Adja people in the Mono. Some parts of the land in Djeffa are bought by rich 
people from urban areas (for instance Cotonou and Porto-Novo) for the plantation of coconut 
trees. A great differentiation in the landholding for agricultural or horticultural activities 
emerged in Djeffa. Borrowing, sharecropping, and renting, are the most common ways to have 
access to land for the people in Djeffa. Food insecurity is a problem in this village, and very 
often malnutrition of the children occurs. 
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The content of the work of the women's group in Djeffa 
In face of the complex context described above, seven women in Djeffa found a way to cope 
with their chaotic situation. At the beginning they engaged in a tontine, a local saving 
organisation, which had multiple purposes: assistance for burial ceremonies, mobilization of 
funds for economic activities (small scale business), etc. The tontine was based on rotating 
savings which enabled investments in commercial activities (maize storage and reselling, small 
scale commerce of imported products, processing activities etc.). The tontine is a common 
practice in Benin, for instance, the Kugbe, a saving organization for burial ceremonies was 
studied by Vodouhe (1996) in the Southwestern par of Benin. 
During the time the tontine was operational, a villager from Djeffa, who spent several years 
in Nigeria, learned of organizations of some women groups which functioned very much like 
a cooperative. Those women together sold oilpalm, fish, cassava, gari and several imported 
products. Back in Djeffa, he felt the need to advise the women's tontine group so that they 
should organize themselves like the Nigerian women he had observed. The women's group 
in Djeffa evolved in this way as it was explained by Beatrice (see Box 7.1). 
Box 7.1: Beatrice explains how the idea of creating a group emerged 
One of our brothers had been in Nigeria several for several years. When he came back, he advised us that it 
should be nice that we work together. At this period, we agreed with him and explained to other women that we 
could create a group together and do more than what we do individually. We explained the idea to many women 
and about 60 inhabitants of Djeffa (45 women and 15 men) joined the movement. Then the Association des 
Femmes de Djeffa, the women's group, was created in 1988. Some women said at that period: if we work 
together, we will get more money through small business and keep our tota (household), get more food for the 
children through horticultural activities (called jardin by the women) The goal as explained by the women was 
to help in the amelioration of the well-being of its members in terms of economic and household needs. 
Later, the fact that a few men were involved should be understood as one way to seek 
complementarity between women and men which enabled the development of several activities 
by the group. The group was ruled by a bureau chaired by a woman (see Box 7.2). The task 
of the bureau was to organize the members of the group to increase its performance to produce 
organic matter and improve the stability and the fertility of the soil. Solidarity exists within 
the group for helping the members during the burial ceremonies. A member of the group who 
lost a relative received support from his fellows. The members of the group assisted also in 
the ceremonies and its behaviour gives a sign of prestige based on the importance of a social 
relationship and a network. 
Box 7.2: The composition of bureau of the women's group in Djeffa 
• President (a woman) 
• Vice-president (a woman) 
• Secretary (a woman) 
• Assistant secretary (a man) 
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• Treasurer (a woman) 
• Assistant treasurer (a man) 
• Organiser (a man) 
• Adviser (an old woman) 
• Responsible for propaganda (a woman) 
7.3 Resource-Flow management from the perspective of the women's group 
The principle of resource-flow management 
The principle of the resource-flow management from the perspective of the women is based 
on an optimal use of the local agricultural products for processing, using by-products to 
produce organic manure for improving the stability and the fertility of the soil (see fig. 7.1). 
Resource-flow management is based on three basic interrelated economic activities: coconut 
fruit processing, pig raising and horticulture. 
The first activity is the processing of kernels of coconut fruits into oil. Coconut fruits 
are bought from the Station ae Recherches sur le Cocotier by the women for processing. The 
Station de Recherches sur le Cocotier has a big plantation of coconut trees near Djeffa. The 
kernels of the fruits are extracted and crushed in the mill. Large quantity of water is added to 
the pasty substance obtained from milling. Then, the mixture is filtered and the bran is 
separated from the liquid which is boiled to obtain the oil. The bunches of the coconut fruit 
and the nutshells are sold (they are used for fire). The bran that remains at the oil extraction 
(called dja by the women), the by-product of processing, is used in a second activity: pig 
raising. Feed for pigs in an important constraint in Djeffa. Increasing the scale of kernel 
processing into oil can provide more bran which is used to feed pigs. In this manner, a strong 
link between the first and the second activity is developed. The pigs are raised on a bedding 
consisting of grasses specially collected. The mixture of the pigs' excreta, urine and the 
bedding ferments to produce an important quantity of organic manure for horticultural 
activities. In this way, the group produces vegetables. Figure 7.1 reveals the synergy within 
the agroecosystem generated by the women's group. From a natural resource which is 
available in the area, the women produce an important quantity of organic manure to improve 
the fertility of the soil. 
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( ^ ^ ) Inputs 
( ) Activities 
I i Outputs for sale 
Figure 7.1: Resource-flow management by the women's group in Djeffa 
Collective action and resource-flow management 167 
Photo 7.1: Organic manure collected from the sites for horticulture 
Photo 7.2: The women work together to produce vegetables 
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The women's way of interpreting the importance of nutrients and implications for soil 
management 
The production of organic manure through a combination of different activities provided 
nutrients to the soil. This practice of regenerating the soil by using organic manure was 
internalized by the women's group. Some concepts were developed to explain the 'movement' 
of nutrients in the soil. When the soil is used, their speech of vivinontrome which means that 
the nutrients are released from the soil, when organic manure called gbo is added to the soil, 
their speech of vivinonbieme, which means nutrients enters the soil. 
Vivi (which appears in both vivinontrome and vivinonbiome) means something 'sweet' 
which gives 'force' to the soil. It was used by the women to designate the nutrients. The 
suffixes nontrome and nonbiome explain the movement of the nutrients in the soil-plant 
relationship. They became convinced they 'they must bring something' to the soil, if they 
expected a good result to occur. The women's group in Djeffa learned experientially about the 
importance of nutrients in the soil for the growth of the plants. 
The importance of nutrients in the women's perception can be deduced from then-
continuous practice of resource-flow management to grow healthy vegetables without use of 
chemical fertilizers. From the ecological point of view, the principle is based on exploiting 
complementarity and synergy in resource-flows by combining different activities to obtain the 
nutrients. The soil in Djeffa is very sandy. Organic manure produced by the women was 
appropriate to improve the structure of the soil. In this condition, one can say that organic 
manure ensured two ecological services: improving the structure and the fertility of the soil. 
7.4 Collective action and resource-flow management by the women's group before the 
democratization era 
The problem and perception with respect to resource-flow management 
The problem as perceived by the women's group 
A crucial problem faced by the women's group at the beginning oftheir initiative was the lack 
of funds for buying a large quantity of coconut fruits for processing. The activities are 
interrelated and the possibihty to get some funds for the development of the first activity was 
a determinant to increase the scale of pig raising and then to obtain sufficient organic manure 
for horticulture. The only way for the women at that period to start this activity was to use the 
funds obtained from their own contributions (tontine). Nevertheless, according to the president 
of the group, the mobilization of the funds was difficult. The members wanted to keep the 
financial contribution to the activities as low as possible. 
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The initial idea of the women was that, in working together, they could improve food shortage 
in their households by producing vegetables. But according to the members of the group, the 
collective work was difficult because the activities were not well done as a result of unequal 
contribution in sharing the work. Two days (Wednesday and Thursday) a week were allocated 
for the collective work. However, many women arrived very late at the working place, the 
headquarters of the group. Another problem was that all the activities were not equally 
attractive and it was easier to get participation in some tasks than in others. 
Gandudu, Ahodudu and Houhouihouan are three basic concepts which were used by 
the women to explain some of the problems they faced. Gandudu means leadership and the fact 
that many members wanted to lead the group did not help increase its performance. Ahodudu 
refers to members who chose deliberately not to reimburse the money they got from the group. 
Houhouihouan is the jealousy problem vis-a-vis the members of the bureau, the leaders of the 
group. 
Collective action and Resource-Flow management: defining the problem 
All the activities involved in the resource-flow management need money and labour for their 
execution. In concrete terms, processing kernels into oil requires money for buying the 
coconut fruits, the material for processing (pot, bowls), an infrastructure (a small factory); and 
labour is needed for the implementation of this activity. Pig raising also requires investment 
for buying the piglets. Labour includes the construction of the pig sties, the daily feeding of 
the pig, and the collection of grass for bedding. Horticulture was one activity which did not 
require money. The contribution of the members for this activity was based only on their 
labour for the preparation of the nurseries, and seedbeds, the collection of the compost from 
the pig sty, the transplanting the plants, daily watering, harvesting and selling. 
Ensuring the provision of labour is most difficult. Not doing one's share is profitable 
for an individual member since she can still benefit as a member of the group. The women's 
perception of the problems that arose in the project (see above) shows that many members of 
the group were unwilling to contribute much effort to the activities. However, improving soil 
structure and fertility are highly related to a voluntary contribution of labour and money by 
the stakeholders to produce organic manure through the other activities. The problem can be 
redefined as how the group copes with this situation so as to sustain the activities. 
The performance of the activities is related to the functioning of the group itself. Such 
functioning can be realized if the stakeholders participate in the discussion at the level of the 
group and contribute in terms of money to the functioning of the Bureau which represented 
the group. Other contributions to functioning of the group might be related to the control of 
the funds at the level of the group, collective support for the definition and enforcement of 
sanctions and rules of the group. 
In view of the above, all the activities in resource-flow management would be difficult to 
women to carry out individually. The investigation of Schelhaas (1978: 22-3) draws a similar 
conclusion for the region of Seme-kpodji (including Djeffa). Collective action to pool resource-
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Table 7.1: The division of tasks in the Women's group in Djeffa 
Basic Activities in the Women's 
Group 
Gender related division of tasks in the Women's Group 
Women Men 
Coconut processing processing the kernel of coconuts 
into oil 
selling the oil produced 
separate the kernel from the 
nutshell 
Pig raising and production of 
organic manure 
feeding the pigs 
collection of grass for bedding 
construction of the sties 
Horticulture talcing care of the nurseries 
(watering) 
transport the organic matter into 
the garden 
transplanting the plants 
watering the plants in the garden 
selling the products 
fencing the garden 
preparing plant nurseries for the 
garden 
seedbed preparation 
harvesting the products 
The tasks of the women were continuous through time. Every day the women were responsible 
for doing something (e.g., feeding the pigs, watering the plants). The tasks of the men were 
intermittent and happened at a certain phase of the execution of one activity, for instance sty 
flow management for improving soil structure and fertility as a basis for horticultural activity 
was a novel solution. 
How did the women's group learn towards successful collective action for resource-flow 
management? 
This question addresses the know-how of the women and the way they organized their 
activities to stimulate an effective contribution of the members. Some men are members of the 
group, and as will be explained, this was a strategic decision by the women (e.g., solving 
labour problems). A second aspect of the women learning concerns the definition of rules and 
sanctions and their enforcement. 
Organization for the activities between women and men 
The division of tasks was perceived as an important issue for the performance of the group. 
The women were convinced that they could not do some tasks involved if some men were not 
members of the group. Some tasks which were not done culturally by women are left to the 
male members. The complementarity between men and women is visible in the organization 
of the activities by the bureau of the women's group (see Table 7.1). 
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construction for pig raising and seedbed preparation for the horticulture activity. Instead of 
using wage labour for the tasks the women were not able to do, they accepted men as members 
of the group was a solution. 
Rules, sanctions and access to shares in the group 
The members of the group have their individual activities and affairs. They agreed to do 
collective work on Wednesdays and Thursdays. Wednesdays are devoted to the activities in 
the farms when the group is cultivating tomato, sugar cane, pepper, cassava, maize, okra and 
vegetables. It happens, very often in the rainy season, that all the members go to the farm for 
land clearing, sowing, weeding or harvesting. When the group has to do several activities 
together, for instance, pig feeding, cassava processing into gari, watering the plants in the 
garden (horticultural activities), some subgroups are formed to do various works together. A 
member is chosen to be responsible for the activity devoted to the subgroup. At the end of the 
work, mere is a check of a member's presence in a notebook. When a member arrives and 
works, the sign (+) is ticked off to his or her name. For permission or an absence because of 
illness, the sign (p) is ticked off on his or her name. When a member is very late for an 
activity, he/her will not lose the day when it is possible to do an amount of work equivalent 
to the work already done by the others. Otherwise, the day does not count. For absence 
without a convincing reason, the sign o is used. For each activity, the number of working days 
is known and the contribution in working days of each member. These results give the basis 
for the distribution of the benefit in the group. The absence to any activity is sanctioned by an 
equivalent loss of the shares. 
Every Thursday, the members meet at the headquarters of the group in Djeffa. It is an 
occasion for the members to discuss several issues: organization of the work during a week 
and distribution of the tasks, information on correspondence with the group (letters are 
translated for the members who can not speak and read French) and monitoring of presence 
at the activities. The money for the weekly tontine is collected on Thursdays and the 
subscribers sign a savings bank-book (250 FCFA/month for the women and 500 FCFA for the 
men). This money is used for collective activities in the group for which there is no credit. As 
explained earlier, when the group started, all investments (buying coconuts and processing 
into oil, small investments for pig raising) came from own savings. When a woman would like 
to join the group, this issue is discussed in the Thursday meeting. A member of the group is 
not free to involve a new member without the agreement of the others (see Box 7.3). 
Box 7.3: Beatrice, the eldest of the women, explains the procedure to accept a new member in a group 
Working in a group is not an easy task. You must know each other first. When a man or a woman comes to us 
and would like to join the group. We have to decide in a meeting. If anybody knows that the candidate created 
any trouble in other groups, we would not accept the request. However, if everybody is convinced that the 
candidate is serious, we can accept temporarily and see his or her walo (behaviour, way of doing) during a certain 
period (minimum three months) before a final decision. When a woman is in our group, we can accept her 
husband. All the women do not have their husband in the group and all the men do not have their wives in the 
group. 
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The members were discouraged when immediate benefits were not forthcoming. Many 
members tried to avoid making sacrifices after the creation of the group. This problem was 
a reason for some people to leave the group (see Box 7.4). 
Box 7.4: Beatrice explains why some members were not motivated and left the group 
We did very difficult work, for instance, we decided to repair the street which leads to our meeting and work 
place after the creation of the group. The street was very sandy and going there with motorbikes and cars was 
difficult. We collected loamy sand 2 km from to our place. Some members found the work very hard and they 
did not perceive the 'immediate benefit' and left the group. Maybe the people left because we did very difficult 
work. Some of them got credits through the group and did not pay back and we punished them (esinxoe). Some 
women left because they had the ambition of gandoudou (to rule the group, leadership) but they did not succeed 
because they were not elected. Those women created other groups to realize their ambition but they have failed 
and their groups disappeared. After that they came back to renew their membership with us and we refused. I 
could not know that we should be in the stage we are today. Since so many people could see that we are 
progressing (many visitors to the groups with cars and motorbikes), several groups have emerged in the village 
Djeffa to imitate us. Now you could count more than 15 groups in Djeffa. However, other members were 
confident that in the future the group should be profitable for everybody if they were very courageous to continue. 
The number of memberships decreased from 60 at the beginning to 40 (25 women and 15 men). After this hard 
work any visitor could arrive at our headquarters with their car or motorbike. 
Effects of learning processes within the women's group 
At the early stage of the formation of their group, the women started monitoring the 
participation in the collective activities. Sanctions were installed to deal with free-riders. The 
fact that many women and men were excluded (esinxoi) could be a sign of the effectiveness 
of these sanctioning structures. Dynamics observed at the level of the women had the effect 
to maintain the group and engage in successful collective action. However, as will be analysed, 
external supports contributed to these dynamics for ongoing resource-flow management 
activities. 
External supports for the women's group in Djeffa 
The government extension organization: the CARDER-Oueme 
The women's group in Djeffa emerged at a period when there was not really an existing 
framework for the support of local initiatives (Dangbegnon, 1994). For instance, the extension 
work of the CARDER was characterized by a top-down approach. The CARDER organization 
was the official structure for rural development in Benin within the 'Marxist political regime'. 
The Village Extension Worker (VEW) assisted the women's group in the framework of its 
conventional activities. As described by Tossou (1995: 55), the CARDERs focused on the 
organisation of local groups, input supply, the provision of credit facilities to farmers' groups, 
and on-farm testing of technologies (e.g., new varieties). At that period, the CARDER-Oueme 
was using the Training and Visit (T&V) system (for more details on the content of the T&V 
system: see Benor et al, 1984). The women's group in Djeffa was opportunistically targeted 
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as a contact group by the CARDER-Ouémé people. The projet foyer amélioré was introduced 
by the CARDER in Djeffa through this group. The group received advice about how to 
organize a group to perform effectively, and this task is called animation cooperative by the 
VEW. The group could also get assistance in agricultural product processing (coconut fruit 
processing into oil), and access information on new ways of farming as explained by Assiba 
in Box 7.5. 
Box 7.5: Assiba appreciates the support of the CARDER to the group 
When we created our organization, the CARDER people arrived and helped us. We learned how to cultivate 
vegetables to have a good yield. Every two weeks the Glegan (Village Extension Worker) visits us. He brought 
a herb (Mucuna, a soil cover leguminous plant) which helped destroy the hard weeds (Jmperata cylindrica called 
se) in the farms. 
The women's group was chosen, opportunistically, as a contact group for extension activities 
by the VEW. The VEW visited this group twice a month. The foyer amélioré (a device for 
economic use of firewood) was introduced in Djeffa through the women's group. This 
opportunity was perceived as a privilege and a reason for maintaining one's affiliation to the 
group. The stakeholders were also proud to be regularly visited by the VEW because the other 
villagers who were not organized in groups did not attract CARDER staff. 
The support of CARDER did not have a direct link with the resource-flow management 
activities. However, training of local barefoot promoters for the foyer amélioré might have 
presented an incentive to maintain the group for a similar further opportunity. 
The actions of the NGO CIRAPIP at the initial stage of the women's group 
CIRAPIP (Centre d'Information et de Recherches pour l'Auto-Promotion à l'Initiative 
Paysanne = Research and Information Centre for the Auto-Promotion of Peasants' Initiatives) 
is one of the NGOs created in 1984 during the Marxist regime3 (cf. also Vodouhê, 1996: 119). 
This NGO established contact with the women at the beginning of the creation of their group. 
Animation rurale was carried out with the objective to reinforce the organization of the group. 
An animator made regular visits to Djeffa. The stakeholders learned how to increase 
participation in a group by establishing rules and norms within a group. 
The fact that the majority of the stakeholders in the group was illiterate was a 
bottleneck in their participation in many activities outside the group. This problem was 
perceived by the CIRAPIP. So they carried out an alphabétisation programme. The aim was 
to enable the responsabilisation of the stakeholders, increase the accountability, and ensure a 
good functioning of the group. 
CIRAPIP developed a social assistance programme called PCN (Programme 
Communautaire de Nutrition = Community Nutrition Programme) with the women. This 
opportunity was appreciated very much by the women's group. Through this programme, two 
women of the group were trained, they are called Agents Communutaire Nutritionel 
(Community Agents for Nutrition). Their task was the suivi nutritionel, which means the 
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control of the way the children are fed in relation to their heath. They weigh the children in 
Djeffa, control their growth, provide a conseil (advice) for the women about the nutritional 
state of their children and how to improve it. 
The most important issue in the support of the CTRAPD? was providing the members 
with food which was negotiated with the EEC (European Economic Community) 
representation in Benin. They received maize, rice, oil and milk from the CIRAPIP for 
collective activities. This opportunity was motivating for the members and they appreciated 
the extent to which the maintenance of the group benefitted (see Box 7.6). 
Box 7.6: Assiba assesses the importance of the CIRAPIP for the maintenance of the group 
We have suffered for the progress of our group. Many people left but we continue with endurance to work 
together. I will not remember what the CIRAPIP did for the consolidation and the organization of the group. We 
got more food from CIRAPIP. Because of this opportunity, the women who left early the group had tried several 
times to join us again and benefit but they failed. They created their own group, hopefully to obtain food but they 
did not succeed. 
Institutional framework and the policy context for the external supports 
The role of the NGOs in helping the local organization did not exist at that period within the 
government institutional framework for rural development. Nor did rules exist for the 
functioning of local organizations like the women's group in Djeffa. Existing structures were 
the Groupement Révolutionnaire à Vocation Coopérative and Groupement Villageois under the 
control of government organizations such as the CARDER. The existing government 
organizations could not provide the women's group sufficient opportunities to satisfy their 
various needs and support the activities in which they were already engaging. 
The policy context was characterized by a monopoly of the government organizations 
for the support of local organizations. One of the consequences was that, blanketing actions 
and strategies (e.g., a 'commodity approach', focusing on cotton production) were adopted and 
the diversity existing ecological and socioeconomic conditions of stakeholders in various 
locations of Benin are neglected. The policy context did not provide enabling conditions under 
the blanket national policy of the 'Marxist regime' based on the centralization of decision-
making power. 
Can successful collective be maintained for an ongoing resource-flow management within 
the women group in Djeffa? 
Before the democratization, the women's group started with many members. Some members 
left because of leadership problems or an absence of immediate profit. However, the learning 
processes of the group itself was crucial for maintaining the group and collective action. 
Monitoring of activities reduced space for free-riders. A sanctioning structure was established 
which provided an environment in which the members had the assurance that the rules were 
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followed by everybody. The CIRAPD? provided external support for mamtaining successful 
collective action which benefited ongoing resource-flow management activities. 
7.5 Collective action and resource-flow management during the democratization era 
Changing context and new dynamics 
At the end of 1989, the failure of the Marxist regime in face of a severe economic crisis in 
Benin led to a shift in the national political system4. Later the Beninese adopted a liberal 
regime and a multiparty system in the Conférence Nationale5. As will be noticed, these 
changes implied a new dynamics in rural development and opportunities at the local setting. 
The monopoly of the CARDER organization in rural development activities in Benin has 
changed. Associations are allowed and there is a mechanism for their official recognition. The 
new political environment enables the emergence of many NGOs for the promotion of rural 
development. 
Within this new context, the women's group in Djeffa started looking for opportunities to 
enhance the resource-flow management activities. In 1991, the group joined a networking 
movement for the development of Agriculture Durable (sustainable agriculture) in Benin6. In 
January 1992 the women's group in Djeffa participated in the creation of a network called 
RED AD (Réseau de Développement d'Agriculture Durable = Network for Sustainable 
Agriculture Development). The group became a founding member of RED AD. This network 
aims at promoting sustainable agriculture in Benin with local organization like the women 
group in Djeffa. It involves NGOs with activities related to sustainable agriculture, and 
individuals in research institutions and agricultural development agencies in Benin. 
The objectives of the REDAD were the following: 
• to create a linkage between local organizations/associations with NGOs and 
professionals in research and development activities to strengthen local capacities in 
practising sustainable agriculture; 
• to exchange information and experiences related to sustainable agriculture (through 
joint field visits, newsletters, on-farm trial visits etc.); 
• to create a contact between local organizations/associations and international 
development organizations and donors in the way that they should active in the 
negotiation of their 'own development'. 
The NGOs were also interested in local organizations like the women's group in Djeffa 
which already had some successful initiatives. For instance, resource-flow management by the 
women's group in Djeffa was a 'model' at the beginning of the REDAD. Parallelling this 
network movement, the group multiplied their contact with many NGOs and this is an 
indication of its dynamics7. 
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Revisiting the perspective on resource-flow management 
The women's group is continuously looking for ways to sustain their integrated system based 
on resource-flow management. According to the women, coconut fruits became very expensive 
and making a profit is difficult. Especially, when the coconuts are purchased far from Djeffa, 
transportation costs are very high. So oil processing was done when coconut fruits could be 
purchased around Djeffa to avoid transportation costs. As an alternative, the women 
introduced cassava processing which has a direct role in their resource management principle. 
The peels of cassava and the bran obtained after processing cassava, are used to feed the pigs 
(see fig. 7.2). The constraint in cassava processing is the absence of a grating machine. 
Manual grating to process it into gari is time-consuming. They bought cassava or coconut 
fruits and sometimes additional organic fertilizer (as Assiba explains in Box 7.7.). 
Box 7.7: Assiba explains the problem caused by a scarcity of coconut fruits 
We got money from the 'reseau' (REDAD) for pig raising. We bought 22 pigs to fatten. The scarcity of coconut 
fruits for processing has caused a lack of waste for feeding the pigs. We bought additional waste of a brewery 
to feed the pigs. We did not make profit on this activity. We cannot stop pig raising because we need the organic 
manure for horticulture. 
The problems and perceptions 
The problem as perceived by the women 
After working together for some years, the women appreciated the progress of the group. They 
referred to economic problems and their well-being (Ninonmi-miton). Three basic criteria were 
identified: economic performance, promoting individual members of the group, and 
mamtaining the group for collectively managed resource-flow. 
The first criterion, the economic performance, is an emergent issue within the group. How can 
the women organize their activities to make profit? This question became a particular problem 
for the women. As will be shown later, they obtained many credits and they perceived that the 
more efficient they are, the more many external supports will trust them. 
During the author's discussion with the women's group, the president requested a training for 
them so that they would be more efficient. 
The desire of the individual members of the group was to make a difference in the 
village Djeffa. According to them, it is very important that the other villagers would have a 
positive 'image' on them because they belonged to a group. They would feel ashamed if other 
villagers did not perceive any change in their livelihoods. This would mean that the group was 
not doing very well. 
Mamtaining the group became equivalent to keeping up their various activities. The 
members became more conscious that individually they would not be able to capture all the 
opportunities they had as a group. 
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Figure 7.2: Resource-flow management revisited 
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The problem as perceived at the level of RED AD 
RED AD is more interested in the resource-flow management activities. This practice was a 
'convincing model' of agriculture durable at an early stage of this network. Mamtaining and 
improving such practices are a crucial problem within the RED AD. However, the participation 
of the women's group (and other groups) in REDAD's meeting was a way to arrive at 
agreement about a collective resource-flow management in Djeffa. Membership fees from the 
women's group, other contributions for the realization of activities (within REDAD), and 
members' suggestions and feedbacks are required for mamtaining also REDAD. If the local 
organizations which are members of REDAD did not contribute, this network probably could 
not perform. However, good functioning at the level of REDAD has implications for the 
performance of the local organizations which are members, especially the women's group in 
Djeffa (provision of opportunities, ensuring the follow-up of activities, etc.). Members of 
REDAD knew that this network would not have a raison-d'etre for agriculture durable without 
dynamic local organizations such as the women's group in Djeffa 
Defining the nature of the problem 
The provisioning problems described earlier (see §7.4) are still seen as a critical issue by the 
group members. The problem has become more important as the women's group became 
involved in more activities as will be analysed later. More individual contributions (e.g., 
labour, mutual monitoring) are required to make profit. Nevertheless, mobilizing a voluntary 
collective action remains a living problem in resource-flow management. 
The fact that the women's group is a founding member of REDAD implies the 
facilitation of successful collective action by activists from this network is also related to the 
provisioning problem at the REDAD level. All the components of the REDAD must provide 
more for a good functioning of REDAD. Voluntary collective action is also required at a 
higher level than the women's group in Djeffa. 
Joint learning between REDAD and the women's group for enhancing resource-flow 
management activities 
The structure and organization of REDAD 
REDAD involves a coalition of farmers' organizations, NGOs, and individuals who are 
researchers, development professionals or consultants. Recently the number of the farmers' 
organizations which are involved in the REDAD's activities reached 200. About 50 NGOs and 
100 individuals participate in this network. 
The structure of REDAD is presented in fig. 7.3. The General Assembly is an annual 
meeting which involve all the members of REDAD8. The role of the meeting is to approve the 
planning of activities for REDAD, the acceptance of new members, the election of the 
members of the Administrative Council (every three years), and the re-adaptation of 
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institutions for the functioning of RED AD. This council involves a president, a general 
secretary, a treasurer, two representatives of the farmers' organizations, one representative for 
the coalition of the NGOs, and one representative for the coalition of individuals. The role of 
the council is to monitor activities, and support decision making about the execution of 
activities by the Executive Directorate. 
Figure 7.3 : The structure and organization of RED AD 
Although REDAD is composed of different coalitions, a 'meeting point' of their different 
interests emerged. Farmers' organisations are motivated to get money for their activities even 
if there are no constraints which need funding. Individual members of REDAD are motivated 
to give intermittent assistance and get perdiem. NGOs are motivated to provide technical 
assistance and to manage funds. Nevertheless, many lack a clear perspective on how to 
organize collective learning with farmers' organisations. All these interests are visible at the 
level of General Assembly, the Administrative Council, and the Executive Directorate which 
function as the platforms of REDAD. Activities on which these platforms agreed resulted from 
negotiation and collective decision making (as will be explained later). 
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Learning about constraints and opportunities for enhancing resource-flow management 
A growing interest emerged in Participatory Technology Development (PTD) with the local 
organisations involved in REDAD for the development of agriculture durable. This idea was 
perceived since the beginning of the networking activities. Visits by professionals who are 
members of the REDAD, to the local organizations started. The women's group in Djeffa 
received particular attention because their existing initiative that attracted professionals. During 
first contacts9 with the women's group, group discussion yielded many problems that called 
for assistance within the REDAD. 
The constraints of the women in resource-flow management concerned a lack of funds 
for buying more coconut fruits to increase oil production. Implicitly this would increase the 
number of pigs they could raise. Land insecurity for their horticultural activities was also 
perceived. They had borrowed land and this presented some problems with respect to 
investments such as the construction of wells. However, the women are motivated to develop 
their activities. They sent a document to the headquarters of REDAD with the following 
requests for support: tools for horticulture, construction of cement pig sties, increasing the 
level of pig raising activities, assistance for a project in aquaculture, and the construction of 
a shed for processing activities. Meanwhile, the immediate interest of REDAD was in the 
women's horticultural activities based on organic manure. Therefore, it was decided to engage 
in preference ranking with the women. 
Being a member of REDAD, I was in a position to plan and implement this exercise 
with the women's group in 1995. It started by group interviews and the following existing 
activities were identified: (1) tontine, (2) horticulture, (3) pig raising, (4) coconut processing, 
(5) maize marketing and (6) cassava processing. After that, we agreed on icons to visualise the 
activities. I drew the icons, showed them to the members and they made sense to them before 
we started the exercise. I drew a paired-wise ranking matrix on a large sheet of paper located 
in the midst of the participants. I placed the icons on the Y-axis of the matrix and explained 
that the same icons would be placed also on the X-axis. We decided that some signs instead 
of icons should be used in the X-axis to save time. The next step was how to proceed. We 
divided each cell into two sub-cells and identify the 'jargon' that should help to move in cells 
and sub-cells. The Y-axis was called odo (lower level) and the X-axis aga (upper level). In 
each cell, the position at aga is the corresponding X-axis and the position at odo for Y-axis. 
To fill the matrix, all the participants have maize grains. For each combination of two 
activities, they could follow the rule of aga and odo to fill the cells. The maize grains are 
replaced by dots with pen to avoid disorder. Each cell represents a comparison (in terms of 
votes expressed by placing a maize seed) between the activities (see table 7.2 and photo 7.3). 
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Table 7.2: Result of matrix ranking with the women' group 
tontine Pig horticulture coconut maize cassava 
processing processing 
tontine 
Pig 8 
3 
horticulture 6 6 
5 5 
coconut 5 6 6 
processing 6 5 5 
maize 3 2 3 2 
8 9 8 9 
cassava 6 6 4 2 10 
processing 5 5 7 9 1 
Each cell represents a comparison (in terms of votes expressed by placing a maize seed) 
between two activities. 
Photo 7.3: Ranking exercise with the women 
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The high score for maize marketing can be explained by the fact that this activity could 
mobilize an important amount of money and therefore attracted more members of the group, 
especially the women. Tontine provided credit opportunities and contributed to the 
maintenance of the group as a woman said: 'if you are not a member of the group, you will 
not benefit'. Cassava processing into gari was appreciated because each member could get her 
share for home consumption and the remaining was sold. Pig raising and horticulture are two 
closely related activities, the first provided organic manure for the second. The lower score 
of coconut processing activity can be explained by the decrease of profit and the difficulty to 
get the coconut fruits. Our immediate learning point after the exercise was that the Tontine 
contributed greatly to the development of individual affairs, and this could explain the 
endurance to maintain the group. 
These results constituted background information for REDAD for making decisions 
about possibilities for external support of the women's group. 
REDAD as a platform for decision making about the support of resource-flow management 
The promotion of agriculture durable requires financial resources to carry out some activities 
with the farmers' organizations. The idea of the micro-projet (small-scale project) was 
developed within REDAD. Farmers' organizations would be allocated some funds (maximum 
500,000 FCFA) for the development of specific activities related to agriculture durable. The 
idea was approved by the donor ICCO (Duteh Church Organization) and REDAD could obtain 
within its triennial programme (1995-1998) funds for 30 micro-projets (cf REDAD, 1995). 
The fact that the number of the farmers' organizations has increased tremendously10 made 
allocating some funds to the farmer's organization within REDAD a complex political decision 
because all of them wanted financial assistance. 
The women's group was among the first farmers' organization in REDAD. The age 
criterion gave an advantage to this group. After a discussion in a commission created jointly 
by the Executive directorate and the Administrative council, the decision was made to finance 
pig raising activity for the women's group so that a large quantity of organic manure would 
be produced for horticulture. The micro-projet of the women was selected and the group was 
provided with 500,000 FCFA, in the form of loan that the group had to reimburse. 
Financial support of REDAD for resource-flow management activities: learning about social 
processes at the level of the women's group and REDAD 
When the women got the funds, they did not exactly follow the plan of the micro-projet 
designed with them. They built some cement pig sties for the pigs. They bought 22 piglets to 
be fattened. The remaining money was used to rotate among the members as individual credit. 
Pig raising activity was not successful, the period coincided with a scarcity of coconut fruits 
and cassava. According to the women, they bought feed and realize that the cost was becoming 
important while they did not do any calculation". However, the loan allowed the women to 
realize other projects, for example maize marketing (explained below), which allowed them 
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to reimburse the credit after a period of hesitation. The women's group wanted to have the 
assurance that other farmers' organizations which got the same credit were also going to 
reimburse. 
The NGOs in RED AD sought to become managers of the funds of the micro-projet. 
None of the farmers' organizations such as the women's group in Djeffa, accept this. This in 
turn decreased the motivation of the NGOs to assist them. NGOs did not learn with the 
farmers' organization to strengthen their capacity in agriculture durable as planned by 
RED AD. The Executive Directorate did not succeed in mobilizing existing competencies 
among the individual members to ensure good coordination. 
Analysing the effectiveness of REDAD's financial support: what are the implications for the 
facilitation of successful collective action for resource flow management? 
The support of REDAD should be more than providing financial assistance and controlling 
funds claimed by NGOs within REDAD. The NGOs did not perceive any incentive to play a 
new role for the support of the women's group for instance monitoring the increase of the 
performance of the women's group. Also, there is a great diversity in the professional 
competencies of the individuals within REDAD (biodynamic horticulture, integration of 
livestock production with horticulture, green manure management, alley-cropping, etc.) which 
could be conducive to sustainable agricultural development. 
Moreover, coordination at the level of REDAD did not yet emerge. This role should 
be taken seriously for enhancing synergy between individual members and NGOs towards a 
voluntary collective action within REDAD. For instance, bringing out the newsletter 
NOUVELLES du REDAD is difficult because everybody is interested in activities which are 
immediately remunerated. 
Despite the problems encountered by the women's group, successful collective action 
is maintained. Maybe this can be explained by the various other opportunities from external 
support. 
Various other opportunities from external support: what are the effects on the women's 
group? 
Non-formal education through learning and exchange of experiences within REDAD 
The women's group benefited from many activities of REDAD. They participated to a field 
visit to learn about the realization of the RAMR project. Thus they discovered how mucuna 
(Mucuna pruriens var. utilis) is used to improve the fertility of the soil and to control a hard 
weed (Imperata cylindrica). Alley-cropping systems designed with Gliricidia sepium and 
Acacia auriculiformis were also learnt. The group participated in a field discussion at the 
Centre agro-pastoral of Se (in Mono Province), where the participants got the opportunity to 
learn how goat and sheep production can be linked to bio-dynamic horticulture. 
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Field visits organised by REDAD stimulated exchange of experience and generated 
collective learning among the participants. This activity helped to establish direct contact 
among stakeholders within REDAD. Many contacts were developed by the women's group 
in the context of REDAD. 
The farmers' organizations very much appreciated exchange of experience, especially 
the trip to Burkina Faso to meet other local organizations. Despite a contribution (10,000 
FCFA) requested from the participants, the selection of candidates was always difficult. For 
instance in April 1997, two women travelled from the Northern part of Zou Province to bring 
their contribution to the headquarters of REDAD and register for the trip to Burkina Faso. The 
selection of participant within the women's group in Djeffa was difficult. A meeting was 
organized by the group to decide. Two men in the group were very interested to go to 
Burkina. The president of the group also was interested but her husband died at that period and 
she could not go. After a discussion, other women could not go. The decision was made that 
they should designate one person and the men should do the same. They decided to go to the 
headquarters of REDAD to negotiate two participants for the group instead of the one fixed 
by the Executive Directorate. During the visit, the members of the group explained to me the 
problem and called for my assistance in the negotiation at REDAD headquarters. They sent 
20,000 FCFA to prove that they could pay for two participants. I went to the Executive 
Director of REDAD. However, he told that having two participants for one group was not 
possible because it was difficulty enough to provide one place for each group which wanted 
to come. Finally the president of the group designated a man for the trip to Burkina Faso. 
Training opportunities for the women's group 
Many members of the women's group were trained. Two members were trained in the NGO 
Songhai for the identification and implementation of integrated activities. Songhai is a well 
known NGO for combining aquaculture, animal production (pig, goat, sheep, chicken) and 
crop production in an integrated production system. 
Four members (two women and two men) were sent to Lomé by the Centre Béninois 
pour Développement Economique et Social (CEBEDES), for training in compost making 
organized by the ssociation pour t'Autopromotion des Jeunes sans Emploi et des Groupement 
Agricoles au Togo (AGEGAT), a Togolese NGO. After this training, some representatives of 
this NGO arrived in Djeffa to see how the group applied what they had learned. The president 
of the group (woman) was trained in leadership by the Association des Personnes Rénovatrices 
des Technologies Traditionelles (APRETECTRA). APRETECTRA and SONGHAI are 
members of REDAD. The training opportunities were the result of networking within 
REDAD. With the help of the CARDER-Ouémé, the group had a contact with the Centre de 
Traitement des Ordure Ménagères(CTOM), a NGO in Tohouè, a village around 10 kilometres 
from Djeffa. Two members of the groups were trained during two weeks in composting 
techniques, especially in aerobic conditions (i.e., with oxygen), the methods learned in Togo 
is anaerobic conditions (i.e., without oxygen). The General Directorate of CARDER-Ouémé 
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has organized a Training session in aquaculture (the technique called Hwedo, explained in the 
Lake Aheme case. 
Strengthening the tontine activity of the women's group 
CEBEDES introduced a new form of credit for the women's group to strengthen their tontine 
activity. The members of the group called it Dupko ('you eat and it remains'). The loan 
obtained from CEBEDES was 200,000 FCFA with 1% interest/month (the group also gets 
back 1% interest/month). This money rotated among the members of the group. CEBEDES 
introduced a saving booklet for each member. Every Thursday, each member of the group 
gave an amount of money which is recorded. Depending on the importance of the saving a 
member had made, he or she could request a loan from the money provided by CEBEDES for 
individual activities. The savings recorded in the booklet was a guarantee and an indicator of 
the money a member could get as a credit. At the end of the year, each member got back his 
or her total amount of money recorded in the booklet. This could be used as a capital to start 
a personal business. The women appreciated very much this activity and requested more 
money for credit. The problem which emerged was that the credit allocation caused internal 
friction and the money requested exceeded savings recorded in the booklet. New rules were 
adopted and the beneficiary presented other guarantees. For instance a member of the group 
received a loan which exceeded the money recorded in her booklet. She presented one pig, one 
goat and her radio as a guarantee. 
Credit opportunities by linking the women's group to a government project 
The women's group was involved in a government project on food security (PILSA: Projet 
d'Intervention Locale pour la Sécurité Alimentaire) by CIRAPIP NGO. Credit was obtained 
for maize marketing. The women bought maize during harvesting period and resold it when 
the price was higher. The group got 330,720 FCFA for this activity and the CIRAPIP 
observed their capacity to manage the funds. The result was successful and CJJIAPD? 
supported them for the second time with 500,000 FCFA and later with 800,000 FCFA. The 
support of PILSA/CIRAPD? enabled the construction of a storage house for the maize selling 
activity. The contribution of the group was 20% (10% for labour and 10% as financial 
contribution) of the total cost of the storage house (400,000 FCFA). 
The women found this activity very fruitful and they make profit after paying back 
PILSA. The group could reimburse credit obtained from REDAD with this activity. In the 
group, some members would like to redistribute the profit (option 1) while others preferred 
to invest this money in maize production (option 2). I joined fortuitously the discussion. 
During the discussion the men were for option 1 and the majority of the women for option 2. 
According to the adepts of option 1, a redistribution of an amount of the benefit should be 
motivating. The adepts of option 2 demonstrated that if they reinvested the benefit the maize 
production, they would have mobilized much money for their own to continue the maize 
activity. Option 2 got most votes and was adopted. The members of the group discussed 
among themselves to reach an agreement. 
186 Platflorms for resource management 
New dynamics and changing practices by CARDER'S extension worker for the support of the 
women's group 
Discussion above shows how the women's group is involved in a large network which created 
many opportunities. Critical incidents in working with the women reveal how these dynamics 
have stimulated changing practices by a CARDER'S extension worker (see Box 7.8). 
Box 7.8: A new way of working by a Village Extension Worker with the women's group in Djeffa 
On Thursday, I was talking with the women's group in Djeffa. The Village Extension Worker of CARDER 
Oueme' arrived for his regular Training&Visit. I encouraged him to carry out his activity (I wanted to know the 
content of his activity with the women that day). He planned to teach the women how to use a biological pesticide, 
the seeds of Azadirachta, Mica to treat the vegetables. He explained the whole process and demonstrated it 
immediately to the women's group. They treated their vegetables with the solution prepared with the Village 
Extension Worker (see photo 7.4). At the end of this activity, the Village Extension Worker asked the following 
question to the women: what do you want me to teach you the next visit? A woman said that her goats had an 
infection on their skin. He replied and said that: I know how to treat these diseases. The other women also agreed 
that this issue would be the topic for their next session with the Village Extension Worker. 
Photo 7.4: The extension worker is showing how to use a bio-pesticide 
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This Village Extension Worker based his activities on the demands of the women's group. The 
latter would not have paid much attention to his visit if the extension activities did not match 
their needs. The Village Extension Worker observed that (as he explained to me) the 
competition with many NGOs required a change on their own practice, and working on 
specific interests of the target groups. 
Analysing the effects of various external supports on the women's group 
The diversity of external supports created an environment in which the members of the group 
did not have incentives to leave the group. Many opportunities such exchange of experience, 
training, credit, marketing, etc., were offered. Beyond the collective benefit from external 
supports, credit obtained for the rotating saving and loan scheme enabled individuals to 
develop their own activities which were also very important for the members of the group. 
Therefore successful collective action was also maintained for resource-flow management. 
7.6 Conclusions 
The present case study demonstrates that resource-flow management can be effective for 
improving soil fertility in Djeffa if successful collective action can be maintained. Factors that 
affect successful collective action are related to the nature of the group itself, the context and 
the existing opportunities 
With respect to the group, the capacity for generating institutions such as collective 
decision-making, monitoring, and sanctioning are critical factors for mamtaining successful 
collective action. 
With respect to the context, the present case study shows that a shift in the political 
system of the country has implications for making grass-root development processes more 
dynamic. 
The more the context enables the development of pluriform initiatives (e.g., the 
emergence of NGOs in Benin), the higher is the access to opportunities provided by external 
support for local organizations such as the women's group in Djeffa. In these circumstances, 
the members a group can only maintain their public goods to sustain these opportunities. In 
this manner, the conditions are established for continued ecological practices such as resource-
flow management which require successful collective action. 
Notes 
1. Gari is a product obtained from processing cassava 
2. Within my training for the degree of Ingenieur Agronmone at the FSA/UNB, I did my stage on regional planning 
in the Sous-Prefecture of Seme-kpodji (including Djeffa) in 1988. This gave me the possibility to understand the 
major opportunities and socio-structural problems in this region. 
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3. During this period, the Marxist regime forbade development initiatives outside the government structures such 
as the GRVC (Groupement Révolutionnaire à Vocation Coopérative). 
4. In December 1989, the central committee of the unique political party in Benin rejected Marxism-Leninism 
which was the only political option since 1975. 
5. In February 1990, different representatives of the nation in Benin met to discuss about a new political option. 
This event is called Conférence Nationale. 
6.1 was also involved in this movement as one of the main initiators of the networking process for the development 
of the Agriculture Durable in Benin. 
7. Before the democratization, the women's group had only contact with CARDER and CIRAPIP. During the 
démocratisation the group has contact with CARDER, CIRAPIP, REDAD, CEBEDES, APRETECTRA, CTOM, 
, USPP, AGEGAT, NGO Songhai, etc. (see glossary for explanation). 
8. With the growing number of the members of REDAD, the General Assemblies are costly. There is actually a 
debate for the choice of representatives at the level of Sous-Préfecture for the General Assembly. 
9.1 was the General-Secretary of REDAD. This position enabled me to be involved in these activities. 
10. In 1992, only 4 farmers' organizations were involved in REDAD's activities. The activities of REDAD 
attracted many local organizations. Their number is growing very fast. 
11. During the present case study, the women requested training to be able to follow-up their expenses to monitor 
whether they are making profit or not. 
8 Regenerating the Maro Forest in Burkina Faso: The Evolution 
of Platforms for Resource Management1 
E.S. Nederlof & C. Dangbégnon 
8.1 Introduction 
More and more of the world's forest resources disappear due to human interventions. The 
quantity of trees decreases at an incredible speed and former forests are left as deserts. This 
alarming forest situation is what this chapter is about. In 1980, 52% of Burkina Faso territory 
was natural forest (a Common Pool Resource) that degraded due to droughts, bush fires, 
agriculture, illegal woodcutting, and overgrazing (DREEF, 1996). From the natural forests 
of Burkina Faso, 25 % (3,8 million hectares) are protected and officially considered state 
property. An increasing problem is the uncontrolled wood cut in these forests to satisfy the 
ever-rising demand of fuel wood in large parts of the country. This case study deals with a 
classified forest in the south west of Burkina Faso, the Maro forest. 
Our first acquaintance with the Maro forest was facilitated by PNGT members - more 
about this project in 8.6 -, who let us visit and fall in love with this beautiful place. To get a 
first impression of the history of the forest, existing documents were consulted. These 
documents include not only official project documents (e.g. Equipe Mobile Pluridisciplinaire 
du Houet, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1997; Equipe Technique Forestière, 1996), but also 
reports of studies (e.g., Drabo, 1985; Kaboré, 1995; Sanou, 1995; Sidibe, 1992, 1996; 
Zoungrana, 1996). 
In a second stage two of the twenty-one villages surrounding the Maro forest were 
studied. The first criterion to select these villages was the existence of forest activities by the 
villagers. There are several reasons why Kadomba was chosen; an important one is that the 
PNGT describes Kadomba as an example village and many of their activities are executed 
here. It gives us the opportunity to study a successful case of collective action. Practical 
advantages motivated this choice. Bekuy is quite a different village than Kadomba, because 
it failed in a lot of activities that required collective action (individual goals were properly 
reached) from the viewpoint of the PNGT members. This village might teach us about the 
conditions that should be fulfilled to come to collective action. During a stay in these villages 
semi-structured and non-structured interviews were held with the different stakeholders. Group 
interviews were an instrument to obtain insight in the problems and foreseen solutions within 
a village community, individual interviews were held to gain more precise information. 
Participant observation and direct observation were an equally available source of information. 
In addition to the villagers, we spoke to other stakeholders; members of the PNGT, the 
Forest Agency/ministries and the groupement for donkey cart holders and lorry drivers. 
In the first paragraph (8.2) of this chapter the Maro forest ecosystem will be described and the 
stakeholders identified. Even though most of the information concerns the present, a historical 
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approach is adopted to emphasise the evolution of the learning processes, the facilitation of 
change, the practices, and the platforms for resource management at four different periods. 
These periods concern the forest under local arrangement (8.3), in colonial times (8.4), under 
the IDA project (8.5) and under the PNGT (8.6). Conclusions will be drawn about the 
functioning of the platforms created and the possibilities for improving them. 
8.2 The Maro Forest Ecosystem and Stakeholders 
The Maro forest ecosystem 
The Maro forest is located in the south-western province Tuy, formerly Houet2 (see Map 8.1). 
The major city in this region is Bobo- Dioulasso, which is the second city of Burkina Faso and 
an important trade centre. 
The Maro forest has a surface of 56 227 ha. according to Le Service National des Sols 
which determined this in 1979 (UGF, 1992). The forest is situated along the Bobo-Dioulasso-
D&lougou road, at about 75 kilometres north-west from Bobo- Dioulasso between the latitudes 
11 20' and 11 45'N and the longitudes 3 45' and 4 W (EMP, 1996b). The Maro forest is 
limited on the north by the Bobo-Dioulasso- Deaougou and Sara-Hounde road, on the south 
by the river Ouer6 and part of the Kassoho- Bondokuy road. On the west the Maro forest is 
limited by the Oueri river and the Laissa river and on the east by the river the Tuy and the 
Darankuy river. 
The forest is located in five departments; Bekuy, Bereba, Hounde\ Lena and Satiri. In 
these departments we find twenty-one villages in the surroundings of the forest, one of them 
is Maro, after which the forest is named. The total population is estimated at 26 099 
inhabitants in 1985, which will be 40 178 inhabitants in 1996, assuming an annual growth rate 
of 4 % (EMP, 1996). The population in the surroundings of the classified forest are mainly 
Bwaba, Bobofing, Mossi and Fulbe, amongst them are Protestants, Catholics, Muslims and 
Animists. The main activities undertaken are agriculture (the major crops are maize, sorghum 
and cotton) and cattle breeding. The number of transhumant cattle is larger than the number 
of settled cattle (EMP, 1995a). A total of 13 770 animals of which 9 613 cows, donkeys and 
horses and 4 157 sheep and goats are herded in the forest, according to a census held in 1992. 
Other activities are apiculture and crafts. Every village has some holy places in the forest, be 
it rivers, hills or trees. At these places sacrifices to the Gods are made and no human being 
has the right to use these places in another way. The fauna of the classified forest varies from 
elephant to monkey, even though some species such as the lion became extinct. 
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Map 8.1 
Burkina and the location of the classified forest of Maro. 
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The stakeholders of the Maro forest 
We can not talk about the Maro forest without mentioning the inhabitants of the surrounding 
villages. Their lives are linked to the forest in every way. In religion, food, medicines, etc. 
the forest is very present and they obviously have their stake. There are as many stakes as 
people but we can subdivide the population in several -more or less- homogeneous subgroups. 
At village level, the population can be divided in migrants, cattle breeders and natives, who 
can be subdivided in women, older men and young men. These stakeholders must act 
collectively if they are to manage the Maro forest in a sustainable manner. That is, they have 
to agree on objectives and accept to 'take less' from the forest and give more to public goods 
needed to sustain it. 
These stakeholders are present in every stage of history, but every period also has its 
own stakeholders and actors, who will be discussed in the following corresponding sections. 
8.3 The Maro Forest under local arrangement 
Before the 1940s, the Maro forest belonged to the local population. To understand this 
ownership we first have to understand the general land tenure system of the local inhabitants. 
Land is divided over several families in this part of Burkina Faso3. When the French arrived, 
one family had to represent the colonial administration and a chief family was appointed4. This 
family was also given the responsibility over land tenure. Nowadays, this family is always 
informed by the other families when the latter want to give land to newcomers, which means 
that the former somehow kept their colonial power. In all, traditionally the Maro forest 
belonged to some big families who divided the right to use it to other family units. 
However, a distinction should be made between (i) land allocated for farming, 
including land that has fallow, and (ii) the 'bush', i.e., unallocated land that can be used by 
everybody who falls under the jurisdiction of the original settler or his descendants. The bush 
(i.e., the larger part of Maro forest in pre-colonial times was a common pool resource which 
was used for hunting, gathering of wood, cattle grazing and gathering of various forest 
products such as roofing material, medicines, fruits, etc. Not much is known about the 
original rule of access, but these must have been well-developed if one takes into consideration 
the special role of hunters, the value given to the bush meal, etc. It is said, however that, that 
due to pressure of use, serious degradation of the forest had already started before the second 
World War. 
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8.4 The Maro Forest under colonial rules 
During the colonial period and particularly in the 1930s until the 1950s, the Forest Department 
of the Government of Burkina Faso started a policy to classify certain forests by the Décret 
of July 4, 1935. This Décret reflects the intention of the colonial government to prevent 
rampant deforestation (Sibide, 1992). This instruction results from the action forestière en 
Afrique Occidentale Française defined in February 1933 (see Box 8.1). 
Box 8.1: Instructions of the Gouverneur Général of the AOF 
J'ai envisagé comme moyen efficace d'empêcher une trop grande deforestation du pays, de créer un vaste domaine 
forestier classé, dégagé de l'inconsistance des terres boisées, vacantes et sans maîtres, bien constitué en droit, 
définitivement assis en superficie et spécialement protégé. C'est vers la constitution, la conservation et 
l'amélioration de ce domaine que doivem tendre nos efforts tandis que temporairement, nous laisserons dans ce 
domaine non classé les indigènes exercer librement leurs usages. 
The main purposes of this centralisation (see also De Zeeuw, 1995) were to hinder further 
farming in the forest and to have some forests under state control. 
The colonial power classified the forest of Maro on January 17, 1940 under arrêté N 
116/SF/5 (Zampaligre, 1995) and a new stakeholder, the Colonial Government, started 
participating. After this date, the forest of Maro became state property and belonged to the 
Bande du Haut Comoé (Kaboré, 1995: 4). 
Box 8.2: A wood-cutter from Kadomba explains 
At this time some people from the state came to the villages and spoke to the chief and his advisers. The officers 
said they wanted to buy a piece of our land. Because they offered us 300 FCFA and a rifle we accepted. When 
we realized what we had done, it was too late; we were not able to pay back any more. 
This classification meant that the population was prohibited from undertaking any activity 
except gathering dead wood, fruits, nuts and medicinal plants. In the beginning 'no one' 
undertook any illegal activity, but at a certain moment some villagers, who had no traditional 
rights to use the forest, decided to cultivate in it because fertile land outside the forest was no 
longer available and fresh land was required to cultivate commercial crops like cotton. This 
example was quickly followed by other villagers. At this time, the plots were hidden deeply 
in the forest. 
The status of classified forest authorized state-appointed Forest Agents to protect the 
land and control misuse. These Forest Agents belonged to the Forest Agency created by the 
colonial authorities. This institution was however not recognized (as was the traditional one, 
when the big families organised the management of the forest) by the direct stakeholders and 
their rales were not respected (the classified forest was meant to bet left untouched but was 
used even more than before). The newly formed public property completely obliterated the old 
common property rules but did not provide a viable alternative. 
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During the classification, some enclaves5 were left and some others were created later on 
demand of the local population concerned. Some villages asked to open an enclave for them 
as well because they were in need of land. To realize this, they were required to have fifteen 
witnesses testifying that none of the villagers engaged in illegal activities in the forest. 
However, according to the local population, people were afraid to testify and, as a 
consequence, the enclaves could not be realized (p.c villagers). 
This situation, in which the only legal activities were the gathering of dead wood, 
plants and fruits, lasted until 30 December 1980, when a forest project financed by the 
International Development Agency (IDA) arrived. 
Because the forest legally became public property, the population did not feel 
responsible for it any more. Forests initially were common goods, used and owned by the local 
population. During the colonial period the government made them public goods by classifying 
them. The state considers the forest as its property and it is managed by state representatives; 
the Forest Agency. The local population continued, however, to exploit the forest and even 
those who initially had not the right to use the forest entered it. The local population 
considered the forest as an open access good, with all the tragedy that results from such a 
definition (Hardin, 1970). That the state was not able to control the forests is often explained 
by the overestimation of its own capacity; the state did not have sufficient means to control and 
manage its property. The state intended to fight deforestation, but in fact promoted it with its 
policy. The former, rather effective, local form of management was destroyed in favour of a 
not affective government one. Jodha (1996: 205) makes the same remark when stating "state 
interventions have disrupted the community management of common pool resources, 
transforming them to de facto open access resources, with all the resource degradation and 
other associated consequences". This is exactly what happened for the Maro forest. 
8.5 The Maro Forest Management under IDA project 
Because people continued to cultivate and cut illegally in the state owned forests, solutions 
were sought to prevent the forest from further degradation. As a result of the drought in 1973-
1974 (Nana, 1990), new policies to protect the forest against deforestation emerged. Parts of 
the natural vegetation were substituted for industrial plantations during the 1970s. The IDA 
project is one of these activities. The goals of the project were to assure the future rural 
population sufficient fuel wood, to assure the fuel wood provision for urban regions by 
creating an industrial plantation, and to improve the productivity of the natural forest ( 
Zampaligre, 1995). 
Box 8.3: An inhabitant of Kadomba explains the actions of the forest agents 
In 1960 the Forest Agents came to take three of our villagers to prison because they cultivated in the forest. After 
this people became more careful; some left the forest and others went even further into the forest to hide their 
plots better' (pers. com. an inhabitant of Kadomba). 
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The species planted were exotic species; Eucalyptus and Gmelina as well as local 
species such as Khaya senegalensis, Anogeissus lerocarpus, Tamarindus indica etc. Eucalyptus 
is mainly used for the production of fuel and timber wood, Gmelina is mainly used for the 
production of lumber wood (Sidibe, 1992). 
Directly linked to the plantation, another element of the project was the nursery garden 
(Drabo, 1985) which was in use until 1986 (Sidibe, 1992). 
The plantation was an industrial one and the local population got 1000 FCFA a day to work 
in it. As a consequence of the industrial character of the plantation, the local population did 
not consider it as their property, not in the last place because revenues of woodcut did not 
directly flow into the village. During this period those who worked in the forest learned 
techniques to cut wood properly. 
The IDA forest project was programmed for at most fifty years with a renewal of 
funding by the World Bank every five years (Drabo, 1985: 3) and was financed as well by the 
state of Burkina (Bounnkougou, 1984). However, the project did not last this long. 
The World Bank financed the IDA project from 1981 to 1986. From 1987 to 1989, the 
project received a Don Norvégien (Ouédraogo, 1990). The World Bank stopped its finance 
because the project did not reach its aims, which might be because the project did not take 
account of the local population and their participation in it. It was realised that industrial 
plantations, based on destruction of a natural vegetation to the advantage of a man-made one, 
was not the desired solution (DGEF, 1991). After 31 December 1989, the project managed 
to exist from reserves for some time (Nana, 1990) but it soon had to stop. During all this time 
the local population kept entering what was left of the natural forest to cultivate crops. 
After the IDA project, the Maro forest consists of two types of forest, the natural forest 
and the industrial plantation. The project only intervened in the plantation and the situation of 
the natural forest did not change. 
When the tragedy of the commons threatened, the IDA project started its commercial 
plantations. Through these industrial plantations, the IDA project aimed to privatise part of 
the Maro forest. It became a private property. The population worked in the plantations and 
considered them as a private property of the project. For the natural forest, however, nothing 
changed and the local population still treated it as an open access resource. It is important to 
realise that we have to deal with two resources; the industrial plantation and the natural forest. 
As a result of introducing plantations, trees acquired an economic 0 value. This made 
management even more complex because other actors (consumers, middlemen) started 
participating. 
196 Platforms for resource management 
8.6 The Maro Forest Management under the PNGT 
In the eighties, the state more or less 'opened' the forests to the surrounding villages, so that 
the population can use and protect the forest at the same time (Hagberg, 1992). To fight 
against the deforestation and diminution of the natural resources, the state took some measures: 
• promoting replantation on large scale by the local population; 
• providing information about improved stoves from 1982s onwards; 
• introducing La réorganisation Foncière which made all land state property and is 
written up in the RAF6 
• settling rules about exploitation and commercialization of wood (Pare, 1989). 
As a result of the RAF, a Domaine Fonder Nationale (DFN) was created made up of 
all land situated in the national territory of Burkina Faso. So the whole Burkina territory falls 
in the DFN and is therefore public (state) property. The RAF was adapted in 1991. This new 
version discriniinates between land aménagé and not aménagé; and all land which is not 
aménagé is state-owned property. All forest resources remained thus state property. The RAF 
is not adapted to the local realities (de Zeeuw, 1995), because no account is taken of the 
existing local land tenure systems, and is free for interpretation because it is written in French 
instead of local languages. The local population has an other conception of the property regime 
and the RAF is therefore not always respected. 
All forest, fauna and water resources fall under the national forest policy, which has as main 
points: 
• the conservation of bio-diversity; 
• appreciation of forest, wildlife and water resources for economic development and 
improvement of likelihoods; 
• employment and income generation for the population; 
• participation of the local population and transferring them to the responsibility over 
forest resources by means of decentralisation. 
The RAF and the environmental and forest policies led to the Forest Code, which provides 
more specific rules. Toulmin (1991: 27) describes the forest codes in the Sahel as consisting 
of 'lists of restrictions or prohibitions on forest use, with permits issued by the Forest Agency 
for certain allowable activities. Even trees on farms are subject to such restrictions and farmers 
must pay a permit before cutting a tree they themselves planted'. Although Burkina farmers 
do not have to pay for a permit to cut their own tree, they should inform the Forest Agency 
so that advice can be given on the way it will be cut (so that it will grow again). Major 
changes after the adaptations in 1997 are the more participative approach and the permission 
of private ownership. For example, where forest were all state owned property managed by 
the Forest Agency, nowadays the possibility exists to sign a contract in which the Forest 
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Agency gives the responsibility over part of the forest to an individual or group of individuals 
(Code Forester, article 38). 
Policy has embraced decentralisation because of the failure of centralisation. According 
to de Zeeuw (1995), the state has overestimated its capacities. Decentralisation7 foresees 
handing over of certain competencies to local communities. Since 1985, decentralisation is 
implemented (Coulibaly, 1993) and its rules were encoded in five laws in May 1993. Since 
November 1993, an organisation, the Commission Nationale de la Décentralisation (CND) has 
existed, which is charged with the elaboration of a more precise text (Ouatarra, 1997). 
With this new political approach some new actors started participating, who will be 
discussed here. The agency which is charged with the forest management in Burkina Faso is 
the Forest Agency consisting of several levels. On national level, there is the Ministère de 
l'Environnement et de l'Eau (MEE), which is divided in ten regional Directions Régionale de 
l'Environnement et des Eaux et Forêts (DREEFs). The representative of the DREEF at the 
provincial level is the Service Provincial de l'Environnement et des Eaux et Forêts (SPEEF). 
This SPEEF is in its turn divided over districts, which are represented by a Forest Agent (see 
figure 8.1). 
MEB National level 
DREEF DREEF Regional level 
SPEEF 
• \ ^ 
SPEEF Provincial level 
Districts Districts 
(forest agent) (forest agent) 
District level 
Figure 8.1: Organization of the Forest Agency 
The DREEF is charged with the coordination and application of forestry policies. The Service 
Provincial de l Environnement et des Eaux et Forets, SPEEF, the representative of the DREEF 
on provincial level has the following tasks: 
• mobilizing, training and organizing the population; 
• supporting the Forest Agents; 
• collecting field data; 
• implementing the forest rules (DREEF, 1995). 
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This provincial agency is in its turn divided 0 districts. At this level the Zones d'Encadrement 
Forestier are located. Its goals are to contribute to the maintenance of the ecological 
equilibrium, the conservation of bio-diversity, and the rationalization of the utilization of the 
natural resources within the framework of a successful Gestion de Terroir. In Bekuy -one of 
the border villages of the Maro forest- we find such a Zone d'Encadrement Forestier 
represented by a Forest Agent. Traditionally villagers are very frightened of these agents, but 
their image increasingly changes and trust in these agents begins to increase. Wiersum & 
Lekanne (1995) give a detailed description on the pluriform position of these Forest Agents. 
Nowadays their role is to ensure that no illegal activities are undertaken and to make people 
aware of the problems and ways to solve them. 
An institution working in the Maro forest is the PNGT. The PNGT depends on the 
MEE (see above), the Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales (MARA) and the 
Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Plan (MEFP). 
The PNGT has its own organization structure. At the national level we find the Unité 
de Gestion Opérationelle (UGO), based in Ouagadougou, which coordinates the work of the 
PNGT. At the provincial level, the PNGT can be divided in the Unité de Gestion Forestière 
(UGF), which depends on the MEE, and the Unité Provinciale de Gestion Opérationnelle 
(UPGO), depending on the MARA. These two agencies together form the Equipe Mobile 
Pluridisciplinaire (EMP). This team is assisted by the Equipe Technique Forestière (ETF) (see 
figure 2). 
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Figure 8.2: The organization of the PNGT 
The UGF comprises Groupements de Gestion Forestière (GGFs). These GGFs are charged 
with the management of the plantation. More precisely, these GGFs have the responsibility 
over a parcel of the plantation. Several parcels form a Unité d'Aménagemem (UA) which is 
managed by an association (grouping of several GGFs). These associations do not have another 
function than to formulate a management plan. The aim was to give this association 
responsibility for the management of the natural forest, but this does not seem to work. A 
federation of associations is intended for the management of the whole forest, but this has so 
far not been realized. 
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These GGFs are created for the management of the plantation and the commercialisation of 
wood. In this process, the SPEEF has the role to guide the commercialisation and the PNGT 
to facilitate the relations among the different actors involved. To keep matters simple, we shall 
not distinguish between UGO, UPGO or UGF, but we will continue to speek about the PNGT. 
Other actors who are important in the commercialisation process are the traders and 
consumers. In every stage, the commercialisation process is guided in every stage by the 
environmental agency and facilitated by the PNGT. The traders can be divided in three groups; 
(1) the lorry drivers who collect the wood in the villages and buy it from the villagers, (2) the 
donkey cart holders who collect the wood in the villages or, when it is far away, buy it from 
the lorry drivers who collected the wood for them, (3) the vendors who buy the wood from 
the lorry drivers. The donkey cart holders and sellers sell the wood to the consumers. The 
different traders are organised in two groups; the Groupement des Exploitants de Bois et 
Charbon de Bois (GEBC) for the donkey cart holers and the Groupement des Transporteurs 
Exploitants de Bois de chauffe et de Charbon (GTEBC) for the lorry drivers. The sellers can 
belong to both. Consumers are not organised however. 
Until 1993, the major problem was the pressure of farmers and herdsmen on the classified 
forest. To solve this problem, the PNGT tried to explain to the local population why they 
should leave the forest, created the Groupement de Gestion Forestière (GGF), and arranged 
for the exploitation and commercialization of wood. At that time all plots in the Maro forest 
were cultivated with cotton8 a major threat to all forests. The achievement of the PNGT until 
now is that the 665 farmers who still cultivated in the forest left, so that it is not used for 
cultivation any more. Fourteen GGFs have been created and a lot of wood is sold (UGF, 
1995). 
The PNGT uses a gestion des terroirs approach, which is born in the context of the 
degradation of natural resources and the inability of previous approaches to solve this problem. 
It was realized that interventions without the motivation and participation of the stakeholders 
do not solve problems. An approach that takes the population into account was needed. The 
concept gestion de terroir was formulated in the context of the land reform (RAF) decided 
upon by the Burkinabé revolution (Lekanne, 1995: 4) and the process of decentralization. 
In general, the PNGT intends to stop and turn around the degradation of natural 
resources. Among other objectives, the PNGT aims at a greater and firmer awareness of the 
village people, leading to better control systems for local communities to collectively manage 
their own natural environment (see as well UGO, 1997). 
This awareness contains two messages. The first is to make the village aware of the 
problem of over-exploitation and degradation, and the need for sustainable management. The 
second is to promote and develop a local basis for solving common problems in land use 
management. The rural community as an entity has to take democratic responsibihty for better 
management of the renewable natural resources in its territory, with technical and financial 
assistance provided by the Government (Lekanne, 1995). 
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The PNGT works on gestion des terroirs in Gnagna, Kouritenga and Kénédougou. In 
the province of Houet and Bougouriba, it works on the gestion de terroir in combination with 
the gestion de forêts. The choice for these provinces is mainly based on ecological criteria. 
Gnagna is on the border with the Sahel (the North of Burkina Faso), Kouritenga and 
Kénédougou have a high demographic pressure, and Houet and Bougouriba have many 
migrants (Lekanne, 1995: 6). 
As mentioned, the PNGT created the GGFs to give the responsibility for the plantation 
to the local population; the industrial plantation was replaced by a participation project. 
Nowadays the forest is called a classified one, but in spite of this name (which suggests that 
no activity is undertaken in it) legal activities, such as wood cut, are carried out by the local 
population. 
The PNGT in Houet is involved in the management of the Maro forest. The main aim 
of the aménagement of the Maro forest is to come to a co-gestion between the state and the 
population using the forest and to contribute to an improvement of the living conditions of the 
people. This means that the state officially stays owner but the population has the users' right. 
This right is, however, restricted by state rules. The specific goals of this co-management are: 
• to improve and manage the forest resources in a sustainable way; 
• to contribute to the resolution of farmer-herdsmen conflicts; 
• to make communities aware of the way the forest should be protected and exploited; 
• to maintain bio-diversity; 
• to conserve historical and cultural places (EMP, 1996a). 
During discussions with the local population, the PNGT explained that the management of the 
forest is their responsibility even if the forest is officially state owned. 
8.7 Co-management in practice for regenerating the Maro Forest 
The first contact between the PNGT and the local population consisted of four stages: 
1) informing the local administration about the project and asking for collaboration of partner 
agencies; 
2) discussing the goals of the project with the village authorities. 
When the PNGT arrived, they asked the chief and other village leaders wether they were 
interested in the project. 
According to a local inhabitant: 'because the chief agreed all the others had to follow this advice'. 
3) Participative diagnosis with the village by the use of the Méthode Active (Accélérée) de 
Recherche Participative (MARP)9. This diagnosis consists of two stages. In the first stage, the 
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PNGT prepares the field visit, seeks contact with relevant actors and does a literature research. 
The second phase is a learning process or prise de conscience of the whole local population 
and the PNGT about their environment and the possible actions to be taken. 
Tools used during this stage by the PNGT10 are maps, diagrams of exchange, seasonal 
calendars, work calendars, Venn diagrams, photos and maps, reports, interviews, soil 
classifications, etc. These participative approaches allow an interaction between the PNGT and 
the local population and emphasises the importance of local knowledge. The diagnostic 
participatif took at about five days per village. 
For the sake of the diagnostic participatif, the PNGT members divided the village in 
three groups; the young, men and women. For these five days, everybody was invited, so that 
everybody had the opportunity to understand the decision making, but not every group was 
evenly represented (for example migrants were under-represented). 
During five days all these groups worked separately, with a member of the PNGT, on the 
same questions from seven till twelve and from fifteen till seventeen hours (see Box 8.4). 
Box 8.4: Information from a villager in Kadomba 
They asked about the history of our forest and what we do with the forest now, from where we got the land, the 
relations we have with other inhabitants and with neighbouring villages, they wanted to know the boundaries of 
our village... With these answers the PNGT understood the problems we have and we sought solutions together. 
4) Last meetings when GGFs were created and office members elected. 
Simultaneously with the proposition to co-manage the former industrial plantations, the PNGT 
"asked" the villagers to leave their plots in the forest. The villagers were aware of the fact that 
the PNGT cooperated with the Forest Agency and thus had the power to force them to leave 
the forest or even put them in jail, so they left. 
The PNGT's aim was, however, to make people aware why they should stop farming 
in the forest. It organised, during the four years that it had intervened in the region, several 
journeys to other provinces and regions to make people aware of the degradation and 
deforestation processes whichs threaten their country (see Box 8.5). 
Box 8.5: Learning experience in Kadomba 
The PNGT brought me to Gorom Gorom and what I saw there was a desert. When they told me that their 
grandparents had a forest -like ours- but that it has disappeared due to over exploitation, bush fires etc., I 
understood why the PNGT has come to our village and told us to leave the forest [the plots they cultivated] and 
I will explain what I saw to all the others, because the people of Gorom Gorom can not even cultivate anymore 
on the ground they have! 
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The last stage was the creation of the GGF in all the interested surrounding villages. These 
groupements are divided over three associations; the first association is the one of Bekuy in 
which the groupements of Sara, Lamba and Bekuy are united. There are two associations in 
Satiri; the first comprises Dorossiamenso and Kadomba; the second Ramatoulaye and 
Nefrelaye. The others are not organized in an association11. It is on the basis of the diagrams 
made during the diagnostic participatif'that the connections and relations between the different 
villages were established, and that associations were formed (Kaboré, 1994). It is with these 
associations that the work in the plantation is executed according to a plan d'aménagement'. 
These associations are, however, at present only used for the sake of organizing the work 
division (by the environmental agency and PNGT) and not (yet) for the organisation of 
collective action. 
Each association has a Unité d'Aménagement (UA) which is divided in six parcels, 
which is, in turn, redivided over the groupements constituting the associations. There are no 
rules to redivide the parcels over the GGFs but account is taken of the size of the different 
groupements (UGF, 1994). The groupements which are not divided in associations focus on 
the commercialisation of dead wood. 
The wood cutting period in the plantation takes place from about the first of January 
until the 31st March (Sanou, 1995) and concerns two exotic tree species; Eucalyptus and 
Gmelina. Two types of wood are cut in the plantations of Maro: fuel wood in the form of 
cords and fagots, and service wood in the form of trunks classified in two groups: diameter 
of 7 to 15cm, and 16 to 20cm, at a length varying from 3 to 9 meters (UGF, 1995: 1). 
The money earned from wood cutting is divided among the wood-cutter, the forest tax (fonds 
d'aménagement) and the working capital (fonds de roulement). This money will be handed 
over by the PNGT. Each year, meetings among the environmental agency, the PNGT, 
representatives from Houet and Bougouriba, GEBC, GTEBC and the GGFs of Houet and 
Bougouriba are held, during which prices are settled. These prices are thus negotiated among 
the different actors involved. The environmental agency has, however, the last word and 
therefore the final decision making power. 
After the cutting period, we can see the wood piled up in cords placed at the borders 
of the plantation. Between April and August, lorry drivers from Bobo-Dioulasso come to 
collect the wood to transport it to town, first Gmelina and, when this is finished, Eucalyptus. 
Woodcutters sell their wood to the lorrrydrivers, but the money will be handed over by the 
PNGT and environmental agency members when all wood is collected. A voucher system is 
used to register all transactions. The lorry drivers resell the wood to the sellers, who sell it to 
the consumers. 
As explained, each village which was willing to participate in organized woodcutting 
formed a groupement with the aid of the PNGT. The office holders of the GGF are a 
president, a secretary, a treasurer and an instructor. The instructor was trained by the PNGT 
to master all the techniques concerning commercialization, hammering, cutting and making 
cords. The instructor is expected to communicate the knowledge to the other GGF members 
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(KaborS, 1994). These instructors were chosen and accepted by the assembly. The instructor 
is responsible for the total cut by the members, for the daily and final evaluation of the 
production, and for the techniques members use to cut wood (UGF, 1994: 26). 
Members are free to participate. Those who thought it would be profitable signed up 
for the first year. Every new year, an increased number of people realised that wood cutting 
is profitable and signed up to participate. Money is not the only motive for people to 
participate in the GGF. Wood cutting takes place during the dry season in which no activities 
are normally undertaken. 
Not everyone who desires so is allowed to cut the wood. The condition for participation 
is that one participates in maintanance of the parcels. 
To protect the plantations against bush fires, firebreaks need to be cleaned each year 
so that fire can not jump over them. There is no reason for a fire to start in the middle of a 
parcel. Therefore one knows that fires which do start in a parcel are lit. Although this does 
not happen very often, stories about this sort of crime do circulate. This cleaning of fire breaks 
takes place in October and November. The local population complains however that these 
firebreaks are not cleaned well enough, due to a lack of equipment. 
At the moment wood cutting will start, all members of the GGF are assembled by the 
office bearers. Each year a parcel is chosen in accordance with the management plan and the 
office bearer points out a line to each person (so parcels are divided across persons and not 
across families) to indicate where one should cut. When one has finished a line, one can ask 
another one at the office. The maximal number of lines a person is allowed to cut, is 
determined in advance. Normally the area which can be cut is larger than all the members 
together are able to cut, so there is not really a problem if one wants to do more than one is 
allowed to. But in the case of scarcity, people can give a line of wood to each other (for 
example, when someone can not finish his line or when the other is in real need of money). 
A serious problem for the local population is the heaviness and danger of the work. 
Several villages do not have a hospital or medical centre and this is considered as one of the 
main shortcomings. The first year the PNGT provided a small pharmacy, but during the 
following years the villages had to take charge of this themselves. 
The trunks have to be cut in parts of one meter. Wood should be transported to the 
roadside and put in "cords". For women it is often difficult to transport the wood to the road 
because it is very heavy and they do not have access to equipment as donkey carts. These 
"cords" will stay here for at about three months to dry, before trade can take place. It is a 
problem for the local population that wood is only collected in June or even August when work 
on the plots has already started. When the lorry arrives every wood-cutter has to be there when 
he wants to be paid, this hinders him to go freely to his field. 
These general principles are established by the environmental agency and PNGT, but further 
internal rules for the functioning of the groupement are settled by the members themselves. 
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Such internal rules for the functioning of the groupement are Oassembly of the villages. When 
one of the office holders does not execute his work properly, he can be summoned by the 
assembly. This assembly consists of the village authorities, the GGF office holders and all the 
others concerned. In the case of Kadomba, where a Comitie Villageoise de Gestion des 
Terroirs (CVGT) has been formed, these CVGT members are included. 
In the case of an offence, not only office holders, but also GGF members, will be 
convoked for the assembly. For example, when a villager wants to have bamboo he should ask 
a special permission from the Forest Agency. There are also certain types of wood which 
people need for constructions that can only be found in the forest. To cut this, permission 
should be asked of the Forest Agency as well. When somebody cuts wood without permission 
(for himself or for commercial reasons), he will be asked to appear before the assembly. 
Traditionally there are some holy places, which people are forbidden to exploit, if one does 
so anyway, the person will appear before an assembly consisting mainly of elders, but the 
members mentioned before are free to participate too. There are, for example, holy trees 
which should not be chopped because they house a God. There are also some holy rivers 
where one is not only allowed to fish but also to cultivate or chop wood in the immediate 
surroundings. Nowadays some riversides are declared protected in collaboration between the 
local population and the PNGT. As a consequence, there are even more rivers now wMthin 
a margin of 100 meters of which one is forbidden to chop or cultivate. The PNGT helped by 
making the paint to mark the trees available to the participants. In the case of an offense in 
a holy place, sacrifices should be paid to the elders who will sacrifice these to the Gods. In the 
case of a delict concerning a protected riverside, the offender has to pay a sum of money 
which the treasurer will put in the cashbox of the working capital (fond de roulemenf). When 
the offender does not obey the verdict of this committee, the help of the Forest Agents will be 
asked. 
When a bush fire has taken place, the perpetrator is called for the same committee as 
discussed in the case of illegal cutting. A considerable amount of money has to be paid to the 
village in cash. In case of a very large fire, the perpetrator will be handed over to the Forest 
Agents. 
One source of income for the working capital is thus explained; fines are paid for the breaking 
of a law as settled by the GGF. Another source is part of the revenues for wood cutting. 
Villages are free to decide how to use this money. 
It can be used for loans with and interest of ten percent (case of Kadomba), to buy 
millet, pay school fees, buy medicines, etc. When someone can not pay back in time, the 
office holders ask him to give a 'guarantee'. This varies from a cow, to a bike or a radio, 
according to the debt. This guarantee will be taken in the case that the person does not pay 
back. The moment loans are to be paid back depends on the period cotton revenues are be 
paid. 
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The people who work for the GGF are paid from the money that staus in the fund. Their 
transport costs and FCFA 1000 for one day of work will be remunerated. In Bekuy, the money 
is also used to pay the workers of the GGF and for the benefit of the village. The use of this 
money has, however, caused serious problems in the GGF and even led to a change of the 
commute. There was no sufficient internal control and communication, and no method to 
sanction the culprits (due to cultural perceptions with respect elders and natives of the village). 
Members who are hurt as a consequence of cutting wood, are assisted by the GGF (case of 
Bekuy) and even hospital bills are paid out of th&fonds de roulement. 
For the cleaning of the firebreaks the villages set their own rules as well; in Kadomba for 
example, each member has to clean about fifty meters, which is allotted by the officials. The 
work is executed for one day per week until the whole unit is completed. This might take 
about six days in all. Each member should participate. In the case of illness or another valid 
reason, one should inform the executed committee that one is hindered. Participation in this 
cleaning is a condition for participation in the wood cut. When you have not participated, it 
is not possible to sign up, except when you pay 1200 FCFA on the day you sign up for every 
day you did not clean (see Box: 6). 
Box 8.6: The instructor of Kadomba gives an example 
The first year three people paid 1200 FCFA for every day the others cleaned and they did not participate in 
cleaning. But one quickly realized that it is too much money and nowadays [almost] everyone helps. Even those 
who are not sure to cut, but think about it, will help to be absolutely safe. 
New habitants can participate but, in the case of Bekuy, they have to pay the price of three 
"cords" to the group's cashbox. 
In Kadomba, regular surveillance is carried out in the forest to see if no illegal 
activities are undertaken. This means that someone moves around the forest to check all the 
bush. These surveillances are held alternately by the members of the comittee of gestion des 
terroirs and by other volunteers. Every three or four days another person guards. However, 
Kadomba is the only village with organized monitoring. 
All the members of the GGF participate in replanting a collective work that is not paid. 
This activity is organized at the national level, and each village replants at the same moment. 
Campaigns are held to make people aware of the reasons to replant. In the Maro forest the 
seedlings are provided by the PNGT. 
Women said that a lot changed for them now that they participate in the harvesting 
ofwood. In the first place, they are busier because they have an additional task. But -more 
importantly- women have much more money to spend which makes them less dependent on 
their husbands. This is confirmed by a study executed in 1996 by Zoungrana. In earlier times 
women often helped in cotton production, but it was the husband who received most of the 
benefits (see Box 8.7). 
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Men are generally satisfied with the wood cut as well because it provides them with some extra 
money in a period when they normally have no work. The problem is the moment the lorry 
should be loaded, which coincides with the time that work starts on the fields. The wood has 
to dry for at about three months. Wood is however collected even later because the lorries 
have to go into every village. It is the PNGT which tells the village at what time the lorry will 
come and it is as well the PNGT who gives the plan to the lorry drivers. Where Kadomba 
villagers were able to explain to us why the lorry drivers could not come early, Bekuy 
villagers (in a group interview) said only that it was 'PNGT's fault'. What changed is that 
young men often moved to Ivory Coast or Ouagadougou during the dry period to earn some 
extra money. Now that revenues can be gained in their own village these youths will stay and 
are therefore available for other activities. 
Migrants seem to be fully integrated in the GGF, and migrant members are generally 
satisfied with the wood cutting. The fact that the GGF in Kadomba functions very well, while 
the one in Bekuy has a lot of problems might be explained by the fact that the GGF of Bekuy 
has many migrant members, while in Kadomba, they are almost all natives. Migrants 
allegedly, are interested in the revenues wood can give but not in the management of the 
forest, which is an investment in the future, according to a PNGT member. 
As mentioned earlier, wood cutting is an individual activity, which means that the one 
who cuts is the one who receives the money. Revenues, and decision making power, were 
formerly controlled by the family head. Nowadays, this power has been divided across 
individual members of the family. 
The traders are organised in two groupements; the Groupement des Exploitants de Bois et de 
Charbon de bois (GEBC), the donkey carts and the Groupement des Transporteurs Exploitants 
de Bois de Chauffe et de Charbon (GTEBC), the lorry drivers. The vendors can join the 
GEBC or GTEBC according to their preference. 
An organisation of wood transporters had existed since the revolution in 1983. Because 
the members realised the advantages of working in a group, the organisation continued even 
after the revolutionary regime, under the name Union des Exploitants de Bois et Charbon de 
bois (UNEBOC). At the time its main aim was, according to a member, to "fight against the 
Forest Agency". Due to different and contradicting interests between donkey cart holders and 
lorry drivers, lack of confidence, financial and individual problems between office members, 
the UNEBOC separated into the two different groupements, the GTEBC and the GEBC on 7 
June 1994. These groupements function as an intermediary between respectively the lorry 
drivers or donkey cart holders and the Forest Agency. 
Box 8.7: DRARA animateur explained the situation of the women 
After having sold the cotton, the husband often tells his wife that there had been lot of problems and that he has 
earned nothing. Maybe he would give her no more than 5000 FCFA for all the work she did and the woman could 
not but accept. 
Regenerating the Maro Forest 207 
The GEBC is legally recognised since 1995. Because not all former UNEBOC 
members did agree on the separation, some members were not ready to sign up in the new 
GEBC, which posed starter problems. The Forest Agency did however force donkey cart 
holders to become members of the GEBC if they wanted to transport wood with their donkey 
carts. 
Members of this group can buy a permit to cut wood from the Forest Agency. 
Members have to pay a contribution to be considered a member of the groupement. This is, 
however, not always done, which seriously hinders the groupement's work. The Forest 
Agency also began giving cut permits to those who are not groupement members and this is 
an even more serious problem for the functioning of these groups. 
The real problem is therefore the lack of cooperation between the groupements and the Forest 
Agency. According to a member of the GTEBC, this might be due to changes in the internal 
organisation of the Forest Agency, "not every person follows the same policy". 
Due to the different states and values of lorries, members also have different interests. 
Therefore conflicts exist even among members "richer lorry drivers are no longer ready to 
contribute for poorer ones", according to an office member. 
Formerly, sellers had to buy a card from the groupement to show to consumers that the 
Forest Agency alowed them to sell. But nowadays, the Forest Agency gives them a permit 
without the sellers going to the groupements, which made it impossible to distinguish between 
legal and illegal sellers. 
A more general problem for traders is the illegal woodcut in the natural forests. This 
means not only a loss of income for the groupements, but it also provokes unfair competition. 
Wood is illegally cut, mainly by donkey cart holders and villagers who sell it to lorry drivers. 
But because the lorry has to follow the main road this is difficult. Villagers may do this due 
to lack of cash, because the benefits from the wood cut from the plantation come only several 
months after wood has been cut! Lorry drivers can practise fraud by taking more "cords" than 
allowed in their lorry. 
When the plantation wood is transported, all other wood is prohibited. But even then, 
natural wood enters from everywhere as both GEBC and GEBTC members explained. Both 
agree that it is easier for a donkey cart than for a lorry to smuggle natural wood. Since 
plantation wood is much less appreciated (mainly Gmelina, than 'natural' wood, people often 
do not want to buy the former), vendors can not even sell it and other illegal wood is 
preferred. 
In the plantation therefore (almost) no illegal activities are undertaken, but in the natural 
forests the motivation is different. A villager of Kadomba explained us: "of course they do not 
illegally chop in their plantation, it is their own property, but the forest is state owned 
property. They want to take from it whatever they can". We should mention here that people 
never said that they themselves cut wood illegally, but after some insisting they do agree that 
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other villages might do this.But what the villager explained to us might be the core of the 
problem; people feel responsible now for the plantations, but not for the natural forests. 
According to the groupements, the Forest Agency exerts less and less controls (the 
Forest Agency confirmed this [pers. com. Forest Agent] and explained it by a lack of financial 
means). On the question why the groupements do not control themselves, a GTEBC office 
holder answered: 
'You are right that we should control ourselves, but I do not want a problem between my brother and me, I can 
not go to the Forest Agency to tell them that my brother cheats!' 
Another member explained that members do not have cofidence in the Forest Agency 
anymore and are therefore not motivated to maintain on its behalf. 
Internal organisational problems (among UNEBOC members themselves) reduced the common 
interest and increased the tendency to undertake illegal activities. Also the Forest Agency takes 
the groupements less seriously and even gives permits without the knowledge of the 
groupements, thereby undermining the local control system. 
The disappearing trust among members of the groupements and between them and the 
Forest Agency, results in increased fraud. 
The groupement can exclude a member for some months and will inform the Forest 
Agency about it. But this is all power the groupements have. GTEBC officers told us about 
people who stop illegal wood traders on the road and tell them to pay, threatening them to go 
to the Forest Agency, or even saying they are of the Forest Agency. This happened because 
Forest Agents took the habit of stopping people without wearing uniforms. Other corrupt 
practices are also said to be on the increase. 
Consumers are not organised and therefore more difficult to integrate. Because they 
are not organised, the PNGT defends them when this is necessary during meetings with all the 
other actors involved. Consumers prefer natural wood over Eucalyptus. Gmelina does not burn 
very well and gives no charcoal after burning. It is therefore sometimes even rejected. The 
criteria for good wood are the time it burns, the way it burns and the charcoal it gives. 
8.8 Analyzing the evolution of platforms and conclusions 
The Maro forest initially was a common property resource; the ownership (and decision 
making power) was in the hands of some big families who divided rights across the local 
population. Ensminger (1996) claims that in Africa use rights are often assigned at the 
household level, while transfer rights are assigned at a higher level. At that time, the 
commumty had the power to refuse access to outsiders, prevent encroachment by its own 
members, establish restrictions on cutting trees etc.(see Jodha, 1996). 
The state, however, classified the Maro forest and made it into public property 
resource: the forest is state owned and is managed by its representative; the Forest Agency. 
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The population began exploiting it as if it were an open access resource, with all the risks of 
exhaustion. By trying to halt deforestation, the state actually stimulated it. 
When the tragedy of the commons treatened, the IDA project opened commercial 
plantations to privatise the forest make it private property. The population worked in the 
plantations and considered them as a private property of the project. For the natural forest, 
however, nothing changed and the local population still treated it as an open access recource. 
We are dealing with two resources; the industrial plantation and the natural forest. 
From the local rules to the IDA project, platforms for forest resource use are sensitive 
to ownership concerning the forest. 
Nowadays, the Government tries to make people aware of the need to sustainably manage the 
forest themselves, but without giving official ownership away (the forest is owned by the state 
but managed by the population). But there is a tendency to move from a public property to a 
common property. As explained, the four types of property rights (private, state, open access 
and common) are idealtypes. The state now tries to ensure that the forest is managed by 
defined local groups (the GGFs). On the other hand, the state does not want to give the 
ownership of the forest away, and the forest stays a public good. The property regime can 
therefore not be described in one of the four idealtypes, but is a mix. The state gave the PNGT 
the task to facilitate this co-management. 
The population now considers the plantations in the forest as theirs and is willing to 
invest in it. The plantations are seen as this mixed type of state and common property 
resource. The local population considers the natural forest, however, as an open access 
property good, and illegally cuts wood in it. 
The learning process involved in the move towards co-management started with the 
diagnostic participatif, which stimulated the local population to think about the problems they 
faced, and led to search for collective solutions to problem situations. In this learning process, 
both PNGT members as well as direct local stakeholders learn about the situation and the 
possible solutions. This diagnostic participatif can be seen as a temporal platform. The 
question is wether all stakeholders took part in this diagnostic so that all had the opportunity 
to participate in the decisions on how to undertake collective action. The village chief (a 
native) was asked to invite people to the meetings. The non-integration of herdsmen, and to 
a lesser degree migrants, in the community might well have led to the under-representation of 
these groups in the diagnostic, even if they formally had an equal chance to participate in 
decision making. 
It is during the diagnostic participatif that the local population accepted to change the 
property regime of the forest from a public to a more common one. In the first place, 
everybody who still cultivated in the forest had to leave. The PNGT tried to make people 
aware of why to leave the forest plots, but even though people said to understand the motives, 
it was by threat of force that they left the forest (the PNGT warned that people would not not 
leave the forest would be forced by the Forest Agents). 
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To compensate this loss of plots, the PNGT proposed to give local people the 
management of the plantation, which was formerly owned by a project. The PNGT also 
proposed to facilitate their relations with the state agencies which guide the commercialisation 
of plantation wood. The local population was convinced that the plantation would provide them 
with revenues and they accepted. The negotiation thus resulted in co-management between the 
local population and the state. It is interesting to examine how co-management works in 
practice. 
As a result of the diagnostic participatif, a local platform for decision making has been 
created; the GGF which manages and controls the cutting of wood in the plantation. The wood 
is now cut according to a plan made up by the PNGT. The GGF in itself represents a process 
of collective social learning. I also created the executive committee which has the decision 
making power. This executive committee is formed through a democratic election, for which 
everybody was eligible. Some people were proposed by other villagers or people proposed 
themselves. Everybody could raise his hand to indicate who should be elected in a process that 
was facilitated by the PNGT. Everybody who became a member of the GGF is allowed to 
participate in the exploitation of the "common good". By entering the groupement, the rules 
with respect "taking less" and "giving more" are accepted by the new member. Before signing 
up in the groupement, the member had to participate in cleaning the firebreaks, which is 
registered by the executive committee. There are associations (made up of several GGFs) 
which function at the terroir level, but these are more theoretical constructs by the PNGT, 
since they do not have a clear function. A platform at the interterroir level is still completely 
missing. 
These organisations are the basis for the co-management between the state and the local 
population, facilitated by the PNGT. Of interest are the strength and weaknesses of this co-
management. 
A first achievement of the co-management arrangement is that individuals have the possibility 
to benefit by earning money from wood cutting. In addition to the money, decisionmaking 
power is distributed across several members of the family (men and women), instead of being 
monipolized by the family head (as in the case of cotton). A first condition according to 
Breemer et al (1995) in the success of collective action is that the local people should reap 
significant benefits from changes in local resource use. This condition is fulfilled. It is an 
additional benefit because the activity takes place in the dry season when normally no activities 
are undertaken, and wood cutting does therefore not compete with other income generating 
activities. 
A second achievement is that rules to prevent free riding are successfully implemented. 
Participation in the cleaning of firebreaks is a prerequisite to be allowed to participate in wood 
cutting. Consequently, free riding by wood cutters without maintaining the forest, is out of the 
question. When people do not help in cleaning the firebreaks, they have to pay an amount for 
each work day. Since this payment is disproportionately high, people respect the rale to clean. 
In this case, people thus have strong rales and means to sanction and monitor free riding. 
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Another achievement is that watches are organised so that wood, which is posed at the 
roadsides, cannot be stolen. Everybody has his turn in preventing such theft and is willing to 
participate because it is one's own wood which can be stolen. 
A fourth achievement is that a conflict resolution mechanism has been created. When a conflict 
arises, an assembly will judge and eventually punish the culprits. There already was such a 
system for violating traditional rules (for example with respect to holy rivers and trees), but 
it was adapted for the implementation of new rules. 
Directly related to the strong point that individuals can gain revenues, as discussed above, 
there is a weakness that not all local people benefit from the new arrangement. For herdsmen 
this way of earning money does not fit into their cultural pattern and they refuse to collaborate. 
In the Fulbe culture, it is a shame to earn money through 'slave work' and this is exactly the 
way the cutting of wood is seen by the Fulbe herdsmen. This is even more striking when we 
read in a PNGT (1996a) that the herders are expected to be GGF members who are included 
in the management of the forest. 
'It is such a complex problem that we did not know how to handle it until now. It should be 
best when they entered the GGF as well. That we did not undertake anything until now, is 
because we can not start everything at the same time. But do not worry, we did not forget this 
group, we think about them!' (pers. com. Ky Zerbo, PNGT member) 
For farmers a solution was succesfiilly negotiated: farmers leave their plots in the forest 
but they can profit from cutting wood. Herdsmen, however, are not allowed any more to enter 
the forest with their animals, but they gain no advantage to compensate this. 
Migrants participate in wood cutting, but their only motive is the money they earn. As 
a result, they are more interested in short term profit than in long term (it is after all an 
investment in a territory which is certainly not theirs), which seems to have negative impact 
on the management of the organisation (of the GGF) as is suggested by the case of Bekuy as 
compared with the GGF of Kadomba. The fact that migrants do not have vested land tenure 
rights, seems to determine their lack of motivation to participate in the management. This 
influences, in its turn, their willingness to invest to achieve long-term goals. 
A second weakness is the lack of communication between the local population and the 
traders. All stakeholders have a full knowledge of the ecological processes involved, and what 
should or should not be done to manage a forest sustainably. This is what Breemer et al. 
(1995) have called 'sound ecological guidance'. To reach it, the stakeholders in the recource 
should communicate with each other. The role of the PNGT is to facilitate this communication. 
Figure 8.3 shows that all communication passes from traders to PNGT and from PNGT to 
local population without any direct contact between the population and the traders. 
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The Environmental Agency has the role to guide the commercialisation process and the PNGT 
to facilitate the relations between the different actors involved. The PNGT has, however, taken 
on more the role of an intermediary than of a facilitator. For example, the day lorry drivers 
come to the village to transport wood is completely arranged by the PNGT without any contact 
between these two groups. As a result, the local population does not understand what 
determines the date the lorry will come ('and it is PNGT's fault'). Consequently, local people 
are not present on the day the lorry comes, which in its turn poses problems for the lorry 
drivers. Direct contact between the different stakeholders might lead to a better understanding 
and therefore better collaboration between the different groups. The PNGT has obtained a 
Ideal situation 
Traders (lorry drivers, 
donkey c a r t s ) ^ 
Local population 
^ P N G T - ^ 
(facilitator) 
Actual situation 
Traders (lorry drivers, 
donkey carts) 
PNGT 
! 
Local population 
Figure 8.3 : Communication between traders and local population 
certain powerful position which can not be justified by their role of facilitator. 
At the UGO level, one agreed that the PNGT is too much involved in the management of the 
FCM; 
'Without doubt the PNGT should retire from the management of the forest. We keep arranging 
everything for the local population but they surely are able to do it themselves. I had a 
discussion about this with the PNGT members myself the last time I was there' (pers. com. 
Taoko, UGO member). 
PNGT officers were however convinced that the local population was not yet ready to do 
things themselves; 
"It is a process which goes gradually, everybody wants to go quickly but we should not. Our 
task is to facilitate the commercialisation of wood, the GGFs and the management of the 
forest, they can not yet do without us. And when you say we are more intermediary than 
facilitator you did not listen to what we have to say, but takes all the population tells you for 
granted." 
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An explication might be that the PNGT is a project intended to disappear in the future, but the 
agents des Eaux et Forêts are intended to stay to execute their control and communication role. 
Because the agents des Eaux et Forêts are employed by the PNGT, this might cause some 
internal tensions and different role conceptions for individuals. 
A third, directly related, weakness is the non-recognition of the importance and role of 
platforms, as represented in the figure 8.3; 
Ideal s i tuat ion 
F o r e s t A g e n c y Traders (lorry dr ivers , 
d o n k e y carts , v e n d o r s ) 
G T E B C 
G E B C 
(facilitator) 
A c t u a l s i tuat ion 
F o r e s t A g e n c y Traders (lorry dr ivers , 
d o n k e y carts, v e n d o r s ) 
^ G T E B C 
G E B C 
Figure 8.4: Contact between Forest Agency and traders 
As shown, the problem is that communication does not take place between the two 
groupements, but directly between Forest Agency and traders. As a consequence, members 
do not respect the GEBC or GETBC rules any more, and these groupements loose their power. 
The groupements used to control illegal sales, but now that vendors have no need any more 
to pass by the GEBC or GTEBC, these vendors do not have the signs any more to indicate that 
they are legal, but they can have the permits anyway. This means that, through this lack of 
communication, an essential control and power system has been destroyed. Through a renewed 
communication between the Forest Agency and the GEBC and GTEBC, this problem might 
be solved. 
A fourth weakness is that the conflict resolution mechanism is influenced by cultural rules. In 
the case of Bekuy, a corrupt village elder could not be punished due to cultural conceptions 
of the assembly with respect to elder and natives. Such relations of trust and reciprocity seem 
to be more or less missing when migrants and natives work together. The cultural conceptions 
which can hinder or temper the functioning of official rules, seem effective among natives. 
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A fifth weakness is that the whole commercialisation process is guided by the state, and 
therefore very vulnerable to corruption. It is the state which receives the receipts and hands 
over the money, it is the state which sells the wood to donkey cart holders, it is the state which 
gives permits to search or sell wood. In all these links, the risk of corruption is present and 
several cases of corruption have been mentioned. 
A sixth weakness is that the sanctioning mechanisms at the village level are hold by the Forest 
Agents. This system is also vulnerable to corruption (fines without receipt etc.). The 
groupements (GGF, GEBC or GTEBC) do not have the power to sanction and in the case of 
GEBC and GTEBC even the monitoring system does not exist any more (see third weakness) 
which -needless to say- provokes illegal practices. 
A seventh weakness are the problems within organisations. We saw that the groupement of 
Bekuy was confronted with corruption and bad leadership. The GEBC and GTEBC are also 
examples of organisations which obviously do not work perfectly. The problems are 
organisational, but these seem all to result from a lack of trust between the members. Conflicts 
of interests provoked a split of the organisation and consequently members did not have faith 
in their organisations any more. 
A final weakness is directly related to the use of the natural forest as discussed above. Because 
the natural forest is illegally exploited, the traders are confronted with an unfair competition 
because natural wood is offered on the market and consumers prefer this wood. To reach a 
more sustainable management of the plantations, sustainable management of the natural forest 
is indispensable. 
Facilitation requires measures at the level of the state and at the level of institutions (in our 
case PNGT). The state has to create the conditions for the institutions as well as for the 
population. The institutions have to work within this framework, but they have their own 
facilitation capabilities (or room for manoeuvre). 
Already for four years, the PNGT facilitates the process of sustainable management. 
In the first place, it uses communicative interventions to convince the local population that 
collective action is needed to come to sustainable management. The diagnostic participatif has 
this function and the Forest Agents try to create such awarenes among the local population at 
any time they can. Study trips are also organized for this purpose. These communicative 
interventions are mainly meant to stimulate collective action. 
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Another type of facilitating uses incentives. The PNGT gave boxes of medicines to the local 
population to take care for injuries resulting from wood cutting. It also provided seedlings for 
forest replanting. 
Apart from these elements, the technical advice which is provided is of a considerable 
importance. The wood-cutters are advised how to cut the wood. But the PNGT also advises 
when problems arise in the executive committee at the village level groupements. As 
explained above, we feel that the PNGT is too dominant and should focus on its facilitatior 
role. 
The state facilitates in creating a legal and regulatory system. It determines, for 
example, how groupements or associations can be legalised. This legalisation is important 
because such a legalised organisation can obtain the responsibility over part of the forest, 
according to the new forest codes. 
Until now, wood prices has been fixed. After liberalisation, prices are expected to rise 
considerably, which might be a problem for the consumers (mainly poorer households use 
wood for food preparation). We feel that consequences of, and possibilities for, liberalisation 
should be carefully analysed. The control system of the state certainly is not adequate, natural 
wood enters the village without restrictions. As a GTEBC member said it: 
"You should go to the main road coming from Ouagadougou, when you go there at around 
seventeen hours, I am convinced that you will find at least twenty donkey carts entering with 
natural wood. In the past, Forest Agents knew these roads and it was not so easily to enter but 
nowadays the Forest Agents do not control any more." 
This diminished control is explained by a lack of financial means. When the state itself 
is not capable to control illegal activities we wonder if a solution might be to transfer this 
power to the local population (GGF, GEBC, GTEBC) and provide them thus with an effective 
sanction and monitoring system. 
The Maro forest is rapidely deforested and, like the other forests in Burkina Faso, its 
forest is trought with social dilemmas. People exploit the forest in their own interest without 
taking account of the collective interest. Even if people do not farm any more, animals enter 
and people illegally cut wood. People should accept not to enter and not to chop more than 
what can be sustained. This is often indicated by the metaphor 'take less'. People should also 
invest in the management, for example, by replanting and monitoring illegal users. This can 
be expressed by the metaphor 'give more'. 
This use of the forest resource is not faced with only one sort of social dilemma but 
with a web of such dilemmas. The situation is thus a rather complex one and over time, people 
have tried to solve them by implementing different property regimes. 
The problem of common goods dilemmas can be overcome when stakeholders agree on 'take 
less' through collective action. So the different stakeholders of the Maro forest should cut less 
and manage their forest by collective action. However, this requires some public goods, such 
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as a capacity for policy making, monitoring and sanctioning. Without these collective actions, 
natural resource management is not possible. For successful collective action, overcoming the 
public goods dilemma is also important. Stakeholders should be ready to 'give more'. 
Co-management practices enabled the development of platforms of the level of villages (the 
GGFs), of terroirs (the Comité Villageois de Gestion des Terroirs), and of inter-terroirs (the 
Commission Inter-Terroirs). 
Notes 
1. This chapter is based on a MSc thesis by E.S. Nederlof (1997): Facilitation of Forest management. The case of 
wood exploitation in the classified forest of Maro, Burkina Faso. Wageningen: wageningen Agricultural University. 
She collaborated within the NIRP programme in the selection of a Burkina case (chapter...). Hence her own MSc 
thesis was so relevant to the subject of this book, she graciously consented it to write a version for this book. I 
(Constant Dangbégnon) greatefully acknowledge this contribution. 
2. Until October 1996 our research location was situated in the Houet province, but after the restructuring of 
Burkina Faso's provinces (creation of 15 new provinces), this province is called Tuy. 
3. The Mossi (major ethnic group in Burkina Faso) have a tengsoba, land chief, who is the descendant of the first 
who arrived on this parcel. He is traditionally the only one authorised to give land away. He redivided the land in 
his turn over some families, but they only have 0 rights and no ownership rights. 
4. Here the Mossi system is followed. 
5. With enclave we mean an area in the classified forest which does not fall under the classification rules and can 
thus be used for agriculture and other purpose. 
6. The RAF was written in 1984 because "[...] des objectifs fondamentaux de la Révolution tels que l'autosuffisance 
alimentaire et le logement pour tous ne peuvent être atteints qu'avec un système foncier et agraire qui permette une 
occupation et une exploitation rationelles des terres. " (ZATU et KITL 1991: 6). 
7. Decentralisation is defined by Dédouni (1997) as le transfert des compétences étatiques aux collectivités locales 
leur conféront une personnalité juridique, un patrimoine et un pouvoir de décision qui leur sont indispensable pour 
assumer la gestion effective de leur terroir (PNGT, 1994). 
8. If the plots had not been cultivated for food, the PNGT would not have forced the owner to leave. Now all plots 
were used for commercial purpose. 
9. According to the PNGT le diagnostic participatif est un processus d'identification et d'analyse avec les 
populations de l'ensemble des potentialités et des contraintes de leur milieu afin de disposer d'un programme 
commun d'actions de développement. Il est donc permanent, itératif et doit permettre l'appropriation de la démarche 
et des objectifs par les populations. Il est le point de départ de la responsabilisation villageoise (1997 a&b). See 
Reseau MARP (1997) for a further description of the MARP method. 
10. This is the first year that the PNGT will use a theater to make people aware of the environmental degradation 
and to introduce the GdT approach. 
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11 . Nowadays there are fourteen groupements de gestion forestière; which are: Dorossiamenso, Kadomba, 
Ramatoulaye, Néfréïaye, Békuy, Lamba, Sara, Bala, Sokourani, Tiérako, Boho-kari, Yabé, Maro et Koukourouna 
(EMP, 1997: 1). 
9 Developing Platforms for the Gestion of a Zone Sylvo-PastorcUe 
in the Houet Province, Burkina-Faso 
9.1 Introduction 
'Gestion' and 'aménagement' of terroirs have been implemented since the mid-1980s in the 
Francophone West Africa. The difference between them will be explained below. These 
approaches are perceived as a novel solution for environmental degradation in rural areas, 
mostly at the village' level (Painter, 1993). Donors, governments and planners initiated many 
actions based on these approaches especially in the Sahelian countries. However, such 
criticisms (e.g., Tollman, 1993) of the Gestion Des Terroirs approach led to the continuous 
adaptation of these notions1. Still, in many circumstances the extent of technical realization 
prevails in evaluating various actions. Generating a long-enduring organization at the level 
of a terroir is not yet achieved satisfactorily. This chapter assumes that the platform notion is 
potentially useful to compensate this weakness of the 'gestion' and 'aménagement' of terroirs 
approaches. 
The present case study deals with the problems in implementing of the Gestion des 
Terroirs by the Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs (PNGT) in the particular context 
of the Burkina Faso. At the beginning of the study, two important documents were available 
and used as an additional source of data to complement the primary information obtained. The 
first document (PNGT, 1995) presents the rationale of the national programme for the gestion 
des terroirs in Burkina Faso and defines the national policy. It explains also the general 
perspective implied in the gestion des terroirs, the role of the other actors (national and 
international NGOs), the conditions for success, and the measures to ensure follow-up of the 
action of the gestion des terroirs. The second document (PNGT/EMP-Houet, 1995) presents 
the process and content of the 'gestion/aménagement' in the Houet province, and a detailed 
description of the area (physical environment, the people and their history and their activities) 
in which concrete activities are carrying out. 
Several research methods and techniques were used for this case study. Individual and 
group interviews were used to collect data at the level of the stakeholders and the professionals 
of the PNGT and other actors (NGOs, the extension workers, pohtical authorities). Snow-ball 
techniques were used and the stakeholders and the professionals helped identify the key 
informants during the investigations. Group interviews were done with specific interest groups 
(natives, migrants, and herders) with stakes in the aménagement of a ZSP. As will be seen 
later, many activities were carried out during the study and participant observation was used. 
At the end of the field research in the region of Bobo-Dioulasso, a group discussion was 
organised with the professionals of the PNGT. The advantage was that the information 
obtained from the stakeholders was cross-checked. 
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This chapter starts with the notion of aménagement and gestion of terroirs, from the 
perspective of the PNGT in Burkina Faso (§9.2). The following section (§9.3) will explain the 
concept of the Zone Sylvo-Pastorale (ZSP) and present the stakeholders and their livelihoods. 
Then the aménagement of a ZSP done by the PNGT will be analysed (§9.4). This process was 
operational during the present study. The stakeholders were interpreting and speculating on 
how they should use the ZSP after the realization. As will be analysed later, there were 
different perceptions on the ZSP according to the natives, the herders, and the organizational 
plans perceived by professionals. So anticipating on the analysis of resource management in 
the ZSP (see §9.5), emerged as a relevant issue. This case study draws specific conclusions 
about the nature of the platforms for the 'aménagement' and 'gestion' of terroirs ( see §9.6). 
9.2 'Gestion des terroirs' and 'aménagement des terroirs' according to the PNGT 
The concepts gestion des terroirs and aménagement des terroirs 
According to the PNGT (cf. PNGT, 1995: 14), 'the gestion des terroirs is a rural development 
approach which is based on the responsabilisation and participation of rural communities in 
managing resources in a defined space called a terroir, through land tenure security, and for 
ensuring the sustainability of these resources. The gestion des terroirs combines aménagement 
des terroirs, agrosylvopastorale production activities, and the creation of socioeconomic 
infrastructures, in a perspective on sustainable development at the local level' (my translation 
CD). 
The aménagement des terroirs is defined as a process of implementing concerted action 
and measures for the sustainable valorisation of the natural resources in of the terroirs. The 
development of the terroir is not only realized at the community level but also at the individual 
level by taking into account financial and human resources. Aménagement refers to 
improvement and involves a variety of investments to raise the level of productivity of the 
natural resources in a given area. 
Thus gestion des terroirs is broader than the aménagement des terroirs. The plans for 
the gestion des terroirs involve aménagement des terroirs. Gestion des terroirs calls for a 
rational utilization of all the resources of the terroir (natural resources, human resources, 
financial resources, etc.). Aménagement is used to describe a series of actions which involve 
using the resource in a particular way, limiting access to certain times and controlling levels 
of resource use. 
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Objectives and key features of the gestion des terroirs approach of the PNGT 
The global objectives of the Gestion des Terroirs in Burkina Faso are the following (see 
PNGT, 1995: 16): 
• responsabilisation of the rural communities to face their destiny; 
• restoring and improving the potential of natural resources; 
• ensuring the reproducibility and durability of actions initiated and realized; 
• achieving a better management of space of the natural resources; 
• ensuring land tenure security to enable the development of farming systems; 
• integrating agricultural activities, livestock, forestry and fishing; 
• improving social relationship among farmers, herders, migrants and natives; 
• helping the villagers to develop a representative organization which will become a 
partner for external mtervening agencies; 
• promoting inter-village organization for the management of rangeland, forest, 
watershed, community infrastructures, etc.; 
• creating conditions for coordinating various activities within the Gestion des Terroirs. 
Key features in the gestion des terroirs approach are the following: 
• the approach is based on participation and the responsabilisation of the rural; people. 
The top-down approach is rejected; 
• the approach is global, and it covers multiple sectors to take into account different 
dimensions of rural livelihoods; 
• professionals in the field work in a team. Complementarity between their different 
disciplines is acknowledged; 
• the approach is flexible, bottom-up and decentralised to village level. 
The concept of a zone sylvo-pastorale 
In the local context of the use of lands, two big spatial units can be distinguished in Burkina 
Faso: the agricultural lands and the bush ('/a brousse'). The latter involves the fallow and 
lands which are not cultivated ('terre enfriche'). They are grazing areas or natural forests 
(Hien, 1995). The concept of the zone sylvo-pastorale refers to these areas. From the 
ecological point of view, the vegetation cover of the sylvo-pastoral zone keeps the soils in 
good condition (prevention of soil erosion and improvement of water retention) and constitotes 
a land reserve for farming activities (Hien, 1995). A zone sylvo-pastorale provides pasture, 
fuelwood, fruits and natural vegetables for the villagers. It constitutes a reserve of medicinal 
plants. Increasing drought in Burkina Faso has caused migrations of farmers and herders from 
the drier regions to the Southern part of Burkina Faso to the Houet Province. Consequently, 
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the sylvo-pastorale areas are under siege by migrants and conflicts often arise between natives 
and migrants. 
In face of these evolving problems in the Houet Province of Burkina Faso, the 
aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale was perceived within the gestion des terroirs activities2 
by the PNGT in this area. According to the PNGT, the implementation of this action involved: 
• decision-making about the allocation of a certain part of village territories to livestock 
production and tree planting; 
• planning of activities for the facilitation of the livestock production in this zone; 
• defining the organizational structure which involves the stakeholders in the 
management. 
The end of the aménagement means that a zone sylvo-pastorale is created. This zone 
includes a corridor space to enable the passage of cattle. Watering points and animal care 
paddocks ('parc de vaccination') are created. Tree planting is permitted under the zone 
framework. The emphasis should be given to the tree species whose leaves can be used as 
fodder for cattle. The quality of pastures will be improved in this zone through the 
aménagement of the bush with fodder species. Particular attention will be given to the carrying 
capacity of the zone through the rotation of the parcels based on a rational utilization of the 
pastures. Activities such as farming, hunting and building houses are forbidden in this zone. 
The zone sylvo-pastorale involves, on the one hand, infrastructures such as corridor space, the 
animal care paddocks, watering points ('retenue d'eau') and fire-breaks in the forested areas. 
On the other hand, natural resources such as trees, pastures and water need to be managed. 
The organizational structure of the PNGT that intervened in the Houet Province is the 
same as the one described in chapter 8 (see figure 8.2). The EMP operated at the grass-root 
level, in the villages. 
In view of the explanation above, a man-made zone sylvo-pastorale as envisaged by 
the PNGT, involves a process for realizing it (the aménagement, see §9.4), and ways of 
managing it after the creation of the zone (the gestion, see §9.5). Before an analysis of the 
creation of the zone sylvo-pastorale and its management, I will discuss the nature of the 
stakeholders in the intervention area of Houet Province. 
9.3 The stakeholders in the intervention area of the PNGT 
The intervention area 
The intervention area of the PNGT covers all the villages in the Départements3 of Satiri and 
Bekuy, and all the villages surrounding the Maro forest (see chapter 8) in Houet Province. 
Geographically the area is between 11°20 and 11°56 North latitude and 3°45 and 4° 12 of 
longitude. The zone has a surface of 2029 km2. Village targeted by the PNGT for gestion des 
terroirs activities at the beginning of the intervention, i.e., for elaborating plans of 
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aménagement concerned Kadomba, Sara-Bekuy, Tierako and Bala (cf. PNGT/EMP-Houet, 
1995). 
Kadomba in the Département of Satiri is a village inhabited by the native Bobo, the 
migrant Mossi and some sedentary herders. The arrival of many migrant Mossi in Kadomba 
started in 1970, when severe droughts appeared in the Sahel. Land in Kadomba belongs to six 
big family compounds. Within these families, the family heads have the right to give land to 
migrants. This prerogative is in the interest of the family heads because the receivers of land 
will give many presents, for example animals, money, or colanuts, and they will return each 
year to give a small present, for example chickens. This results in the situation that many 
migrants received and continue to receive land until now. Land is not purchased by the 
migrants but it is lent to them and the owners should get it back afterwards. Through this 
process of giving usufruct, villages which consist only of migrants are created. Ramatoulaye 
and Nefrelaye are two villages which are in the territory of Kadomba. As will be explain 
later, this has some implication on the identification of a terroir. 
The villages Sara and Bekuy are in the Département of Bekuy. Here, the Bwaba people 
are the natives. Ethnic groups such as the Mossi, Dating and Samon, are the migrants in the 
two villages. Herders are also in the area. Land property rights are the same as in Kadomba. 
In Sara, land belongs to ten big family compounds. Lamba is a migrant village in the territory 
of Bekuy. 
Tierako is a village inhabited by the native Bobo. Unlike Kadomba, Sara and Bekuy, 
there are no migrants in the territory of Tierako. An explanation may be found in the land 
rights and transaction patterns. The land belongs to the family heads but there is only one chief 
of land who organizes sacrifices for land use in the village. 
Bala is a village inhabited by native Bobo and migrant Mossi as in Kadomba. Lands 
belong to ten big family compounds. Migrant Mossi gained access to land through borrowing. 
In all the villages, many organizations are functional. The Groupement Villageois des 
Agriculteurs (GVA) is the most powerful because of cotton production. Other organizations 
concerned the Groupement Villageois Féminin (GVF); the women's organization; the 
Groupement Villageois d'Eleveurs (GVE), the livestock production organization; the 
Groupement de Gestion Forestière (GGF, see chapter 8); and the Comité Coutumier des Vieux 
(CCV) is found where animism is still practised (e.g., in Kadomba and Bala). 
Focus on Kadomba for the study and in-depth analysis 
Kadomba was the first village where the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale started 
successfully by PNGT professionals. Kadomba was chosen for study and in-depth analysis of 
the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale. This choice was made with the help of PNGT 
professionals in the Houet province. The idea was to follow the existing momentum of the 
implementation of the aménagement from Kadomba to other villages. A zone sylvo-pastorale 
is a desire of many villages. According to the professionals of the PNGT in Houet, the 
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experience gained with the aménagement in Kadomba served as a 'model' for the continuation 
of the process in the other villages. 
From a strategic point of view, Kadomba presented a situation where natives, migrants 
and herders are frequently in interaction because of repetitive conflicts between the crop-
farmers and the herders. The native Bobo, the migrant Mossi and the herders were the 
potential stakeholders in these conflicts. They needed to agree among themselves how to use 
the terroir so as to reduce conflicts. The intervention of the PNGT aimed to realize this 
objective. 
9.4 Developing platforms for the Aménagement of a Zone Sylvo-Pastorale 
Problems and perceptions according to various stakeholders and the PNGT 
The native Bobo: one economic system should not destroy another 
The parable, 'an economic system should not destroy another' used by a native Bobo, is meant 
to summarise the main problems of the natives Bobo, the crop-farmers. Farming and herding 
are considered as two different 'economic system', in the parable used. When the cattle caused 
serious damages to the crops, the meaning attributed, by the native Bobo, was: an 'economic 
system' is destroying another. The conflict with the herders started in the early 1970s, the 
period of the arrival of first herders who stayed temporarily in the village Kadomba. A serious 
conflict emerged between the native Bobo in Kadomba and the herders as explained by Millogo 
(see Box 9.1). He concluded that it was an historical event that should not be forgotten in the region. 
Box 9.1: Millogo explains the conflict between the native Bobo in Kadomba and the herders 
Since 1972, there is a fight between herders and fanners. Their animals caused serious damages in cotton farms. 
One way to secure your cotton farm was to be there during the nights and prevent the cattle from destroying it. 
The herders arrived in Kadomba for the first time in 1972. They stayed temporarily during the dry season and 
returned at the teginning of the rainy season. I cannot forget a case of serious conflict in 1976. There was one 
death among herders and 14 villagers including myself were arrested. We were in jail for 10 months and 24 days. 
How the conflict had emerged? The farmers used to cultivate cotton and the harvesting should finish in December. 
Before the herders arrived in Kadomba, they sent a message and informed the farmers about their arrival. They 
asked them to complete the harvesting of their cotton farms, if not the cattle should destroy it. Unfortunately, 
every farmers did not have sufficient labour to complete the harvesting in time. Another problem was that, 
depending on the period you sow the cotton, the harvesting should start in November while the herders arrived 
already in October and caused serious damages to the cotton farms. When the villagers noticed that the same 
problem was repeated every year, they convoked the herders the 10th April 1976 at the Chef du Village place to 
come to an agreement and avoid conflicts. The herders arrived and at the meeting we said that we are neighbours 
and an economic system should not destroy another. The cattle did not have to destroy the cotton farms. The 
herders could not understand because they had already informed the farmers to harvest their cotton farms. This 
meeting turned to a fight and one herder was killed and another seriously wounded by the villagers. After that, 
the herders went to the local police and they could give only the names of 14 villagers. These people were arrested 
and they were put in jail. It was an event that should not be forgotten 
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The cattle also stamps the watering place used by the villagers. After their passage, the water 
is not clean and the women complain. A sixty years old stakeholder in Kadomba compared the 
actual situation to the one when he was too young (twenty years old) and said that there was 
sufficient space in the past and the population was low. Today, you cannot have a farm 
somewhere without the presence of a herder near. The number of farmers and herders 
increases. Very often conflicts occur but it is not easy to resolve them at local or 
auministration levels because the herders have more money than the farmers, and they can to 
corrupt the officials in order to avoid official sanctions. As a result, the situation was difficult 
for everybody in Kadomba. 
The migrant Mossi: what a blind man wants is to see ... 
The parable 'what a blind man wants is to see, what a deaf man wants is to hear and to talk', 
used by a migrant Mossi, can summarize the perception of the problem by the Mossi. The 
migrant Mossi have another perception of the problem with respect to the need to initiate an 
aménagement of a tone sylvo-pastorale. The main problem perceived by the Mossi is the land 
insecurity they face. The migrant Mossi also raised the problem of soil fertility decline. By 
analogy, the Mossi identified themselves as a blind man and a deaf mute compared to the Bobo 
people. Finding a solution to the problem of land insecurity and the declining fertility of their 
farms was more important than initiating an aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale (see Box 
9.2). 
Box 9.2: Yameogo, a migrant Mossi from Koudougou 32 years ago, gives his perception of the problem 
The parcel I am exploiting for 30 years ago is depleted and has lost its fertility. I got this parcel from a native 
Bobo landowners. I do not have the possibility to choose another parcel in Kadomba. I do not have other areas 
to clear and cultivate.... concerning the problems with the herders ... in the area where the herders and farmers 
are living, it is normal that a conflict occurs sometimes ... it happens that one day the teeth bite the tongue. But, 
a good relationship with the herders is important because they are keeping the cattle we need for the ox-plough. 
The herders: crop-farms are everywhere 
The strategy of the herders to cope with the environmental uncertainties is to move to the 
humid areas in the dry season in order to find fresh pasture. In the rainy season it is good for 
the health of the cattle to move to the dry area and avoid too much humidity. Nowadays, the 
movement from the North (dry areas) to the South (humid areas) is becoming more and more 
difficult. Sangare, a herder living in Kadomba since 6 years ago, explained his experience and 
the problem encountered in the seasonal movement with his flock (see Box 9.3). 
Box 9.3: Sangare explains the nature of herding and how he copes with the situation 
During the dry season I move with my flock to Gaoua, which is more humid, and find pastures and water for the 
cattle. I return to Kadomba in the rainy season. I left Norma in the Northern part of Kadomba because the area 
was very dry and it was difficult to find pastures and water for the cattle. Moving from Nouna to Kadomba was 
very difficult because of the presence of several crop-farms along the route. Even nowadays it is not easy to go 
in Gaoua and return to Kadomba. It is common that a cattle enters a crop-farm and causes serious damage. In this 
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case, I go to the Chefde village with the farmer and together we try to find a compromise. We try to avoid the 
fagamaw (administration) because at this level, the resolution of the problems takes more time and money. We 
have three basic problems: pastures, watering place and corridor space. There is also the problem of finding 
missilayoroko, a place where a paddock can be made to keep the cattle. During the rainy season, we need a place 
at the upstream of lands and in the dry season, we need the downstream of the lands, where we can find fresh 
pastures and trees with green leaves. 
Finding pasture and watering places for the cattle in the dry season is a crucial problem for 
the herders. During the rainy season, the herders have the problem of finding a corridor space 
because there are crop-farms everywhere. The difficulty to move with the cattle without 
causing damage to the crops in the rainy season is due to the fact that the existing corridor 
spaces were closed by the farmers. In the past the herders, could join the 'classified' forest 
of Maro and find some places where they could live peacefully with the flocks. But the farmers 
also moved to the Maro forest to cultivate the fertile lands and the herders were in trouble 
again in sharing the forest area. 
The PNGT: the ecological crisis requires interventions to halt environmental degradation 
Burkina Faso is a country where 90% of the population depends on the exploitation of land 
and natural resources such as water, forests, and pastures for their livelihoods. The 
contribution of the agricultural sector to the GNP was estimated of 30% in 1992 (PNGT, 
1995: 8). Despite this importance, the Burkinabe's bio-physical environment faces severe 
degradation since 1950 and catastrophic droughts from 1969 to 1973. The consequence is a 
long term deterioration and the emergence of fragile conditions for the development of the 
agricultural economy. The terminology used to emphasize the magnitude of the problem is 'the 
ecological crisis' (PNGT, 1995). A diagnosis of the situation was carried out and two principal 
factors were found to explain the ecological crisis: (i) physical or agro-climatic factors and (if) 
human factors (PNGT, 1995: 89). 
The first type of factor originates from the presence of endemic droughts which caused 
ecological disorders based on the degradation of the structure of the soils, the regress of annual 
rainfall, and the destruction of the vegetation cover. The second type of factor is attributed to 
the nature and the impact of human activities on the environment. Demographic pressure 
causes the reduction of fallow periods and the ever greater exploitation of the natural 
resources in general. Anarchical land clearing, shifting cultivation, burning, and excessive tree 
cutting practices as well as unsuitable land tenure systems (parcelling out of lands, conflicts 
about property which lead to insecurity) were the most critical human factors observed. 
Migration of people and uncontrolled transhumance from the degraded areas resulted from the 
ecological degradation. 
Burkina Faso governments had no alternative choice but to design interventions to halt 
the environmental degradation and create conditions for economic growth in the rural areas. 
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Box 9.4: Souleymane, a migrant farmer is disappointed with the resolution of his problems with a herder 
In 1996, a flock of cattle went into my maize farm and caused a serious damage to the plants. I succeeded to 
convey the flock to the fourrière of Kadomba. The herder was informed, he agreed on the damages and preferred 
the resolution of this problem at the level of the local police. The herder paid the pound costs (frais de fourrière) 
and went to the local police in Satiri (gendarmerie) to negotiate. I was informed later by the local police that an 
extension worker will come from Satiri to estimate the equivalent costs of my maize-crops which were damaged. 
I was waiting and nobody arrived. I explained my problem to the manager of the fourrière in Kadomba. He was 
surprised and went to Satiri to request the arrival of the extension worker in Kadomba. But until this day, nobody 
arrived. I am disappointed, I believed that the herder corrupted the local police. This problem always happens 
and we do not know what to do. 
Stakeholder analysis for the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastoral as the solution to the 
problems 
The physical planning of the Terroir in the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale involved 
the allocation of part of the lands and the vegetation for the pastoral activities (herding) to 
avoid the interference with the agricultural activities (cropping). From that point of view, the 
land owners need to sacrifice a portion of their patrimony and the herders must reduce the 
freedom of the mobility with their flocks. According to the herders, their concrete need can 
be summarized in the following key words: pastures, watering places, and corridor space. The 
concession required by the native Bobo, the landowners involved in the reorganization of the 
terroir, would limit their cultivation areas. If nothing was done to reduce this negative aspect 
Defining the problem of the aménagement of the zone sylvo-pastorale 
From the previous presentation of the perception of the problem by the immediate relevant 
stakeholders and the PNGT, one can argue that the problematic context is characterized, on 
the one hand, by serious conflicts among stakeholders; and on the other, by an anarchical 
utilization of the land based on extensive cultivation and herding. The crop-farmers (both 
native and migrant) wanted to avoid crop damage by cattle. The herders accused the farmers 
of closing the corridors for the cattle and making their movement very difficult. Conflicts 
occur with two types of herders: the herders living at the 'periphery' of Kadomba and the 
transhumants. The former destroyed the crops just after sowing periods and the latter created 
troubles during the harvesting times, especially of cotton. 
Replanning the utilization of the land areas for a sustainable use (preventing ecological 
crises) and reducing the conflicts were objectives which can only be reached through shared 
understandings, negotiated agreements and concerted actions among the stakeholders. They 
had experienced an alternative solution to the problem, the idea of the public fourrière (animal 
pound). The animals which caused damages to the crops were conveyed to the fourrière. The 
owner of the animals (cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, etc.) needs to pay the cost of the fourrière 
and the estimated damages. 
There is evidence which shows that a coercive strategy only does not solve the crucial 
problem of conflicts among the stakeholders. Rather, the problem was deepened through 
corruption according to the experience of a stakeholder in Kadomba (see Box 9.4). 
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of the trade-off (the positive one should be the reduction of crop damage and conflicts), the 
crop-farmers would be motivated to break the negotiated agreement in face of the need to 
extend their farm size or to practise shifting cultivation. The aménagement of a zone sylvo-
pastorale can affect the socio-economic position of the migrant Mossi, for example 
dispossessing them of the lands they received from the native Bobo. All these issues need a 
careful analysis for the success of the aménagement. 
According to the way the professionals of the Equipe Mobile Pluridisciplinaire (EMP) 
learned with the stakeholders at the grass-root level, the facilitation of change in the 
aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale was based on the support of the local processes which 
were facilitated by the intervention. The EMP has strong vehicles for the trips from Bobo-
Dioulasso to the intervention area. These activities were funded by the World Bank, Norway 
(NORAD), France (Caisse Française de Développement - CFD) and Germany (GTZ). 
Starting the aménagement of a ZSP: the social learning path of the PNGT team 
Village forum and collective decision-making 
The PNGT chose participatory processes to learn with the stakeholders to design jointly the 
intervention to solve the problems. The Méthode Accélérée de Recherche Participative 
(MARP), a participatory action research method was used by the EMP, a pluridisciplinary 
team. Men and women from Kadomba, be they native Bobo, migrant Mossi, or herders, were 
invited in participate to village fora. The village fora had taken place before my investigations 
started. Sanon explains the way the MARP was organized (see Box 9.5). 
Box 9.5: Sanon described the participatory action research process in Kadomba 
When the PNGT people arrived in Kadomba, they gave the idea of village assemblies to discuss our problems and 
find solutions about the way we use our 'nature' (sogoko). Later, the Chef de Village invited everybody and we 
did the assembly with the PNGT people. At the beginning they asked several questions like: 
• According to the fact that your terroir is degrading, what are the solutions you have? 
• The herders are everywhere in your terroir, what is the problem this situation causes? what are the 
solutions you have? 
• What king of relations exist between you and the neighbouring villages? 
We gave the following answers: 
• Sogoko is degrading and we are getting worried about it. 
• We have several conflicts with the herders 
• Our lands are very poor 
After that, we were divided in three groups: old men, young people5 and women. During three days we discussed 
the questions in the village. Our conclusion with respect to the conflicts between crop-farmers and herders was: 
we would like the herders to be in one side and the farmers in other side of the village territory. The PNGT 
people said that this can be possible and they can help us to achieve this goal. That was the way we started with 
the idea of the creation of the Missi-sara (sylvo-pastoral zone) in Kadomba. During the assemblies, we did some 
maps which are with the Chef de Village. The maps show the Mara (village territory) of Kadomba. 
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The main objective for organizing this forum was to facilitate collective learning so that the 
participating stakeholders would perceive the need to start the aménagement of zone sylvo-
pastorale. The implementation of this activity by the PNGT necessarily required the effective 
participation of the stakeholders. 
Dividing the participants into different groups was a way of making the collective 
learning more dynamic. For instance, the Chief of Kadomba explained that the mapping 
exercise which was done by each group was not the same. Professionals of the EMP acted as 
facilitators. Stones, sticks, and large sheets of paper were used to represent the specific areas 
of the terroir where the crop-farms of the majority of the stakeholders are located, the areas 
which were often used by the herders, and the locations where the conflicts between the crop-
farmers and the herders occur frequently. Several natural systems (rivers and their floodplain, 
forest, hills) were located by the stakeholders. Different types of maps were drawn according 
the young, the women and the old men. 
Discussion among groups of stakeholders participating in the forum was supported by 
this mapping exercise which presented a visual ground for exploring alternatives to replan the 
terroir. Collective discussion yielded different ideas and interests for decision-making. The 
village's forum was also an opportunity for the EMP to collect data based on a participatory 
rural appraisal. 
Collective decision-making at the village's forum took the form of covenants among 
the participating stakeholders for the re-organization of their terroir, as Salon said in Box 9.5: 
crop-farmers should be in one side and the herders in other side of the terroir. One can argue 
that this way of reasoning by the villagers made visible their interdependence with the herders. 
The move to this level of perception was necessary for successful collective action between 
villagers and herders. 
However, the migrant Mossi were not interested in this forum for collective decision-
making about the aménagement. Depending on the way they perceived the village's forum, 
they feared that the idea to initiate a re-organization of the terroir in Kadomba would deprive 
them of the lands they had borrowed from the native Bobo (see Box 9.6). 
Box 9.6 Ouedraogo explains the fears of the migrant Mossi about the aménagement of ZSP 
When we started with the PNGT, the idea to use the lands of Kadomba in other ways emerged. There was a 
misunderstanding between Bobo people and migrant Mossi. I do not have a problem yet. But there are some 
migrant Mossi who lost the lands they were using in the creation of a reserved forest (réserve foncière). The 
sacred zone covers their farms and they were asked to leave this area. They did not get other lands to cultivate. 
Since this event, we are not in security of the lands we are using. 
The herders did not come to the meeting: they also feared the idea of reorganizing the terroir. 
The interpretation of the native Bobo was that the herders did not like this idea of reorganizing 
the terroir because they wanted to use the whole village terroir to find pastures for their cattle. 
This interpretation was confirmed during a discussion with the herders. They would appreciate 
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the idea of creating a zone sylvo-pastorale for the rainy season, the period where there are 
many crop-farms, but during the dry seasons they would like to go beyond this zone. 
The herders did not understand the functioning of the zone sylvo-pastorale because the 
aménagement plan (as explained by PNGT professionals) did not deny their access to the 
whole village territory during the dry season. The fact that they did not participate might also 
be related to a lack of communication. 
Learning about terroir: negotiation of local plans for the aménagement of a zone sylvo-
pastorale 
The terroirs are not congruent with administrative divisions. They are based on the local 
ownership patterns. The native Bobo in Kadomba were the first to start the discussion with the 
EMP to allocate a part of their terroir for the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale. At that 
stage, the active participation of the 'families' who owned lands in the villages was very 
important for agreeing on the boundaries of the terroir. They helped the PNGT professionals 
and together an the agreement was made on the boundaries of their terroir. The terroir is 
called Mara by the native Bobo. The same procedure was done later in other villages of the 
intervention area. 
Map 9.1 presents the terroirs under siege and their respective boundaries. One can notice that 
there are some villages (e.g., Nefrelaye, Ramatoulaye, etc.) which do not have a specific 
terroir because the stakeholders who are living there, the migrant Mossi, are not land owners. 
The boundaries emerged from negotiation and interactions because the procedure to follow was 
not well known beforehand by the resource managers. 
The professionals of the EMP argued that the so-called landowners in the villages did 
not have a document which proved their ownership, but everybody agreed in the villages. 
Officially there is no recognition by the government that the Bobo are the landowners in 
Kadomba. However, the professionals decided to refer to the existing local land ownership to 
negotiate the plan. Two criteria were important. The first was that the selection of zones 
between the terroirs should be continuous to enable the improvement of corridor space. The 
selection of the zone should also be located in the areas of the terroirs where there were very 
few farms. This idea was developed to avoid the dispossession of the migrant Mossi or others. 
After Kadomba, the negotiation of physical planning occurred in the other terroirs. 
However, the enthusiasm was different (compared with Kadomba) according to the native 
Bobo in this village. For instance, the stakeholders in Bala refused at the beginning, they 
misunderstood the reason that they might allocate a certain part of their terroir to the herders. 
Of interest is the involvement of farmers in Kadomba in explaining the importance of the idea 
of the PNGT for avoiding conflicts with herders to stakeholders in other villages. The fact that 
the farmers in Kadomba understood the intervention was an advantage because this stimulated 
change in other villagers who visited Kadomba to find out what was going on. A plan for the 
aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale was made (explained below). However, it had to be 
negotiated at a higher level. Before analysing this process, I will explore how platform 
development was implemented so as to get insight into learning and negotiation processes. 
230 Platforms for resource management 
Terroir boundaries 
Developing platforms 231 
Learning about platform development in the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale 
The development of a platform for the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale was based on 
the mobilization of existing specific local organizations. The Groupement de Gestion 
Forestière (GGF), a village level structure for the exploitation of the woodlot in the Maro 
forest (see chapter 9), was involved. But so were many other local organizations. Two of them 
concerned respectively agriculture (Groupement Villageois d'Agriculteurs = GVA) and 
livestock production (Groupement Villageois d'Eleveurs = GVE). The former was the most 
powerful and constituted, specifically the organization of the cotton producers. Many villagers 
are crop farmers, or animal (cattle, goat, sheep, and pig) breeders and belong to the GVA and 
the GVE. The Comité Technique Villageois (CTV) which consists of the villagers who were 
trained in a specific domain (soil erosion control techniques, forestation techniques, 
beekeeping, etc.); and the Comité de Gestion du Matériel (CGM), those who were in charge 
of the maintenance of the tools and equipments brought by the PNGT, were involved. The 
women's organization, the Groupement Villageois Féminin (GVF) was operational in the 
villages. 
Each of those organizations had their representatives in the Comité Villageois de 
Gestion des Terroirs (CVGT), an organizational structure for solving problems with respect 
to the gestion des terroirs, at the village level, which did not correspond necessarily to the 
terroir level (see fig. 9.1). At the level of the terroir, the Comité Villageois de Gestion du 
Terroir (CVGT), the resource management structure, was created and the leaders were chosen 
among the representatives of the CVGV. The resolution of many problems, as was the case 
in the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale, required a decision making structure across 
terroirs. The creation of an Ad hoc committee was based on the choice of representatives from 
the CVGTs which were concerned. Figure 9.1 shows three different levels of the 
representation and organization for the gestion des terroirs and especially for the aménagement 
of a zone sylvo-pastorale. 
The development of the platform for the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale 
involving the existing local organizations was expected to enable the mobilization of the local 
people's experience. The different socioeconomic groups involved was expected to have a 
voice in the aménagement and stimulate a holistic view of the solution to the problems 
identified. Another reason was that conflicts would be avoided among the existing local 
organizations in the execution of activities for the aménagement and to promote a synergy 
among them. 
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Figure 9.1: Levels of the ecosystem and platforms for the aménagement of a zone sylvo-
pastorale 
Facilitating platforms for concrete action in the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale 
Negotiation and mediation for the official recognition of the aménagement plans 
After having negotiated the plans at the level of the stakeholders, the next step was the official 
agreement at the higher level, the Houet province. The plan needed to be discussed in relation 
with the government plan. The government physical national plan, the Aménagement de 
Territoire (cf. PNGT, 1995), focuses on harmonious development of the national terroir for 
a better distribution of the population and the activities they perform according to: (i) the 
constraints and potential of the natural milieu, (ii) technical and human capacities, (iii) 
economic necessities, and the interactions and the socio-economic characteristics of the 
regions. The Aménagement du Territoire is a frame of reference for poUtical authorities at the 
levels of nation, regions and the provinces. The physical planning which was done by the EMP 
and the stakeholders should be consistent with the provincial plan. This accommodation 
between the 'local' plan and the provincial one took a considerable amount of negotiation and 
discussions (see Box 9.7). 
Box 9.7: Debating the plan of the aménagement of a ZSP in a forum at the province level 
A forum chaired by the Haut Commissaire of the Province of Houet was organized to discuss, among others, the 
plan for the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale. Fifty participants were at this forum which involved political 
authorities of the province, directors of regional directorates (environment, social action, rural promotion, 
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urbanism, etc.), journalists, weather forecast service representatives, representatives of the NGOs, and the 
representative of the PNGT. At this forum, three points were treated: (i) presentation of the PNGT to the 
assembly; (ii) presentation of the plans for zone sylvo-pastorale; and (iii) the examination of the plans. The Haut 
Commissaire of the Houet province opened the forum and emphasized the degradation of the environment which 
motivated the emergence of the gestion des terroirs approach. The participants were informed that the plans which 
will be examined is the outcome of the work of the PNGT at the grassroot level. The presentation of the plan 
raised several questions. Examples of important questions which were asked to the PNGT professionals in the 
following. The first question concerned the legal recognition of the farmers' organization that are functional and 
the extent to which they could be sustained. Is dividing the terroir in the intervention area an appropriate practice? 
Ro what extent are administrative authorities of the Département integrated in the process of plan elaboration? 
The PNGT people reacted and said that the implementation of the plan will focus on village organizations. There 
is a procedure for the official recognition of farmers' organisations. The problem is not dividing the terroir, but 
how the villagers can continue to respect the different zones identified for aménagement. The participants 
recommended a clear statement of the possibilities and the limits of the competence of the stakeholders. The plan 
for the aménagement of terroirs was adopted by the participants. 
The fact that the participants in the discussion forum made suggestions to the EMP for the 
improvement of the plans of the aménagement stimulated another role for the professionals: 
the mediation between the 'bottom' (stakeholders) and the 'top' (actors at the province level). 
The role of the mediation was defined in terms of the conciliation of the aménagement plans 
generated at the grassroot level and the conception of the Aménagement du Territoire at the 
level of the province. Mediation was one way to incorporate different values and aspirations 
from the 'bottom' to the level of development plans at the 'top'. The plan adopted for the 
aménagement was the one which was negotiated with the stakeholders at the grass-root level 
(see map 9.2). 
The implementation of activities in the aménagement of zone sylvo-pastorale 
After negotiation and mediation in the forum at the province level, the EMP returned to the 
grassroot level to implement, with the stakeholders, the activities in the aménagement of a 
zone sylvo-pastorale. The principle of the gestion des terroirs based on participation and 
'responsabilisation' of the local people was applied (cf. PNGT, 1995:17). The activities were 
organized jointly between the professionals of the PGRN and the members of the Comité 
Villageois de Gestion des Terroirs. The tasks they faced were: the training of some 
stakeholders, the organization of the activities and the financial and technical support. 
The activities in the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale were the following: 
establishing the boundaries of the zone to be improved, fixing landmarks or painting the trees 
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at the borders of this zone to mark out the boundaries, and tracing the corridor space in the 
zone with landmarks in cement. Some stakeholders were trained to perform these activities. 
The landmarks in cement were made with the locally available labour. 
Using local labour for the activities for setting the boundaries provided an additional 
source of income because the PNGT assisted the worker financially. They got 500 FCFA per 
day for participating in these activities. 
The incentives for the stakeholders in participating to the activities 
Another type of incentive was the official visit and encouragement from political authorities 
at high level. An example was the visit of the Minister of Agriculture and Animal Resources 
of Burkina Faso in Kadomba to congratulate the stakeholders. This initiative was well-
appreciated in the village. The local people always referred to this event during this study. 
They believed that they should continue to do the activities with the PNGT in order to 
maintain their privileged position. 
The first activities implemented by the intervention, the composting technique {fosses 
fumières), were successful. The stakeholders discovered that the yield of their farm could be 
increased and they did not need to extend the size of their farm. The success of this innovation 
introduced was perceived by the stakeholders as an incentive to continue the activities with the 
EMP. 
Support institutions for the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale 
The study found that support institutions for aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale have 
several dimensions. The first dimension is a clear assignment of responsibility between the 
relevant organizations for supporting the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale. The 
theoretical and methodological backgrounds of the gestion des terroirs in Burkina Faso (see 
PNGT, 1995) explains the way NGOs, government and private organizations should be 
involved in the gestion des terroirs activities. Participatory appraisal and participation in 
discussion fora for the adoption of physical plans offered opportunities for cooperation. A new 
role of the extension organization, the DRARA (Direction Régionale de l'Agriculture et des 
Ressources Animales) was defined in terms of the intensification of the Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale 
production. The new role of the Recherche-Développement concerned the follow-up of the 
stakeholders to identify their constraints in other to generate adapted solutions in the context 
of the gestion des terroirs. The Recherche-Développement is a section of the Agricultural 
Research Organization such as the INERA (Institut d'Etudes et de Recherches Agricoles) of 
Burkina Faso. The assignment of activities was an important issue in the gestion des terroirs, 
especially the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale, because a great deal of money was 
involved in the implementation of the activities and all the organizations concerned in the rural 
development activities wanted to participate, but often had no clear idea about their 
contribution. 
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The second dimension concerned the definition of property rights to allow a long term security 
of the investments involved in the aménagement. Unfortunately, there still is a confusion due 
to the coexistence of 'modern institutions' such as the RAF (Réorganisation Agraire et 
Foncière) and the customary land tenure system (de Zeeuw, 1995). 
Analysing the effectiveness of the intervention 
A strong point that can be learnt from the intervention in the aménagement of the zone sylvo-
pastorale was the attempt of professionals to link grass-root development to the level of policy 
ascribed above. The facilitation of the aménagement took the form of mediation between the 
stakeholders and actors at the higher level of the social aggregation. In that aspect, resource 
management activities resulted from a negotiated agreement at a higher platform. 
9.5 Anticipating on the nature of platforms for the Gestion of the Zone Sylvo-Pastorale 
Anticipating on problems perceived by stakeholders 
Current problems perceived by stakeholders 
What will be the role of the crop farmers after the creation of the zone sylvo-pastoralel One 
informant said that the crop-farmers do not have an answer because this problem basically 
concerns the herders. It is their responsibihty to decide wether other herders should join them 
to use the zone sylvo-pastorale. According to the herders, the creation of the zone sylvo-
pastorale should attract other herders if the same idea is not developed in many other regions. 
They would not be able to chase those herders. The zone sylvo-pastorale should be the main 
concern of both herders and crop-farmers. 
A discussion with a group of 6 herders revealed that they were worried about the 
aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale. The fact that they did not participate in the village 
forum meant that they did not have a clear idea about the way the zone sylvo-pastorale will be 
used. This misunderstanding might create serious problems. But, a professional of the EMP 
of Houet Province interpreted their absence as a strategy of the herders to not follow the rules 
of the functioning of the zone sylvo-pastorale (see Box 9.8) 
Box 9.8: A professional of the EMP-Houet interprets the strategy of the herders 
'I do not understand why the herders complain. I think that they are developing a strategy to settle in the zone 
sylvo-pastoral, or maybe, how they can get a space in this zone. But this is forbidden by the legal statement of 
the plans, since we created several infrastructures (parking of vaccination of the animals, watering places, etc.) 
in Weredara (herders' hamlet near Kadomba) for the herders, they should not complain. We explained also that 
the herders should not be in the zone sylvo-pastorale the whole year. During the dry season, when the farmers 
have completed the harvesting of their crops, they should go to other zones. 
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Defining the dimensions of the problem and prospective solutions 
The first dimension of the problem concerns the maintenance of the infrastructures mentioned 
above. For instance, users such as transhumants are not necessary located in any terroir, and 
making them contribute to public goods would be very be very difficult like the problem of 
exclusion from public goods. The stakeholders were thinking already about the solution to this 
problem. The idea of doing a survey to locate the herders on the terroirs and to know the size 
of their flocks was explained by the secretary of the CGT in Kadomba. One can understand 
the need to define a user group of the zone sylvo-pastorale in order to find a solution for the 
problem of support of the imrastructures in the zone sylvo-pastorale (see Box 9.9) 
Box 9.9: A perspective on solution for the maintenance of the infrastructure of the Zone sylvo-pastorale according 
to a secretary of the CGT 
When the zone sylvo-pastorale will be created, we will count the number of came the herders have. There are 
also some fanners who keep their own cattle. A tax will be defined for those who have a flock of cattle and would 
like to use the watering place in the Zone sylvo-pastorale and maybe 200 F CFA/animal/year can be paid. We 
need to control the zone sylvo-pastorale avoid that many herders will come from other regions to benefit. A 
meeting will be organized with the herders and I am sure that they will accept. 
The problem of making transhumants contribute to the maintenance of the infrastructure was 
not addressed in the idea of the secretary of the CGT. Thinking of a sedentary group of 
herders in the zone sylvo-pastorale would be a great mistake because from that point of view, 
only a part of the problem can be solved. 
The second dimension of the problem would be the development covering the many 
terroirs which hold the zone sylvo-pastorale to maintain corridor space (see map 9.2). The 
strategy of the EMP for solving this problem was to create a forum by which the stakeholders 
could agree on a form of the organization between terroirs for managing the zone sylvo-
pastorale. But other issues also emerged. How should the stakeholders contribute to sustain 
such an organization? How should the organizations between terroirs be maintained and who 
will provide the cost of its functioning? 
The third dimension of the problem concerns the allocation and regulation of the 
natural resources such as water and pasture for the cattle, and exploitation of the fuelwood by 
the stakeholders. During the discussion with the professionals of the PNGT, the idea of the 
'carrying capacity' was developed. A system of rotational grazing would be developed. 
According to the content of the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale, a watering place was 
planned which could serve for 4 000 cattle per annual. Moreover, given the fact that the 
movement of the transhumants is unpredictable in the region, the idea of the 'carrying 
capacity' for the allocation and regulation of natural resources can hardly be expected to work. 
According to me, knowing the dimensions of the problems is a good starting point. 
Instead of thinking about a pre-conceived solutions like using norms based on the idea of 
carrying capacity, I take for the granted that, on the one hand, the adapted solutions can only 
result from a learning process with the stakeholders, and on the other, that the facilitation of 
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change will involve new roles for the intervention such as the conflict resolution and mediation 
for the allocation and regulation of the use of the natural resources in the zone sylvo-pastorale. 
The nature of the social learning for successful resource management in the zone sylvo-
pastorale 
Unlike the situation at the beginning of the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale, the 
involvement of the herders should be a priority because they are the main stakeholders for the 
exploitation of the zone sylvo-pastorale. But the herders do really not have a terroir and the 
lands do not belong to them. For this point of view, the native Bobo, the owners of the land, 
are also important. The learning processes must take place at the level of the zone sylvo-
pastorale, with all the stakeholders and, from the organizational point of view, involve the 
platforms for the governance of the zone sylvo-pastorale. 
Developing curricula through experiential learning for improving and monitoring the physical 
state of the Zone sylvo-pastorale 
The improvement of the physical state of the zone sylvo-pastorale will require learning 
processes for developing indicators which should be well-understood by the stakeholders. The 
indigenous observation of the zone sylvo-pastorale and the indicators used for appreciating the 
good health of the natural resources (e.g., pastures) should be carefully developed. The 
importance of indicators is related to the fact that they should provide tools for anticipating on 
the water depletion and the degradation of the pastures. The indicators can be developed on 
the basis of an experiential learning with the stakeholders. 
Bio-physical scientists should be mobilized at the level of the zone sylvo-pastorale to help 
improve the natural resources. A previous study in Burkina Faso (cf. Hien, 1995) 
demonstrated that improvement of the zone sylvo-pastorale can be brought about through 
physico-chemical and biological measures. But the appropriation of new methods for 
improving of the zone sylvo-pastorale by the stakeholders should be realized through 
experiential learning with them. For instance, do the bush fires improve or degrade the 
pasture? When and how they should be used? Such issues should be subject of experiential 
learning with the stakeholders. 
Learning with the stakeholders about their roles in face of emergencies 
There are many problems in the management of resources in the zone sylvo-pastorale and their 
resolution is possible only if the participation of stakeholders is effective. A concrete example 
is trying to locate those who benefit without contributing to the maintenance of infrastructures 
in the zone sylvo-pastorale. 
The nature of the natural resources such water and pastures are vulnerable to depletion. 
Conflicts can arise among competitive wants. The problem is also that the new comers might 
not know the rules of using the zone sylvo-pastorale. A critical issue is the exclusion of 
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aspirant users without conflict. The development of strategies for resolving such types of 
conflicts should be the core for social learning. In many situations, the resolution of the 
conflicts is left to the political authorities who often use the police. Instead, one should seek 
negotiated agreement, and avoid worsening the problems by corruption (see §9.3). In this 
respect, the prevention of conflicts and wars because of the passage or temporary settlement 
of transhumants is a key issue. Agreement only among the stakeholders for the zone sylvo-
pastorale about their own interaction is not enough. Instead, they should agree also on 
concerted action with respect to other stakeholders, such as transhumant herders. 
The nature of the platforms for resource management in the zone sylvo-pastorale 
The types of resource management activities in the zone sylvo-pastorale determines the nature 
of the stakeholders and the levels at which they should take concerted actions (see table 9.1). 
There are some activities (e.g., maintenance of the corridor space and watering places) which 
can only be effective if concerted actions among stakeholders in different terroirs is effective. 
Table 9.1: Resource management activities in the Zone sylvo-pastorale and level of 
effectiveness 
Resource management 
activities in the zone 
sylvo-pastorale 
The relevant 
stakeholders 
Level of the 
effectiveness 
Comments 
Maintenance of 
corridor space 
Herders/farmers Many terroirs are 
concerned 
Herders have to respect the 
corridor space and the farmers do 
not cultivate there 
Water use by herds 
and maintenance of 
infrastructures 
Herders/farmers Many terroirs are 
concerned 
Representative of many terroirs 
may not be relevant. The 
agreement on the rules and 
regulation for the water use and 
the contribution for the 
maintenance of the infrastructure 
are important 
Folder cultivation for 
cattle 
Herders Many terroirs are 
concerned depending 
on the location of the 
herders 
Regulation of use, and exclusion 
of those who did not contribute 
should be the core issue 
Tree planting and 
woodlot exploitation 
Farmers Terroir When the villagers of a terroir are 
interested in tree planting and the 
wood exploitation 
The platform for resource management in the zone sylvo-pastorale should not be the 
same as the CVGT. The ad hoc commission, the structure of the decision-making between 
different terroirs would not be effective because the representatives were selected among the 
members of the CVGT. The herders who did not have any organization in the villages were 
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not involved. The zone sylvo-pastorale can be governed effectively if platforms at different 
levels are operational. 
What does the Gestion of the Zone sylvo-pastorale imply for the facilitation of future 
concrete actions and platforms? 
New roles for the intervention in the gestion the zone sylvo-pastorale 
The common thought about the 'responsabilisation' and the participation of the stakeholders 
in the burkinabè's context was based on the idea of the promotion of local organization capable 
of generating 'sustainable' development of the local economy. The concepts like the transfer 
of competencies to local collectivities, decision-making autonomy, and the transfer of certain 
decision-making powers were used to explain how they should enable the socio-economic 
development of local collectivities (cf PNGT, 1995: 24-5). 
From that point of view, everybody believed that the realization of these conditions 
would mean the end of the intervention, for instance, in the particular case of the Zone sylvo-
pastorale. This question was raised also during the forum discussion held in Bobo-Dioulasso 
about the aménagement plans developed at the grass-root level, the intervention site of the 
PNGT in the Houet province (see Box 9.7). The professionals in the EMP should not fold 
their arms after the creation of the Zone sylvo-pastorale. Many new roles should be relevant 
for the intervention in order to sustain the use of the zone sylvo-pastorale. 
The observation was made, during the discussion forum about the zone sylvo-pastorale 
at the provincial level, that many litigations and cases under dispute arise which surpass the 
competence of the stakeholders. Examples are the presence of transhumants who cause 
conflicts and wars, boycotting an agreement of the physical plan of the zone sylvo-pastorale, 
the exclusion of potential stakeholders from opportunities in the zone sylvo-pastorale, etc. This 
conclusion suggests that the new roles of public intervention should be conflict resolution, and 
trying to mediate disputes among the stakeholders for maintaining the institotions of the Zone 
sylvo-pastorale. The role of the mediation of the intervention should be to ensure an equitable 
access and control over the zone sylvo-pastorale. 
Incentives for maintaining successful collective action by the stakeholders 
The extension activities in the intervention area focused on the restoration of the fertility of 
the soils, a crucial problem of the stakeholders (crop-farmers). The farmers were organized 
in working groups (Groupe de Travail) for their training in composting techniques. Such a 
contribution of NGOs to the restoration of the fertility of the soils was found also in Kadomba. 
For instance, the NGO GERN (Gestion des Ressources Naturelles = Natural Resource 
Management) was working with the Groupement Naam6). 
Working together with stakeholders to intensify their cropping systems should be seen 
as a great incentive for mamtaining the zone sylvo-pastorale. The role of the extension and the 
NGOs should be seen in terms of an incentive to participate in the maintenance of the zone 
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sylvo-pastorale. Many stakeholders noticed the importance of composting techniques for 
increasing the yield without increasing the farm size. This learning of the native Bobo in 
particular should be an important motivation point for mamteining the zone sylvo-pastorale. 
Conducive policy contexts for the exploitation of the Zone sylvo-pastorale 
The aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale was implemented without any clear statement of 
the land tenure issue. The accommodation with the landowners allowed the continuation of the 
activities of the aménagement. But the main beneficiaries of the zone sylvo-pastorale are the 
herders who have no land rights. Political measures become relevant to support the 
maintenance of the zone sylvo-pastorale. If no action is taking, the native Bobo should claim 
their lands in the future. 
Many processes in the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale occurred at the grassroot 
levels. The transfer of statutory power to this level is important to enable decision-making and 
statutory prerogatives. This idea was called decentralization in the Burkinabe's context. The 
realization of this objective should be a strong political shift which would strengthen many 
development processes at the grassroot level and especially resource management in the zone 
sylvo-pastorale. 
9.6 Conclusions 
Many factors that contribute to the success of the development of platforms for the 
aménagement of a zone sylvo pastorale. First, perceived interdependence among potential 
stakeholders was a driving force for successful collective action. This interdependence 
becomes visible through the repeated conflicts between crop-farmers and herders. They can 
only reduce their suffering if they come together to learn to change the course of conflict 
situations. Unlike the situation in Benin (chapter 5, Save area), the villagers who had decision 
making capacity took a great deal of responsibility. 
Second, existing organizations in the villages enable the development of platforms for 
collective learning at the level of villages, terroirs, and intst-terroirs. However, the 
stakeholders can only maintain the zone sylvo-pastorale if they keep up the momentum for the 
aménagement, and find ways to exclude other stakeholders from the zone sylvo-pastorale. New 
roles are required for professionals, such as monitoring, conflict resolution and mediation. All 
these issues are important for the sustainability of the management of the zone sylvo-pastorale. 
Notes 
1. For instance, in Burkina Faso, the professional changed the notion of the Gestion des Terroirs Villageois in 
Gestion des Terroirs to adopt inter-village perspective (for more information see PNGT, 1995). 
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2. The PNGT was carrying out many activities: forest management, watershed development, soil fertility 
improvement, etc. The aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale is only one aspect of their activities. 
3. The administrative structure in Burkina Faso has the following levels: first the State is divided into Regions, a 
region is divided into Provinces, a Province is divided into Départements, a Département is divided into Communes, 
and each Commune involves many villages. 
4. The cost of the fourrière is 500 FCFA per day and per cattle. 
5. The difference between old men and young men is not clearly explained. However, most of the family head of 
big compounds. 
6. The Groupement Naam is a form of local organisation which started among Mossi people in Burkina Faso. For 
more information, see Ouédraogo, 1989. 
Part 3: Synthesis & Conclusions 

10. Synthesis and Comparative Analysis 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a synthesis and comparative analysis of the case studies presented in Part 
3. Many issues, be they theoretical or practical for successful resource management, are 
raised. The case studies are used here as learning experiences from which theories emerge. 
The arguments in this chapter serve one purpose: understanding the facilitation of deliberate 
interventions with respect to resource management. 
The definition of resource management problems in the chapter 2 suggests that 
collective action is the first puzzle. The platform, i.e., realizing collective resource 
management at the appropriate ecosystem levels, is identified as the second puzzle. 
For that reason, coupled system thinking is adopted as a perspective for studying 
resource management problems. In the present chapter, these two puzzles of collective 
resource management are revisited. After that, on the one hand, the effects of social learning 
for realizing the conditions for effective resource management are analysed. On the other, the 
implications are analysed of facilitating resource management puzzles for: (i) problem 
definitions, (ii) strategies for influencing behavioural change, (iii) institutions and organization, 
and (iv) policy contexts. Conditions for maintaining for effective resource management are 
discussed and some lessons from the case studies about the Adaptive Resource Management 
(ARM) notion are drawn. 
In all, this chapter mainly addresses the third research question in chapter 2: Can fresh 
ideas, concepts and theories, be identified to support the facilitation of deliberate ARM 
interventions towards greater sustainability? 
10.2 Resource management problems revisited 
What is the nature of the resource management problems? 
The different types of resource management dilemmas discussed in this chapter have been 
identified in the case studies (see Table 10.1). A new problem that emerges especially in the 
Lake Aheme case is the so-called second order dilemma. 
The second order dilemma is a phenomenon related to the move of a resource management 
problem to the policy level, especially in the ambiance of an electoral system such as Benin. 
Any political decision about an endangered ecosystem under siege is not neutral and will 
demand sacrifices of the stakeholders. Such a situation is qualified by the 'destitution' of the 
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Case studies Examples of public goods Examples of common goods Nature of resource management problems 
Lake Aheme institutions and organizations for the lake; fish, shrimp, crab; Public good dilemma, ecological and social 
collective Akaja; Hwédo for a group crises, common good dilemma, assurance problem, 
second-order dilemma 
Rangeland corridor space; institutions and organizations pastures, water for cattle social crises, public good dilemma 
for rangeland (COGEF) 
Watershed contour lines with vétiver; gullies; rainfall water ecological crises, public good dilemma 
gallery forest, CGT; UIGREN 
Women's infrastructures for producing organic matter; *** public good dilemma, assurance 
group the group itself; REDAD problem 
Maro forest fire-break; trees; GGF; inter-village, trees (woodlot) ecological crises, public good 
organizations dilemma, assurance problem 
GZSP" corridor space; fire-break; CVGT pastures, water for cattle. ecological crises, public good 
inter-terroir committee; fodder trees (woodlot) dilemma, assurance problem 
= Gestion zone sylvo-pastorale 
Table 10.1: Examples of public and common goods, and the nature of resource management problems in the case studies 
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stakeholders (Bennett, 1990). Political authorities prefer to be neutral or maintain the laisser-
aller because they fear that taking measures might make some stakeholders unhappy which has 
implications for controlling people, and for strategies for acquiring stakeholders' votes. The 
second order dilemma in the African context, as in the situation around Lake Aheme in Benin, 
can be understood also through the parable of Bayart (1989): 'the politics of the belly' (La 
politique du ventre). In many situations, the second-order dilemma denotes the choice between 
controlling the stakeholders and mamtaining political power. This choice overshadows the 
issue of taking political measures to solve problems related to resource management. The 
second order dilemma has the consequence of raising the cost for resource management, and 
of creating a very complex situation for future generations. 
How and when do resource management problems evolve? 
Public goods dilemmas 
A public good dilemma is a crucial problem that emerges in various situations in the case 
studies. The problem is related to providing and maintaining regenerative practices, and 
functioning institutions and organizations for resource management. 
• The motivation of the stakeholders not to contribute (or contribute less) is very high 
when they perceive that they can benefit from improvements due to regenerative 
practices or the performance of institutions and organizations, without being detected 
by others. Wade (1988) explains this phenomenon by the expression 'noticeability of 
cheating'. 
• The failure to detect the stakeholders, who perceive incentives to free-ride acerbates 
the public good dilemma. The Lake Aheme case illustrates this problem while the 
ability to monitor contributions in the cases of the resource-flow management and the 
Maro Forest enable the exclusion of the free-riders. 
• A comparison of sanctioning structure for resource use in Lake Aheme during the pre-
colonial and post-colonial times (fishing police) suggests that the less rigid the 
monitoring and sanctioning structure for preventing and punishing free-riders, the more 
frequent public goods dilemmas arise. The free-riders do not fear to be detected and 
punished or believe that they can get out trouble by means of corruption, as happened 
around Lake Aheme. 
Ecological and social crises 
• An ecological crisis is perceived as a problem by the stakeholders when it makes sense 
to them or seriously affects their livelihoods. 
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The frame of reference, and solutions and opportunities stakeholders had for using the 
ecosystem under siege, affect their perception on the ecological crisis (example of the 
watershed cases in Mono and Ouesse. 
Ecological crises perceived at the policy level (e.g., in long term planning) are not 
always immediately shared by the stakeholders. This is the case for the gestion des terroirs 
programmes in Benin and Burkina Faso. Also, not all the ecological crises can be 
instrumentally shown. The way one learns towards a shared understanding is challenging. 
Perceived ecological crises are experienced differently by various interest coalitions or groups 
of stakeholders. From that point of view, what one considers as an ecological crises can only 
emerge from an agreement, which is the outcome of interaction and negotiation. 
• The ecological crisis is socially constructed as an emergent property of a soft-system, 
as the cases of Lake Aheme, the rangeland in Benin and Burkina Faso (AZSP), reveal. 
All the conflict situations in the case studies are illustrative. The diversity of resource use 
practices of various groups and coalitions of stakeholders in the ecosystem under siege creates 
arenas of conflict among different interest coalitions and tensions as in the cases of the Lake 
Aheme and rangeland (Benin and Burkina Faso). Therefore social crises, especially conflicts, 
emerge when the actions of one group/coalition of the stakeholders affect the others' activities 
and livelihoods. A particular issue which emerges from the Lake Aheme case is the role of a 
third party capable of mediating disputes and establishing social justice about the appropriation 
of common goods. The absence of such a third party favours the emergence of social crises. 
In these conditions, conflicts become a refusal to accept attempts by one group /coalition of 
stakeholders to exert powers over the use of natural resources. 
• Social crises evolve when the stakeholders fail to agree upon institutions and 
organisations for resource management to avoid situations characterized by anarchy 
and chaos. 
Common goods dilemmas 
• Common good dilemmas represent market failure to regulate natural resource use. 
Scarcity is a crucial issue because the scarce the natural resources (common goods), 
the more they are economically valued. 
The historical approach adopted for analysing the Lake Aheme case shows that the 
common good dilemma emerges in a situation where scarcity of common goods leads to 
competitive arenas. 
• Perceived 'self-efficacy' by the stakeholders in competitive arenas of resource use 
acerbates a common good dilemma. The concept of 'self-efficacy' is explained by 
Bandura (1977, 1982). Here, perceived efficacy is the individual stakeholder's 
expectation that he/she will be able to affect the outcomes. 
• The lake Aheme case reveals also that the lack of alternative economic opportunities 
for the stakeholders, and degradation of their likelihoods, acerbate common good 
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dilernmas. According to Holling & Sanderson (1996), stakeholders aim for continuity 
and stability, while a natural resource which is used can be become scarce. 
The assurance problem 
Assurance problems should not be confounded with public good or common good dilemma. 
The difference lies in the fact that the behaviour of the stakeholders is conditioned by the way 
they perceive their fellows or the effectiveness of existing mechanisms for resolving resource 
use dilemmas. 
• The Lake Aheme case reveals that the loosening of sanctioning structures stimulates 
the emergence of the assurance problem. 
• The presence of corruption also enhances the assurance problem. The loss of trust in 
resource use institutions and organizations has the same effect. 
• The assurance problem becomes visible when individual stakeholders are invited to 
contribute financially to the realization of a collective infrastructure (public good) for 
resource management. Meanwhile, the assurance problem is less important for 
contributions to labour for collective work. 
This proposition is based on the watershed case in Benin. Collective work, for instance 
digging gullies for protecting village mud houses against erosion, enable some stakeholders 
to monitor directly whether his fellows are contributing. 
• In the resource-flow management case, the invisibility of the women, their few 
contributions during meetings about individual contributions for the realization of 
public goods, is conducive to the assurance problem. 
10.3 Solving resource management problems: the need for collective action 
Empirical evidence of collective action in resource management 
Collective action has been perceived as key first condition for solving resource management 
problems in chapter 2. Public good dilemmas, common good dilemmas and assurance 
problems can only be solved if collective action is effective. Ecological and social crises can 
be solved if the stakeholders share understanding of the problem. 
Collective action is a necessary condition because, as is demonstrated in the cases, the 
solution of conflicts and dilemmas can only result from interaction, negotiation, mediation and 
conflict resolution (for example rangeland and aménagement cases). The second-order 
dilemma was found to be a major constraint to effective political measures. A condition for 
solving it could be the facilitation of organizations and institutions at the grass-root level that 
integrate politics and ecology (Dryzek, 1995). Yet an ecological democracy at the grass-roots 
level or a collective 'green environmental' movement to breaking impasses did not emerge in 
Benin. 
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All the case studies show that collective action is effective where a relative success in resource 
management has been achieved. Stinting/quota measures and distributive fishery resources for 
the Akaja practice in the Lake Aheme, during the colonial period, were not successful because 
the stakeholders did not accept collective action. Policy prerogatives for establishing social 
justice, equity and enabling conditions for breaking impasses around Lake Aheme did not 
succeed because two coalitions of stakeholders (Xha people and Akaja users) did not act 
collectively. However the governance of this lake was successful when the stakeholder adopted 
collective action during the pre-colonial times. The case of the women's group in Djeffa 
reveals that regenerative practices such as resource-flow management are conditioned by 
successful collective action and by active participation of the stakeholders to provide many 
public goods. Co-management practices for the Maro Forest in Burkina Faso involve 
successful collective action to maintain firebreaks and keep the forest from being destroyed by 
unexpected bushfires. 
Can successful collective action be generated for resource management? 
Despite the empirical evidence, in many circumstances, the realization of collective action for 
joint benefits is unlikely especially for large groups as found in resource management context. 
The theory of Olson (1978), the logic of collective action, assumes the difficulty of getting 
individuals to achieve joint welfare as opposed to individual welfare. Wade (1988) synthesizes 
the theory as follows: (i) voluntary collective action will not produce public goods; (if) 
collective action based on selective positive or negative incentives may produce public goods. 
Following Olson (1978), collective action problems have attracted many scholars in the field 
of social psychology (e.g., Messick, 1983), and political sciences (Hardin, 1982; Sandler, 
1992). Their work is mostly based on empirical analyses of factors that affect collective action. 
Collective action is a main concern in the 'common-pool resources' theory. Steins & Edwards 
(1998: 3) identify conditions to realize collective action from the work of Wade (1988), 
Ostrom (1990) and Pinkerton & Weinstein (1995). Lessons from the present study suggest 
that: 
• Collective action is not only the action done together by two or many people (Sandler, 
1992: 1). It means also that individual actions are consistent with norms, rules, etc. 
agreed upon collectively. Collective action can be expressed through the willingness 
of many stakeholders to act beyond their individual interest, maybe, because of stimuli 
from their environment. 
The case studies suggest that, for effective sustainable collective resource management, some 
important issues need to be analysed further. First, we shall provide empirical examination of 
the effects of social learning on collective action. Second, the implications of the facilitation 
of successful collective action (e.g., institutions, policy contexts) are analysed. Third, 
conditions for mamtaining successful collective action are discussed. 
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Meanwhile, what are the levels of collective action for resource management in 
ecosystems under siege? The answer to this question is difficult. The second puzzle for 
resource management perceived in chapter 2 appears again. In order to discuss the issues 
raised above, the notion of the coupled system will be used to answer the question about the 
levels of collective action. 
10.4 Coupled systems characterisation for resource management: the need for 
platform(s) 
The coupled system is perceived as a relevant concept for the 'soft-side of land use' (Roling, 
1997). This concept is also operationalized in chapter 2. The case studies suggest that the 
understanding and characterization of coupled systems for resource management remains a 
major issue. Especially, the boundary problem is critical. The discussion below may provide 
some ideas for a coupled system characterization. 
Ecosystem level(s) for effective resource management: the boundary problem 
From the ecological point of view, perceived ecosystem level(s) at which resource management 
can be effective depend on the structure (organizing principles) and functions (biodiversity, 
ecological services) of the ecosystems under siege. Previous discussions (in chapter 2) have 
led to the proposition of four types of ecosystems. 
Lake Aheme shows that the effects of ecological services and the functioning of 
biodiversity (natural regulation of salinity; reproduction of fish species) can only be well-
appreciated at the level of the lake. Fishery resources cannot be easily subdivided for 
management purposes (e.g., rationing of use). But the watershed and forestry cases show that 
regenerative practices can be implemented in many parts of the ecosystem. 
In chapter 2, the issue of boundary is discussed only for the rangeland ecosystem. 
However, Ostrom (1990: 90) argues that defining the boundaries is an important criterion for 
mamteining 'common-pool resource institutions in general. The boundary problem is crucial 
for the conceptualization of resource management for the ecosystems under siege. Below, some 
concrete propositions are enumerated according to the lessons drawn from the case studies. 
• The case studies suggest that what emerges as boundaries, depends on the purpose, 
perception, interpretation, and interests of the stakeholders, and other actors at higher 
levels of social aggregation who are concerned with resource management. Ecosystem 
boundaries reflect a policy issue. According to Mougenont & Mormont (1997), the 
boundaries evolve from the qualification and designation of areas perceived to be 
managed. 
This outcome is noticed in the watershed development in Benin and the AZSP in 
Burkina Faso where the choice of the intervention areas for resource management is 
incorporated in the planning processes by the government. The rangeland cases in Kemon and 
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Save show that the boundaries are embedded in property right issues based on territories 
controlled by individual stakeholders, social groups, and communities. However, the 
boundaries are variable depending on the perception and the activities of the stakeholders. 
Herders have a different way of interpreting the boundaries. For instance the geographical 
location and availability of key natural resources (rivers as watering places, availability of 
pasture according to seasons, etc.) are some key parameters. 
• The ecosystem boundary is socially constructed, i.e., negotiable and arbitrarily set up 
through interaction among stakeholders, an emergent property of a soft system. 
As for the Lake Aheme case, different coalitions of stakeholders in conflict perceived 
their interdependence at the level of the lake for effective resource management. The 
delimitations of the terroirs and the identification of a ZSP and a voie sylvo-pastoral (corridor 
space) in Burkina Faso are based on interaction and negotiation with stakeholders in different 
villages. 
Implications of the boundary problem for stakeholder identification 
Who are the stakeholders perceived to be involved in resource management? This is not a 
simple question. Most of our case studies reveal that the stakeholders emerge temporally 
according to existing opportunities, the functioning of local organizations, ecological crises 
(e.g., drought and transhumance of herders), etc. A second critical issue with respect to 
stakeholder identification concerns the understanding of the existing legally and socially 
sanctioned ability for exclusion. Below, some concrete ideas are synthesized and existing 
mechanisms for exclusion of stakeholders in resource management situations are discussed. 
• Existing organizations in the local setting, which are operational for resource 
management, offer an entry point for the identification of the stakeholders. They 
emerge from conflicts of interests and tensions between activities in resource use 
arenas. To focus on interest coalitions in the ecosystem under siege is a good start for 
thinking about the crucial resource management problem (Lake Aheme case). 
• Stakeholders can be identified by their perceived interdependence in the ecosystem 
under siege. A typical example is the watershed development case. Success of 
downstream stakeholders depends on upstream stakeholders. Improvements by 
upstream stakeholders are beneficial for downstream stakeholders (watershed case). 
• Stakeholders are often arbitrarily identified in ill-defined social structures according to 
the goals or purposes one seeks to realize. However, the watershed development case 
poses a concrete problem. The community of the stakeholders do not always 
correspond to the watershed areas targeted. Stakeholders can be best identified if one 
starts from the ecosystem under siege and take into consideration, for instance, 
ownership and use rights questions. 
Ostrom (1990) argues that, without defining boundaries and closing it to 'outsiders', 
stakeholders face the risk that others will benefit from their existing efforts. Many strategies 
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for the exclusion of stakeholders are identified in the case studies: the establishment of an 
identification card for the herders in Kemon, the establishment of a membership cost for the 
Djeffa women's group, a permit for natural stakeholders in the Lake Aheme case (failure after 
a certain period), and permission to the herders to settle in the Cnabe community. 
However, this question remains difficult because closing boundaries to outsiders is not 
systematically perceived by the stakeholders. The issue only becomes important, for instance, 
after repetitive crises (conflict, scarcity of natural resources). The idea of identification card 
in Kemon emerged after a serious war between the villagers and herders in the region. 
The platform notion revisited 
The platform notion was discussed in chapter 2. A distinction was made between platform and 
effective platform. Some ideas were discussed for platform development and I explained that 
more insights are expected from the empirical investigations. 
Previous studies show that the focus on platforms is a focus on social processes, such 
as conflict resolution, negotiation, institutional development, leadership, power, etc. So 
platforms can be one time meetings, elected committees, formally appointed boards or councils 
or even parastatal or government bodies (Roling, 1998). 
• The present study reflects on many case studies to argue that the platform notion is 
dynamic, heuristic and sensitive to the boundary problem within ecosystems under 
siege for resource management. 
The Lake Aheme case has revealed the evolution of a platform for its management. The 
rangeland case in Benin shows an operational platform in Kemon and a platform perspective 
in the village Ayedjoco (in Save case) among Chabe people. The watershed development case 
show many platforms and the importance of scaling up towards the whole watershed identified. 
The Maro forest case unravels ownership and level of management for the definition of 
platforms. 
But when the boundary is not a relevant issue for the conceptualization of the 
ecosystem under siege, the effective platform for resource management does not depend on 
level(s) of ecosystem. This situation is noticed for the resource-flow management case by a 
women's group in Djeffa. In this situation, networking at higher levels of the social 
aggregation for several opportunities is the most important. 
As in the case of collective action, the analysis will be based on three aspects. First, 
a systematic empirical examination of the effects of social learning on platform development 
is carried out. Second, the implications of the facilitation of platforms (e.g., institutions, policy 
contexts) are analysed. Third, conditions for the functioning of platforms are discussed. 
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10.5 Social learning: effects on collective actions and platforms for resource 
management 
Social learning in resource management is different from the adoption process according to 
Rogers (1995). As explained in chapter 2, social learning can take many forms. Three basic 
issues are discussed from a praxeological focus: learning about ecosystems, learning about 
social processes, and learning about platform development. However, the various situations 
enumerated in the case studies are informative and enable more insight. 
• The question is then: what are the effects of social learning within resource 
management, especially on collective action and platform development? 
Based on this question, the following issues are discussed below: (i) what is learned and when? 
(ii) ways of learning revealed in the case studies and their effects within resource management; 
and (iii) effects of social learning on collective action and platform development. 
What are learned and when? 
Many ideas developed in chapter 2 concerning learning, are still relevant. Here, only striking 
issues with respect to resource management will be analysed. 
Social crises create a dynamic learning environment with respect to resource management. The 
case studies reveal various learning situations about social processes. 
• Serious crises engage stakeholders in conflict resolution, decision-making, negotiation 
and mediation (Lake Aheme case, rangeland case, and gestion zone sylvo-pastoral 
case). 
• learning paths by an intervening agency involved in a social crises situation involve 
all the issues above, and structuration processes and platform development (see 
watershed case, rangeland case in Kemon, Maro forest case, and the aménagement of 
a zone sylvo-pastorale case). 
• Ecological crises in ecosystem under siege are the triggers for stakeholders to learn to 
adapt continuously to evolving conditions (see Lake Aheme case, resource-flow 
management case). 
• However, the crises might not be perceived immediately by stakeholders. In these 
circumstances, intervening agencies can pool learning processes about the ecosystem 
under siege. Informal experiences of Kossi in the watershed development case (Ouesse) 
and co-management practices in the Maro forest are concrete examples. 
Synthesis and comparative analysis 2 5 5 
Ways of learning: what are the effects within resource management? 
Divinatoryprocesses and 'spiritism' 
Divinatory processes consist of consulting oracles and speaking with 'Earth-Spirits' to know 
the causes of problems and the remedies required (for more explanation: see Peek, 1991). The 
Fd (or Ifan) is an example of that way of learning. A divinatory process is a transcendental 
way of learning about all kinds of perceived problems that have some consequences for 
livelihoods with respect to local resource management. However, this practice has an informal 
character and is specific to a community or a particular ethnic group. It is effective for 
resource management where the stakeholders believe in the relationship between 'spiritism' 
and sustainability of resource management. 
The Lake Aheme case shows that practice of 'spiritism' affect a maintenance of 
collective action. One effect of this practice is the creation of an environment characterized by 
fear that stimulates compliance. Nowadays many forests are managed by divinatory processes 
and 'spiritism'. In AZSP, the Comite Coutuniers des Vieux (CCV) is still using this way of 
learning. 
Experimentation and observation 
Individual stakeholders, interest coalitions, and intervening parties in resource management 
are learning entities. Thus stakeholders are stimulated to learn to take advantage when they 
perceive opportunities in the wider economic environment (for example when the situation 
changed with respect to Lake Aheme during the colonial time). 
Experimentation is based on testing and probing of, for example, regenerative 
practices, institutional frameworks, or policy measures. A main learning point from all the 
case studies is that experimentation generates diversity within resource management activities 
by the stakeholders and intervening parties. A concrete example is that erosion control 
techniques used in the Mahi village agglomeration were reproduced in different ways. 
Experimentation leads to self-discovery for many watershed participants in Ouesse. 
Observation triggers change of existing norms and practices about the use of natural 
resources through a mechanism of self-reflection on one's curiosity or others behaviour and 
activities of interest. Observation stimulates autonomous and horizontal diffusion of soil 
erosion control techniques in Ouesse. Many villages decided to sign a partnership with the 
PGRN project after they had observed the activities of the project in other villages. Mutual 
control in competitive resource use arenas is based on observation of other behaviour. 
Metaphors, dialogue and interactive processes 
A shared metaphor or proverb is a key element for learning because it synthesises meaning 
that can be shared. The proverb provides a model for a shared agreement, for instance the 
Yankpikpi in the rangeland case in Kemon (if you need peace, you will not touch Yankpekpe). 
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Dialogue is another way of learning in resource management. It helps to share ideas, 
and to enrich one's frame of reference. Field visits, network activities, and exchange journeys, 
discussed in the case study of the women's group in Djeffa, can also be very effective. 
Dialogue can take the form of organized interactive processes between an intervening party 
and stakeholders and lead to agreement on norms, technologies and actions to be undertaken 
in resource management. I have noticed this way of learning in the watershed case 
(identification of an alternative contour farming practice in Aplahoué; interactive process to 
agree on a Dossier de Financement in Ouesse). 
Interactive processes occur among facilitators and stakeholders through mapping and 
visioning exercises to agree on terroir boundaries, to make decisions for planning, and agree 
on concrete actions (e.g., the Aménagement de Terroir in Burkina, the watershed development 
in Benin). 
Analysis and appreciation of resource use situation 
Resource management activities themselves are a potential source of learning. The role of 
history is important, for instance, the stakeholders compare actual livelihood situations of 
resource use to the one in the past (common expression: before it was good .... now it is 
becoming worse). Biophysical analysis that is based on the evolution of natural resource 
appropriation (e.g., catches, wood use) is one way of learning to appreciate the resource use 
situation (the Lake Aheme case). Aerial photographs are used in the same way (the watershed 
cases). Analysing practical experiences from ongoing resource management activities itself 
leads to reflexive learning and consistent decision making. In the lake Aheme case, the 
government did not pay attention to a reflexive learning and replicated the same decisions (the 
problem of Akaja and Xha). However, in Burkina Faso, learning from forest management 
activities to adopt a co-management strategy is successful. 
Effects of social learning opportunities on collective action and platform development 
In resource management situations, intervention plays a catalytic role for collective learning 
at the appropriate level of the ecosystem. This happens when decentralized methods are used 
(e.g., curricula for discovery learning, mapping and visioning), and negotiation, mediation and 
conflict resolution are successful. For instance, such interventions in realizing collective action 
and platform development processes were successful in the case studies of the watershed 
development, the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale, the Maro forest, and the rangeland 
in Kemon. 
Social learning leads to the creation of 'rich pictures' (e.g., problem perception by 
various stakeholders) on the problematic resource management situation. At best, it enables 
a shared vision on ways forward with respect to resource management problem. In Ouesse, 
a learning path to make the problem visible led to the need for collective action and to an inter-
village platform development for scaling up natural resource development. 
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Situations where joint learning leads to agreement on concrete action are provided by 
the watershed case and the Maro forest case. In the former, the intervening agency and a group 
of stakeholders developed a plan (the Dossier de Demande de Financemenf) to start concrete 
actions. In the latter, co-management practices for exploiting and regenerating the Maro forest 
were gradually developed by the intervening agency and villagers. 
External support and intervention create more active learning environments for the 
stakeholders, and enrich local learning processes with respect to resource management. The 
case of the women's group in Djeffa shows how networking activities provided learning 
opportunities for the development of local initiatives to enhance performance. 
Intervening parties also learn from the stakeholders when participatory methods are 
adopted. For instance, the watershed cases show that the way professionals go about watershed 
development is learnt from the intervention process. Through social learning, stakeholders and 
other actors at the ecosystem level of social aggregation realize the need for negotiated 
agreement or concerted action to solve the problematic situation. A typical example is the 
rangeland case in Kemon. After negotiation and mediation by the PGRN team, the native 
Chabe realized the importance of involving the herders in their initial committee. 
10.6 Facilitation of successful collective action and platforms for resource management 
Solving resource management problems is a complex process. It involves trade-offs and 
sacrifices for the stakeholders. The notion of facilitation applied to resource management goes 
beyond technology transfer, advisory and information support services, and extension which 
focuses on solution of specific problems. Critical issues such as breaking impasses, 
overcoming barriers, scaling up individual actions, etc., enlarge the horizon of facilitation in 
resource management. Facilitation can focus on a deliberate process of developing or 
stimulating the use of a regenerative practice (e.g., Akaja, Hw6do or contour farming, see case 
studies of Lake Aheme and Watershed development). Leadership promotion, development of 
institutions for solving social dilemmas can be the main issues. 
As explained in the previous section, solutions of resource management problems are 
amenable to facilitating successful collective action and effective platforms. Consequently, the 
central question discussed below is the following: 
• What does the facilitation of successful collective action imply for ways of defining 
problems, strategies for changing behaviour, institutions, and for conducive policy 
contexts? 
Defining resource management problems 
Defining resource management problem for the facilitation of successful collective action and 
platforms is not a question of biophysical professionals, but of communicative professionals 
who operate within social and political contexts (cf. Roling, 1994). 
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• Those professionals are required to make the problem visible among multiple 
stakeholders in a problematic resource use situation. Soft system methodology is used 
for the case study of the lake and the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale 
• The necessity to share understanding about the problem among various actors in a 
relevant organization is vital to provide opportunities for successful collective action 
and platform development. RAAKS windows can be used to enable those actors to 
develop a common appreciation of the problem, and agree on the coordination required 
for developing synergy at a higher level with respect to formulating a mission 
statement about the problem. 
• Defining the resource management problem needs the identification of trade-off in 
changing the situation towards successful collective action and platform development. 
In these circumstances. Stakeholder analysis has proved useful to perceive the trade-
offs and think about how one can go about the process of change. The watershed case 
shows how professionals learn to make the problem visible, and for Lake Aheme, the 
fact that the trade-off was neglected was an important factor for failure. 
Strategies for stimulating change 
Facilitating successful collective action and platforms of resource management implies that 
strategies based on incentives for stimulating change offer an enabling environment for 
collective behaviour by the stakeholders. 
• Incentives perceived through this enabling environment are to be found in the 
facilitating process itself, the means available for intervention, and the opportunities 
offered, for instance the credibility of intervening party or the external support. 
• The rangeland case in Kemon shows that an intervention which incorporates local 
initiatives, by using an innovative approach such as the Appui-Conseil is hastily 
perceived as a great incentive. Nevertheless, repetitive failures of a directive 
intervention lead to loss of faith in external supports. Excessive corruption has the 
same implication. Lake Aheme is a good illustration when one refers to the evolution 
of the lake's problem across various attempts for intervention, and the failure of the 
fishing police which was established in post-colonial times. 
• Thus one can argue that the more effective the nature of external support, the more 
stimulating the resource management situation is for inducing voluntary behavioural 
change with respect to collective action and platform development. 
Facilitating successful collective action and platforms implies that strategies based on 
communicative intervention such as animation rurale, non-formal education, folk media and 
participatory learning are used for voluntary collective behavioural change. A Particular 
phenomenon noticed in the case studies is the emergence of new roles for professionals in the 
field. Conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation are such new roles. Serious difficulties 
are also noticed for these emerging roles. 
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• Observation from Benin and Burkina Faso reveals that resource management activities 
are imbedded in adniinistrative structures where professionals work with 'instructions'. 
Moreover, high level positions in resource management organizations are held by 
specialists in specific domains, i.e., foresters, fishery specialists, veterinarians, etc. 
Therefore existing conditions do not permit a full exploitation of these new roles. 
Recently, multidisciplinary teams have emerged at the lower level of organizations' 
hierarchy. Professional involved at this level are mostly targeted for training 
programmes to use communicative strategies (participatory methodologies to stimulate 
changes). Lesson from the case studies reveal that professionals must also be targeted 
so that they can learn to adopt communicative behaviour to pool efforts for negotiated 
agreements, concerted action, joint decision making, etc. 
Institutions and organizations 
Gundersun et al (1995: 496) argue that most institutions are established to carry out some 
preconceived set of policies, plans or missions. These practices should not be applied in 
resource management activities if successful collective action and platform development are 
to be expected at grass-root levels. 
Institutional dimensions involve norms to monitor, rules of use, property rights, 
covenants among the stakeholders and intervening parties, sanctioning arrangements, roles 
assigned to organizations, and decrees and laws for environmental protection (Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom & Schlager, 1996; Roling & Jiggins, 1998). 
• The case studies reveal these issues, but institutions and organizations are socially 
constructed and negotiable. A critical problem discussed in institutional economics is 
that the cost of enforcement of the institutions is mostly high, especially for resource 
management. Cooperation of stakeholders becomes a necessary condition for success 
(North, 1990). 
• The facilitation of change in resource management involving successful collective 
action and platforms implies that institutions and organizations for resource 
management are governmental and non-governmental, fluid, malleable , and capable 
to be locally adapted according to evolving conditions. 
• In critical resource use situations, the more effective the implementation of rules, 
agreements and procedures, the more effective the trust in them and in the 
opportunities for solving social dilemmas by management. The weakness of such 
institutions are perceptible in the failure to implement them. The Lake Aheme case 
reveals that when the involvement of high political entities fail to enforce institutions 
for resource management, professionals who have the official mandate to work in 
resource management, fear to try other alternatives. Consequently, the resource use 
situation leads to loss of faith by stakeholders with respect to the institutional 
dimension of management, because they perceive that the highest authority system is 
not capable of enforcement. 
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Conducive policy contexts 
Resource management involves many activities that are developed at the grass-root level, 
covenants among stakeholders are required for resource management. Moreover, functioning 
platforms require local decision-making, continual adaptation of institutions, etc. All these 
issues imply policy contexts which enable transfer of certain decision making powers 
(statutory, or regulatory) to the local level as a necessary condition for sustaining collectively 
developed activities by communities. A key word used here is 'decentralization'. 
• In addition to the ideas developed in chapter 2, decentralization should not be seen a 
simple administrative representation, but conditions to enable the creation of local 
political entities to debate resource management problems and to plan, or deliberate, 
alternative solutions at the community level. It calls for more participation of 
stakeholders to enable possibilities for research and development organizations to work 
with their needs and aspirations. 
• The resource-flow management case shows that the national political context has some 
implication for the performance of resource management activities at the local level. 
We noticed that a shift in the political system in Benin led to a rapid emergence of 
many of NGOs, and their competition, which has led to increased of opportunities for 
stakeholders. 
• The Lake Aheme case suggests that only at the policy level can conditions be created 
to effectively counter failure of mechanisms to reduce use of natural resources and 
avoid degradation. 
However, the creation of conducive policy context with respect to resource 
management faces many problems such as instability of administrative bodies, 'unfair' political 
campaigns based on promises that present immediate benefit for stakeholders (but have further 
negative consequences), hesitation and lack of courage to undertake complex environmental 
decision-making by political entities. 
For instance in Benin, political authorities kept on increasing the price of cotton to 
ensure the votes of stakeholders. But this would inevitably lead to more land degradation in 
the context of Benin, while the Beninese environmental plan (cf. PAE, 1993) aimed at 
environmental protection. Lake Aheme has made visible many impediments to creating an 
effective conducive policy context for resource management. 
10.7 Conditions for successful collective action for resource management 
The main concern for the analysis below is to understand phenomena that trigger or stimulate 
successful collective action in resource management situations. Factor identified in the case 
studies (discussed below) are: perceived interdependence with respect to resource management 
problem; sharing risks in collective resource management situations, mutual benefits, 
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perceived externalities within resource management activities, and trust in social capital for 
resource management. 
Perceived interdependence with respect to resource management problems 
A historical analysis of the Lake Aheme case shows that scarcity of fishery resources and 
conflicts between coalitions of stakeholders leads to the realisation of their interdependence 
and collective learning. 
Perceived interdependence with respect to resource management problems positively 
affects change from individual to collective action. According to Bandura (1977), individual 
stakeholders judge their self-efficacy and realize that their staying power, capability and 
strength are individually vulnerable. Then, they perceive the importance of collective efficacy 
that is also an expression of interdependence. 
The Lake Aheme case reveals that self-efficacy falls down due to the 'zero-sum game' 
(cf. Roe, 1993: 31) with respect to the appropriation of scarce fishery resources. Mahi people 
in Ouesse realize the need for scaling up watershed development efforts because their 
continuous shifting cultivation practices would lead to a collective and negative impact (also 
a situation of interdependence) on the development of the local economy in the future. Mahi 
people use the metaphor Sedokou ('Nature is the wealth of everybody') to explain this idea. 
Successful collective action for the aménagement of a ZSP in Burkina Faso is motivated by 
a collective negative experience with crop damage and conflicts. The fact that everybody is 
suffering from it creates a situation in which the stakeholders perceive their interdependence. 
Mutual benefits if successful collective action is adopted 
Collective action emerged when stakeholders perceive mutual dependence on it. Interaction 
between villagers and herders and the integration of their economy in Ayedjoco (Rangeland 
case in Save) generated collective action because the herders were keeping their cattle. Peace, 
security and business (cattle trade) created an environment for mutual benefit in Kemon. 
• The more stakeholders perceive mutual benefit within their activities, the better the 
conditions for successful collective action. 
Perceived externalities within resource management activities 
Opportunities such as access to credit and extension are positive externalities for collective 
action within resource management activities. These externalities maintain group and collective 
action in the Djeffa women's case. Externalities are critical factors for the maintenance of 
public goods. 
The watershed case reveals spatial externalities which are also forms of 'market 
failure', unexpected cost or conditions of stakeholders depending on their location. These act 
as informal incentives for cooperation (cf. also Ostrom et al, 1993: 198). 
262 Platforms for resource management 
Risk Snaring, tontine and increasing negotiation power 
Risk sharing can be interpreted as informal, and formal mechanisms that induce stakeholders 
to undertake collectively beneficial actions for resource management (adapted from Seabright, 
1993: 117). This factor is identified in the women's group case study in Djeffa. A concrete 
example is the failure of pig raising activities with a credit obtained from the RED AD. The 
women refer to this situation to explain the importance of working together as a group. 
Trust in social capital for resource management 
Trust is the expectation by stakeholders of a group that other members will cooperate. Trust 
acts as a variable whose value influences the magnitude of collective action. Social capital 
refers to resource management institutions and organization. For instance, rules and the new 
organization called Comité de Gestion du Foncier pastoral (COGEF) of the local organization 
of Chabe people in Kemon (rangeland case study) is a form of social capital. Trust in social 
capital refers also to the assurance problem, and is a condition for mamteining successful 
collective action. 
10.8 Conditions for the functioning of effective platforms for resource management 
The effectiveness of a platform is discussed here as the extent to which a platform is 
functioning well and maintained for resource management. 
• What are the conditions which enable continuous monitoring of resource use and 
adherence to covenants among the stakeholders? 
Below seven conditions based on lessons from the case studies are discussed. 
(1) Collective action 
The conditions for maintaining collective action discussed above (§10.7) are valid for effective 
platforms. A well functioning platform requires collective action. In many circumstances, 
intervening parties for resource management start directly by creating committees (example 
of platforms) which are not functional because of the absence of conditions for collective 
action (e.g., the CGT in the watershed case in Mono, ad hoc commission in the rangeland case 
in Save). The Lake Aheme case shows that the local platform of stakeholders was effective 
when the conditions for maintaining collective action were present, while many committees 
created afterwards failed when these conditions disappeared. 
(2) Representation at the appropriate ecosystem level 
A positive impact of a platform depends on the representation of all the stakeholders who are 
relevant at the perceived ecosystem level which is appropriate for collective resource 
management. However, this condition works when the ecosystem boundary (discussed in 
§10.4) is a relevant issue. The amelioration of soil fertility by the women in Djeffa was not 
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constrained by representativeness because the boundary question was not relevant. 
Representativeness is perceived as a criterion for fruitful collective resource management by 
Pinkerton & Weinstein (1995, quoted by Steins & Edwards, 1998: 3). Interest groups, 
coalitions, categories of stakeholders need to be involved or represented in the platform to 
enable collective resource use. The Lake Aheme case shows that the initiative of the Xha 
people failed because (among other reasons) they did not involve the coalition of the Akaja 
users and other categories of the stakeholders in the lake area. 
(3) Quality of leadership 
The quality of leadership among the stakeholders is a condition which contributes significantly 
to the effectiveness of platforms. This notion is seen in a positive sense, which means that the 
leaders can lead their fellows in dealing with ecological imperatives. This does not necessary 
include political leadership. 
As the Benin context shows, the involvement of the Association de Développement 
(which was supposed to pool grass-roots development efforts) in political arenas transformed 
the leadership into serving the interests of political parties. The facilitation of leadership 
becomes a crucial issue to enable a social movement towards collective resource management. 
In Burkina, a visit of the Minister of Agriculture and Animal Resources in Kadomba to 
encourage the stakeholders for the Aménagement and Gestion des Terroirs activities positively 
affected the quality of leadership. Committees for resource management function well in this 
village. 
(4) Possibilities to meet 
Regular meetings enable the participating stakeholders in a platform to assess the resource use 
situation for decision-making and deliberations. Ostrom (1990) also perceives this condition 
when discussing monitoring as a criterion for long-enduring common-pool resource 
institutions. The concrete example of the COGEF in Kemon illustrates the importance of this 
condition. The members of the committee meet every Wednesday at their headquarters to 
monitor the extent to which their activities (delivering residence certificates to migrant herders 
to stay in their territory, controlling transhumance, etc.) are being achieved. The governance 
of Lake Aheme during the precolonial time, the management of the Maro forest and the 
aménagement de terroir activities show the importance of platform meetings. 
(5) Capacity for implementing mechanisms for concerted action and conflict resolution 
Concerted action depends on platforms and refers to the ability of its participating 
representatives to negotiate with the wider community of resource users. This role of platforms 
depends also to the nature of the ecosystem under siege. 
Concrete example from the case studies show the importance of the mechanisms for 
concerted action. The Bureau of the Women's group in Djeffa chose meeting as a mechanism 
for concerted action. The aménagement of zone sylvo-pastorale in Burkina, the rangeland case 
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in Kemon, and the watershed case combine committee meetings and village assemblies as the 
mechanism for concerted actions. In the Lake Aheme case, the mechanisms are complex and 
involve meetings of the coalition committees, inter-coalition' meetings, village assembly, 
fishing community's meeting with representatives of the government and political bodies (e.g., 
journée de réflexion). 
All the case studies involve conflict situations. The more the representatives in a 
platform can set up mechanisms for conflict resolution, the more the stakeholders will trust 
the functioning of the platform. The rangeland case in Kemon is a good illustration. Ostrom 
(1990) perceives this issue as a design principle for long-enduring common-pool institutions. 
She argues that stakeholders should have a rapid access to low cost local arenas. However, 
what should be crucial for a platform is the capacity to judge what types of conflicts they can 
probably resolve and what should go beyond their competence and require some actors at 
higher levels (than the platform). Repetitive failures of conflict resolution by a platform affects 
its credibility. This problem was raised in the AZSP case in Burkina. During a forum at the 
provincial level, the participants recommended the PNGT team to define clearly the limits of 
the competence of the local people to resolve conflicts that should emerge within the Gestion 
des Terroirs. 
(6) Stakeholders are the main concern for the functioning of operational platforms 
The platform is perceived to involve not only the stakeholders, but also other potential actors 
at higher levels of social aggregation (Rôling & Jiggins, 1998: 303; Steins & Edwards, 1998). 
Still, this arrangement can impede the effectiveness of a platform for resource management 
when many functions are translated to a higher level. The Lake Aheme case shows that the 
Bureau of the committee generated after the journée de réflexion involved only representatives 
at the ministry level and from political associations. Afterwards, when problems emerged in 
the lake area, they were not present. Actors at higher levels should support decision-making, 
create enabling conditions, mediate complex disputes and facilitate the responsabilisation of 
the stakeholders. 
(7) Possibilities for continual learning towards adaptability 
Continued learning towards adaptability involves modification of rules, monitoring and desired 
decision-making, re-evaluation of covenants among the stakeholders, etc. These issues are vital 
for long-enduring platforms for resource management. All the case studies show ongoing 
dynamics both at the level of ecosystems under siege and human systems. The next section 
elaborates some lessons from the case studies. 
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10.9 Adaptive Resource Management (ARM): lessons from the case studies 
Adaptive management from the ecological and 'soft' point of view 
Adaptive Management is used by Holling (1995, 1996) to explain dynamics between ecological 
systems and management institutions. The adaptive paths of Holling's notion are based on 
temporal and spatial dimensions of ecological and social systems. This idea is expressed in the 
following quote from Holling's (1995: 8-9) work: 
'the very success in managing a target variable for sustained production of food and fiber apparently leads 
inevitably to an ultimate pathology of less resilient and more vulnerable ecosystems, more rigid and unresponsive 
management agencies, and more dependent societies. ... Moreover, those pathologies occur not only in examples 
of renewable resource management but also in examples of rigid policies of regulation of toxic materials or in 
examples of narrow implementation of protection for endangered species'. 
But, from the 'soft' point of view, according to Roling (1997), Adaptive Management 
is not only a question of temporal and spatial dimensions. It involve issues such as 'identity' 
and 'community', making things visible at the level of ecosystems under siege, monitoring the 
impact of human activity, negotiated agreement, concerted action and conflict resolution. 
Both, the ecological side and the soft side explained above, provide ideas to incorporate 
adaptive management into resource management. The former reflects temporal and spatial 
pathways for looking at resource management. The latter reflects social differences and 
discontinuities in terms of perspectives (my own interpretation of 'identity' and 'conmiunity'). 
Below some evidence from the case studies is presented before some lessons learned 
will support my clarification of the notion of adaptive resource management. 
Some empirical evidence 
The Lake Aheme case 
The analysis of the lake was carried out through temporal scales. It shows many variations 
with respect to the evolution of the problem from the pre-colonial time to the democratization 
era. Learning about the problem and facilitating alternative solutions has led to emergence 
(e.g., the failure of Akaja). New problems such as ecological crises (e.g., fish scarcity) and 
conflicts triggered a new learning process and facilitation cycle until impasse has become the 
most critical for Lake Aheme. 
The rangeland case 
Resource management here is spatial variable within the same community. In Save, attempts 
to agree based on learning in Ayedjoco compete with the desire of other stakeholders to 
continue their slnfting cultivation. Conflicts emerged and the problem became the dilemma of 
some stakeholders between trust in the institutions built by the village and serving their own 
interests. In Kemon, crises stimulated learning and the implementation of the Appui-Conseil 
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to generate new institutions and organizations. A new problem emerged: the extent to which 
the new social capital can be maintained. 
The watershed case 
Resource management for watershed development is spatially sensitive. Establishing the 
identity of the stakeholders was essential for making the problem visible, and for choosing 
alternative solutions for soil and water conservation. However, new problems emerged. In 
Ouesse, the vetiver created new perturbations in the agroecosystem. An increase in labour 
required for contour farming and maintenance were perceived by the participants in watershed 
development. These emergent perceptions created new problem definitions process, learning 
processes, and the facilitation of alternative solutions. 
The resource-flow management case 
Soil fertility decline has led to the consequence of low income for women's group in Djeffa. 
This problem stimulates a learning process and a shift to regenerative practices that enable the 
creation of public goods (the group itself, infrastructures, etc.). From this stage, new problems 
such as a public good dilemma (contribution problems) emerge. New learning processes and 
facilitation started for monitoring, continually decision-making within the group, checked on 
participation to the activities. Sanctioning structure is defined for the noticeability of cheating. 
For instance, stakeholders are excluded from the public goods which are generated when they 
did not provide any effort. 
The Maro forest case 
The analysis of the Maro forest is temporally sensitive and made visible the changing patterns 
of the forest: (1) use under local rules before 1940, (2) intervention of colonial authorities by 
changing local law/rules; (3) IDA project period; and (4) the PNGT period. Pressure of 
stakeholders (crop-farmers, herders, migrant farmers) on the forest can be defined as a 
problem which motivates tentatively for conservation (intervention of colonial authorities) and 
exploitation (IDA project) of the Maro forest. Lessons learned continuously from the dynamics 
of the evolution of the Maro forest stimulated problem redefinition, new learning and 
facilitation of new alternative solutions. Recently, the PNGT adopted new strategies by 
involving the stakeholders in the management of the Forest. The problem become now the use 
of scarce commonly owned forest resources (woodlot), contributions for tree planting and the 
maintenance of firebreaks. New learning processes involve decision-making arrangements and 
concerted actions. The professionals facilitated distributive payoffs from wood cutting, and 
training of local people for transfer of competence for co-management. 
The gestion of the zone sylvo-pastorale case 
The need to initiate a gestion of the zone sylvo pastorale resulted from severe transhumance 
problems, crop damage, clashing interests and conflicts between pastoralists and crop-farmers. 
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The learaing processes for the realization of a ZSP involve collective learning: initiating 
participatory action with local people, terroir mapping, visioning, initiating processes for 
terroir delimitation, negotiation, structuration and mobilization of existing institutions at the 
level of a terroir and inter-terroir. The team of the PNGT provided opportunities like the 
extension support for the creation of the ZSP, and the training of local people to carry out 
some activities (e.g., the delimitation of the corridor space). Thus, the introduction of 
composting technique convinced stakeholders in Kadomba that yields can be increased on a 
small plot at low cost. However some stakeholders (especially the herders) started anticipating 
on the problem of exclusion for the gestion of this zone sylvo-pastorale. Then new learning 
processes and the facilitation of alternative solutions are projected in the future. 
Lessons learned: the adaptive resource management notion 
In view of the above, adaptive notion takes for the granted that the resource management 
problem is dynamic. Therefore the social learning process and facilitation need to be 
continuously revisited for tackling evolving conditions, which are emergencies in resource use 
situations. 
Learning loops in organizations (cf. Argyris & Schon, 1978; Argyris, 1992) may 
provide guidelines to argue how continuous adaptation to evolving conditions can be done 
within resource management activities. Single-loop learning occurs when detections and 
corrections of errors by stakeholders and an intervening agency permit to carry out resource 
management activities based on initial objectives. Double-loop learning occurs when, as an 
example, initial resource management objectives and institutions are changed. Triple-loop 
learning occurs when initial ways of learning in organization are changed. 
Learning loops can be applied to cope with dynamics in resource management (cf. 
Maarleveld & Dangbegnon, 1998). So one can say that adaptive resource management requires 
a move from single-loop learning to double-loop and triple-loop learning to cope with evolving 
conditions and to continuously adapt resource management institutions. Stakeholders and 
intervening agencies can operate in an adaptive cycle which involves resource management 
problems, social learning, facilitation, and emergencies (see fig. 10.1). 
10.10 Concluding remarks 
This chapter probably does not cover all the issues that appear in the case studies (chapters 4 
to 9). Our main objective is to pull out some propositions to stimulate reflection for the 
realization of sustainable collective resource management. 
Issues raised reveal the importance of collective action and platform development for 
sustainable collective resource management as the central issue of resource management. 
Possibilities for continuous institotional change, a capacity for adaptation in resource 
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Figure 10.1: Adaptive learning cycle based on lessons from case studies 
management organization and dynamic policy contexts are essential for adaptive resource 
management. 
11 Conclusions and Recommendations 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter concerns the conclusions of the present study and suggests some 
recommendations for development with respect to adaptive resource management. In chapter 
two, three main research questions have guided reflection: 
• To what extent can various resource management situations from Benin and Burkina 
Faso, be analysed? 
• What are the factors that affect the success or failure of the various resource 
management situations analysed? 
• Can concrete and fresh theories, concepts and ideas, be identified to support the 
facilitation of deliberate adaptive resource management interventions towards greater 
sustainability? 
Case studies in Benin and in Burkina Faso have revealed that various resource management 
situations can be analysed with respect to the perspectives and methodologies developed. 
Each case study analysed in the previous chapters draws specific conclusions 
concerning factors that affect the success or failure with respect to resource management. Case 
studies which show relative success of management, also show successful collective action. 
Factors governing success are therefore related to the extent to which platform(s) is/are 
developed and is/are functioning effectively. Factors such as a lack of decision-making 
capacity, inconsistent institutional and policy frameworks, weak policy contexts, etc., increase 
the risk of failure in resource management. 
Some lessons are learned from the case studies and they provide insight, theories and 
new ideas (chapter 10) to enrich the perspectives and methodologies initially used. 
This chapter will discuss the implications and challenges for new ways of thinking about 
innovation processes and meory-informed practices with respect to adaptive resource 
management 
11.2 Adaptive resource management is different from conventional technology 
development 
Conventional technology development has dominated ways of dealing solutions with respect 
to problems in agriculture and resource management. After the green revolution in Asia, some 
development leaders believes that, of the many problems facing stakeholders in Africa with 
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respect agriculture and resource management, the most critical is a lack of 'science' and 
'technology' (Borlaug & Dowswell, 1995). 
This belief heavily tends to emphasize conventional technology development in which 
'innovation' is instrumentally perceived for solving critical problems that stakeholders face in 
African context. This is a limitation with respect to adaptive resource management. 
Venkantesan (1997: 55) argues that natural resource management requires a decision-making 
capacity of local stakeholders to plan locally relevant works. 
The present study shows that adaptive resource management is different from 
technology development in which technology transfer is the dominant practice. Widening the 
concept of innovation has become relevant. Adaptive resource management involves many 
take-offs, which means that what stakeholders want is not necessary what they should get if 
sustainability is to be achieved. 
• All the case studies have made plausible that innovation concept needs to be widened 
to involve negotiation between wants and gets in conflicting resource management 
situations. 
• This way of thinking about innovation implies new roles for professionals such as 
conflict resolution, facilitation of collective action, and platform development, and, 
according to Rôling (1997: 21), negotiated self-restraint of human greed. 
11.3 Key emerging issues for the facilitation of adaptive resource management 
Praxeologies (theory-informed practices) for intervention, be they Transfer of Technology, 
Farm Management, Ecologically-sound Agriculture, are discussed by Rôling & Jiggins (1998). 
The framework used for these praxeologies involve the following key variables: practices, 
facilitation of learning, support institutions and networks, and conducive policy contexts. I will 
refer to these key elements to argue key issues that emerge concerning the facilitation of 
adaptive resource management. This choice is made because of my intention to pull out some 
practical ideas with respect to interventions in this domain. Below concrete ideas are 
enumerated. 
(a) Practices that underpin adaptive resource management 
• Successful collective practices at the level of ecosystem, individual actions are 
consistent with the collective goal; 
• taking less from common goods (especially in situations of complex arenas and natural 
resource scarcity); 
• giving more to public goods, be they organizations, instimtions, infrastructures, etc.; 
• sharing understanding of the ecosystem to resolve social and ecological crises; 
• fostering organizational development to counter assurance problems and second order 
dilemmas. 
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(b) Learning in adaptive resource management 
• accepting multiple perspectives; 
• learning to think at the level of ecosystem under siege; 
• learning to reach agreement through negotiation, mediation, and interaction; 
• creating opportunities for reflexive learning by stakeholders; 
• developing opportunities for non-formal education or animation rurale. 
(c) facilitation of learning 
• using soft system methodology to create a rich picture on problematic situations; 
• using RAAKS for identifying mission statements among various intervening agencies; 
• using Stakeholders Analysis to make trade-offs visible with respect to solutions; 
• organizing learning paths to demonstrate mutual inter-dependence; 
• creating conditions for discovery learning; 
• using a process approach towards a 'responsabilisation'; 
• organizing a structuration process towards platform development; 
• promoting leadership to make platforms effective; 
• linking platform to higher levels of social aggregation; 
• using RAAKS for role development among various intervening agencies; 
» training stakeholders, transferring competencies, and training local trainees; 
• creating incentives to stimulate successful collective action. 
(d) Support institution and networks 
» using platform for adaptive resource management at appropriate ecosystem level; 
• networking with various governmental or non-governmental organization to perform 
various activities within resource management; 
• using learning groups and stakeholders organizations; 
• defining property right institutions with respect to adaptive resource management; 
• defining rules of use and covenants to monitor their implementation; 
• defining rules for exclusion and designing sanction structures; 
• using existing local organizations for adaptive resource management; 
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(e) Conducive policy context 
• decentralizing certain powers to the grass-roots levels; 
• supporting learning cornmunities in collective resource management; 
• reforming external research and development organizations to become activists at the 
grass-root level; 
• supporting regulations to counter 'market failure' concerning resource use; 
• adopting mechanisms for long-term planning with communities. 
11.4 About sustainability with respect to adaptive resource management 
As assumed in chapter 2, sustainability with respect to adaptive resource management is an 
emergent property of a soft system. Many sustainable practices with respect to resource 
management are based on negotiated agreement, and are socially constructed. Lessons from 
the case studies have made this issue visible. 
However, there is still a dominant belief in sustainability in term of instrumental issues, 
as was noticed in the watershed case in Benin (e.g., investment/realization criterion of the 
Word Bank, and which was explained by a PGRN professional in the field). 
Lessons from the case studies suggest that a new vision is required for the assessment 
of sustainability with respect to adaptive resource management. Below some ideas are 
enumerated. 
• Sustainability with respect to adaptive resource management depends on the extent to 
which collective action is being achieved. 
• Sustainability with respect to adaptive resource management depends on the extent to 
which resource management institutions are internalized or become a body of 
community social capital in which they build trust. 
• Sustainability with respect to adaptive resource management depends on the extent to 
which community decision making capacity, quality of leadership, and management 
capacity are maintained. 
• Sustainability with respect to adaptive resource management depends on the extent to 
which the policy context enables conditions for adaptive resource management. A 
concrete example is that there is a strong appeal for participatory process for the 
gestion des terroirs in Africa while the existing institutional framework and the global 
policy context do not allow an effective realization of such an idea (cf. also Toulmin, 
1993). 
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11.5 Implications of adaptive resource management for planning 
Design and implementation of development programmes are mostly instrumentally organized. 
Practices are based on formulating concrete objectives, defining activities, and identifying 
'means' to control achievements. The persistence of this culture may be related to the fact that 
donors, governments and planners want to know exactly the extent to which 'resources' and 
'means' enable the achievement of ultimate goal. 
I refer to the work of Woerkum & Aarts (1998) to argue that adaptive resource management 
requires that planners of development professionals move from an instrumentalist to a more 
interactive approach. Also I find relevant ideas such as process planning for adaptive resource 
management. 
However, in the African context, the fact that resource management plans make heavy 
use of external funds often leaves little room for implementing ideas such as an interactive 
approach or process planning. Probably much research is needed to provide alternative 
solution for such a complex problem. 
11.6 Assessing rigour in the constructivist inquiry used 
The constructivist inquiry enabled me to successfully combine various research approaches: 
exploratory approach for case studies and grounded theory principles (synthesis in chapter 10). 
Instead of trying to 'prove' preconceived hypotheses in an ex-post phase of the research 
process by reliability and validity indicators, constructivist methodology has constantly made 
use of trustworthiness and authenticity criteria for rigour within the present study. My main 
lesson from the present study is that: 
• Making use of the trustworthiness and authenticity criteria in the constructivist 
methodology is a predisposition which starts from the beginning to the end of a 
research process. 
This lesson is visible in the way the case studies were selected, the constant check on the value 
system of the stakeholders involved in an in-depth investigation, and the comparison between 
similar cases. 
Trustworthiness criteria are satisfied in the present study by looking at historical 
development of resource management situations studied, which led (or did not lead) to 
successful collective action and platform(s), and comparing similar resource management 
topics that reveal the relevance of collective action and platform(s), e.g., watershed 
development in two eco-zones, rangeland management on the one hand under local 
arrangement, and the other by external support. 
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Authenticity criteria are also satisfied in the present study by using participatory methodologies 
which help to honour emic construction by stakeholders. Sharing space with stakeholders 
during participatory action research was another way to ensure authenticity criteria. Concrete 
examples were the mapping exercise with herders in Save, and the matrix ranking with a 
women's group in Djeffa. 
11.6 Practical recommendations and suggestions for future research1 
Practical recommendations 
(a) Intervention can be helpful and is often needed; but it should emphasize facilitation and 
mediation. When governmental, non-governmental and grass-roots (people's) organizations 
pool their efforts (as in the Burkina Faso case) the relative advantages of each can lead to an 
optimization of the outcome. 
(b) Decision making in adaptive management of natural resource goods should be decentralized 
and delegated to the relevant ecosystemic level, e.g., natural regions, watersheds and terroirs -
and not to administrative units which in former colonial countries are often artificial. To 
enable this change in attitude, decision makers and chief implementers at the centre of power 
need "training'' and encouragement in rethinking their roles in the development process. 
(c) Helping local organizations to become more effective enhances their chances to represent 
the interests of their members on the platforms, on which solutions to conflicts are sought. 
(d) Fostering local self-organization, establishing local meeting places, using local media and 
facilitating transport of local groups to visit other groups to contemplate similar problems, 
should be enhanced. Meeting other groups and facilitators should enhance the joint learning 
process which is needed to combine experiences of the past with new opportunities. 
(e) Government should have the courage to forbid by laws and other means, practices (e.g., 
small mesh size of fishing nets, excessive tree cutting for farming, overuse of common goods) 
mat endanger the sustainability of ecosystems . 
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Notes 
1 ..This section make use of the Technical report sent to the Netherlands Israel Research Development Programme 
(NIRP) who funded the present study. The report was synthesized by Prof. A. Blum, coordinator of the research 
programme in which this study was based 
Suggestions for future research 
Lessons from the present study suggest some ideas for future research. There are the 
following: 
• How to optimize the interaction among governmental agencies, non governmental 
organisations and local peoples' groups in the planning, execution and summing up of 
field experiments which lead to collective resource management; 
• H o w to enhance the effectiveness of mediation to resolve conflicts about the 
management of natural resources; 
• H o w to use Geographic Information System (GIS) in an interactive manner with 
stakeholders to make problem visible in ecosystem so that they can move to a shared 
understanding to take collective action. 
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Summary 
The present book focuses on platforms for (natural) resource management. It analyses various 
case studies in Benin and Burkina Faso. Conditions for collective resource management in 
conflict and interdependent situations are the most critical issues. The present study raises the 
importance of socioeconomic sustainability. It aims at incorporating social perspective within 
economic growth by focusing on stakeholders needs and by learning with them to respond to 
evolving conditions. 
The present book is based on three main parts. After an introductory chapter (chapter 
1), the first part discusses the perspectives and methodologies used to carry out the present 
study. The second part analyses six case studies, and the third part presents a synthesis and 
the main conclusions. 
Part one: perspectives and methodologies 
In part one, perspectives and methodologies used to carry out the research are developed. 
First, resource management problems are elaborated. They cover several dimensions: social 
dilemmas in interdependent resource use situations, and social and ecological crises. Collective 
action and platforms are the puzzles of effective resource management in face of these 
problems. These two notions are the central points of my argumentation if conditions for 
sustainably managing natural resources is to be realized. 
The fact that resource management problems unravel two different assets, the social 
(stakeholders) and the natural (ecosystems), I have used 'coupled systems thinking' to 
elaborate perspectives with respect to resource management (chapter 2). Based on this notion, 
'hard system thinking' is applied to conceptualize ecosystems for the purpose of resource 
management. 'Soft system' is also applied as a form under which we organize our attempt to 
reach common appreciation of problematic situations. These perspectives enable me to develop 
the notions of platform, social learning to cope with both ecosystem and social dynamics, and 
the facilitation of change in resource management (communicative intervention, incentives, 
support institutions, and policy contexts). Having elaborated my perspectives for the present 
study, I could define first, the following problem statement: 
"The extent to which the perspectives elaborated, help develop theories, practices and 
ideas, in the particular contexts of resource use in Benin and Burkina Faso, for the 
facilitation of adaptive resource management in various attempts to enhance 
regenerative practices and sustainable development in ecosystems'. 
Second, I define the following research questions: 
• To what extent can various resource management situations from Benin and Burkina 
Faso, be analyzed? 
• What are the factors that affect the success or failure of the various resource 
management situations analyzed? 
• Can concrete and fresh theories, concepts and ideas, be identified to support the 
facilitation of deliberate adaptive resource management interventions towards greater 
sustainability? 
The methodologies of the present study (chapter 3) involve a scientist's curricula for 
discovery learning and the concrete research methodology. Case study research approach, 
grounded theory and comparative study are used. Exploratory research is done to gain novel 
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and fresh arguments that contribute to the scientific and public debate with respect to resource 
management practices. 
Part two: case studies 
Six case studies were carried out (four in Benin and two in Burkina Faso). The first case study 
(chapter 4) deals with fishery resource management, specifically Lake Aheme in Benin. An 
analysis of the evolution of the platform for Lake Aheme's resource management is done from 
the pre-colonial period to the recent democratization process in Benin. The major conclusion 
from the Lake Aheme case is that, sustainability is an emergent property of a soft system, 
which means that the impasse noticed in the management of the lake can only be broken if two 
conditions are satisfied. On the first hand, collective action is effective for regulation, mutual 
control and monitoring. On the other hand, a platform is developed for governing the lake and 
resolving conflicts. 
The second case study (chapter 5) deals with rangeland resource management within 
the Chabe community in Benin. Two situations are compared: the local arrangement in Save 
area and the implementation of the Appui-Conseil for collective rangeland resource 
management. The first situation reveals that, a lack of decision making capacity and concerted 
action, and an absence of organizations and institutions for resource management, affect 
failures. In the second situation, a negotiated agreement and concerted action led to the 
development of a platform. The major conclusion from this case study is that, barriers to 
collective rangeland resource management can be overcome if different categories of 
stakeholders adopt collective action, develop platforms for decision-making, monitoring, 
sanctions and exclusion at the level of gaa, villages and regions. 
The third case study (chapter 6) presents watershed development problems with two 
ethnic groups, the Adja and Mahi people in Benin. The critical issue here is the extent to 
which scaling up watershed development from the level of farms to the watershed for 
intervention, is effective. This implies the need to develop inter-village perspectives. Within 
both the ethnic groups, the absence of consistent property right institutions was a barrier for 
watershed development. Platforms for pooling a systematic treatment of micro-watersheds 
towards the watershed development based on inter-village structuration (scaling up) did not 
yet emerge in Mono. A reason was the nonexistence of local organizations that could 
strengthen this process. In Ouèssè, the creation of the Union Inter-Villageoise pour la Gestion 
des ressource Naturelles (UIGREN) also called SEDOKU, was a platform at the level of the 
region of Mahi people. The success of the scaling up process was due to existing organizations 
and a collective learning path adopted by the intervening agency. 
Resource-flow management to improve soil fertility by a women's group is analyzed 
in the fourth case study (chapter 7). The analysis considers two different contexts: before, and 
during democratization process in Benin. Resource-flow management can be effective only if 
successful collective action is maintained to provide public goods (e.g., infrastructures, the 
group itself). A major conclusion for this case study is that, a shift in the political system of 
Benin, has some implications for making grass-root development processes more dynamic. 
Many opportunities such as credit, training, exchange of experience, enable the maintenance 
of the group, and in turn, collective action for resource management. 
The fifth case study (chapter 8) shows the evolution of forestry problems from a purely 
indigenous regulation to the recent intervention of the PNGT and co-management practices in 
Burkina Faso. This case study reveals that, the evolution of the platform is sensitive to 
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ownership issues œncerning the Maro forest. This case involves both public goods (e.g., fire 
break) and common goods (e.g., trees). Co-management practices, exclusion of free-riders and 
monitoring, enable collective action and platforms for regenerating the Maro forest. 
The gestion des terroirs applied in a physical planning process to enable the creation 
of a zone for herding and tree planting, is analyzed in the sixth case study (chapter 9). The 
main issue was the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale. The need to initiate this 
aménagement emerged from severe problems such as crop damages due to the transhumant 
herders, and clashing interests among herders, the native Bobo and the migrant Mossi. 
Perceived interdependence among these stakeholders was a driving factor for successful 
collective action and platform development for the aménagement of a zone sylvo-pastorale. 
This interdependence has become visible through repeated conflicts between herders and crop-
farmers. However, the case study reveals that the management of the zone sylvo-pastorale will 
require new roles such as monitoring, conflict resolution, and mediation for professionals. 
Part three: synthesis and conclusions 
Many propositions and concrete ideas are pulled out with respect to resource management 
(chapter 10). They are addressed to resource management problems, social learning, and the 
facilitation of changes. Crises in ecosystems are triggers of social learning by stakeholders and 
intervening agencies. The facilitation of change goes beyond transfer of technology, advisory 
work and information support services, and extension which focuses on solution of specific 
problems. The case studies acerbate the importance of collective action and platforms to realize 
a successful collective resource management. Collective action means that individual action 
are consistent norms, rules, etc., which are collectively agreed upon. Collective action can be 
expressed through the willingness of many stakeholders to act beyond their individual interest, 
maybe because of stimuli from their environment. Conditions for successful collective action 
are: perceived interdependence with respect to resource management; mutual benefits; 
perceived externalities within resource management activities; risk sharing, tontine and 
increasing negotiation power; and trust in social capital for resource management. The 
platform notion is dynamic, heuristic and sensitive to the boundary problem within ecosystems 
under siege for resource management. Conditions identified for the functioning of effective 
platforms are: collective action, representation at the appropriate ecosystem level, quality of 
leadership, possibilities to meet, capacity for implementing mechanisms for concerted action 
and conflict resolution, stakeholders are the main concern for the functioning of operational 
platforms, and possibilities for continual learning for adaptability. The present study explains 
adaptive resource management concept. A major conclusion (chapter 11) is that adaptive 
resource management is different from conventional technology development. Sustainability 
with respect to resource management depends on collective action, trust in resource 
management institutions, decision making capacity, quality of leadership, management capacity 
and policy contexts. Implications of adaptive resource management for planning are discussed. 
Practical recommendations are suggested. They are addressed to the role of governments, local 
communities, and effectiveness of adaptive resource management. 
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Résumé 
Ce livre concerne le changement social et la durabilité socio-économique dans le domaine de 
la gestion des ressources naturelles. D fait une analyse de comment conduire des processus de 
changement pouvant aboutir à une gestion rationnelle et collective des écosystèmes menacés 
de dégradation par une forte pression humaine. Il met un accent particulier sur l'utilisation des 
ressources naturelles dans des contextes caractérisés par des situations conflictuelles et 
d'interdépendence. Plusieurs études de cas ont été analysées au Bénin et au Burkina Faso. La 
durabilité socio-économique qui révèle une grande importance, implique l'intégration des 
sciences sociales dans la croissance économique. En d'autres termes, il s'avère indispensable 
de prendre en compte les besoins des parties prenantes, puis de faire l'apprentissage avec elles 
pour réagir continuellement face aux nouvelles mutations et des changements par rapport aux 
conditions existantes. 
Le présent livre s'articule autour de trois parties. Après un chapitre introductif 
(chapitre 1), la première partie présente les perspectives et méthodologies utilisées pour 
conduire la présente étude. La seconde partie analyse six études de cas, et la troixième 
présente une synthèse et les conclusions. 
Première parties: perspectives et méthodologies 
Les perspectives et méthodologies qui ont guidé la réflexion dans la conduite de la présente 
étude, ont été développées. Premièrement, la nature du problème de la gestion des ressources 
naturelles a été élaborée (chapitre 2). Elle est multi-dimensionnelle: les dilemmes sociaux dans 
des situations d'interdépendence pour l'utilisation des ressources naturelles et les crises 
sociales et écologiques dans les écosystèmes sous une forte pression humainne. De ce fait, les 
problèmes identifiés ne peuvent trouver de réponse qu'à travers une action collective et au 
développement des plateformes, facteurs déterminant pour une gestion rationnelle des 
ressources naturelles. Ces deux concepts (action collective et plate-formes) ont servi de fil 
directeur pour notre argumentation dans l'analyse critique de toutes les études de cas. Les 
succès ou échecs identifiés en dépendent. 
Les problèmes de la gestion des ressource naturelles ci-dessus énumérés intègrent le niveau 
de l'environnement physisque (les écosystèmes) et l'environnement social (les parties 
prenantes). Pour adopter une démarche intégrale qui prend en compte ces deux niveaux, nous 
avons utilisé une perspective basée sur la notion du xcoupled Systems thinking' c'est-à-dire 
organiser la réflexion sur la base des systèmes couplés pour la résolution des problèmes 
(chapitre 2). Cette démarche a permis d'une part la conceptualisation des écosystèmes dans 
l'optique de la gestion rationnelle des ressources naturellles; et d'autre part, l'identification des 
systèmes sociaux ("soft Systems') pour développer une appréciation commune des problèmes. 
Dans la concrétisation de cette approche, nous avons discuté l'idée de développer des plate-
formes, en d'autre terme, des niveaux des écosystèmes où une action collective est nécessaire 
pour la gestion collective des écosystèmes. La dimension sociale de la gestion des ressources 
naturelles impose une vision dynamique dans la manière de résoudre des problèmes 
environnementaux. Nous avons développé deux concepts: apprentissage social ('social 
learning') et la facilitation d'une démarche systématique pour la résolution des problèmes liés 
à la gestion des ressources naturelles. L'accent est mis sur des méthodes d'intervention 
œmmunicative et incitative, l'analyse du cadre institutionnel et des contextes politiques. Dans 
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Trois 
une suite logique, l'élaboration des perspectives a permis de positionner la problématique de 
la présente étude. Elle est définit de la manière suivante: 
Jusqu'à quelle envergure les perspectives élaborées permettent de développer des 
théories, pratiques et idées dans les contextes spécifiques du Bénin et du Burkina Faso 
dans l'optique de la facilitation de la gestion adaptative des ressources naturelles et des 
pratiques régénératrices et un développement durable dans les écosystèmes. 
grandes questions de recherche ont été définies: 
Jusqu'à quelle envergure des situations variées concernant la gestion des ressources 
naturellles au Bénin et au Burkina Faso peuvent-elle être analysées? 
Quels sont les facteurs qui affectent le succès ou l'échec des situations variées de la 
gestion des ressources naturelles qui ont été analysées? 
Peut-on identifier des théories nouvelles, des concepts et idées pour la facilitation des 
interventions en vue de la gestion adaptative des ressource naturelles vers une 
durabilité? 
Nous avons utilisé des méthodologies assez diversifiées pour conduire la présente 
étude. D'une part, elles concernent des curriculums qui permettent au chercheur de 'faire des 
découvertes' à travers l'apprentissage collectif et des méthodes de recherche participative. 
D'autre part, la méthodologie de recherche est basée sur les études de cas, une démarche 
exploratoire et comparative (chapitre 3 ) . 
Deuxième partie: les études de cas 
Six études de cas (quatre au Bénin et deux Burkina Faso) ont constitué la base empirique de 
ce livre. Elles couvrent des domaines variés tels que la pèche, la gestion des pâturages, 
l'aménagement des bassins versants, l'horticulture bio-intensive, la foresterie, et la gestion et 
l'aménagement des terroirs. 
La première étude de cas (chapitre 4) analyse la gestion des plans d'eau, plus 
précisément le cas du Lac Ahémé au Sud du Bénin. L'évolution de la plate-forme pour la 
gestion des ressources du lac a été analysée selon une démarche historique de la période pré-
coloniale au processus récent de la démocratisation au Bénin. L'impasse constatée sur le lac 
Aheme ne peut être rompue que si des parties prenantes adoptent une action collective et 
développent une plate-forme pour la résolution des conflits et une bonne gouvernance du lac 
Ahémé. Il résulte de cette analyse appronfondie qu'une gestion durable des ressources du lac 
ne peut se concevoir sans la mobilisation des organisations des parties prenantes qui sont 
perçues pour la définition et le respect des institutions du lac (règles, interdits, control 
réciproque, etc.). 
La deuxième étude de cas (chapitre 5) analyse la gestion des pâturages et la résolution 
des conflits liés au phénomène de la transhumance dans les communautés Chabè du Bénin. 
Deux situations différentes et complémentaires ont été comparées. La première révèle le 
manque d'une capacité de prise de décision, le manque d'action concertée et une absence des 
organisations et institutions susceptible de favoriser une gestion collective des pâturages et de 
la transhumance par les acteurs potentiels. Ces problèmes ainsi énumérés sont à la base des 
échecs pour une gestion durable. Dans la deuxième situation, des arrangements négociés pour 
action collective soutenue par l'Appui-conseil, ont facilité la création d'une plate-forme pour 
la résolution des conflits et la gestion de la transhumance à Kemon. Il résulte de cette étude 
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de cas que les barrières vers une gestion collective des ressources naturelles ne peuvent être 
rompues que si les différentes catégories des parties prenantes adoptent une action collective 
et développent des plate-formes pour la prise de décision, le monitorage, des mécanismes de 
sanctions et d'exclusion à l'échelle villageoise, inter-villageoise et régionale. 
La troisième étude de cas (chapitre 6) présente une analyse des problèmes liés au 
développement des bassins versants avec deux groupes ethniques du Bénin: les Adja 
(Département du Mono) et les Mahi de Ouèssè (Département du Zou). Le problème critique 
dans cette étude se traduit par la démarche effective à mettre en oeuvre pour le développement 
des bassins versants à partir de la parcelle individuelle des paysans jusqu'aux micro-bassins 
versants et le bassin versant entier qui justifie une intervention. Cette spécificité du 
développement des bassins versants sous-tend la nécessité de développer une approche inter-
villageoise. Aussi les études conduites dans deux ecozones différentes en milieu Adja et Mahi 
font-elle ressortir l'absence des institutions efficaces pour la gestion de la tenure foncière qui 
constitue une barrière pour l'aménagement des bassins versants. Le développement des plate-
formes pour le traitement systématique des bassins versants n'a pas encore émergé dans le 
Mono. Des organisations locales à l'échelle inter-villageoise, pouvant faciliter un tel 
processus, n'ont pas encore été mobilisées. Par contre à Ouèssè, la création de l'Union Inter-
villageoise pour la Gestion des Ressources Naturelles (UIGREN) offre une plate-forme pour 
le développement des bassins versants au niveau de la région Mahi de la Sous-Préfecture de 
Ouèssè. L'existence d'organisations locales des parties prenantes, l'apprentissage collectif 
organisé par une Organisation Non-Gouvernementale (ONG) et la prise en compte des priorités 
de développement de ces parties prenantes ont contribué au succès relatif, noté dans 
l'aménagement des bassins versants à Ouèssè avec les Mahi. 
La quatrième étude de cas (chapitre 7) analyse la gestion de la fertilité des sols par un 
groupe de femmes. L'accent est mis sur la gestion des flux de ressources à travers les activités 
génératrices de revenu qui sont faites par les femmes (transformation des noix de coco en hule, 
transformation du manioc en gari, élevage du porc, etc.). L'analyse a pris en compte deux 
contextes différents: la période d'avant, et durant le processus de démocratisation au Bénin. 
Cette étude de cas a révélé que la gestion des flux de ressource ne pourrait être effective que 
si une action collective efficace est soutenue pour la provision des biens publiques du groupe 
(p.e., infrastructure et le goupe même). Une conclusion majeure de cette étude de cas se 
présente de la manière suivante: le changement de la politique nationale au Bénin a des 
implications sur la dynamique des processus de développement à la base. Des opportunités 
telles que le crédit, la formation et l'échange d'expériences a un effet positif sur le maintien 
des groupes et une action collective pour la gestion des ressources naturelles. 
La cinquième étude de cas (chapitre 8) fait une analyse historique de la gestion de la 
forêt classée de Maro au Burkina Faso. Cette analyse prend en compte les changements de 
l'évolution de la régulation endogène de l'utilisation des ressources de cette forêt vers une 
pratique récente de co-gestion. Cette étude de cas a révélé que l'évolution de la plate-forme 
pour la gestion de la forêt classée de Maro est liée aux changements qui sont intervenus dans 
les droits de propriété. Aussi les problèmes liés à la gestion des biens publiques (p.e., pare-
feux) et des biens communs (p.e., bois de feu, bois de construction) constituent-ils des tâches 
majeures pour le fonctionnement des plate-formes dans le modèle de co-gestion. Dans le même 
ordre d'idée, la pratique de co-gestion, l'exclusion des 'free-riders' (ceux qui désirent profiter 
sans contribuer) et le monitorage ont permis d'une part, l'émergence et le maintien d'une 
action collective, et d'autre part le fonctionnement des plate-formes pour la régénération de 
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la Forêt Classée de Maro. 
La sixième étude de cas (chapitre 9) présente une analyse de la gestion des terroirs dans 
la situation concrète de l'aménagement d'une zone sylvo-pastorale. La nécessité d'une telle 
action résulte des problèmes sérieux tels que les dégâts causés par les troupeaux transhumants, 
des conflits et des intérêts divergents entre éleveurs, autochtone Bobo et migrants Mossi. 
L'interdependence perçue par les différents parties prenantes a un effet positif sur une action 
collective et le développement des plate-formes au niveaux terroirs et inter-terroir. Cependant, 
il résulte de cette étude de cas que la gestion d'une zone sylvo-pastorale nécessitera de 
nouveaux roles pour les professionels, tels que le monitorage, la résolution des conflits et la 
médiation en matière de gestion des terroirs. 
Partie 3: Synthèse et conclusions 
L'analyse des études de cas a généré plusieurs propositions pour la facilitation d'une gestion 
rationnelle des ressources naturelles (chapitre 10). Un accent particulier a été mis sur la nature 
des problèmes en matière de gestion des ressources naturelles, l'apprentissage social et 
collectif et la facilitation du processus de changement vers une durabilité socio-économique. 
Les crises c'est-à-dire les problèmes environnementaux et sociaux qui en découlent stimulent 
l'apprentissage social par les utilisateurs des ressources naturelles et les organismes 
d'intervention. La facilitation du processus de changement va au-delà du simple transfert de 
technologies, de l'assistance à la résolution d'un problème, de l'information, et de la 
vulgarisation qui s'occupe de la recherche de solutions spécifiques à un problème donné. 
Toutes les études de cas ont démontré l'importance d'une action collective et la nécessité de 
développer des plate-formes pour réussir une gestion collective des ressources naturelles. Il 
resuite de nos analyses qu'une action collective signifie des actions individuelles conformes 
aux normes, règles, conventions, etc. qui ont été collectivement définies. Une action collective 
se définit aussi comme la volonté de plusieurs individus à agir au-delà des intérêts individuels 
et égoistes. Des conditions identifiées pour générer une actioncollective sont les suivantes: la 
perception d'une interdependence par les parties prenantes à travers la gestion des ressources 
naturelles, la perception de bénéfices mutuelles par les parties prenantes, le partage de risques, 
les tontines, la perception d'une capacité de négociation par l'action collective, la crédibilité 
du capital social pour la gestion des resources naturelles (institutions, organisations, etc.). Par 
ailleurs, les études de cas ont révélé que la notion de plate-forme est dynamique, heuristique 
et variable en fonction des spécificités de la délimitation des écosystèmes dont les resources 
font (ou feront) l'objet d'une gestion rationnelle. Des conditions identifiées pour générer des 
plate-formes pouvant fonctionner effectivement sont les suivantes: l'existence des conditions 
d'une action collective; la représentation au niveau approprié de l'écosystème concerné pour 
mieux gérer les resources naturelles; la qualité du leadership; les possibilités pour les 
représentants de se rencontrer pour délibérer; la capacité de développer des mécanismes pour 
une action concertée et la résolution des conflits; la responsabilisation; et enfin la possibilité 
d'un apprentissage continue et susceptible d'être adapté. Une conclusion majeure de ce livre 
(chapitre 11) souligne que la gestion adaptative des ressources naturellles est différente de 
l'approche classique de développement technologique, la durabilité socio-économique en 
matière de la gestion de» ressources naturelles dépend d'une action collective, de la crédibilité 
des institutions pour la gestion des ressources naturelles, de la capacité de prise de décision, 
de la qualité de leadership pour une bonne gouvernance, de la capacité de gestion, et des 
contextes politiques. Ce livre a discuté des nouveaux rôles au niveau des gouvernants, des 
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organisations de développement et des communautés locales en vue d'une gestion durable des 
ressources naturelles. Des recommandations ont été faites pour des recherches futures. 
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Samenvatting 
Dit boek behelst een Studie over sociale verandering en sociaal-economische duurzaamheid in 
het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Het analyseert hoe veranderingsprocessen gestuurd 
kunnen worden teneinde een rationeel en collectief beheer te bewerkstelligen van ecosystemen 
die ten onder dreigen te gaan aan een hoge bevolkingsdruk. Het accent ligt op het gebruik van 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen in conflictsituaties en situaties van onderlinge onafhankehjkheid. 
Hiertoe zijn er verschillende case-studies uitgevoerd in Bénin en Burkina Faso. Het belang van 
sociaal-economische duurzaamheid maakt de integratie van sociale wetenschappen in 
economische groei noodzakelijk. In andere woorden, de behoeften van de sociale actoren 
(stakeholders) moeten in acht worden genomen en met hen moet een leerproces worden 
doorlopen om doorlopend op nieuwe veranderingen in de omgeving te kunnen inspelen. 
Het boek bestaat uit drie delen. Na een inleidend hoofdstuk, komen in het eerste deel de 
perspectieven van waaruit de Studie is ondernomen aan de orde en vervolgens worden de 
methoden besproken die in het onderzoek zijn toegepast. In het tweede deel worden 6 case-
studies gepresenteerd en in het derde deel wordt een synthèse gemaakt en conclusies getrokken. 
Deel 1: perspectieven en methoden 
In het eerste deel worden zowel de perspectieven van waaruit deze studie ondernomen is, als de 
methoden die daarbij zijn toegepast uitgewerkt. Allereerst wordt er nader ingegaan op de 
meerdimensionale problemen in het beheer van hulpbronnen. Ze betreffen sociale dilemmas in 
situaties van wederzijdse afhankehjkheid bij het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, maar ook 
sociale en ecologische crises bij hoge bevolkingsdruk. Vraagstukken van collectieve actie en 
platformen zijn de stukjes van een puzzel die moeten worden opgelost om deze problemen het 
hoofd te kunnen bieden. Deze twee concepten van collectieve actie en platformen, vormen de 
kern van mijn betoog als het er op aankomt voorwaarden voor duurzaam beheer van natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen te scheppen. Succès of mislukking blijken er onlosmakelijk mee samen te hangen. 
In de problematiek van het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen komen twee verschillende soorten 
aspecten samen: de fysische omgeving, d.w.z. het natuurlijke milieu of het ecosysteem, enerzijds 
en de sociale omgeving, de betrokken stakeholders, anderzijds. Om een integrale 
onderzoeksbenadering toe te passen die zieh voldoende rekenschap geeft deze twee schillen, 
hebben we een perspectief gehanteerd dat gebaseerd is op het concept van coupled systems 
thinking. Aldus is een hard systems benadering gehanteerd om ecosystemen te conceptualiseren 
met het oog op het (rationeel) beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Een soft systems benadering 
is toegepast om na te gaan hoe mensen zieh pogen te organiseren om tot een gezamenlijke 
standpuntbepaling te komen in probleemsituaties. Voortvloeiend uit deze perspectieven wordt 
vervolgens de platform gedachte nader uitgewerkt, dat wil zeggen het concept van sociaal leren 
om het hoofd te kunnen bieden aan de sociale en fysische dynamiek van ecosystemen, alsmede 
het concept van faciliteren van een systematische benadering voor het oplossen van problemen 
rond het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen (communicatieve intervenue, stimuli, 
ondersteunende en facilitaire diensten, beleidscontext, etc) . Een en ander heeft geleid tot het 
volgende onderzoeksprobleem: 
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1. In welke mate kunnen de hiervoor gepresenteerde perspectieven helpen theoriëen te 
ontwikkelen en praktijken en ideeën te creëren in concrete situaties in Burkina Faso 
en Bénin met het oog op het faciliteren van beheersvormen voor het regenereren en 
verduurzamen van natuurlijke hulpbronnen (adaptive resource management). 
Vervolgens zijn er drie centrale onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd: 
2. In welke mate kunnen uiteenlopende situaties van milieudegradatie in Bénin en 
Burkina Faso, gezamenlijk, worden geanalyseerd? 
3. Welke factoren beïnvloeden succès of mislukking in een verscheidenheid aan 
bestudeerde gevallen van beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen? 
4. Kunnen er nieuwe, verfrissende theoriëen, concepten en ideeën worden 
geïdentificeerd ten behoeve van het faciliteren van weloverwogen duurzame 
beheersvormen van hulpbronnen in een steeds veranderende omgeving? 
Tijdens het onderzoek heb ik een uiteenlopend scala aan onderzoeksmethoden gehanteerd, 
variërend van ontdekkend leren aan de hand van bepaalde curricula, via methoden van 
participatieve observatie, tot het gebruik van vooraf opgestelde kwantitatieve methoden. Ik 
heb case studies verricht, gebruik gemaakt van de grounded theory benadering en 
comparatieve studies uitgevoerd. Voor zover het ging om het verkrijgen van nieuwe en 
verfrissende ideeën om het academische en wetenschappelijke débat te voeden, had de Studie 
een meer verkennend karakter. 
Deel 2: case studies 
Er zijn 6 case studies uitgevoerd, 4 in Bénin en 2 in Burkina Faso, om het empirisch materiaal 
voor deze studie te verzamelen. Ze bestrijken disciplines als de vishouderij, het beheer van 
weidegrond, indenting van irrigatie- en afwateringssystemen, input-intensieve tuinbouw, 
bosbouw en landinrichting en landschapsbeheer. 
De eerste case, in hoofdstuk 4, gaat over aquacultuur, met name het beheer van de visstand in 
Lac Ahieme in Bénin. De evolutie van het platform voor het beheer van Lac Ahiemes 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen wordt geanalyseerd in een historisch perspectief vanaf de pré-
koloniale période tot aan het récente democratiseringsproces in Bénin. De belangrijkste 
conclusie uit deze case-studie is dat de impasse in het beheer van de natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
slechts doorbroken kan worden, als de betrokken partijen (stakeholders) gezamenlijk actie 
ondernemen en een platform gestalte geven om de gerezen problemen het hoofd te bieden en 
een bevredigend beheer te bewerkstelligen. Collectieve actie is nodig voor effectieve 
regulering, wederzijdse contrôle en monitoring; een platform is ook noodzakelijk voor het 
beheer van het meer en het oplossen van problemen die daar mee verband houden. Met 
andere woorden, duurzaamheid is een emergent property van een sofi system. 
De tweede case-study (hoofdstuk 5) heeft betrekking op het beheer van collectieve 
weidegrond en het oplossen van problemen die samenhangen met de jaarlijkse trek van 
veenomaden (transhumance) in de Chabe gemeenschap in Bénin. Twee verschillende 
situaties worden met elkaar vergeleken. In het eerste geval (Save) is er sprake van een locaal 
of traditioneel arrangement, in het tweede van de invoering van een adviesorgaan (Appui-
Conseil) voor het beheer van communale weidegrond. Uit het eerste geval blijkt dat het 
uitblijven van beslissingen (in afwezigheid van duidelijke beslissingsbevoegdheden) en het 
ontbreken van instellingen voor het beheer van de gemeenschappelijke weidegronden, 
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mislukkingen in de hand werken. In het andere geval heeft onderling overleg, gesteund door 
het Adviesorgaan, geleid tot de vorrning van een platform voor het oplossen van mogelijke 
conflicten en tot het maken onderlinge afspraken betreffende het gemeenschappelijk beheer 
van communale weidegronden. Deze case wijst vooral uit dat belemmeringen in het beheer 
van gemeenschappelijke weidegrond kunnen worden gesiecht als verschillende >stakeholders 
gezamenlijk actie ondernemen, platforms ontwikkelen voor beslmtvoraüng, monitoring en 
sanctieuitoefening inclusief het sociaal isoleren van betrokkenen op dorpsniveau, tussen 
dorpen en regionaal. 
In de derde case studie, hoofdstuk 6, komen problemen rond een stroom- en 
afwateringsgebied aan de orde tussen twee etnische groeperingen in Bénin (de Adja in het 
Departement van de Mono en de Mahi in het Departement van de Zou). De kritieke vraag hier 
is 6f en in hoeverre in hoeverre afwateringsproblemen op niveau van het individuele 
huishouden op een hoger niveau van afwatering- en stroomgebied, effectief kunnen worden 
geïntegreerd en aangepakt. Zon aanpak veronderstelt een gemeenschappelijke kijk en 
benadering tussen dorpen. In beide ecozones, zowel bij de Mahi als de Adja, bleek de 
afwezigheid van efficiente organen voor het reguleren van grondbezits- en -
gebruiksverhoudingen een groot obstakel in het collectief beheer van watergebieden. In de 
Mono zijn er nog geen instituties gecreëerd voor het collectieve beheer van 
afwateringsgebieden, hetgeen mede verklaard kan worden uit het ontbreken van locale 
organisaties om de vorrning van platformen te bevorderen. In Ouessé, daarentegen, is er wel 
een platform van de grond gekomen in de vorm van de UIGREN (Union Inter-Villageoise 
pour la Gestion de Ressources Naturelles), ook wel Sedoku genaamd, die zieh tot doel heeft 
gesteld het afwateringsprobleem op regionaal niveau te benaderen, een soort waterschap dus. 
Het succès om dit niveau naar een hoger niveau van aggregatie te tillen is mede gelegen in het 
feit dat er een aantal locale organisaties bestanden, inclusief een intervenierende 
initiatiefnemer die een benadering van collectief leren hanteerde en de 
ontwikkelingsprioriteiten van de bevolking in al zijn gelaagdheden ter harte nam. 
In de vierde case studie (hoofdstuk 7) wordt geanalyseerd hoe een groep vrouwen 
bodemvruchtbaarheidsproblemen te lijf gaat middels de inzet van door hen zelf gegenereerd 
inkomen (via de verkoop van olie verkregen uit kokosnoten, het houden van varkens en het 
verhandelen van tot meel verwerkte maniok). De analyse vergelijkt twee verschillende 
episodes: vôôr en tijdens het democratiseringsproces in Bénin. Uit de studie kan worden 
geconcludeerd dat het beheer en uitwisseling van (individuele) goederen alleen dan effectief 
is wanneer er via collectieve actie voorzien wordt in de levering van publieke diensten 
(bijvoorbeeld openbare infrastructuur of voor de groep zelf). Een andere belangrijke conclusie 
uit deze case studie is dat veranderingen in het politieke systeem (de beleidscontext), een 
positieve weerslag hebben op de dynamiek van het ontwikkelingsproces op dorpsniveau. Het 
verschaffen van kredietfaciliteiten, het geven van scholing, het bevorderen van 
ervaringsuitwisselingen tussen verschillende personen en groepen, bevordert de 
groepssamenhorigheid, haar voortbestaan en dus gemeenschappelijk actie. 
De vijfde case studie speelt zieh af in Burkina Faso (zie hoofdstuk 8). Het behelst een 
historische analyse van het beheer van een beschermd natuurgebied (forêt classée), vanaf een 
zuiver endogene, locale vorm van beheer naar een nieuwe, meer récente aanpak van gedeeld 
management (met de overheid). De studie stelt vast dat veranderingen in het beheer van dit 
beschermd gebied (Forêt de Maro), samen hangen met wijzigingen in 
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grondbezitsverhoudingen en in de eigendoms- en gebruiksrechten. De voornaamste taak van 
het platform voor gedeeld beheer betreffen met name problemen die te maken hebben met het 
beheer van publieke zaken als bosbranden (als vorm van natourbeheer) en van 
gemeenschappelijke, communale, goederen zoals brandhout en hout voor de constructie van 
woningen en dergelijke. Activiteiten van collectieve actie, zoals gedeelde management 
verantwoordelijkheden, het uitsluiten van profiteurs die niets terug doen (free-riders), en het 
gezamenlijk toezicht houden op de gemaakte afspraken, hebben niet alleen bijgedragen tot de 
regeneratie van het Forêt van Maro, ze hebben ook het ontstaan en handhaving van het 
Platform bevorderd; het is een procès van onderlinge wisselwerking. 
Hoofdstuk 9 gaat over het beheer en de inrichting van sylvo-pastorale gronden (aménagement 
sylvo-pastorale), dat wil zeggen gebieden waar bomen kunnen worden gekweekt en vee kan 
grazen. De aanleiding voor deze onderneming was o.a. gelegen in het feit dat het loslopend 
vee, veelal eigendom van nomadische veehouders, veel schade toebracht aan bomen en 
gewassen. Daarnaast waren er veel belangenconflicten tussen veehouders onderling, maar ook 
tussen de autochtone Bobo-bevolking en Mossi-immigranten. Het feit dat men zieh er van 
bewust was dat men van elkaar afhankelijk was, heeft in belangrijke mate bijgedragen tot het 
succesvol ondernemen van gezamenlijke actie en tot het creëren van platformen op 
verschillende niveaus voor de inrichting en het beheer van sylvo-pastorale zones. Deze 
onafhankelijk werd zichtbaar door de vele conclicten die zieh tussen de verschillende 
stakeholders voordeden. De studie heeft ook naar voren gebracht dat het beheer van sylvo-
pastorale gronden nieuwe rollen van functionarissen met zieh mee brengt die zieh daar 
beroepshalve mee bezighouden, zoals monitoren en evalueren, toezichthouding, 
conflicthantering, onderhandelen, etc. 
Deel 3: synthese en conclusies 
De studie heeft talrijke ideeen aangereikt ten behoeve van het beheer van natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen (hoofdstuk 11). Zij hebben te maken met het hanteren van beheersproblemen, 
sociaal en collectief leren en het faciliteren van verandering ten behoeve van duurzame 
ontwikkeling. Fysieke en sociale crises in ecosystemen, zoals milieuproblemen, kunnen 
dienen als springplank voor sociaal leren door stakeholders, inclusief de intervenierende of 
faciliterende partij. Het bevorderen en faciliteren van sociale verandering is meer dan het 
overdragen van technologie, gaat het simpele advieswerk of het beschikbaar stellen en 
toegankelijk maken van informatie te boven; het is meer dan voorlichting geven gericht op 
het oplossen van specifieke problemen. Alle case-studies wijzen op de noodzaak van 
collectieve actie en het creeren van platformen om van succesvol beheer van collectieve 
hulpbronnen te kunnen spreken. Gemeenschappelijke actie veronderstelt dat individueel 
gedrag in overeenstemming is met bepaalde normen, waarden en regels die in onderling 
overleg zijn vastgesteld en waar men het gezamenlijk over eens is geworden. Collectieve 
actie kan ook worden gezien als de bereidheid van vele stakeholders om niet alleen te 
handelen uit eigenbelang, wellicht omdat Signalen uit hun omgeving hen daar toe nopen. 
Voorwaarden om tot succesvolle collectieve actie te komen, zijn: men moet zieh bewust zijn 
van de onderlinge onafhankelijkheid met betrekking tot beheer van hulpbronnen; men moet 
de verwachting hebben dat het oplossen wederzijds profijtelijk is, dat risicos gedeeld worden, 
en dat men er in toenemende mate onderhandelingskracht aan overhoudt; het hebben van 
vertrouwen in het sociale kapitaal voor gemeenschappelijk beheer van hulpbronnen 
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(instituten, niet gouvernementele organisaties, overheidsinstellingen, etc). Ook het bestaan 
van tontines, locale vormen van sparen en kredietverlening, kan bevorderend werken. Het 
platform concept is dynamisch, heuristisch en ontvankelijk voor problemen gelieerd aan de 
definièring van de grenzen van ecosystemen om wier beheer het uiteindelijk gaat. De 
volgende voorwaarden zijn geïdentificeerd voor een effectief functioneren van platformen: 
gemeenschappelijke actie; vertegenwoordiging van belanghebbenden op de geëigende 
niveaus van het ecosysteem; leiderschapskwaliteiten; mogelijkheden om elkaar te ontmoeten 
om te overleggen en te onderhandelen; het vermögen om mechanismen voor onderling 
overleg en confHcthantering in te voeren en te handhaven; decentralisatie van bevoegdheden 
en deskundigheidsbevordering van stakeholders, inclusief mogelijkheden voor doorlopende 
(bij)scholing. De onderhavige studie behandelt het concept van adaptive resource 
management en laat in hoofdstuk 11 zien dat het, als instrument om het systeem doorlopend 
aan veranderende omstandigheden te kunnen aanpassen, fundamenteel verschilt van 
conventionele praktijken van technologieontwikkeling. Duurzaamheid met betrekking tot het 
beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen berust op collectieve actie, op vertrouwen in instituties 
belast met dat beheer, op beslissingsvaardigheden, op leiderschapskwaliteiten, 
managementvaardigheden en beleid. Dit boek heeft laten zien dat er voor duurzaam beheer 
van natuurlijke hulpbronnen nieuwe rollen zijn weggelegd voor ambtenaren, 
ontwikkelingswerkers en andere professionals, voor hun organisaties en voor de overheid. 
Het doet praktische aanbevelingen in die richting en suggereert themas voor 
vervolgonderzoek. 
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